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1935 Revision 


(Solan? I l^ttry 51. Iianmi 



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Chapter Title 

I General Characteristics of Small Wars 

II The Strategy of Small Wars 

III Psychology in Small Wars 

IV Concentration 

Section I. Composition of Forces 

II. Organization 

III. Equipment and Supplies 

IV. Training 

V. Employment and Preparation of Commander (s) 
and Staff (s) 

V Transportation 

Section I. Reference Data, Materiel 

II. Motor Transport 

III. Railway Transportation 

IV. Water Transportation 
V. Air Transportation 

VI. Animal and Porter Transport 

VI Port of Embarkation 

VII Training Management for Small Wars 

Section I. Character and Purpose of Small Wars Training 

II. Peace-Time Training for Small Wars 

III. Training During Concentration for a Small War 

IV. Troop Training Aboard Ship 

V. Training in the Theater of Operations 
VI. Training Programs and Schedules 

VIII Operations Orders and Instructions (Navy) (Not printed) 

IX Debarkation 

X Supply Plans 

XI Neutral Zones and Movement Inland 

Section - I. Neutral Zones 

II. Movement Inland 

XII Disarming Population, Collecting, and Custody of Arms 

^ r XIII Arme^Native Organizations 

Section I. General 

II. Preliminary Steps in Organizing a Constabulary 

III. Essential Elements to be Considered in Planning 
. , for the Creation of a Constabulary 

IV. Training a Constabulary 

V. Auxiliary Agents of the Constabulary 

VI. Status of the Constabulary 

VII. Withdrawal of the Intervening Forces 

XIV Relationship — Military, Naval and Civil Authorities 

Section I. General 

II. .The State Department's Influence on Relation- 

ship in Small Wars 

III. The Chain of Command in Small Wars — The 

Navy and the Marine Corps VO 

IV. Military — Civil Relationship 

XV Military Territorial Organization and Methods of Paci- 

Section I. Military Territorial Organization 
II. Methods of Pacification 

XVI Principles and Functions of the Marine Staff 

Section I. The Staff in Small Wars 

II. The Chief of Staff 

III. The First Section H 

IV. The Second Section 
; V : ■ The Third Section 
VL.) The Fourth Section 

VII. ; The Special Staff 

XVII Signal Communication 

XVIII Infantry Weapons and Equipment 

XIX Light Artillery in Small Wars 

XX The Defense, Attack, and Occupation of Towns 

Section I. Defense 

II. The Attack and Occupation of Towns 

XXI Animal Transportation and Mounted Detachments 

Section , I. Introduction ; , a 

II. Care of Animals 

III. Procurement of Animals 

IV. Pack and Other Animal Transportation 
V. Mounted Detachments 

VI. Hastily Organized Mounted Patrols 

XXII Convoys and Convoy Escorts 

XXIII Organizing the Infantry Patrol 

Section I. General 

II. Personnel 

III. Transportation, Equipment and Supplies 

IV. Feeding the Personnel 

• V. Shelter • - "... T\-IW>oD .X'UrM IX)Ot 

VI. Orders and General Instructions 

VII. General Preparations 

XXIV The Infantry Patrol in the Field 

Section I. Introduction 

II. Attacking Ambushes 

III. Prearranged Schemes of Maneuver to 'Engage 


IV. March Formations 
V. March Discipline 

VI. Reconnaissance and Security 

VII. . Laying Ambushes 

VIII. Attacking Houses 

IX. Attacking Small Bivouacs 

X. Stratagems and Ruses 

XI. Aids to Scouting 

XII. Special Operations and Expedients 

XXV Aviation 

Section I. Introduction 

II. Technical Preparations 

III. Missions of Observation Aviation 

IV. Combat Support 
V. Air Transport 

VI. General Conduct of Air Operations 

VII. Communications 

XXVI River Operations 

Section I. Introduction 

II. Boats, Desirable Characteristics of 

III. Armament and Equipment 

IV. Crews 

V. Preparations 

VI. Posts and Boat Stations 

VII. Occupation of Rivers 

VIII. Special Operations 

XXVII River Crossings 
XXVIII Chemical Agents 
XXIX Medical 

Section I. Military Hygiene and Sanitation 

II. Preparation for the March 

III. The March 

IV. First Aid 

XXX Withdrawal from Foreign Territory 

Section I. Introduction 

II. The Withdrawal from Active Operations 
III. The Final Withdrawal 

XXXI Military Government 

Section I. General 

II. Establishment and Administration of Military- 

III. Applications of Principles to Situations Short 

of War 

XXXII Supervision of Elections 

Section I. General 

II. Personnel for an American Electoral Mission 

III. Organization and Functioning of an American 

Electoral Mission 

IV. Organization and Functioning of the National 

Board of Elections 
V. Problems Involved in Conducting Free and Fair 

VI. Registration and Voting 
VII. Final Reports 

8910MCS QUANTICO, VA. 3-9-?7-500 


Quantico, Virginia 

1935 Revision 


General Characteristics of Small Wars 


Small Wars Denned 1-1 

Classes of Small Wars 1-2 

Some Legal Aspects of Small Wars 1-3 

Function of Headquarters Marine Corps in Small Wars 1-4 

The Estimate of the Situation 1-5 

Own Mission 1-5 a 

General Considerations (1) 

Determining the Mission (2) 

Usual Small Wars Missions (3) 

The Purpose of the Mission (4) 

Relative Strength of Opposing Forces 1-5 b 

Enemy Strength (1) 

Own Strength (2) 

Enemy's Probable Intentions 1-5 c 

Courses of Action Open to You 1-5 d 

The Decision 1-5 e 

Supporting Measures 1-5 f 

Campaign and Operation Plans 1-6 

Phases of Small Wars 1-7 

Summary 1-8 

Appendices: Page 

No. 1 Historical Examples of Small Wars Missions 22-23 

No. 2 Historical Examples of Proclamations 23-24 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



QUANTICO VA 22134-5107 



1-1. Small Wars Defined. — a. The term "Small War" is often 
a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. 
As applied to the United States, small wars are operations under- 
taken under executive authority wherein military force is combined 
with diplomatic pressure in the internal or ex ternal affairs of 
another State whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsat- 
isfactory, for the preservation of life and of such interests as are 
determined by the foreign policy of our nation. As herein used 
the term is understood in its most comprehensive sense, and as an 
academic study all the successive steps taken in the developement 
of a small war and the varying degrees of force applied under 
various situations are presented. 

b. The assistance rendered in the affairs of another State may 
vary from a peaceful act such as the assignment of a financial ad- 
visor, which is certainly non-military and not placed under the 
classification of small wars, to the establishment of a complete 
military government supported by an active combat force. Be- 
tween these extremes may be found an infinite number of forms 
of friendly assistance or intervention which it is almost impossible 
to classify under a limited number of individual types of operations. 

c. Comprehensive as the term may be, as herein applied, small 
wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to mili- 
tary intervention in the fullest sense, short of war. All these oper- 
ations are herein termed "Small Wars Operations". They are not 
limited in their size, in the extent of their theater of operations 
nor their cost in property, money, or lives. The essence of a small 
war is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its incep- 
tion and conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing 
forces, and the nature of the operations themselves. In general, 
small wars are operations in which irregular troops are engaged 
on either side or where irregular tactics are employed. 

d. The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does 
not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first rate 
power may be termed a small war. It is this type of routine active 
foreign duty of the Marine Corps in which this study is primarily 
interested. Military operations involved in domestic disturbances 
because of their very nature, in a sense, may be treated as small 

e. Small wars represent the normal and frequent operations 
of the Marine Corps. During about eighty-five of the last one 
hundred years, the Marine Corps, has been engaged in small wars 
in different parts of the world. The Marine Corps has landed 
troops one hundred and eighty times in thirty-seven countries from 
1800 to 1934. Every year during the past thirty-six years since the 
Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps has been engaged in 
active operations in the field. In 1929 the Marine Corps had two- 
thirds of its personnel employed on expeditionary or other foreign 
or sea duty outside of the continential limits of the United States. 



1-2.— Classes of Small Wars.— a. Most of the small wars of the 
United States have resulted from the obligation of the government 
under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and undertaken to suppress 
lawlessness or insurrection. Punitive expeditions may be resorted 
to in some instances, but campaigns of conquest are contrary to the 
policy of the Government of the United States. As the political 
purposes of the government determines its military character, so 
should its national policies mould its national strategy and guide 
its military strategy and plans. It is the duty of our states- 
men to define a policy relative to international relationshins and 
provide the military and naval establishment with the means to 
carry it into execution. With this basis, the military and naval 
authorities may act intelligently in the preparation of their war 
plans in close cooperation with the statesmen. There is mutual 
dependence and responsibility which calls for the highest Qualities 
of statesmanship and military leadership. The initiative devolves 
upon the statesmen. 

b. The legal and military features of each small war present 
distinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all of 
them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. 
There are so many combinations of conditions that a simple classi- 
fication of small wars is possible only when one is limited to 
specific features in his study, i.e., according to their legal aspects, 
their military or naval features, whether active combat was en- 
gaged in or not and many considerations. (For Histroical Exam- 
ples, see Appendix No. 1, wherein U.S. Marines have been employ- 

1-3. Some Legal Aspects of Small Wars. — a. According to in- 
ternational law as recognized by the leading nations of the world a 
nation may protect its citizens and their property wherever situa- 
ted. The President of the United States as the Chief Executive is, 
under the Constitution, primarily charged with the conduct of fore- 
ign relations, including the protection of the lives and property of 
United States citizens abroad, save in so far as the Constitution ex- 
pressly vests a part of these functions in some other branch of the 
Government. (For example, the participation of the Senate in the 
making of treaties.) It has been an unbroken policy of the Presi- 
dents of the United States so to interpret their powers, beginning 
with the time of President Jefferson down to the present with the 
exception of President Buchanan. 

b. The following pertinent extracts from Navy Regulations 
are cited: 

"On occasion where injury to the United States or to citizens 
therefore is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles 
of international law or treaty right, the commander in chief shall 
consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United 
States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, 
reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. 
The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, 
rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof. 



"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against 
anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self 
preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as 
to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection 
of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and lives and property 
of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, 
whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. 
The conditions calling for the application of the right of self pre- 
servation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left to the 
sound judgement of responsible officers, who are to perform their 
duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no 
case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as 
an application of the right of self preservation as above defined. 
It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent 
which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It 
can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for 
acts already committed. 

"Whenever, in the application of the above mentioned prin- 
ciples, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in foreign 
territory on occasions of political disturbance where the local 
authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life and pro- 
perty, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, shall 
first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests 
involved. Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can 
be communicated with from all parts of the world, no commander- 
in-chief, flag officer, or commanding officer shall issue an ultimatum 
to the representative of any foreign Government, or demand the 
performance of any service from any such representative that 
must be executed within a limited time, without first communica- 
ting with the Navy Department except in extreme cases where 
such action is necessary to save life." (U.S. Navy Regulations. 
NR. 722, 723, and 724). 

c. The use of the forces of the United States in foreign coun- 
tries to protect the lives and property of American citizens resi- 
dent in those countries does not constitute an act of war, and is, 
therefore, not equivalent to a declaration of war. The President, 
as chief executive of the nation, charged with the responsibility of 
conducting the foreign intercourse, including the protection of 
the lives and property of United States citizens abroad, has the 
authority to use the forces of the United States to secure such pro- 
tection in foreign countries, 

d. The history of the United States shows that in spite of the 
varying trend of the foreign policy of succeeding administrations, 
this government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other 
states with remarkable regularity and it may be anticipated that 
the same general procedure will be followed in the future. It is 
well that the United States may be prepared for any emergency 
which may occur whether it is the result of either financial or physi- 
cal disaster, or social revolution at home or abroad. In so far as 



these conditions can be predicted and as these plans and prepara- 
tions can be undertaken, the United States should be ready for 
either of these emergencies with strategical and tactical plans, pre- 
liminary preparation, organization, equipment, education and train- 

1-4. Function of Headquarters Marine Corps in Small Wars. — a. 

Small wars, generally being the carrying out of the responsibilities 
of the President in protecting American interests, life and proper- 
ty abroad, are therefore conducted in a manner different from 
major warfare. In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to func- 
tion and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling 
influence over the military operations. The very inception of 
small wars, as a rule, is an official act of the Chief Executive who 
personally gives instructions without action of Congress. 

b. The President, who has been informed of a given situation 
in some foreign country through the usual agencies at his dis- 
posal, makes the decision concerning intervention. He may com- 
municate his decision to the Secretary of the Navy. The senior 
naval officer present may be given directions to send his landing 
force ashore, or authority to do so at his discretion; the Marine 
Corps may be ordered to have a certain number of men ready to 
proceed overseas with the minimum delay. These instructions 
are communicated to the Marine Corps via the Secretary of the 
Navy or Assistant Secretary. Frequently a definite number of men 
is called for and not a military organization; for example, five 
hundred men (not one battalion). The word often comes very 
suddenly and calls for the immediate concentration of the forces, 
ready to take passage on a certain transport which will be made 
available at a given time and place. As a rule there are no other 
instructions than that the forces shall report to..., "the Command- 
er Special Service Squadron," for example. Thereupon Head- 
quarters Marine Corps designates the force, its personnel, organi- 
zation, arms and equipment; all necessary stores are provided and 
orders issued for the commanding officer of the force to report 
in person or by dispatch to the SOP or other authority in the dis- 
turbed area. With the present organized Fleet Marine Force 
ready for movement at a moments notice, the Marine Corps now 
has available a highly trained and well equipped expeditionary 
force for use in small wars, thus eliminating in a large measure 
the former practice of hastily organizing and equipping such a force 
when the emergency arose. Accompanying these simple organi- 
zation and movement orders are the monograph, maps, and other 
pertinent intelligence data of the disturbed area, to the extent that 
such information is on file and can be prepared for delivery to the 
Force Commander within the time limit. Thereafter Headquarters 
confines itself to the admistrative details of the personnel replace- 
ments and the necessary supply of the force in the field. 

c. The operations of the Force are directed by the Office of 
the Naval Operations direct or through the local naval Commander 
if he is senior to the Force Commander. (See Navy Department 
G.O. No. 241.) 



1-5. The Estimate of the Situation. — For outline of form and ana- 
lysis, see "The Estimate of the Situation, Plans and Orders, U.S. 
Naval War College, Newport, R.I." 

a. Own Mission. — (1) General Consideration. — The force is 
usually faced with the responsibility of supporting or replacing 
civil government in administered areas, where it has to deal with 
citizens whose riotous or rebellious behavior must be firmly quelled. 
This must often be done with a minimum loss of life and property 
and by methods that leave no aftermath of bitterness, or render 
the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. Usually this restriction 
is the guiding principle in the mission. 

(2) Determining the Mission. — "The mission is normally 
derived from orders, or a directive, from higher authority." (Est. 
of Sit., U.S.N.W.C.) Frequently the commander of a Marine Corps 
force operating in a small wars theater of operations is not given a 
specific mission as such, in his written orders or directive, and then 
it becomes necessary for him to deduce his mission from the general 
intent of the higher authority or even from the foreign policy of 
of the United States. "When orders from higher authority do not 
exist, you must first deduce a Purpose from what you understand 
to be the general intent of the higher authority as expressed in the 
Campaign Plan, or in accord with the concept of the war. Having 
determined the Purpose to be achieved, you then select for accom- 
plishment a Task which will support that Purpose. From the 
above it is seen that the Purpose of higher authority is the guiding 
star for all cooperation between forces. If for reasons of secrecy 
or policy, the Purpose should not be divulged or where it is clearly 
obvious, it may be omitted. You are cautioned to avoid falling 
into error of making a decision as to the course of action to follow, 
and then calling that course your Mission, merely writing a brief 
to support it instead of making a true Estimate." (Est. of Sit., U.S. 

(3) Usual Small Wars Missions. — The Mission of the 
force in small wars will generally be to support or replace civil 
government, and to establish and maintain law and order in coun- 
tries or areas where it has been disrupted to the detriment or 
jeopardy of the rights and interests of the United States, in order 
to insure the safety and security of our nationals, their property 
and interests. 

(4) The Purpose of the Mission. — The Purposes of many 
Marine Corps forces employed in the past small wars can readily 
be found among the numerous instances cited in Appendix No. 1. 
Generally some form of proclamation will be issued to the inhabit- 
ants of the affected area in which the Purpose of the assisting 
Marine Corps forces employed in the past small wars can readily 
stated. Usually this Purpose will include a statement that the 
occupying forces come not to make war upon the inhabitants but 
to help them resume their ordinary peaceful occupations. (See 
Appendix No. 2, for extracts of proclamations issued in the case of 
the Republics of Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua.) 



b. Relative Strength of Opposing Forces.— (1) Enemy 
Strength. — (a.) Political Status.— In the majority of past small 
wars, any alien intervention or friendly assistance rendered in the 
affairs of a country by a foreign country has been due either to 
internal disorder within that country created by rival political 
parties or factions wherein foreign lives and property were endang- 
ered, or has been undertaken to enforce treaty obligations. 

In the first instance, the chaotic condition has usually resulted 
from the unconstitutional usurpation of government power by a 
certain political faction, the members of which have revolted 
against tyrannical measures of the party in control, or who have 
seized this power for the sake of gain; or because of intense hat- 
red between the rival factions culminating in a revolt against the 
government party. The result of such action caused a state 
of revolution to exist in this country to the detriment of internal 
and external peace and good will. The intervening power was 
usually faced with one of two tasks; either to intervene between 
the two warring factions, occupy certain proclaimed neutral zones, 
and endeavor by pacific or forceful action to make the rival parties 
accept mediation and settlement of the controversy ; or to intervene 
on the side of the de facto or de jure government, or even on the 
side of a new party, assisting that supported party by pacific or 
forceful action in the suppression of the disorders created by the 
rival party. In many cases the rival party would combat the sup- 
ported party, as well as the intervening forces, by a recourse to 
prolonged guerrilla warfare. 

In the second instance, (that of enforcing treaty obligations) 
the immediate cause of the foreign intervention has usually been 
the neglect and repeated refusal of the de jure goverment to carry 
out its obligation under the terms of a commercial or political treaty 
between that country and the intervening power. The inter- 
vening forces have sought by show of force or actual field opera- 
tions to enforce these obligations. Often the de jure government 
has refused to fulfill its obligations, and the intervening power has 
desposed it from the control of the government in order to estab- 
lish a de facto or de jure government which will carry out the pro- 
visions of the treaty. The ousted party then has constituted it- 
self as an active opposing faction to the intervening forces who 
are giving aid, force and power to the new government party. As 
time went on, this rival ousted party undertook offensive action of 
a guerilla nature against all alien forces occupying the country, 
and also against the party established in government control by the 
intervening forces. 

Thus it will be seen that in almost all cases, political parties or 
factions existing in a country under some form of constitutional 
government are the elements Which create situations out of which 
grow small wars operations by an alien power. In making the 
Estimate, therefore, the internal political organization of that 
country, as well as its external obligations as a member of the 
society of nations, should be very carefully studied. This phase of 



the study will necessarily involve a research into the history of the 
country, its form of government, the document or bill upon which 
the authority of its legal government rests and its present organiza- 
tion of political parties or factions. In addition, the study must 
include much thought upon what effect the outcome of the interven- 
tion will have upon the country assisted, the public opinion of the 
citizens of the intervening power, and also upon other countries. 
The latter, in particular, is of great importance, since the effect of 
intervention in any one country may be to alienate the friendship 
and trade relations of other countries with the intervening power 
due to their sympathy with the affected country. 

(b) Economic Status and Logistic Support Available. — This 
factor of the Enemy Strength is in reality an F - 4 study involving 
the question of subsistence, finances, natural resources, arms, 
equipment and ammunition, as well as the limitations imposed on 
the operations of hostile forces by such status and logistic support. 
Usually these unstable countries are heavily indebted to their own 
citizens as well as to foreign powers and citizens. The deposed 
party often strips the state treasury of all available funds ; foreign 
funds are often advanced to the revolting faction to aid in the over- 
throw of the de jure government; modern arms and ammunitions 
of war are purchased with these funds by the revolting faction to 
combat the government forces, and later the deposed government 
party also purchases with the funds they have seized, arms and 
ammunition from adjacent and other foreign countries to wage 
guerilla warfare against the rival party. As a result, the inter- 
vening forces usually find the forces opposing them armed and 
equipped with modern weapons. The forces opposing the interven- 
tion in this guerilla warfare will usually live off the country by forc- 
ing contributions of money, subsistence and other supplies from the 
peaceful inhabitants; often the inhabitants will be friendly to the 
cause of the guerillas and will aid them with such supplies whenever 
they can evade the surveillance of the intervening forces. Thus 
the study of this factor results in an evaluation of the ability of 
the hostile forces to exist as armed opponents to the intervening 

(c) . Geographical Features. — The study of this factor 
of the Enemy Strength will cover the political, admistrative and 
judicial divisions of the state, its capital, its population and its 
area. After a further study is made of the general geographical 
divisions of the country as fixed by relief, water courses, oceans, 
seas and lakes, mountain regions, basins, large valleys, plains and 
plateaus, a more detailed study of the physical characteristics is 
made to determine to what extent these may affect military opera- 
tions. Aside from the study of suitable landing places, one con- 
siders the practicability of a movement into the interior from the 
landing places, and the character and suitability of the communica- 
tions in the country, such as railroads, rivers, trails, roads and 
landing fields. The plain, plateau and mountain regions are studied 
as to the character and extent insofar as they might effect military 



operations. Similarly, a study is made of the military value of 
the rivers, lakes, swamps and desert regions, as well as the nature 
and extent of the frontiers from their strategical and tactical as- 
pects. The cities are considered with a view to their adaptability 
for defense and attack; the nature, size, suitability, and number 
of dwellings within towns suitable for military occupation are also 
made a part of this study. An inspection is made of the amount 
and vulnerability of public works, such as water and electric plants, 
and the transportaion and signal communication facilities in the 

(d) Weather Conditions, etc. — Climatic conditions in 
the probable theater of operations may in many situations affect 
the organization, clothing, equipment, supplies, the health, and 
especially the operations of the intervening forces. A campaign 
planned for the dry season may necessarily be entirely different 
from one planned for the rainy season. This is particularly true 
in countries where the road system is primitive. In another theater 
where the natives depend on river transportation for supply in 
the rainy season, the campaign plan in that region may be materi- 
ally changed during the dry season, due to the rivers being un- 
navigable in that season. Also where only a few "water holes" 
exist in an area in the dry season, the campaign plan may include 
their protection and denial to the opponent, thus forcing the sub- 
mission of the hostile forces in that area. Finally, the weather 
conditions in the theater of operations during the rainy season 
may even be the actual obstacle to the start of combat operations 
at that time and the operations may have to be delayed until the 
period of the dry season. 

(e) Information and Security Service of the Enemy. — 
Undoubtedly the greatest handicap under which Marine Corps for- 
ces have operated in past small wars has been the lack of available 
information of the movements of the hostile forces, and conversely 
the ease with which the hostile forces kept themselves informed 
of the movements of the Marine Corps forces. From the point 
of view of the intervening power, the intervention is usually con- 
sidered a friendly effort to assist the unstable country to reestablish 
peace and order within its boundaries and again to take its place as 
a member in good standing in the society of nations. However, 
from the viewpoint of the majority of the citizens of the occupied 
country, this action by an alien power is an unfriendly one, and 
although the majority of these inhabitants will not actively oppose 
the intervening forces, yet many will indirectly assist the native 
forces with information relative to the movements of the inter- 
vening forces. This may be done also because of the fact that 
relatives of these native citizens are among the native forces oppos- 
ing the operations of the Marines. It can be stated as an accepted 
premise that when Marine Corps forces occupy territory in small 
wars countries, the intelligence service of the opposing forces will 
be superior to that of the Marine Corps forces. To attempt to 



equalize this situation, and even gain a slight advantage, recourse 
must be had to propaganda clearly stating the definite purpose of 
the Marine Corps forces in the theater in order to show the friendly 
aid that is being offered to the country. Friendships should be 
made with the inhabitants in an honest and faithful endeavor to 
assist them to resume their peaceful occupations and to protect 
them from the illegal demands made upon them by the malcontents. 
Even the liberal use of intelligence funds will materially aid the 
Marine Corps forces as to the hostile intentions. Secrecy of move- 
ments, their preparations and operations under cover of darkness, 
and the use of code or cipher messages will greatly aid in pre- 
venting the hostile forces from gaining information of contemplated 
movements of Marines. 

(f) Material Characteristics. — An outstanding advan- 
tage enjoyed by the irregulars in small wars is their mobility. 
These forces are not encumbered with modern suppty loads or other 
impedimenta which reduce the speed at which troops can march. 
Their knowledge of the terrain and the movements of a Marine 
patrol operating against them permits them to move quickly and 
safely to avoid contact with the Marines. Their mobility often 
permits them to evade the Marine patrol and then launch an attack 
against a defenseless village or some isolated Marine outpost. In 
the past, Marine Corps forces have encountered these irregulars 
armed with old types of weapons, most of which have been con- 
sidered obsolete; the Marine Corps forces on the other hand have 
been equipped with modern weapons whose superiority over those 
of the opposition has enabled the Marines to quickly overcome them 
when contact was made. In the future, however, due to the ease 
with which modern arms and equipment can be obtained from out- 
side sources, it is to be expected that these irregulars will be in 
possession of weapons and equipment equally as effective as those 
with which the Marines will be equipped. Therefore the decided 
advantage in arms and equipment enjoyed by Marine Corps troops 
in the past will seldom obtain in the future. While the system of 
signal communication, as such, employed by the irregulars will often 
be superior to the mechanical communication system of the Marines, 
yet a decided advantage may be had by the latter in the availability 
and energetic use of the modern radio sets from the patrol set to 
the large set employed by the area commander. The irregulars' 
communication system usually consist of messengers, hilltop-to- 
hilltop signals or calls, friendly natives' warnings, etc. The 
use of aviation to operate with Marine Corps patrols as a means of 
signal communication will often be of decided value and may at 
times offset the advantage enjoyed by the native signal communica- 
tion system. 

(g) Composition, Condition and Disposition of Enemy 
Forces. — When the intervening forces initially enter a small 
wars country, they usually find the opposing elements organized 
into fairly large groups controlling certain definite areas. As 
combat action is employed against them, they are either driven 



from these areas to more remote ones, or the larger groups of irre- 
gulars are dispersed and the irregulars remain in the same areas 
but in very small bands. From this stage, their action is one of 
guerrilla warfare. Often one small band of guerrillas may be dis- 
persed as a result of combat; the members of that band return to 
their peaceful occupation until the hue and cry has died down; 
and then later they secretly assemble again for a surprise raid 
on some Marine outpost or peaceful undefended village, after which 
the band again disperses to re-assemble at some future call of its 

(h) Racial Characteristics, Morale and Skill. — One is 
generally prone to under estimate the quality of leadership of the 
irregulars. Often they have a marked respect for their chiefs, 
and a certain discipline in their organized bands or groups. Very 
often the opposition is led by men who have been trained in the 
United States or European military schools and who have had much 
experience in practical soldiering in their specialized type of war- 
fare. Irregular forces in active operations always attract foreign 
soldiers of fortune of varied experience and reputation whose 
fighting methods influence the character of opposition encountered. 
As an individual, the irregular is usually hardy and more or less 
accustomed to the rigors of a primitive existence. He has keen 
eyesight, is observing, and is experienced in woodcraft. He gets 
along with less food than others require and he exercises greater 
frugality in its consumption. He knows how to obtain food, if 
there is any to be had in the country, and is adept at cooking 
in the field. Accustomed to withstanding the elements, he is little 
affected by heat or cold, and can sleep as soundry on the open ground 
as in bed. He is seldom ill and when he has slight ailments or has 
met with a minor accident, he knows how to treat himself and re- 
quires no medical service. In general, he is tougher than others 
who are used to all the refinements of civilization, and therefore 
he is naturally adapted to this type of warfare. Withal his morale 
is a rather uncertain quantity, now very high due to local success, 
and again very low due to a local failure, thus resulting in constant 
fluctuation in the strength of the different groups. Marines must 
be ever ready to recognize and exploit this weakness in the average 
irregular group. Once their morale is shaken, they should be con- 
tinually pressed until captured or completely disbanded. (For 
complete study of Racial Characteristics, see Chapter III, Psy- 
chology of Small Wars.) 

(2) Own Strength. — "Make a study of the strength of 
your own forces, considering the factors corresponding to those 
studied under Enemy Strength and any other pertinent facts re- 
garding your own forces. This should be done with your Mission 
always in mind." (Est. of Sit., U.S.N.W.C.) 

(3) Relative Strength. — Under this heading, one should 
now compare the factors of the Enemy and Own Strength as ana- 
lyzed in (1) and (2) above, in order to arrive at a definite con- 
clusion as to the relative combat efficiency of the opposing forces. 



The conclusion one may reach in such a comparison may often in a 
small wars estimate indicate that due to the terrain features in 
one area, one or the other force will be relatively superior. This 
is particularly true in the area where it is necessary to conduct 
river operations in which the irregular forces are initially superior 
due to their familiarity with this type of operations. 

c. Enemy's Probable Intentions. — Initially a Marine Corps 
commander in a small wars operation may readily estimate the 
probable intentions of the opposing forces, since these forces will 
be concentrated in a few large groups. The probable intentions of 
these groups usually will be to occupy the present area and con- 
trol the same under some temporary form of government until the 
Marine Corps forces expel them entirely from the area or disperse 
the large groups. An offensive movement against the Marines will 
not as a rule be undertaken by these groups; their purpose being 
to hold the area in which they are located as a section seceding 
from the part of the country then under Marine supervision. 
Later, when the large groups have been dispersed, smaller bands 
or groups will operate actively not only against the Marines but 
also against the towns and population then under control of the 
Marines. This final opposition by the iregulars will degenerate 
into guerrilla warfare. So many small bands or groups will en- 
deavor to operate that a definite conclusion as to the probable in- 
tentions of any one of these groups will be difficult to determine. 
However, generally their intentions will be to make surprise attacks 
on Marines in superior numbers and against undefended local villag- 
es and towns. To offset such action, Marine patrols must be strong 
enough in numbers and armament to withstand any surprise 
attack or ambush, and the principal villages and towns must be 
given adequate protection. Further, by energetic patrolling of the 
area and vigorous pursuit of the hostile forces once contact is 
gained, Marine Corps forces should be able finally to force the irre- 
gulars to disband completely or to move to another more remote 
and less fertile area. The pursuit of these small bands should 
be continuous. 

d. Courses of Action Open to You. — Under this heading, the 

Marine Corps, commander must choose finally the best course 
of action to follow in order to accomplish his Mission. The su- 
preme commander may choose a number of courses in the employ- 
ment of the total forces at his command. His choice of action will 
necessarily result in a scheme of maneuver, either strategical or 
tactical. To accomplish his Mission it may be necessary to make 
a show of force in occupying the State capital, for often the history 
of the country indicates that he who holds the capital holds the 
country. Again, he may be forced to occupy the principal cities 
of the country, or even hold a certain area whose economic re- 
sources are such that its possessor controls the lif eblood of the coun- 
try. More frequently however it will be necessary for the Marine 
commander to initiate active combat operations against the large 
groups of malcontents or opposing forces who occupy certain 



areas. The entire scheme of maneuver will frequently result 
in the occupation of the coastal area initially with a gradual co- 
ordinated movement inland, thus increasing the territory over 
which Marine control and protection may be established. As this 
territory extends, it will be necessary to create military areas with- 
in it under the control of subordinate commanders. The area 
commander in turn will seek to control his area by use of small 
detachments to protect the towns and to conduct active operations 
against any irregular groups known to be in that area. The Marine 
commander of a small detachment protecting a village or town 
must decide on a course of action to be undertaken should an 
attack on the town be made by any hostile force. This course 
of action is decided upon at the time of the initial occupation of 
the town and embodied in the defense plan of the commander. 
The details of this plan are promulugated to all members of the 
detachment so that at the sounding of the general alarm signal, 
battle stations will be manned and the maneuvering unit (local 
reserve) will be prepared to execute any course of action suitable 
to the occasion. A Marine patrol leader should always consider 
as one of his effective courses of action when contact is gained with 
irregulars, the launching of an immediate attack against the hos- 
tile forces followed by an energetic pursuit. A Marine patrol seek- 
ing contact and combat with the irregulars must, prior to such con- 
tact and combat, decide upon certain courses of action he will take 
if ambushed, and if at all practicable, train the elements of his 
force in the execution of his scheme of maneuver. Such a com- 
mander will constantly be on the alert, asking himself at intervals 
during the patrol, "What should I do here if surprised by the hostile 
forces?" In this manner, a patrol commander will be constantly 
prepared to initiate action at any point in the course of a day's 

e. The Decision. — When the Marine commander of any 
force has finally selected the best course of action and determined, 
in general terms, how it may be executed, he then must make his 
decision. This decision will consist of a statement of his course of 
action followed by how, in general terms, it is to be carried out 
and why. The decision indicates the commander's general plan 
of action as expressed in paragraph 2 of an operation order. In 
paragraphs c and d above, certain definite plans of action or deci- 
sions are explained that pertain to the supreme Marine commander, 
the Marine area commander and the small Marine patrol or defense 
detachment commander. The basic principle underlying any 
decision in a small wars operation in which Marine Corps forces are 
employed is that of initiating immediately energetic action to dis- 
band or destroy the hostile forces opposing them. This action 
should hasten the return of normal peace and good order to the 
country in the shortest possible time. 

f. Supporting Measures.-— (1) Operations Required.— To this 
factor of the Estimate, the commander of a Marine Corps Force will 
give careful thought in determining the detailed scheme of maneu- 
ver to accomplish his Mission and to execute his decision. In 



one situation of a small war, it may be necessary only to employ 
his force in a demonstration or as a supporting force to the local 
native forces which operate actively against the hostile forces; 
therefore the detailed plan will be a simple and short one. In 
another situation, the commander will be forced to execute a large 
number of movements by the individual units of his force in order 
to combat the operations of the hostile irregulars. In the latter 
case, the entire force will be organized into area units, each of 
which will have a specific mission assigned in order to carry out 
the intent of the supreme commander. In turn the area command- 
er will organize his own force into smaller area units which will be 
actively employed in protecting the cities and towns of the area 
either by defensive measures or by active patrolling of the area. 
The small patrol leader in turn will make a decision as to the opera- 
tions necessary to be carried out by the elements of his unit in ful- 
filling the mission assigned to him by the area commander. These 
local operations may consist of a periodic patrolling of a small 
section of the area to prevent establishment therein of the hostile 
forces, or they may consist of active combat operations directed 
against known or reported locations of the hostile forces, their 
caches of supplies or their established bases. Also the patrol opera- 
tions may consist in the denial of a river or water route to the 
hostile forces. Thus it is seen that each commander from the su- 
preme commander to the subordinate patrol leader will be faced 
with a decision as to the number and type of operations his force 
will be required to execute in order to attain his goal. 

(2) Formulation of Tasks. — The "Operations required" 
involve the assignment of tasks to the elements of the commander's 
force. Each element or subordinate unit of his command will be 
given a part to play in the course of action to be carried out by the 
entire force. For instance, in an infantry patrol seeking contact 
with the irregular forces, the patrol commander having decided 
upon his best course of action at any part of the march will assign 
definite tasks to each element of the column. Initially, these tasks 
will be normal ones for the elements of the marching column (ad- 
vance guard, main body, pack train, and rear guard.) These ele- 
ments also will be prepared to execute their own definite combat 
tasks when contact is gained with the hostile force. The patrol 
commander should rehearse the elements of his command in the 
execution of their separate tasks either before the start of the 
march or at certain places on the route of march. In this manner 
each element will be throughly conversant with its own task in 
carrying out the course of action decided upon by the patrol com- 
mander. In a formal written field order, these task assignments 
form paragraph 3 of the order. 

(3) Command Organization. — "Having determined what 
Tasks are necessary, you must ascertain what forces are to carry 
out each Task and assign these forces to Task groups and designate 
commanders therefore." (U.S.N.W.C., Est. of Sit.) The Marine 



Force commander having decided upon his course of action and the 
tasks to be accomplished therein, when the distribution of entire 
command into subordinate area commands is decided upon, must 
then decide what forces to assign to each task, or area. In one 
instance in assigning a force to a task, he may find that the task 
can be accomplished by an independent battalion; in another case 
he may find that it will be necessary to assign a reinforced regiment 
or more. It is preferable to retain complete organizations in as- 
signment of forces to tasks. Incidentally this permits the de- 
signation of the organization commander as the Task Group Com- 
mander. However if such is not done, then the senior commander 
must definitely assign a commander to the Task Group, by name. 
Normally the senior line officer with the Task Group would be 
named as its commander. Sometimes however this seniority will 
have to be ignored, by the assignment of a commander to a Task 
Group who has those characteristics that the task demands. Such 
a deviation from service practice may be required in the assignment 
of a leader to the elements of a patrol ; an energetic and experienced 
NCO may be selected to command the advance guard of a patrol 
in preference to that unit's own normal commander. Such how- 
ever is not particularly good practice and should not be resorted 
to unless clearly necessary. 

(4) Coordinating Measures. — In a small wars campaign 
these measures involve particularly the cooperation of the avia- 
tion force with the ground troops. This cooperation may be in 
the form of simple contact at periodic intervals with ground 
patrols, in combat support of these patrols when contact has been 
gained with the hostile force, in supplying ammunition and food to 
the patrols at frequent intervals, in evacuating the wounded from 
a patrol after an engagement, and in some cases in the transporta- 
tion of reinforcements to ground troops. Radio communication 
between the patrols and their base must be co-ordinated in order 
that a constant watch may be maintained on the radio frequency 
used by the patrol in communicating with its base or headquarters. 
Co-ordination of effort may also be necessary by separate task 
groups in order to execute the course of action decided upon by the 
supreme commander; this being accomplished either by prescrib- 
ing detailed operations in the field or by arranging for communica- 
tion between units. In the determination of these co-ordinating 
measures, the commander will usually evolve certain ones which 
pertain in a general sense to all the elements of his command. 
These measures are those commonly encountered in paragraph 3 X 
of an operation order. In the case of patrol commanders, these 
measures will include the following; time at which the assembly 
is to take place preparatory to the march, time at which animals 
are to be watered and fed, assembly points for the elements of the 
patrol, the instructions relative to the secrecy of the preparations 
and any other instruction which may pertain to the patrol as a 


1—5 —3 

(5) Logistic Support. — This factor constitutes the sub- 
stance of paragraph 4 of an operation order, In the case of a 
patrol, it will involve the number of rations and other supplies to 
be carried, the number of pack animals and the allocation of 
pack loads, the availability of the aviation to furnish needed auto- 
matic supplies, and the utilization of local resources to replace the 
ration or as a partial substitute therefor. 

(6) Special Provisions.— The substance of this fac- 
tor is found in paragraph 5 of an operation order. These pro- 
visions will include the following : 

Communications Plan ; 

Place of the commander during the operation. 

1-6. Campaign and Operation Plans. — a. Military action is the 
concrete means designed to apply force in the execution of the 
national policy. In military operations of small wars, strategical 
and tactical principles are applied in attaining the political objective 
of the government. The political objective indicates the general 
character of the campaign which the military leader will undertake. 
The Campaign Plan indicates the general military objective and, in 
general terms, the nature and method of conducting the campaign. 
It will set forth the legal aspects of the operations and the co-related 
authority and responsibilities of the force. If military government 
or some form of political control is to be instituted, the necessary 
directives are included in the campaign plan. This plan also 
indicates the general nature of employment of the military forces. 
It indicates what, if any, use will be made of existing native forces 
or of those to be organized. 

b. The Operation Plan prescribes the details of the tactical 
employment of the force employed and the important details of 
supply and transportation for that force. It may indicate the 
territorial division of the country for tactical or administrative 
control. It provides also for the most efficient employment, main- 
tenance, and development of the existing signal communication 
system. If the campaign plan calls for the organization of a native 
constabulary, detailed plans must be made for its early organiza- 
tion and training. If the campaign plan calls for the employment 
of local armed civilians or guards or if such action is considered 
necessary or advisable, plans must be made for the organization, 
training, equipment, supply, clothing, subsistance, pay, shelter, 
and employment of such troops. If the mission calls for the sup- 
ervision of elections, this plan must include the necessary arrange- 
ments for the non-military features of this duty as well as the 
tactical disposition of the Force in the accomplishment of the task. 

c. The initiation of a campaign before adequate preparation 
have been made, may well be as fatal in a small war as in regular 
warfare. The tactical operations or regular troops against guer- 
rillas in small wars is habitually offensive. Even though opera- 
ing under a strategic defensive campaign plan, regular combatants 
in contact with bandits will emphasize the principle of the offensive 



to gain psychological supremacy. Isolated forces exposed to 
possible attack by overwhelming numbers must be well protected 
in positions prepared to develop the greatest possible effect of their 
weapons. Reverses, particularly at first, must be avoided at all 
costs. Prolonged operations are to be avoided. 

1-7. Phases of Small Wars. — a. Small wars seldom develop in 
accordance with any stereotyped procedure. Certain phases of 
those listed below, may be absent in one situation ; in another they 
may be combined and undertaken simultaneously; in still others 
one may find that the sequence of events or phases may be altered. 

The actual operations of small wars may be arbitrarily di- 
vided into five phases as follows : 

Phase 1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of van- 

Phase 2. The arrival of reinforcements and initation of gene- 
ral military operations in the field. 

Phase 3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and 
cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies. 

Phase 4. Routine police functions. 

Phase 5. Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations. 

b. First Phase. — Initial demonstration or landing and ac- 
tion of vanguard. 

(1) One of the most common characteristics of the small 
wars of the United States is that their forces "dribble in" to the 
countries in which they intervene. This is quite natural in view 
of the national policy of the government. It is not at war with 
its neighboring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of ter- 
ritory; its purpose is friendly and wishes to accomplish it with as 
little military display as possible with a view to gaining the last- 
ing friendship of the inhabitants of the country. Thus its gov- 
ernment is observed endeavoring to accomplish its end with the 
minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing more than a demonstra- 
tion of force if that is necessary and reasonably sufficient. This 
policy is carried on throughout the campaign and reinforcements 
are added by "driblets", so many hundreds, or a battalion, or a 
regiment at a time, until the force is large enough to accomplish 
its mission or until its peace time limitations in personnel have 
been reached. Even after landing, instructions probably will be 
received not to exert any physical force unless it becomes absolutely 
necessary, and then only to the minimum necessary to accomplish 
its purpose. Thus orders may be received not to fire on irregulars 
unless or until fired upon; instructions may be issued not to fire 
upon irregular groups if women are present with them even 
though it is known that armed women accompany the irregulars. 

(2) During the initial phase small numbers of troops may 
be sent ashore to assume the initiative, as a demonstration to in- 
dicate a determination to control the situation, and to prepare the 
way for any troops to follow. This vanguard is generally composed 
of the ship's Marine guard or mixed forces of Marines and sailors 



from ships at the critical points. Owing to its limited personnel 
the action of the vanguard will often be restricted to an active de- 
fense after seizing a critical area such as an important sea-port 
or other city, the capital of a country or disturbed areas of limited 

c. Second Phase. — The arrival of reinforcements and initia- 
tion of general military operations in the field. 

During this period the theater of operations is divided into 
areas, and forces are assigned for each. Such forces should be 
sufficiently strong to seize and hold the most important city in the 
area assigned and to be able to send combat patrols in all directions. 
If certain neutral zones have not been designated in the first phase 
it may be done at this time if deemed advisable. At this time the 
organization of a native military and police force is undertaken. 
In order to release ships' personnel to their normal functions afloat 
such personnel are returned to their ships as soon as they can be 
relieved by troops of the expeditionary force. 

d. Third Phase.— -Assumption of control of executive agencies, 
and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies. 

If the measures in phase two do not bring decisive results it 
may be necessary to resort to more thorough measures. This 
phase may involve the establishment of military government or 
martial law in varying degree from minor authority to complete 
control of the principal agencies of the native government; it will 
involve the further strengthening of our forces by reinforcements. 
More detachments will be sent out to take other important local- 
ities; more active and thorough patrolling will be undertaken; 
measures will be taken to intercept the vital supply and support 
channels of the opposing factions and a combination of effort by 
physical and moral means to break the resistance opposed to law and 
order. During this period the Marines carry the burden of most 
of the patrolling. The native troops, supported by the Marines 
are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that these 
native agencies may assume their proper responsibility of restoring 
law and order in their own country as an agency of their govern- 

e. Fourth Phase. — Routine police functions. 

(1) After continued pressure of the measures in phase 
three, it is presumed that sooner or later regular forces will subdue 
the lawless elements. This period deals more properly with the 
execution of police functions wherein the judicial agencies are em- 
ployed to an increasing degree. Military police functions and judi- 
cial authority, to the extent that they have been assumed by our 
military forces are gradually returned to the native agencies to 
which they properly belong. 

(2) It is constantly borne in mind that none of these judi- 
cial responsibilities are assumed by our military forces beyond 
that expressly provided by proper authority. One must be certain 
not to assume that he has any judicial power which is beyond his 



expressed and legal authority. The status of commanders of de- 
tached posts must be clearly denned in orders from superior author- 
ity. Furthermore, as long as the judicial authority rests squarely 
upon the shoulders of the civil authorities, the military forces 
should continually impress and indoctrinate them with this re- 
sponsibility while educating the people in this respect. Each sit- 
uation presents certain characteristics peculiar to itself; in one 
instance officers were clothed with almost unlimited military auth- 
ority within the law and our treaty rights ; in another, less auth- 
ority was exercised over the population; and in a third instance 
the forces of occupation had absolutely no judicial authority. The 
absence of such authority is often a decided handicap to forces of 
occupation in the discharge of their responsibilities. If the local 
judicial system is weak, or broken down entirely, it is better to have 
the military authorities temporarily and legally endowed with this 
authority than to get in the embarrassing situation which may 
result from illegally assuming it. 

(3) During this phase the Marines act a reserve in sup- 
port of the native forces and are actively employed only in grave 
emergencies. The Marines are successively withdrawn to the lar- 
ger centers, thus affording a better means for caring for the 
health, comfort and recreation of the command. 

f. Fifth Phase. — Withdrawal from the theater of opera- 
tions. Finally, when order is restored, or when the responsible 
native agencies are prepared to handle the situation without other 
support, the troops are withdrawn upon orders from higher auth- 
ority. This process is progressive from the back country or in- 
terior outward, in the reverse order to the entry into the country. 
On the other hand it often happens that even after evacuation of 
the forces of intervention a Legation Guard is left in the capital, 
which organization assumes the usual functions of such detach- 

1-8. Summary. — a. Since the World War there has been a flood of 
literature dealing with the old principles illustrated and the new 
technique developed in that war; but there always have been and 
ever will be other wars of an altogether different kind, undertaken 
in very different theaters of operations and requiring entirely differ- 
ent methods from those of the World War. Such are the small 
wars which are studied later. There is, on the other hand," 1 a sad 
lack of authoritive texts on the methods employed in small wars. 
However, there is probably no military organization of the size of 
the U.S. Marine Corps in the world which has had as much practical 
experience in this kind of combat. 

b. This experience has been gained almost entirely in small 
wars against poorly organized and equipped native irregulars. 
With all the practical advantages we enjoyed in those wars, that 
experience must not lead to an under-estimate of the modern irre- 
gular, supplied with modern arms and equipment. If Marines 
have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the 
past they must now prepare themselves for the increased effort 


1 — 8 and Appendices, Chapter 1 

which will be necessary to insure victory in the future. The fu- 
ture opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be able 
to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments 
at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a 
thorough knowledge of the trails, the country and the inhabitants ; 
likewise he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the 
natural obstacles, as climate and disease; he can live in a country 
which will not support a white man. All these natural advantages, 
combining primitive cunning and modern armament will weigh 
heavily in the balance against the advantage of the Marine forces 
in organization, equipment, intelligence, and discipline, if a careless 
audacity is permitted to warp good judgement. 

c. Although small wars present a special problem requiring 
particular tactical and technical measures, the immutable prin- 
ciples of war remain the basis of these studies and require the 
greatest ingenuity in their application. As a regular war never 
takes exactly the form of any of its predecessors, so, even to a 
greater degree is each small war somewhat different from anything 
which has preceded it. One must ever be on guard to prevent his 
views from becoming fixed as to procedure or methods. 

d. Small wars demand the highest type of leadership direct- 
ed by intelligence, resourcefulness and ingenuity. Small wars 
are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious 
responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders 
lacking specific instructions. In the present Fleet Marine Force, 
the Marine Corps possesses a definite and permanent force which 
in future small wars operations may be expeditiously embarked 
and transported to any theater of operations. The creation of 
this properly trained and equipped force has eliminated the dis- 
advantages which occured in the past in the hasty formation of an 
expeditionary force from personnel taken from numerous posts in 
the emergency. 

Historical Examples of Small Wars Missions. 

1. Display of naval force to secure protection of American 
citizens; (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Jaffa, 1858). 

2. Use of Navy to protect American interests: (Japan, 1864 
to open to navigation the Straits of Shimonoseki: Haiti, 1888; 
Brazil, 1893, Navy interfered to secure non-interference with neu- 
tral commerce by insurgents). 

3. Ultimatum demanding satisfaction delivered before landing 
made: (Porto Rico, 1824; Island of Johanna, 1851; idemnity paid 
without landing forces; Nicaragua, 1854; Fiji Islands, 1858, For- 
mosa, 1867 ; Korea, 1871). 

4. American Forces landed in cooperation with other powers 
for the protection of foreigners: China, 1854, United States and 
Great Britain; Uruguay, 1855, United States, Great Britain; France, 
Spain; China, 1856, United States and Great Britain; Uruguay, 
1858, United States and other powers; Africa, 1860, United States 


Appendices, Chapter 1. 

and Great Britain; Panama, 1860, United States and Great Brit- 
ain ; Japan, 1864, United States, Great Britain and France, Nether- 
lands; Japan, 1868, United States, Great Britain and France; Uru- 
guay,1868, United States and other powers; Somoa, 1899, United 
States and Great Britain; Honduras, 1911, United States, Great 
Britain, and Germany; China, 1911 - 19**; United States and other 

5. Simple protection of American citizens located in disturbed 
areas : This was the purpose of landing of forces in China, 1854 ; 
Uruguay, 1855 and 1858; China, 1859; Africa, Kisembo, 1860; 
Panama, 1860, Japan, 1868; Uruguay, 1868; Egypt, 1882; Korea, 
1888, Navassa Island, 1891 ; Chile, 1891 ; Hawaii, 1893 ; Korea, 1894 
Nicaragua, 1899; China, 1900; Santo Domingo, 1903; Honduras, 
1907; Nicaragua, 1910; Honduras, 1910 and 1911; Cuba, 1912; 
Cuba, 1917-1919; Smyrna, 1922. 

6. Reestablishment of American legation, collection of idem- 
nities and protection of minister: Japan, 1864; Honduras, 1924. 

7. Protection of custom-house at the instance of regular 
local officials: Uruguay, 1868. 

8. Invasion of foreign territory for protection of American 
citizens and American territory: Spanish Floridas, 1817. 

9. Operations of American forces landed on foreign soil for 
the protection of American Interests: 

(a) Forces merely land and apparently undertake no hostile 
measures: Uruguay, 1858; China, 1859; Africa, 1860; Panama, 
1860; Japan, 1868; Uruguay, 1868; Hawaii, 1874; Mexico, 1876; 
Korea, 1888; Navassa Island, 1891; Chile, 1891; Hawaii, 1893;. 
Korea, 1894; Nicaragua, 1899; Santo Domingo, 1903; Honduras, 
1907; Honduras, 1911; Nicaragua, 1910; Honduras, 1912: Hondur- 
as, 1914; Honduras, 1925. 

(b) Forces conducted belligerent operations: Amelia Is- 
land, 1811; Cuba, 1823; Porto Rico, 1824; Falkland Islands, 1831; 
Sumatra, 1832; Fiji Islands, 1840; Samoa, 1840-1841; China, 1854; 
Nicaragua, 1854; Fiji Islands, 1855; Uruguay, 1855; China, 1856; 
Fiji Islands, 1858; Formosa, 1867; Korea, 1871; Samoa, 1899; 
China, 1900; Santo Domingo, 1912-1924; Haiti, 1914-1934. 

10. Establishment of presumed regular government: Samoa, 
1899, joint action, United States and Great Britain. 

11. Suppression of local riots: Hawaii, 1874, landing at in- 
stance of Government to restore order; Egypt, Alexandria, 1882, 
landing to restore order, extinguish fires, etc. ; Panama, 1919-1920. 

12. To enforce demands for amends for certain affronts and in- 
dignities committed against the United States: Mexico, 1914. 

13. Securing an idemnity: Island of Johanna, 1851; Japan, 
1864; Haiti, 1888. 

14. Destruction of pirates infesting certain areas, whether 
nationals of the disturbed area or not: This was the purpose of 
landing forces in Amelia Island, 1811; Cuba, 1823; China, 1854. 

15. Punishment for murder of American citizens: Sumatra 


Appendices, Chapter 1. 

1832; Fiji Islands, 1840; Samoa, 1840-1841; Fiji Islands, 1858; 
Formosa, 1867. 

16. Punishment for insults or injuries to American citizens or 

American officers, such injuries not resulting in death: Porto 
Rico, 1824; Falkland Islands, 1831; Nicaragua, 1854; Fiji Islands, 
1855; China, 1856; Japan, 1863; Korea, 1871; Mexico, 1916-1917. 

17. Landing of American forces in times of foreign revolutions: 

(a) Without the invitation of either faction: This Gov- 
ernment has repeatedly, both alone and jointly with others landed 
forces in times of revolutions in foreign countries in order ade- 
quately to protect American interests. These landing were made 
as set forth below. Unless otherwise stated, our attitude seems 
to have been neutral as between the contending factions. China, 

1854, the operations were conducted against the regular imperialist 
troops who had captured an American pilot boat in the harbor of 
Shanghai; Uruguay, 1855, operations directed against both fac- 
tions; Uruguay, 1858; Africa, Kisembo, 1860, Japan, 1868; action, 
neutral; Egypt, 1882; Korea, 1888; Chile, 1891; Hawaii, 1893; Nic- 
aragua 1899, China, 1900; Santo Domingo, 1903; Nicaragua, 1910; 
Honduras, 1911; Nicaragua, 1926. 

(b) At the instance of the regular local officials ; Panama, 
1860; Uruguay, 1868; Hawaii, 1874; Nicaragua, 1912-1925; Nica- 
ragua, 1926-1932. 

(c) Interference between two fighting factions, i.e., the 
revolutionists and the forces of the regular government: Uruguay, 

1855, massacre of insurgents prevented; Samoa, 1899, one faction 
actively supported; Dominican Republic, 1904, a zone established 
in which no fighting was permitted; Honduras, 1911, a zone estab- 
lished in which no fighting was permitted; See also Japan, 1864. 

18. Landing of American forces in time of war between two 
foreign nations : Korea, 1894 ; Honduras, 1907. 

Some students of tactics who analyze certain combat opera- 
tions of small wars, have been able to divide such wars into Bush 
Warfare, Hill Warfare, River Warfare and so on. Since, in our 
present studies, we are not limited to any peculiar tactics especially 
adapted to any particular terrain, no such refinement or special- 
ization will be made herein. The tactical principles of all will be 
studied and later applied in the situations encountered. 


Historical Examples of Proclamations. 

1. Proclamation issued by Rear- Admiral Caperton, U.S.N., 3 
Sept., 1915, at Port-au-Prince, Haiti: (Extracts only). 

"Information having been received from the most reliable 
sources that the present Government of Haiti is confronted with 
conditions which they are unable to control, although loyally at- 
tempting to discharge the duties of their respective offices; and 
these facts having created a condition which requires the adoption 
of different measures than those heretofore applied; and in order 


Appendices, Chapter i 

to afford the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince and other territory 
hereinafter described, the privileges of the Government, exercis- 
ing all the functions necessary for the establishment and mainten- 
ance of the fundamental rights of man, I hereby, under my auth- 
ority as commanding officer of the United States of America in 
Haiti and Haitien waters, proclaim that martial law exists in the 
city of Port-au-Prince and the immediate territory now occupied 
by the forces under my comand." 

2. Proclamation issued by Captain H.S. Knapp, U.S.N., 29 Sept., 
1916, at Santo Domingo City, Dominican Republic : 

"Whereas the United States Government, with great forbear- 
ance and with friendly desire to enable Santo Domingo to maintain 
domestic tranquillity and observe the terms of the aforesaid treaty, 
has urged the Government of Santo Domingo certain necessary 
measures which that Government has been unwilling or unable to 
adopt; and 

"Whereas in consequence domestic tranquillity has been dis- 
turbed and is not now established, nor is the future observance of 
the treaty by the Government of Santo Domingo assured; 

"This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate 
or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Santo Domingo, but on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that 
country in returning to a condition of internal order that will 
enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obli- 
gations resting upon it as one of the family of nations", etc. 

3. Proclamation issued by the commander, Special Service 
Squadron, U.S. Navy, in December, 1926, relative to establishment 
of neutral zone in the vicinity of Puerto Cabezas, Republic of 
Nicaragua : 

****The following territory is hereby declared a neutral zone: 
Puerta Cabezas and Bilway, including the outskirts for a distance 
of two miles.*** no carrying of arms, ammunition, or knives in the 
neutral zone. There must be no recruiting or any other activities 
carried on in the neutral zone which may have any bearing on the 
presecution of hostilities. **otherwise they must disarm and de- 
liver such arms to the Cleveland's landing force commander. *** 

Later the White House spokesman stated to the Press that the 
purpose of landing Marines was to protect lives and property and 
the interests which the American government itself had in that 
territory. (American canal rights). 


8088(l) MCS OUANTICO, VA. 2-15-37-300 


1935 Revision 

The Strategy of Small Wars 


Basis of the Strategy of Small Wars 2—1 

Nature of the Operations 2 — 2 

Organization 2 — 3 

National War 2 — 4 

Principles of War (Application) 2 — 5 

Superiority 2 — 6 

Movement 2 — 7 

Objective 2—8 

Offensive 2—9 

Surprise 2 — 10 

Security 2—11 

Economy of Force 2 — 12 

Cooperation 2 — 13 

Simplicity 2 — 14 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1 Hoche in La Vendee 13 

No. 2 Spanish and Cuban Methods 13 

No. 3 Bugeaud in North Africa 14 

No. 4 The Peninsular War 14 

No. 5 The Philippines 14 

No. 6 Internal Disturbance 14 

No. 7 Movement 15 

No. 8 Objective 16 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



2—1. The Basis of the Strategy of Small Wars.— a. The mili- 
tary strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the 
political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major opera- 
tions. In the latter, war is undertaken only as a last resort after 
all diplomatic means of adjusting differences have failed. At this 
juncture the political authorities indicate by national policy the 
objective to be attained, the accomplishment of which devolves upon 
the supreme military commander. In this case national policy 
chooses the road for strategy and the military commander's objec- 
tive ordinarily becomes the enemy's armed forces. The political 
authorities do not interfere with the military features or operations 
of the problem, except to modify and interpret the political mission 
in accordance with new situations. 

b. Diplomatic agencies should conduct negotiations with a 
view to arriving at a peaceful solution of the problem on a basis 
compatible with both national honor and treaty stipulations. Al- 
though the outcome of such negotiations often results in a friendly 
settlement, the military forces should be prepared for the pos- 
sibility of an unfavorable termination of the proceedings. The 
mobilization of armed forces constitutes a highly effective weapon 
for forcing the opponent to accede to national demands without 
resort to war. When a time limit for peaceful settlement is pre- 
scribed by ultimatum the military -naval forces must be prepared 
to initiate operations upon expiration of the time limit. 

c. In small wars, either diplomacy has not been exhausted or 
the party that opposes the settlement of the political question can- 
not be reached diplomatically. Small war situations are usually a 
phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with diplomatic 
effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participa- 
tion in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert con- 
siderable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in 
such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action 
as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign. This 
feature has been so marked in past operations, that Marines have 
been referred to as State Department Troops in small wars. In 
certain cases of this kind the State Department has even dictated 
+ he size of the force to be sent to the theater of operations. The 
otate Department materially influences the strategy and tactics 
by orders and instructions which are promulgated through the 
Navy Department or through diplomatic representatives. 

d. State Department officials represent the government in 
foreign countries. The force generally nearest at hand to back up 
the authority of these agents is the Navy. In such operations the 
Navy is performing its normal function, and has, as a component 
part of its organization a force of Marines organized, equipped, and 
trained to perform duty of this nature. After the Force has landed, 
the commander afloat generally influences the operations only to 
the extent necessary to insure their control and direction in ac- 
cordance with the policy and the instructions that he has received 
from higher authority. He supports and cooperates with the Force 



to the limit of his ability. In the later stages of the operation the 
local naval commander may relinquish practically all control in order 
to carry out routine duties elsewhere. In such case the general 
operations plan is directed by, or through, the office of Naval Opera- 
tions in Washington. 

e. Wars of intervention have two classifications ; intervention in 
the internal, or the external affairs of another state. Intervention 
in the internal affairs of a state may be undertaken to restore order, 
sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or to enforce 
the fulfillment of obligations binding between the two states. In- 
tervention in the external affairs of a state may be the result of 
a treaty which authorizes one state to aid another as a matter of 
political expediency to avoid more serious consequences when the 
interests of other states are involved, or to gain certain advantages 
not obtainable otherwise. It may be simply an intervention to 
enforce certain opinions or to propagate certain doctrines, principles, 
or standards. For example, in these days when pernicious propa- 
ganda is employed to spread revolutionary doctrines, it is conceiv- 
able that the United States might intervene to prevent the develop- 
ment of dissemination of political disaffection which threatens^he 
overthrow of a friendly state and indirectly influences our own 

2—2. Nature of the Operations.— a. Irregular troops may dis- 
regard, in part or entirely, International Law and the Rules of Land 
Warfare in their conduct of hostilities. Commanders in the field 
must be prepared to protect themselves against practices and 
methods of combat not sanctioned by the Rules of War. 

b. Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in 
order to obtain supplies which are then secreted in remote strong- 
holds. Seizure or destruction of such sources of supply is an im- 
portant factor in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods 
of operation must be studied and adopted to the pyschological re- 
action they will produce upon the opponents. Interventions or oc- 
cupations are usually peaceful and altruistic. Accordingly, the 
methods of procedure must rigidly conform to this purpose; but 
when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the inter- 
vention, the operations must be pursued energetically and expedi- 
tiously in order to overcome the resistance. 

c. The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the 
character of the people encountered. National policy and the 
precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other 
peoples be maintained on a high moral plane. However, the mili- 
tary strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the 
commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order 
to accomplish the mission without delay. 

d. After a study has been made of the people who will op- 
pose the intervention the strategical plan is evolved. The military 
strategical plan should include those means that will accomplish the 
purpose in view quickly and completely. Strategy should attempt 



to gain psychological ascendancy over the outlaw or insurgent ele- 
ment prior to hostilities. Remembering the political mission which 
dictates the military strategy of small wars, one or more of the 
following basic modes of procedure may be decided upon, depend- 
ing upon the situation : 

(1) Attempt to attain the aims of the intervention by a 
simple, clear, and forceful declaration of the position and intention 
of the occupying force, this without threat or promise. . 

(2) By a demonstration of the power which could be em- 
ployed to carry out these intentions. 

(3) The display of the naval or military force within the 
area involved. 

(4) The actual application of armed force. During the 
transitory stage or prior to active military operations care should 
be taken to avoid the commission of any acts that might precipi- 
tate a breach. Once armed force is resorted to, it should be applied 
with determination and to the extent required by the situation. 
Situations may develop so rapidly that the transition from negotia- 
tions to the use of armed force give the commander little or no 
time to exert his influence through the use of the methods men- 
tioned in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above. 

e. The strategy of this type of warfare will be strongly 
influenced by the probable nature of the contemplated operations. 
In regular warfare the decision will be gained on known fronts and 
probably limited theaters of operations; but in small wars no de- 
fined battle front exists and the theater of the operations may be 
the whole length and breadth of the land. While operations are 
carried out in one area, other hostile elements may be causing 
serious havoc in another. The uncertainty of the siutation will 
result in the establishment of detached posts within small areas. 
Thus the regular forces may be widely dispersed and will probably 
be outnumbered in some areas by the hostile forces. This re- 
quires that the Force be organized with a view to mobility and 
flexibility, and that the troops be highly trained in the use of their 
special weapons as well as proper utilization of terrain. 

f. Those who have participated in small wars agree that 
these operations find an appropriate place in the art of war. Irregu- 
lar warfare between two well armed and well disciplined forces 
will open up a larger field for surprise, deception, ambuscades, etc. 
than is possible in regular warfare. 

2 — 3. Organization. — a. The staff organization and functions 
follow normal lines with the general difference that Force Head- 
quarters must be organized as a G.H.Q. with all the functions and 
responsibilities thereof. Operations may cover a wide expanse of 
territory, involving civil relations with foreign governments and 
nationals as well as an elaborate system of procurement and issue 
of supplies of all classes. The organization of the Force should 
be based on the special conditions to be encountered and on the 
plan of campaign. The details of the organization should be de- 
cided upon only after a comprehensive estimate of the situation. 



b. It is essential to success that the commander in this type 
of operation be a statesman as well as a military leader. Subordinate 
officers should be selected and trained for independent duty. Junior 
officers will be in command of isolated posts and patrols. They 
will be faced with difficult situations demanding the display of 
initiative, energy, and sound judgment from a military stand- 
point as well as administrative ability in handling civil matters. 

2 — 4.._ National War. — a. In small wars it can be expected that 
hostile forces in occupied territory will employ guerrilla warfare 
as a means of gaining their end. Accounts of recent revolutionary 
movements, local or general, in various parts of the world indicate 
that the youth of 18 or 20 years of age take active parts as organiz- 
ers in these disturbances. Consequently in campaigns of this 
nature the Force will be exposed to the action of this young and 
vigorous element. Rear installations and lines of communications 
will be threatened. Movements will be retarded by ambuscades, 
defiles barred, and every detachment presenting a tempting target 
will be harassed or attacked. In warfare of this kind members 
of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers, 
when it suits their fancy and convenience. In addition the Force 
will be handicapped by partisans, who constantly and accurately 
inform native forces of our movements. The population will be 
honey-combed with hostile sympathizers, making it difficult to pro- 
cure reliable information. Such difficulty will result either from the 
clever deceit used by the hostile sympathizers and agents, or the 
intimidation of friendly natives upon whom reliance might be 
placed to gain information. 

b. In cases of levees en masse where the whole people rise 
against the invading forces, the problem becomes particularly dif- 
ficult. This is especially true when the people are supported by a 
nucleus of disciplined and trained professional soldiers. This com- 
bination of soldier and armed civilian presents serious opposition 
to every move attempted by the Force; even the non-combatants 
conspire for the defeat of the Force. 

c. Opposition becomes more formidable when the terrain is 
difficult, and the resistance increases as the Force moves inland 
from its bases. Every native is a potential, clever, opponent who 
knows the country, its trails, resources, and obstacles, and who has 
friends and sympathizers on every hand. The Force may be obliged 
to move cautiously. Operations are based on information which is 
at best unreliable, while the natives enjoy continuous and accurate 
information. The Force after long and fatiguing marches fails to . 
gain contact and probably finds only a deserted camp, while their 
opponents, still enjoying the initiative, are able to withdraw or con- 
centrate strong forces at advantageous places for the purpose of 
attacking lines of communication, convoys, depots or outposts. 

d. It will be difficult and hazardous to wage war successfully 
under such circumstances. Undoubtedly it will require time and 
adequate forces. The occupying force must be strong enough to 



hold all the strategical points of the country, protect its communica- 
tions, and at the same time furnish an operating force sufficient to 
overcome the opposition wherever it appears. Again a simple 
display of force may be sufficient to overcome the resistance. While 
curbing the passions of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice 
and firmness should be exhibited. 

e. The difficulty is sometimes of an economical, political, or 
social nature and not a military problem in origin. In one recent 
campaign the situation was an internal political problem in origin, 
but it had developed to such a degree that foreign national interests 
were affected; simple orderly processes could no longer be applied 
when it had outgrown the local means of control. In another in- 
stance the problem was economic and social; great tracts of the 
richest land were controlled and owned by foreign interests; this 
upset the natural order of things; the admission of cheap foreign 
labor with lower standards of living created a social condition 
among the people which should have been remedied by orderly 
means before it reached a crisis. 

f. The application of purely military measures is not always 
calculated to restore peace and orderly government because the 
fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, 
political or social. These conditions may have originated years 
ago and in many cases have been permitted to develop freely with- 
out any attempt to apply corrective measures. An acute situation 
finally developes when conditions have reached a stage that is be- 
yond the control of the civil authorities and If~Ts~|oolate for dip- y 
lomatic adjustment. The solution of such problems being basically 

a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must 
be of secondary importance and should be applied only to such 
extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective 

g. The initial problem is to restore peace. There are many 
economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administra- 
tive, executive, and judicial functions of the government. These 
are completely beyond military power as such unless some form of 
military government is included in the campaign plan. Peace and 
industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate pro- 
visions for the economic welfare of the people. Moreover, produc- 
tive industry cannot be fully restored until there is peace. Con- 
sequently the remedy is found in emphasizing the corrective meas- 
ures to be taken in order to permit the orderly return to normal 

h. In general the plan of action includes a statement of the 
military measures to be applied including the part the forces of 
occupation will play in the economic and social solution of the 
problem. The same consideration must be given to the part to be 
played by local government and the civil population. The efforts 
of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to 
the attainment of the common end. 



i. Preliminary studies form the basis of plans to meet prob- 
able situations and should be prepared as far in advance as prac- 
ticable. They should thereafter be modified and developed as new 
situations arise. See Appendices Nos. 1 to 8. 

/ 2 — 5^ The Principles of War (Application). — a. The principles 
/ of war^as truly applicable to small war situations as to those 
of regular warfare. In such situations flexibility of mind and adroit- 
ness based on long experience and reflection enables the military 
leaders to readily adapt principles to actual situations rather than 
resorting to fixed methods of procedure. 

b. National policy and the plan of campaign dictate where 
to fight and why. Tactical principles are guides as to the "how" 
to fight. There are no hard and fast rules. Military art rests upon 
principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an 
active and skillful opponent. These principles are: Superiority, 
Movement, Objective, Offensive, Surpise, Security, Economy of 
Force, Cooperation, and Simplicity. 

2—6. Superiority. — -a. In small wars this principle is exercised 

by introducing and making the insurgents feels the intellectual and 
physical power of organized society and civilization. For psycho- 
logical reasons it is important to impress the natives with their 
weakness and the fact that the occupying forces intend to enforce 
the will of the intervening power in the accomplishment of its mis- 
sion. Extreme leniency and vacillation are accepted as a sign of 
weakness and half measures are indicative of a wavering policy. 

b. The guides for action in these campaigns are certain gen- 
eral principles rather than definite instructions. The underlying 
purpose of military literature and schooling is to show how a mili- 
tary force can develop the maximum power with the resources 
at its disposal under varying circumstances. This is modified in 
small wars in that it is often the purpose to have military action 
achieve its results with the minimum exercise of force. 

c. Frequently in this type of campaign the choice lies between 
dispersion of troops in many small detachments and the concentra- 
tion of troops in important localities for the purpose of control and 
coordinated effort. The former method often appeals to the non- 
military minds where lack of military training hardly permits an 
appreciation of the ineffectivenss of such dispositions. However, 
dispersion of force may be necessary and allowable in small wars, 
when it would not be justified in regular warfare. When dispersion 
is necessary the detachments should be so disposed with reference 
to time and space as to facilitate coordinated effort and move- 

d. Passive defense does not overcome the source of trouble 
but rather encourages the hostile elements. Initiative should be 
taken promptly and the source of the trouble eliminated. This im- 
plies a concentration of effort in simultaneous action rather than a 
concentration of numbers which may prove cumbersome in this 
type of operation. When large areas must be covered and the 
means are limited it may be advisable to deal effectively and 
systematically with separate districts in succession. 



2 — 7. Movement. — a. Irregular troops are free from the cum- 
bersome supply system and vulnerable lines of communication that 
usually hamper regulars, and thus possess extreme mobility. A 
strategic advantage is sought over this tactical mobility by the em- 
ployment of modern means of transportation. Troops are moved 
rapidly to the theater of operations by transports. Railway and 
motor transportation and aviation are utilized whenever practicable 
for transport, reconnaissance and combat purposes in all parts of 
the theater of operations. Increased use of the airplane for the 
transportation of troops and supplies may be anticipated in future 

b. Factors of time and space are important elements of the 
principle of "Movement." Correct decisions must be promptly made 
and appropriate orders and instructions issued without delay. 

c. In small wars the promptness of the action is often the 
decisive element rather than the force employed. If nipped in the 
bud, a subversive movement may be averted which might other- 
wise develop in unforeseen proportions and result in long drawn 
out operations. Prompt tactical dispositions and timely movement 
depend upon an efficient intelligence service, mobility, rapid means 
of communication, and the close cooperation of all the elements of 
the Force. 

d. Communications vitally affect rapidity of action and strat- 
egic mobility; they are closely related to "Movement" and should 
receive consideration in the application of that principle. Communi- 
cations play an important part in small wars. Napoleon said: "The 
secret of war is to preserve one's own communications while threat- 
ening those of the enemy." War, like every other collective enter- 
prise, requires coordination and concentration of effort to obtain 
the maximum results. For regular troops small wars are char- 
acterized by long and difficult communications which are vulnerable 
and hard to protect, while irregular forces are not bound to any 
fixed line of communications, since they live on the country and 
constantly change their theater of operations. Moreover, they are 
not dependent on any fixed base of supplies and are aided by native 

e. Small wars are generally wars of transportation for regu- 
lar f orces. The country is often primitive, unproductive and sparse- 
ly settled with little or no means of communication. An efficient 
system of supply and transportation is a paramount consideration, 
the installation of which involves difficulties not encountered in 
highly developed civilized countries. The solution of the problem 
demands initiative, resourcefulness and energy. The supply prob- 
lem plays an important part in the strategy of the campaign and 
calls for staff work of the highest order. See Appendix No. 7. 

2 — 8. Objective.— a. The national objective must be possible 
of attainment and should be altruistic as to purpose. The military 
objective should be closely related to, and materially complement- 
ary to the national objective. As long as the problem is not an 


entirely military one the military objectives sought should be those 
the attainment of which will most quickly and effectively gain the 
national objective with the least application of military force. When 
the problem is military, pure and simple, the usual military objec- 
tives are sought, viz., the destruction of the enemy in the field* 
The mission often includes the seizure of one or more important 

b. By studying the procedure necessary to gain the political 
objective, for example, "Establish a Military Government that 
will function according to local laws and customs," the method of 
gaining the military objective will suggest itself. Such military 
objectives, depending upon political, economic, and military con- 
ditions, may be the defeat of the enemy forces or the possession of 
vital geographical localities, which will materially contribute to the 
attainment of the national objective. When the possession of geo- 
graphical localities has not resulted in gaining the national objec- 
tive, and guerrilla warfare is undertaken by the opposition, there 
arises a most unpleasant and difficult phase of small wars. Geo- 
graphical objectives may be the capital of the country, important 
seaports, markets, political, industrial and religous centers, or a 
productive region. 

c. One of the great differences between small wars and regu- 
lar warfare is that in the former, military commanders are often 
required to deduce their mission from their knowledge of the foreign 
policy of the government and from the situation itself. In the 
latter case the mission is usually clearly defined in written instruc- 
tions or field orders. See Appendix No. 8. , 

d. In situations where the mission of the military leader has 
not been or cannot be clearly defined, care must be exercised that 
the Force does not assume responsibility beyond its authority or 
ability to execute. A state of law and order depends upon the wise 
and effective combination, and administration of the three branches 
of government : legislative, judicial, and executive. When the mis- 
sion consists in assisting the local authorities in restoring law and 
order, the primary responsibility lies with the civil government. 
The policing of a country, an executive responsibility, cannot be of- 
fective without the cooperation of all agencies. The laws must 
be just and operative, and the judicial system must function 
promptly and effectively in disposing of cases of individuals who 
have been apprehended for violating the laws. 

e. Generally the civil government continues to exercise auth- 
ority but finds its executive function impotent and the police or 
military forces inadequate. Unless some form of military govern- 
ment or martial law is established the occupying forces are only 
utilized "in aid to the civil power" and act as a moral and physical 
force in support of the civil authorities. 

f . The possession of the big cities produces an influence upon 
the political and economic affairs of a country which would never 
be obtained by the occupation of a great number of small towns. 



Accordingly the plan should include provisions for the occupation 
of the larger and more important cities, which are held as long as 
they serve the purpose of the occupation. Ordinarly their reten- 
tion increases the overhead and absorbs many men who are not 
available for active operations in other critical areas. Cities and 
towns should be held with the minimum force necessary to insure 
their security. 

g. Whether the mission is maintainance of the civil govern- 
ment or the establishment of some form of military government, 
the first task of the occupying troops is to provide protection for 
those areas or places which are essential to the security and con- 
duct of the civil or military government. It should always be borne 
in mind that the ultimate object is to establish order and to restore 
control to the civil power. See Appendix No. 8. 

2 — 9. Offensive.— a. Strategically a vigorous offensive cam- 
paign is not pursued in small wars as long as diplomacy predom- 
inates and endeavors to seek a solution. Even though operating on 
the strategical defense, the tactical offensive is sought when in 
active military contact with irregulars. In the absence of definitely 
selected objectives in guerrilla warfare, the occupying forces must 
be prepared to strike the guerilla forces wherever they may appear. 

b. In small wars offensive measures should consist of the 
judicious application of force, and in such amounts as to suppress 
lawlessness and to restore peaceful conditions. When armed hostile 
forces are encountered every lawful method and weapon should be 
employed for their defeat or capture. However, drastic punitive 
measures or reprisals should not be permitted. 

2—10. Surprise.— Psychological ascendency over the enemy is 
sought in all warfare but in none does it play a part so important, 
nor are its effect so far reaching, as in small wars. One of the 
prinicipal means of attaining this end is by surprise. Tactical as 
well as strategical surprise is sought. Irregulars appreciate the 
value of surprise and are past masters in its application. Surprise, 
which psychologically breaks the morale of guerrillas may bring a 
speedy conclusion to the hostilities. The irregular as an individual 
is often courageous but his morale is sensitive and vulnerable. The 
vulnerability of small units to attack from all directions make the 
principle of "Surprise" especially important, and likewise its corol- 
lary "Security." 

2—11. Security.— a. In small wars there must always be 
security against physical and moral forces. The intervening power 
encounters an antagonistic feeling, not only in the occupied country, 
but in other countries of racial kinship. These countries sympathize 
with the forces opposing the occupying forces no matter how al- 
truistic the purpose of the intervention or how illegal and unjust 
the cause of the opponents. They frequently lend their unofficial 
support to the opposition either from popular appeal or other ul- 
terior motives. It is the material and moral support from exterior 



sources which often sustain irregulars in the fields. In general 
the intervening power's security measures should be directed 
against this influence so as to ultimately block any outside support 
of the forces opposing the intervention. 

b. Since the causes of situations which result in small wars 
are usually political, social and economic, security should also be 
obtained by measures which promote the political stability of a 
democratic government and the social progress and economic in- 
dependence of its people. These measures are applied in so far as 
practicable through the friendly aid of the intervening government, 
and during the period of hostilities by the military authorities in 
the field. As a step in this direction, a military government may 
be established as a transitory phase in the establishment of stable 
government, during which the civil functions are supervised by the 
military authorities. When unemployment or other social disorders 
are a contributory factor to the situation, relief may be provided by 
the construction of public works, roads, etc. This will provide em- 
ployment for many, who formerly had joined the guerrillas through 
economic necessity rather than individual choice. 

2 — 12. Economy of Force. — a. The very nature of small wars 
demonstrates the application of the principle "Economy of Force." 
Our national policy calls for the minimum application of military 
force and the maximum effort by other means to attain the desired 
object. This is true prior to and during hostilities. To comply 
with this principle of war, the application of military force should 
be strong enough initially to execute the mission. Often the inter- 
vening military force will have to solve its problem with an in- 
adequate number of troops distributed over a wide field. If the 
commander is to carry out his mission under these circumstances, 
he must know how to economize his forces. 

b. In such situations, a commander might occupy a secondary 
or less important region of the main theater of operations with a 
minimum number of troops for the purpose of creating a diversion 
and thereby enticing the insurgents to divide their forces. Here 
the commander would operate generally on the defensive and resort 
only to the tactical offensive with limited objectives on advantage- 
ous occasions. The success of this plan would depend upon the with- 
drawal of a large part of the hostile forces from the main theater of 
operations. This would tend to relieve the pressure at critical points 
within the principal theater of operations, and facilitate the main 
operations, thus contributing materially to the general under- 

c. Particularly in mountainous country, roads and trails will 
control the direction of effort, the selection of positions and lines 
of withdrawal. In advancing upon a position, the hostile force may 
expose a flank which could be turned by small detachments. Such 
detachments profiting by the nature of the terrain could be much 
smaller than units assigned corresponding missions in regular war- 
fare. Likewise, when small detachments are pressed by the enemy, 



their withdrawal would be facilitated by operating in denies and 
in existing lateral passes. 

d. In situations where the occupying forces are numerically 
weaker than the insurgents and are required to hold or cover a 
large area, the strength and location of reserves must be carefully 
determined. The greater the area and the uncertainty of the situa- 
tion, the more important become the reserves. Reserves must be 
able to concentrate quickly at critical points, and their timely ar- 
rival will depend upon the early receipt of information and rapidity 
of movement. In future operations, it is believed the movement 
of reserves or reinforcements will be made by air transport in order 
to bring a superiority of forces against strong guerrilla groups. 
This is especially true in countries where there are practically no 

2 — 13. Cooperation.— a. A more or less serious difficulty in 
small wars is the question of authority. The State Department 
has not ceased to function in the problem and its agencies in the 
theatre of operations continue to exercise certain diplomatic author- 
ity. This authority may be represented and exercised by a min- 
ister, a minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, a per- 
sonal representative of the President, or a chairman of an electoral 
mission. The senior naval officer present, who is generally senior 
to the Marine officer, is also charged with certain responsibilities. 
The commanding officer of the occupying forces and of the native 
constabulary, if such exists, are also charged with certain specific 
tasks. In addition to these diplomatic and military agencies, the 
sovereignty of the state is probably still exercised by a civil gov- 
ernment. This multiplicity in authority and representation may 
give rise to many complications and render difficult unity of effort 
in the exercise of the governmental and military control. Such a 
situation calls for the greatest degree of cooperation. 

b. The planning and the attainment of national policies de- 
mands statesmanship of the highest order. This high order of 
statesmanship involves an intimate knowledge of the military capa- 
city of our country and its regular forces. In turn the military 
should have some knowledge of statesmanship and understanding of 
national policies insofar as they pertain to foreign relations. This 
mutual understanding is of vital importance in events which im- 
mediately precede ultimately culminate in major warfare, where 
the military assumes the mission when diplomatic measures have 

c. If this intimate understanding and cooperation is vital in 
pursuing policies which result in major warfare, it is likewise as 
equally important in following policies where small wars are a 
possible consequence. In the latter, the State Department and 
Naval authorities seek a joint solution. The obligation of mutual 
understanding devolves both upon the naval-military and the State 
Department authorities. In—this unity of purpose and common 
understanding, it is practicable to overcome one of the greatest 
obstacles in such situations, and more nearly approach the prin- 
ciple, "Unity of Command." 


2 — 13 — 14, Appendices, Chapter 2 

d. Civil authorities often continue to exercise their political 
functions, particularly during a friendly occupation or a modified 
form of military government. The closest cooperation should be 
maintained between the civil power and the military forces in order 
to give prestige and force to the actions of the former. A knowledge 
of the military point of view, and in general the military aspects of 
the problem, should eliminate many of the possible sources of fric- 
tion and facilitate cooperation in such cases. 

2 — 14. Simplicity. — Closely associated with the foregoing con- 
sideration of "Cooperation," and contributing to its success, is the 
principle of "Simplicity/' While the situation may appear com- 
plicated, its solution may be found in simple measures. Measures 
simple in themselves, but uncorrelated or conflicting with other 
measures may cause complications. All measures must be mutually 
supporting and coordinated. Where decentralization of command 
is an unavoidable inconvenience in small wars situations, the gen- 
eral plan must be simple and understood by all. 


Hoche in La Vendee, France. 

1. Mobile Columns — How did General Hoche cope with the 
heroic French people of La Vendee in 1794? A young general, a 
skillful politician and soldier, clearly perceived that he could no 
longer endeavor to conquer an enemy with whom it was impossible to 
grapple, and who was not to be reached by mere force of arms- He 
then adopted a system of mobile columns against his able 
opponent, Charatte. Hoche's heavily armed soldiers were obliged 
to carry everything with them; they did not know the country; 
they could not equal the speed of peasants carrying only 
their muskets but who were always certain of finding provisions 
wherever they went, and knew well the smallest ravines and the 
dreariest moors. Consequently Hoche ordered all pursuit to cease, 
and adopted a plan which, being followed by firmness and persever- 
ance, could hardly fail to restore peace to those desolated regions. 

2. Occupation of an Area. — In the first place he established 
some entrenched camps. He then formed a circular line supported 
by the Sevre and Loire, so as to progressively encircle the whole 
country. This line was composed of very strong posts, communi- 
cating with each other by patrols, in such a manner as to leave no 
free space by which an enemy, if at all numerous, could pass. These 
small post detachments were directed to occupy every township 
and village, and to disarm the inhabitants. To accomplish this, 
they were to seize the cattle, which usually grazed in common, and 
the corn reserved in the barns; they were also to arrest the prin- 
cipal inhabitants and by no means to restore the cattle and corn, or 
release the persons taken as hostages until the peasants should 
voluntarily surrender their arms. Now, as the Vendeans were 
more attached to their cattle and their corn than to the Bourbons 
and Ch matte, in due time the peasants surrendered their arms. 


Appendices, Chapter 2 

Spanish and Cuban Methods. 

1. Guerrilla Methods. — In all their wars of the 19th Century 
the Spanish forces conducted war in the guerrilla method. In the 
closing years they adopted the same method in Cuba. Mr. Morris 
says that "with a quarter of a million men at their command, 
Campos or Weyler should, one would think, have been able to con- 
struct a network of military roads from end to end of the island 
with no more effort than was expended in building forts and trochas. 
And with facilities provided for rapid movement in force, they 
should certainly have succeeded in keeping the small bodies of 
insurgents in check and in penetrating all their lurking places." 
Blockhouses were constructed across Cuba between the Provinces 
of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara a distance of less than fifty 
miles, on ground little above sea level and with the flanks resting 
in the tangled mangrove swamps of the coast. 

2. Haphazard Operations. — The Spanish-Cuban War in 1898 
teaches us a lesson of how not to attempt to solve the problem of 
subduing a country like Cuba. It was densely wooded and it pos- 
sessed no roads, except bush paths connecting various towns. The 
Cuban insurgents were intelligent, determined men, and well armed. 
They instituted guerrilla- warfare, and that of reprisals; the in- 
surgents one day became in outward appearance the peaceful 
husbandman of the following. The Spaniards had no plan. Opera- 
tions were haphazard. Large garrisons were quartered all over 
the country, and long lines of communications had to be guarded. 
Columns traversed the country looking for the enemy, who 
harassed them, and cut off stragglers; constant executions with 
their inevitable reprisals embittered the conflict. Finally after three 
years the United States intervened. 

3. Blockhouse System. — The Spanish in Cuba constructed 
lines or blockhouses across the island. They sent out one hundred 
thousand men to Cuba in a short time, but these were held in 
check by Maceo and Gomez and others, with, at the most, thirty 
thousand men. Therefore, the Trocha system (as they called it), 
or blockhouse system (as we call it), failed in Cuba. 


Bugeaud in North Africa. 

Blockhouse System. — Bugeaud applies the Blockhouse System to 
North Africa. — In 1925 they had blockhouses every 600 to 1000 
yards along the 90 kilometers of the Tangier-Tetuan road in Spanish 
Morocco, wired in and manned by one NCO and eight men. At night 
men remained in the blockhouses and in case of attack they would 
telephone the large sector camp for help. The men remained out 
for fifteen days and then went to the sector camp for two months. 
These posts were very vulnerable and many troops were required by 


Appendices, Chapter 2 

this method of operations. The Boer General De Wet repudiates 
the idea that this is an efficient method. He says that if the same 
number of men and amount of energy had been expended in other 
directions the Boer War would have been over very much sooner; 
but other authorities are not of the same opinion. 


The Peninsular War. 

Levees en Masse. — The Peninsular War may be studied to learn the 
obstacles which an invading force may encounter in the occupation 
or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. The examples 
of Henry IV in the wars of the Holy League, of Marshal Berwick 
in Catalonia of Suchet in Aragon and Valencia all present profitable 

The Philippines. 

Untrained Troops. — In the Philippines there about 20,000 American 
troops at Manila, of whom some 2,000 were regular. The remainder, 
were quite untrained; they could march in fours, and that was 
about all. If the Filipino instead of being a very poor fighter had 
been a superior type, well organized and armed, the story of that 
campaign might have been altogether different. 


Internal Disturbance. 

Guerrilla Methods. — A quotation from a book written by Two 
Burgers entitled "The Mobile Boer" gives good food for thought. 
"Five hundred desperate men, armed with rifles using the same 
ammunition as the government, placed in Colorado, with two 
machine guns, and led by men knowing such warfare and country, 
could cause the mobilization of the American Army, form the 
inhabitants in posses, terrorize the whole West, inflict millions of 
dollars damage in life and railroad property, and finally, if necessary, 
escape over the borders without capture, to return when those 
slower moving states, with more limited resources pressed them. 
A force of men with a price on their head, or desperate from other 
causes, familiar with horses and camp life, and in sufficient num- 
bers to sweep by or capture an outpost, present possibilities far 
more formidable than the Apaches which the American government 
had so much trouble to suppress." 



Railroad Destruction. — The commission of sabotage in the nature 
of destruction of railroads in Manchuria by irregulars is a constant 
source of trouble to the Japanese. During the operations in Santo 


Appendices, Chapter 2 

Domingo in 1916 two Marine columns were marching on Santiago 
from Monte Christi and Puerto Plata. The insurgents had de- 
stroyed bridges, parts of the road bed and rolling stock, these being 
a necessary part of the transportation and communication system 
of the advancing columns ; repairs were satisfactorily made and the 
military transportation units were manned by Marines. 

1. Nicaragua. — The mission assumed by the military commander 
in Nicaragua was to assist in establishing order and to gurantee free 
and fair elections. The primary military objective determined 

upon under the situation existing was the hostile force. Neither I 
the possession of the capital and important towns and the patrolling 
of rich agricutural districts prevented Sandino's bands from making 
raids on peaceful citizens and foreigners and their property. The 
only effective means of accomplishing the mission was the destruc- 
tion or neutralization of Sandino's force. Some criticize the advisa- 
bility of selecting so elusive and indefinite an objective considering 
the vast expanse of territory to be covered and the meager means 
available; a maximum of about 5500 to cover about 50,000 square 
miles of territory, when the irregulars had ready access to asylum 
in an adjacent state. The propriety in choosing the objective in 
this case appears to have depended upon the interpretation of 
exactly what constitutes a state of order, and guarantee of free 
and fair elections. 

2. Mexico. — In the Marine Corps expedition to the West 
Coast of Mexico in 1915 the objective was the springs and watering 
places so vital to the Yaqui Indians. 

3. Dominican Republic. — The immediate objective of the 
flying column from Monte Christi in 1916 was the important city 
Santiago. The defeat of the rebel forces which attempted to 
block the progress of the column at Las Trencheras on June 27 
and at Guayacanes on July 3 was simply incidental thereto. 




8108 (l) MCS QUANTICO, VA. 2-1 1-37-300 


Quantico, Virginia 

1935 Revision 
Psychology in Small Wars 


Introduction tf 3-1 

Policy of the United States 3-2 

Study of Characteristics 3-3 

Fundamental Considerations 3-4 

Revolutionary Tendencies 3-5 

Basic Instincts 3-6 

Our Attitude and Bearing 3-7 

Native Troops, Civil Guards and Levies 3-8 

Foreign Nationals 3-9 

Training of Forces for Small Wars 3-10 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U. S. Naval or Military 



3 — 1. Introduction. — -a. While it is improbable that a knowl- 
edge of psychology will make any change in the fundamentals of 
conduct of small wars, it will however, lead to a more intelligent 
application of the principles which we now follow more or less un- 
consciously through custom established by our predecessors. 

b. Psychology has always played an important part in war. 
This knowledge was important in ancient wars of masses; it be- 
comes more so on the modern battlefield, with widely dispersed 
forces and the complexity of many local operations by small groups, 
or even individuals, making up the sum total of the operation. 
In former times the mass of enemy troops, like our own, was visible 
to and under the immediate control of its leaders. Now troops 
are dispersed in battle and not readily visible, and we must under- 
stand the psychology of the individual, who operates beyond the 
direct control of his superiors. 

c. This difficulty of immediate control and personal influence 
is even more pronounced and important in small wars, on account 
of the decentralized nature of these operations. This fact is further 
emphasized because in small wars we are dealing not only with 
our own forces, but also with the civil population which frequently 
contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic sentiments. The 
very nature of our own policy and attitude towards the opposing 
forces and normal contacts with them enable the personnel of the 
Marine Force to secure material advantages through the knowl- 
edge and application of psychological principles. 

d. This knowledge does not come naturally to the average 
individual. A study of men and human nature supplemented by 
a thorough knowledge of the theory should enable those faced 
with concrete situations of this type to avoid the ordinary mis- 
takes. The application of the principles of psychology in small 
wars is quite different from their normal application in major 
warfare or even in troop leadership. The aim is not to develop 
a belligerent spirit in our men but rather one of caution, steadiness, 
instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose 
by diplomacy. A Force Commander who gains his objective in a 
small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success 
than one who has resorted to the use of arms. While endeavoring 
to avoid the infliction of physical harm to any native, there^is 
always the necessity of preventing, as far as possible, any casualties 
among our own troops ; this is always a primary consideration. 

e. This is the policy with which our troops are indoctrinated ; 
a policy which governs throughout the period of intervention and 
finds exception only in those situations where a resort to arms and 
the exercise of a belligerent spirit are necessary. This mixture of 
combined peaceful and warlike temperament, where adapted to any 
single operation, demands an application of psychology beyond the 
requirements of regular warfare. Our troops at the same time 
are dealing with a strange people whose racial origin, and whose 
social, political, physical and mental characteristics may be differ- 
ent from any before encountered. 



f. The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It 
is usually a project dealing with the social, economic and mental 
development of a people. It is of primary importance that the 
fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the 
situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, 
political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study 
the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced ; the most 
practical method of solving the problem is to understand the pos- 
sible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected 
from any actions which may be contemplated. By this study and 
the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls 
may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured. 

g. The great importance of psychology in small wars must 
be appreciated. It is a field of unlimited extent and possibilities 
to which much time and study should be devoted. It cannot be 
stated in rules and learned like mathematics. Human reactions 
cannot be reduced to an exact science, but there are certain prin- 
ciples, which should guide our conduct. These principles are de- 
duced by studying the history of a people and are mastered only 
by experience in their practical application. 

3 — 2. Policy of the United States.-— Formulation of foreign 
policy in our form of government is not a function of the military. 
Relations of the United States with foreign states are controlled 
by the executive and legislative branches of the government. These 
policies are of course binding upon the forces of intervention, 
and in the absence of more specific instructions the commander in 
the field looks to them for guidance. For this reason all officers 
should familiarize themselves with current policies. A knowledge 
of the history of interventions, and the displays of force and other 
measures short of war employed by our government in the past', 
are essential to a thorough comprehension of our relations with 
foreign states in so far as these matters are concerned. 

3 — 3. Study of Characteristics. — The correct application of the 
principles oKpsychology to any given situation requires a knowl- 
edge of the traits peculiar to the persons being dealt with. The in- 
dividual characteristics as well as the national psychology are 
subjects for intensive study. This subject assumes increasing im- 
portance in minor operations. A failure to use tact when required 
or a lack of firmness at a crucial moment might readily precipitate 
a situation that could have been avoided had the commander been 
familiar with the customs, religion, morals, and education of those 
with whom he was dealing. The scope of this publication permits 
only a very limited discussion of this subject. The student must 
not infer that this is any indication of its relative unimportance; 
but rather that collateral reading of appropriate textbooks and 
geographical monographs will emphasize the value of the basic prin- 
ciples set forth herein. 

3 — 4 Fundamental Considerations.— -The resistance to an inter- 
vention comes not only from those under arms, but also from those 
furnishing material or moral support to the opposition. Sapping 



the strength of the actual or potential hostile ranks by the judicious 
application of psychological principles may be just as effective as 
battle casualties. The particular methods and extent of the applica- 
tion of this principle will vary widely with the situation. Some 
of the fundamental policies applicable to almost any situations 

1. Social customs such as class distinctions, dress and 
similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration. 

2. Political affiliations or the appearance of political favor- 
itism shoud be avoided ; while a thorough knowledge of the political 
situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be 

3. A respect for religious customs and the cultivation of 
friendly relations with church officials is the least that can be ex- 
pected of the military. Indifference in such matters can only be 
regarded as lack of tact. 

3 — 5. Revolutionary Tendencies. — a. In the past, most of our 
interventions have taken place when a revolution was in full force 
or the spirit of revolution was rampant. In view of these conditions 
(which are so often encountered in small wars) it may be well to 
study briefly some of the characteristics of revolutions. 

b. The knowledge of a people at any given moment of history 
involves an understanding of their environment, and above all, 
their past. The influence of racial psychology on the destiny of a 
people appears plainly in the history of those subject to perpetual 
revolutions. When composed largely of mixed races, that is to 
say, of individuals whose diverse heredities have dissociated their 
ancestral characteristics, those populations have little stability. 
This class is always difficult to govern, if not ungovernable, owing 
to the absence of a fixed character. On the other hand sometimes 
a people who have been under a rigid form of government may 
effect the most violent revolutions. Not having succeeded in de- 
veloping progressively, or in adapting themselves to changes of 
environment, they are likely to react violently when such adapta- 
tion becomes indispensable. 

c. Revolution is the term generally applied to sudden political 
changes, but the expression may be employed to denote any sudden 
transformation whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines. Political 
revolutions ordinarly result from real or fancied grievances, exist- 
ing the minds of men, but many other causes may produce them. 
The word "discontent" sums them up. As soon as discontent be- 
comes general a party is formed which often becomes strong enough 
to offer resistance to the government. The success of a revolution 
often depends on gaining the assistance of the regular armed 
forces, or at least a promise of their neutrality. However, it some- 
times happens that the movement commences without the knowl- 
edge of the armed forces, and not infrequently has its very incep- 
tion within these forces. Revolutions may take place in the capitals, 
and by contagion spread through the country. In other instances 
the general disaffection of the people takes concrete form in some 



place remote from the capital and when it has gathered momentum, 
moves on the capital. It is sometimes the army itself which effects 
the revolution. 

d. The rapidity with which a revolution develops is made pos- 
sible by modern communication facilities and publicity methods. 
Trivial attendant circumstances often play highly important roles 
in contributing to revolution, and must be observed closely and 
given appropriate consideration. The fact is that beside the great 
events of which history treats, there are the innumerable little 
facts of daily life which the casual observer may fail to see. These 
facts individually may be insignificant. Collectively their volume 
and power may threaten the existence of the government. The 
study of the current history of unstable countries should include 
the proper evaluation of all human tendencies. Local newspapers 
and current periodicals are probably the most valuable sources 
for the study of present psychological trends of various nations. 
Current writings of many people of different classes is not a collec- 
tion of opinions of a single individual but, on the contrary, a history 
of what the people are doing, and thinking and the motives for their 
acts. Thus current periodicals, newspapers, etc., will more ac- 
curately portray a cross-section of the character of the people. 

e. Governments often almost totally fail to sense the temper 
of their people. The inability of a government to comprehend ex- 
isting conditions coupled with its blind confidence in its own 
strength frequently results in remarkably weak resistance to attack 
from within. 

f. The outward events of revolutions are always a conse- 
quences of changes, often unobserved, which have gone slowly for- 
ward in men's minds. Any profound understanding of a revolution 
necessitates a knowledge of the mental soil in which the ideas that 
direct its course have to germinate. Changes in mental attitude 
are slow and hardly perceptible; often they can be seen only by 
comparing the character of the people at the beginning and at the 
end of a given period. 

g. A revolution is rarely the result of a widespread con- 
spiracy among the people. Usually it is not a movement which 
embraces a very large number of people or which calls into play 
deep economic or social motives. Revolutionary armies seldom 
reach any great size ; they rarely need to in order to succeed. The 
military force of the government on the other hand is generally 
small, ill equipped and poorly trained; not infrequently part of it, 
if not all, proves disloyal in a political crisis. 

h. The majority of the people, especially in the rural districts, 
dislike and fear revolutions, which often involve forced military 
service for themselves and destruction of their livestock and their 
farm produce. However, they may be so accustomed to mis-govern- 
ment and exploitation that concerted effort to check disorderly 
tendencies of certain leaders never occurs to them. It is this mass 
ignorance and indifference rather than any disposition to turbu- 
lence in the nation as a whole, which has prevented the establish- 
ment of stable government in many cases. 



i. Abuses by the officials in power and their oppression of 
followers of the party not in power, are often the seeds of revolu- 
tion. The spirit which causes the revolution arouses little en- 
thusiasm among the poor natives at large unless they are person- 
ally affected by such oppression. The revolution, once started, 
naturally attracts all of the malcontents and adventurous elements 
in the community. The revolution may include many followers, 
but its spirit emanates from a few leaders. These leaders furnish 
the spark without which there would be no explosion. Success de- 
pends upon the enthusiasm and determination of those who inspire 
the movement. Under effective leadership the mass will be steeped 
in revolutionary principles, and imbued with a submission to the 
will of the leader and an enthusiastic energy to perform acts in 
support thereof. Finally, they feel that they are the crusaders 
for a new deal which will regenerate the whole country. 

j. How is this situation to be met? A knowledge of the laws 
relating to the psychology of crowds is indispensible to the inter- 
pretation of the elements of revolutionary movements, and to their 
conduct. Each individual of the crowd, based on the mere fact 
that he is one of many, senses an invincible power which at once 
nullifies the feeling of personal responsibility. This spirit of in- 
dividual irresponsibility, and loss of identity must be overcome by 
preventing the mobilization or concentration of revolutionary forces 
and by close supervision of the actions of individuals. 

k. Another element of mob sentiment is imitation. This is 
particularly true in people of a low order of education. Attempt 
should be made to discourage or prevent the development of a 
hero of the revolutionary movement and none should be permitted 
to become a martyr to the cause. Members of a crowd also display 
an exaggerated independence. 

1. The method of approaching the problem should be to exert 
effort to make revolutionary acts non-paying or non-beneficial and 
at the same time endeavor to remove or remedy the causes or con- 
ditions responsible for the revolution. One obstacle in dealing with 
a revolution lies in the difficulty of determining the real cause of 
the trouble. When found it is often disclosed as a minor fault of 
the simplest nature. Then the remedies are also simple. 

m. The opposing forces may employ modern weapons and 
technique adapted to regular organized units, but the character of 
the man who uses these weapons remains essentially the same as 
it always was. The acts of a man are determined by his character ; 
and to understand or predict the action of a leader or a people their 
character must be understood. Their judgements or decisions 
are based upon their intelligence and experience. Unless a revolu- 
tionary leader can be discountenanced in the eyes of his followers, 
and still retain a controlling force with which to carry on negoti- 
ations, it may be best to admit such leadership. Through him a 
certain discipline may be exercised which will control the actions of 
a revolutionary army ; for without discipline, people and armies be- 
come barbarian hordes. 



n. Revolutionary forces are generally new levies, poorly 
trained, organized and equipped, and therefore are limited to simple 
maneuver of close formations. Yet they can often be imbued with 
an ardent enthusiasm and are capable of heroism to the extent of 
giving their lives unhesitantingly in support of their beliefs. 

3 — 6. Basic Instincts.— -a. It is perfectly natural that the in- 
stinct of self-preservation should be constantly at work. This 
powerful influence plays an important part in the attitude of the 
native in small wars. It is not surprising that any indication of 
intervention or interposition will prompt his instinct of self-preser- 
vation to oppose this move. Every means should be employed to 
convince such people of the altruistic intentions of our govern- 

b. Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in man. 
Among primitive people not far removed from an oppressed or en- 
slaved existence, it is easy to understand the peoples' fear of 
being again enslaved; fear of political subjugation causes violent 
opposition to any movement which apparently threatens political 
or personal liberty. 

c. Another basic instinct of man is self-assertion. This is a 
desire to be considered worthy among his fellow beings. Life for 
the individual centers around himself. The individual values his 
contacts as good or bad according to how he presumes he has been 
treated and how much consideration has been given to his own 
merits. This instinct inspires personal resentment if his effort is 
not recognized. Pride, which is largely self-assertion, will not 
tolerate contradiction. Self-respect includes also the element of 
self -negation which enables one to judge his own qualities and pro- 
fit by the example, precept, advise, encourage/ approval, or dis- 
approval of others. It admits capacity to do wrong, since it accepts 
the obligation of social standards. In dealing with foreign peoples 
credit should be readily accorded where merited and undue criti- 
cism avoided. 

d. There are also people and indivduals whose instinctive re- 
action in contact with external influence is that of self-submission. 
Here is found a people who, influenced by the great power of the 
United States, are too willing to shirk their, individual responsi- 
bility and are too ready to let others shoulder the full responsibility 
for restoring and, still worse, maintaining order and normalcy. 
On this event, if the majority of the natives are thus inclined, the 
initial task is quite easy, but difficulty arises in attempting to re- 
turn the responsibility to those to whom it rightfully belongs. As 
little local responsibility as possible to accomplish the mission 
should be assumed, while the local government is encounraged to 
carry its full capacity of responsibility. Any other procedure weak- 
ens the sovereign state, complicating the relationship with and pro- 
longing the military occupation. 

e. States are naturally very proud of their sovereignty. Na- 
tional policy demands minimum interference with that sovereignty. 
On occasion there is clash of opinion between the military and local 



civil power in a given situation and the greatest tact and diplomacy 
is required to bring the local political authorities to the military 
point of view. When the matter is important final analysis may 
require resort to more vigorous methods. Before a compromise 
is attempted, it should be clearly understood that such action does 
not sacrifice all the advantages of both of the opposing opinions. 

f. The natives are also proud individually. One should not 
award any humiliating punishment or issue orders which are un- 
necessarily hurtful to the pride of the inhabitants. In the all im- 
portant interest of discipline, the invention and infliction of such 
punishments no matter how trivial must be strictly prohibited in 
order to prevent the bitterness which would naturally ensue. 

g. By the same token pride should be maintained in our 
forces. No gentleman will carry his saddle between house and 
corral. Natives consider it degrading for a traveller to blacken 
his own shoes. If Marines do menial labor in some countries the 
natives think that they are of the same social strata as the laboring 
class there. This makes the position of enlisted men more difficult 
in commanding the respect of the upper native class, and it is gen- 
erally with this class the military force deals. It is not in 
tended to intimate that Marines are to be relieved from their mili- 
tary duties and responsibilities. 

h. In revolutions resort may be had to sabotage. Unless the 
circumstances demand otherwise, the repair of damage should be 
done by civilian or prison labor. This will have a more unfavor- 
able psychological effect on the revolutionists, than if the occupy- 
ing forces were employed to repair the damage. 

i. Inhabitants of countries with a high rate of illiteracy have 
many child-like characteristics. In the guidance of the destinies 
of such people, the more that one shows a fraternal spirit, the 
easier will be the task and the more effective the results. It is mani- 
festly unjust to judge such people by our standards. In listening 
to peasants relate a story, under oath or not, or given a bit of in- 
formation, it may appear that they are tricky liars trying to de- 
ceive or hide the truth, because they do not tell a coherent story. 
It should be understood that these illiterate and uneducated people 
live close to nature. The fact that they are simple and highly 
imaginative and that their background is based on some mystic 
form of religion, gives rise to unusual kinds of testimony. It be- 
comes a tedious responsibility to elicit the untarnished truth. This 
requires patience beyond words. The same can not be said for all 
the white collar, scheming politicans of the city who are able to dis- 
tinguish between right and wrong; consistently disrespectful of 
veracity, some are unable to tell the truth. 

j. The "underground" or "grapevine" method of communica- 
tion is an effective means of transmitting information and rumors 
with unbelievable rapidity among the natives. When events hap- 
pen in one locality which may bring objectionable reprecussions in 
another upon recepit of information, it is well to be prepared to 
expect the speedy transmission of that knowledge even in spite of 
every effort to keep it localized or confidential. 



^ k. Often natives refuse to give any information, and the un- 
initiated might immediately presume that they are members of the 
hostile forces or at least hostile sympathizers. While the peasant 
hopes for the restoration of peace and order, the constant menace 
and fear of these guerrillas is so overpowering that he does not 
dare to place any confidence in an occasional visiting patrol of the 
occupying forces. When the patrol leader demands information, 
the peasant should not be misjudged for failure to comply with the 
request, when by so doing, he is signing his own death warrant. 

1. Actual authority must not be exceeded in demanding in- 
formation. A decided advantage of having military government 
or martial law is to give the military authorities the power to bring 
legal, summary, and exemplary punishment to those who give false 
information. Another advantage of such government is the auth- 
ority to require natives to carry identification cards on their per- 
sons constantly. It has been found that the average native is not 
only willing and anxious, but proud to carry some paper signed 
by a military authority to show that he is recognized. The satis- 
faction of this psychological peculiarity and, what is more import- 
ant or practical, its exploitation to facilitate the identity of natives 
is a consideration of importance. This also avoids most of the hu- 
miliating and otherwise unproductive process often resorted to in 
attempting to identify natives or their possible relationship to the 
opposing forces. 

m. There are peoples among whom the spirit of self-sacrifice 
does not exist to the extent found among more highly civilized 
peoples or among races with fanatical tendencies. This may ac- 
count for the absence of the individual bravery in the attack or 
assault by natives even where their group has a great preponder- 
ance of numbers ; among certain peoples there is not the individual 
combat, knifing, machete attacks by lone men which one encounters 
among others. This may be due to the lack of medical care pro- 
vided, lack of recognition for personal bravery, or lack of provision 
for care of dependents in case of injury or death. Psychological 
study of the people should take this matter into consideration and 
the organization, tactics and security measures must be adapted 

n. It is customary for some people to attempt to place their 
officials under obligation to them by offering gifts, or gratuitous 
services of different kinds. This is their custom and they will 
expect it to prevail among others. No matter how innocent ac- 
ceptance may be, and in spite of the determination that it shall 
never influence subsequent actions or decisions, it is best not to 
be a party to any such petty bribery. Another common result of 
such a transaction is that the native resorts to this practice among 
his own people to indicate that he is in official favor and ignorant 
individuals on the other hand believe it. Needless to say, when it 
is embarrassing, or practically impossible to refuse to accept a gift 
or gratuity, such acceptance should not influence subsequent de- 



o. Sometimes the hospitality of the natives must be accepted, 
and it is not intended to imply that this should not be done on ap- 
propriate occasions. On the contrary, this social intercourse is 
often fruitful of a better mutual understanding. Great care must 
be exercised that such contacts are not limited to the people of any 
social group or political party. This often leads to the most serious 
charges of discrimination and favoritism which even though un- 
true, will diminish the respect, confidence, and support of all who 
feel that they are not among the favored. If opportunities are not 
presented they should be created to clearly demonstrate to all that 
contacts are not discriminatory and that opinions and actions are 
absolutely impartial. 

3 — 7. Attitude and Bearing.— a. Officers and men serving in 
small wars must be men of high character and unquestioned ability 
who inspire and deserve confidence. An acquaintance with the 
character of the people and a command of their language are great 
assets. Political methods and motives which govern the action of 
natives and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the 
average North American, are practically beyond the understanding 
of persons who do not speak their language, and an official is thus 
barred from association with any but the small portion of the popu- 
lation that speaks English. If not already familiar with the lan- 
guage, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should 
study and acquire a working knowledge of it. 

b. Lack of exact information is normal in these operations, 
as is true in all warfare. Lack of information does not justify 
withholding orders when needed, nor taking action when the situa- 
tion demands it. The extent to which the intelligence service can 
obtain information depends largely on the attitude adopted towards 
the loyal and neutral population. The natives must be made to 
realize the seriousness of withholding information but at the same 
time they must be protected from terroism. 

c. From the very nature of the operation, it is apparent that 
military force can not be applied at the stage that would be most 
advantageous from a tactical viewpoint. Usually turbulent situa- 
tions become extremely critical before the government feels justi- 
fied in taking overt action. Therefore, it is of the utmost import- 
ance to determine the exact moment when the decision of a com- 
mander should be applied. In a gradually developing situation the 
"when" is often the essence of the decision. Problems that will 
illustrate the results of too hasty or too tardy decisions will be of 
value in developing thought along these lines. The force commander 
should determine his mission and inform all subordinates accord- 
ingly. Commands should be kept fully informed of any modifica- 
tion of the mission. 

d. Subordinate commanders cannot make logical decisions, 
nor act strictly in accordance with the desires of the commander, 
if they do not have this information. For the subordinate com- 
mander, the decision may be to determine the status of the situa- 
tion when he would be justified in opening fire. For example, the 
patrol leader makes contact with a known hostile camp and at the 



last moment finds that women camp followers are present in the 
camp. Shall he fire into the group ? In so far as it is practicable, 
subordinate military leaders should be aided in making such de- 
cisions by previously announced policies and instructions. 

e. Delay in the use of force and hesitation to accept responsi- 
bility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will 
always be interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will en- 
courage further disorder, and will eventually necessitate measures 
more severe than those which would have sufficed in the first in- 
stance. When armed bodies are encountered opposing the occupy- 
ing forces, troops employ ordinary methods and weapons necessary 
for their defeat or capture ; but drastic punitive measures to induce 
surrender, or action in the nature of reprisals, may awaken sym- 
pathy with the revolutionists. Reprisals and punitive measures 
may result in the destruction of lives and property of innocent 
people and such measures may have an adverse effect upon the dis- 
cipline of our own troops. Good judgment in dealing with such 
problems calls for constant and careful surveillance. In extreme 
cases, a commanding officer may be forced to resort to some mild 
form of reprisal to keep men from taking more severe action on 
their own initiative. However even this action is taken with the 
full knowledge of possible repercussions. 

f . In dealings with the natives, only orders which are lawful, 
specific, and couched in clear, simple language should be issued. 
They should be firm and just, not impossible of execution nor cal- 
culated to work needless hardship upon the recipient. It is well to 
remember this later injunction in formulating all orders but es- 
pecially in those dealing with the natives. They may be the first 
to sense that order in working a needless hardship upon them, and 
instead of developing their support, friendship and respect, the 
opposite effect may result. 

g. An important consideration in dealing with the native 
population in small wars is the psychological approach. A study 
of the racial and social characteristics of the people is made to de- 
termine whether to approach them directly or indirectly, or employ 
both means simultaneously. Shall the approach be by means of 
decisions, orders, personal appeals or admonitions, unconcealed 
effort, or administrative control, all of which are calculated to at- 
tain the desired end? Or shall indirect methods of outflanking 
rather than a frontal attack, by subtle inspiration, propaganda 
through suggestion by devious means, or undermining the influ- 
ential leaders of the opposition be attempted ? Direct methods will 
naturally create come antagonism and encourage certain obstruc- 
tion, but if these methods of approach are successful the result 
may be more speedily attained. Indirect approach, on the other 
hand, might require more time for accomplishment, but the result 
may be equally effective and probably with less of the subsequent 
regrettable bitterness. 

h. Propaganda plays its part in approach to the people in 
small wars, since people usually will respond to indirect suggestion 
but may revolt against direct suggestion. The strength of sugges- 
tion is dependent upon the following factors: 



(1) Last impression — that is, of several impressions, the 
last is most likely to be acted upon. 

(2) Frequency — that is, repetitions, not one after another, 
but intervals separated by other impressions. 

(3) Repetition — this is distinguished from frequency by 
being repetitions, one after the other, without having other kinds 
of impressions interpersed. 

(4) The strongest suggestion is obtained by a combination 
of "frequency" and "last impressions." Propaganda at home also 
plays its part in the public support of small wars. An ordinary 
characteristics of small wars is the antagonistic propaganda against 
the campaign or operations in the United States press or legisla- 
ture. One cannot afford to ignore the possibilities of propaganda. 
Many authorities believe that the Marine Force should restrict 
publicity to a minimum in order to prevent the spread of unfavor- 
able and antagonistic propaganda at home. However, it is believed 
that when representatives of the press demand specific information, 
it should be given to them, if it is not of a confidential nature or 
such as will jeopardize the mission. Sometimes Marines are press- 
ed with questions: "Why are you here?" etc. The best method to 
follow when a question of public policy is involved, is to refer the 
individual to appropriate civil authorities. 

i. There is an axiom in regular warfare to strike the hardest 
where the going is the easiest. In small wars, it is well to strike 
most vigorously and relentlessly when the going is the easiest. 
When the opponents are on the run, give them no peace or rest, or 
time to make further plans. Try to avoid leaving a few straggling 
leaders in the field at the end, who with their increased mobility, 
easier means of evasion, and determination to show strength, at- 
tempt to revive interest by bold strokes. At this time, public opin- 
ion shows little patience in the interprise, and accepts less explana- 
tion for the delay necessary to bring the operation to a close. 

j. In street fighting against mobs or rioters, the effect of 
fire is generally not due to the casualties but due to the fact that it 
demonstrates the determination of the authorities. Unless the use 
of fire is too long delayed, a single round often is all that is neces- 
sary to carry conviction. Naturally one attempts to accomplish his 
mission without firing ; when at the critical moment all such means 
have failed, then one must fire. One should not make threat with- 
out the intention to carry it out and one should not shoot except to 
hit. Do not fire without giving specific warning. Fire without 
specific warning is only justified when the mob is actively endanger- 
ing life or property. In disturbances or riots when a mob has been 
ordered to disperse, it must be feasible for the mob to disperse. 

k. Military interventions are actually police functions al- 
though warlike operations often ensue. There is always the pos- 
sibility of domestic disturbances getting beyond the control of 
local police. Hence the necessity of employing regular forces as a 
reserve or reinforcements for varying periods after the restoration 
of normal conditions. 



1. The personal pride, uniform and bearing of the Marines, 
their dignity, courtesy, consideration, language and personality will 
have an important effect on the civilian attitude toward the forces 
of occupation. In a country, for example, where the wearing of a 
coat, like wearing shoes, is the outward and unmistakable sign of 
a distinct social classification, it is quite unbecoming for officers 
who accept the hospitality of the native club for a dance, whether 
local ladies and gentlemen are in evening clothes or not, to appear 
in their khaki shirts. It appears that the United States and their 
representatives have lost a certain amount of prestige when they 
place themselves in the embarrasing position of receiving a cour- 
teous note from a people ordinarily considered backward, inviting 
attention to this impropriety. On the other hand, care should be 
exercised not to humiliate the natives. They are usually proud and 
humiliation wil cause resentment which will have an unfavorable 
reaction. Nothing should be said or done which implies inferiority 
of the status or of the sovereignty of the native people. They 
should never be treated as a conquered people. 

m. Often the military find themselves in the position of ar- 
biters in differences between rival political factions. This is com- 
mon in service on electoral missions. The individual of any faction 
believes himself in possession of the truth and cannot refrain from 
affirming that anyone who does not agree with him is entirely in 
error. Each will attest to the dishonest intentions or stupidity of 
the other and will attempt by every possible means to carry his 
point of view irrespective of its merits. They are excitable beings 
and prone to express their feelings forcibly. They are influenced 
by personal partiality based upon family or political connections 
and friendship. Things go by favor. Though they may appear 
brusque at times they feel a slight keenly, and they know how 
to respect the susceptabilities of their fellows. 

n. In some revolutions, particularly of economic origin, the 
followers may be men in want of food. A hungry man will not 
be inclined to listen to reason and will resort to measures more dar- 
ing and desperate than under normal conditions. This should be 
given consideration, when tempted to burn or otherwise destroy 
private property or stores of the guerrillas. 

o. In the interior there are natives who have never been ten 
miles from their homes, who seldom see strangers and less a white 
man or a foreigner. They judge the United States and the ideals 
and standards of its people by the conduct of its representatives. 
It may be no more than a passing patrol whose deportment or lan- 
guage is judged, or it may be fairness in the purchase of a bunch of 
bananas. The policy of the United States is to pay for value re- 
ceived and prompt payment of a reasonable price for supplies or 
services rendered should be made in every instance. Although the 
natives of the capitals or towns may have a greater opportunity 
to see foreigners and the forces of occupation, the Marine Corps 
nevertheless represents the United States to them also, and it be- 
hooves every Marine to conduct himself accordingly. There is no 



service which calls for greater exercise of judgement, persistency, 
patience, tact and rigid military justice than in small wars and 
nowhere is more of the humane and sympathetic side of a military 
force demanded than in this type of operation. 

3 — 8. Native Troops, Civil Guards, and Levies. — a. Every 
people have their peculiar characteristics and customs which may 
be modified somewhat, under influence, but which cannot be des- 
troyed or supplanted. These should be recognized and always con- 
sidered in dealing with the people. 

b. In the organization of native troops, consideration should 
be given to the form of warfare to which they are accustomed and 
no attempt made to impose altogether new forms of discipline and 
tactics upon them unless a long period of training and indoctrina- 
tion is available. In emergencies, where limited time is available 
for training it may be better to organize the troops according to 
their native methods, even under the leadership of their own im- 
mediate officers, with the supervision of Marine Corps leaders. At 
other times, the organization will be led by Marine Corps personnel 
entirely. It is always found to be advantageous to have the assist- 
ance of one or more officers who have had experience in the country 
and know the people ; and it is always advisable to have the advice 
and services of some loyal and trustworthy counselor on all points 
of native custom and character. The organization, equipment, and 
tactics of the native troops is an adaption of their own and con- 
forms to Marine Corps standards only to the extent necessary to 
meet the requirements of the situation. Often different types of 
organization, equipment, and tactics are employed in various locali- 
ties where different types of services are demanded. 

c. With some people it is found advisable to recruit the com- 
panies under their own noncommissioned officers in each town; in 
other situations this plan does not work so well. It is by experi- 
ence rather than by previous knowledge, that one finds whether 
native troops do better work in their own communities or elsewhere ; 
at times native troops operate effectively in other localities because 
of changes in climate, environment, food, etc. In some situations 
it has been found that it was better to employ troops away from 
their home localities where they might have been inclined to use 
their authority improperly against personal enemies or for the 
benefit of friends. 

d. Strict justice exerts a marked influence on the discipline of 
native troops. A very few lessons suffice, as a rule, to impress upon 
them that orders are to be obeyed. When this idea has been im- 
planted in their minds, they generally become amenable to dis- 
cipline. The confidence and loyalty of the native troops is instilled 
by faithful supervision of their material needs. More often than 
not they have previously been accustomed to being poorly and ir- 
regularly paid, and their food carelessly provided for, as has been 
their shelter, clothing, and equipment. By giving them their full 
pay on the date due, devoting care and attention to their mess as 
provided by the allowance and seeing that their shelter, clothing, 
and equipment is proper, native troops will faithfully respond to 



service. In establishing and maintaining an organization of native 
troops, attempt should be made to provide better clothing and shel- 
ter, particularly better food, than native civilians of the same social 
class enjoy. This is decidely an important morale factor. 

e. In active operations the natives constantly look to the Ma- 
rine Officer for leadership, inspiration, and example. In fact, at all 
times, they observe and judge every act of their officers who be- 
come their models. In combat, it has been found advisable to use 
mixed units, Marines and native troops, during the earlier opera- 
tions of the native organizations, to give the natives a good example 
and instill them with confidence in their own ability. If practicable, 
the first engagement should be of a minor character, with every 
prospect of victory. Later the Marines should be used as a reserve 
ready to support the native troops in any emergency which might 
arise, and finally the native troops permitted to assume full re- 
sponsibility. In general, the natives' high estimate of the Marine 
should never be jeopardized . 

f. Duty with native troops requires good sense, extreme pa- 
tience coupled with tact, firmness, discipline and control ; but firm- 
ness without adequate backing may degenerate into bluff, and tact 
alone may be interpreted as a weakness. First and above all, there 
should be the desire to understand the people and a predilection for 
that kind of duty. 

3 — 9. Foreign Nationals. — a. Foreign nationals are often the 
underlying cause for intervention ; almost invariably they are pres- 
ent in the country during the occupation. Generally their concern 
is for the security of their lives and property ; sometimes they have 
an exaggerated opinion of their importance and influence. Gen- 
erally the condition of political unrest does not react directly 
against foreigners, and it often happens that the foreign resident 
does not consider himself in any danger until he reads of it in a 
foreign newspaper, whereupon his imagination becomes active. 

b. Foreign cooperation may at times be a greater obstacle 
to success than the foreign mercenaries in a revolutionary party, 
when for equally unworthy purposes, they render aid openly or 
secretly to the revolutionists in order to assure themselves of the 
protection or favor of any new government. Any discontented fac- 
tion of natives can usually secure the sympathy or support from 
some group of investors or speculators who think they can further 
their own interests or secure valuable concessions by promoting a 
revolution. In any event, in dealing with these corporations and in 
receiving reports from them it may often be wise to scrutinize their 
actions carefully to determine if they have any ulterior motives. 
In interventions, the United States accords equal attention to the 
security of life and property of all foreign residents. 

3 — 10. Training of Forces for Small Wars. — a. A preliminary 
study of the theater of operations must include an analysis of the 
people of the country. Beside the strictly military preparations 
and plans incident to a foreign occupation, there should be formu- 
lated a method or policy for deriving the greatest benefit from 



psychological practices in the field. To make this effective, person- 
nel of the command must be indoctrinated with these principles. 
While it is true that the command will generally reflect the attitude 
of the commander, this will or desire of the supreme authority 
should be disseminated among the subordinates of all grades. This 
may be done in the form of general instructions or talks to the 
officers and men by responsible authorities. 

b. From a psychological point of view, a similar reaction takes 
place in the minds of all subordiates who receive orders lacking 
certain information. One often meets situations, in small wars 
particularly, where information of the enemy and terrain and even 
of neighboring friendly troops is unreliable, and the ensuing orders 
are accordingly vague in these matters. In order to be trained to 
meet these situations simulated situations should require decisions 
of subordinates based on limited information so that a similar de- 
mand during actual small wars operations comes not as a surprise 
or a shock. On the other hand, orders or instructions should con- 
tain such information as is available and appropriate. 

c. Uncertainty of the situation and the future creates a cer- 
tain psychological doubt or fear in the minds of the individual con- 
cerned; if the individual is entirely unaccustomed to it and the 
situation seems decidely grave his conduct may be abnormal or 
even erratic. This situation of uncertainty exists, ordinarily to a 
pronounced degree in small wars, particularly in the initial phases 
of landing and occupation. The situation itself and the form of the 
orders and instructions which the Marine commander will receive 
are often indefinite. In regular warfare, clear cut orders are given, 
or may be expected, defining situations, missions, objectives, in- 
structions, and the like, in more or less detail; in small wars, the 
initial orders may be fragmentary and void of much of the ordinary 
detail. However, unfortunate as this may be, or how difficult it 
may make the task, this is probably the normal situation upon 
landing. In order to be prepared to overcome the usual psycho- 
logical reaction resulting from such uncertainty, studies and in- 
structions in small wars should be accompanied by practice in the 
issuance of orders. 

d. The responsibility of officers engaged in small wars and 
the training necessary are of a very different order from their 
responsibilities and training in ordinary military duties. In the lat- 
ter case, they simply strive to attain a method of producing the 
maximum physical effect with the force at their disposal. In small 
wars, caution must be exercised, and in stead of striving to gen- 
erate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain 
decisive results with the least application of force and the conse- 
quent minimum loss of life. This requires recourse to the principles 
of psychology, and is the reason why the study of psychology of 
the people is so important in preparation for small wars. 

e. The importance of surprise in all warfare cannot be over- 
estimated. But as it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain in- 
formation in small wars, so does surprise become increasingly ef- 
fective when it is obtained. The less educated the people, or the 



more primitive they are, the greater is their fear of the unknown 
or unexpected. This fear may easily develop into panic among 
these peoples, as in untrained troops. A constant endeavor must 
be made to exploit this decisive element. 

f. In actual combat of small wars, situations develop very 
rapidly as a rule, with very little time for estimates, decisions, and 
orders. The realities of small wars are full of constantly chang- 
ing, unexpected, confusing and uncertain situations. Instructions 
and training in peace-time cannot approach, or replace reality but 
should include situations on unknown ground, without maps, some- 
times at night and with sudden surprise elements. Training should 
not be confined to standard situations, which conform to types, and 
which according to given doctrine, must be solved in a definite way. 
The more complicated the situation, the more simple the solution 
and order should be. 

g. In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among 
troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and 
kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass 
of the population. There is nothing in this principle which should 
make any officer or man hesitate to act with the necessary firmness 
within the limitations imposed by the principles which have been 
laid down, whenever there is contact with armed opposition. 

h. The practical application of psychology is largely a matter 
of common sense. Psychological errors may be committed which 
antagonize the population of the country occupied and all the 
foreign sympathizers ; mistakes may have the most far reaching ef- 
fect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, 
respect, and order. Small wars involve a wide range of activities 
including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare 
of the most difficult kind. The situation is often uncertain, the 
orders are sometimes indefinite, and although the authority of the 
military commander is at times in doubt, he usually assumes full 
responsibility. The military individual cannot afford to be intimi- 
dated by the responsibilities of his position, or by the fear that his 
actions will not be supported. He will rarely fail to receive support 
if he has acted with caution and reasonable moderation, coupled 
with the necessary firmness. On the other hand inaction and re- 
fusal to accept responsibility is likely to shake confidence in him, 
even though he be not directly censured. 

i. The purpose should always be a desire to restore normal 
government or give the people a better government than they had 
before, and to establish peace, order and security on as permanent 
a basis as practicable. Gradually there must be instilled the lead- 
ing ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and prop- 
erty and individual liberty. In so doing, one should endeavor to 
make self-sufficient the native agencies responsible for these mat- 
ters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the 
country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native popu- 


81C2(l) MCS QUAN r ICO. VA. 2-17-37-300 

Quantico, Virginia 

1935 Revision 


Section I. Composition of Forces 4- 1 to 4-10 

II. Organization 4-11 to 4-29 

III. Equipment and Supplies 4-30 to 4-32 

IV. Training 4-33 

V. Employment and Preparation of Commander (s) 

and Staff(s) 4-34 to 4-42 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1 Condensed Peace-Strength Tables (Less Transportation) .... 49 

No. 2 Condensed Peace-Strength Table (Transportation) 50 

No. 3 Table Showing Possible Organization of Detached, Separate, 

and Reinforced Units 51 

No. 4 Historical Examples of Factors Influencing Composition of 

Expeditionary Forces 53 

No. 5 Examples of Engineering Work 53 

No. 6 An Example of Transportation Difficulties 53 

No. 7 Establishment of the Fleet Marine Force 54-55 



General ! 4-1 

Infantry 4-2 

Artillery 4-3 

Mounted Troops 4-4 

Engineers 4-5 

Aviation 4-6 

l&ttks A' : hih f \-n : x-. ^l^^l^'j ' 4-7 

Armored Cars 4-8 

Signal Troops 4-9 

Chemical Troops 4-10 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 




4 — 1. General.— a. The continual study of the composition of 
forces required for operations in small wars is necessary not only in 
order that adequate means will be available at all times, but also to 
permit proper preliminary organization and training. For the initial 
phases of such campaigns only the peace time establishment will 
be available. 

b. The composition of a Marine Corps Force for a specific 
operation of this character is controlled by a number of factors, 
the most important of which are the nature of the opposition to be 
expected and the geography of the theater of operations. The lack 
or preponderance of any arm or weapon by the opponent will be a 
material factor in determining whether or not certain arms and 
weapons will be required. The terrain over which the force will 
operate ; climatic conditions ; transportation facilities ; and the avail- 
ability and source of supply will influence the types of arms and 
weapons and the classes of transportation required. See Appendix 
No. 4. 

c. Modern communication is rapidly reducing the advantages 
in armaments formerly enjoyed by the principal powers. The pos- 
session of the latest model weapon is only a matter of money, as 
most manufacturers will sell freely to anyone. Countries where 
operations have been conducted by the Marine Corps against forces 
armed only with the rifle and pistol now possess aircraft and other 
modern equipment. In a recent campaign opponents were en- 
countered equipped with machine guns and automatic shoulder 
weapons, if not for the first time, at least in greater numbers than 
ever before experienced. Bombs were also used by the irregulars. 

d. Transportation is markedly affected by terrain, anct clim- 
atic conditions; this has resulted in forces using different means 
of transport ranging from porters carrying fifty pounds on their 
heads to bull carts carrying about two thousand pounds in dry 
weather, and half that load or less in the rainy season. In many 
cases native pack animals have been the only means of transporta- 
tion available. 

4 — 2. Infantry. — a. Infantry, the arm of close combat, has 
been the most important arm in small wars, because from the 
very nature of such wars, it is evident that the ultimate objective 
will be reached only by close combat. The policy of the Marine 
Corps that every Marine, regardless of his speciality, be basically 
trained as an infantryman has been vindicated time and again, and 
any tendency to deviate from that policy must be guarded against. 

b. The weapons with which the infantry is normally armed 
are based on careful study of the employment of infantry in major 
warfare. In small wars the nature of operations is so diversified 
that the armament varies from the normal ; combat conditions vary 
from forced landings against organized opposition, including all 
arms, to small forces or patrols, operating on jungle trails against 
guerrillas and irregulars, and equipped with an increased proportion 
of automatic and auxiliary weapons. The infantry weapons will 
be treated in detail in another chapter. 



c. The infantry units must be efficient, mobile light infantry 
composed of individuals of high morale and personal courage, 
thoroughly trained in the use of automatic weapons and capable 
of withstanding great fatigue on long and often fruitless patrols. 
As they must assume the offensive under the most difficult con- 
ditions of war, country, and climate, these troops should be well 
led and well trained; that means they should be made up wholly, 
or in a large measure, of regular troops (Marines) especially trained 
in this particular mode of warfare. 

4—3. Artillery. — a. The primary mission of artillery is to sup- 
port the infantry. The light artillery is employed principally 
against personnel, accompanying weapons, tanks, and those material 
targets which its fire is able to destroy. Medium artillery reinforces 
the fire of light artillery, assists in counterbattery, and undertakes 
missions beyond the range of the power of light artillery. Anti- 
aircraft artillery, while primarily for defense against air attack, 
may be used to supplement the fire of light artillery. Artillery fire 
produces great moral effect due to the strong detonation of its pro- 
jectiles. Moral effect is always given consideration in plans for the 
employment of artillery, particularly in small wars. 

b. The modern armament of minor powers and backward na- 
tions has greatly improved their morale, particularly in the initial 
stages of an operation. Light artillery has been given increased 
mobility by recent developments, and the availability of this type 
gives a distinct advantage to the force possessing it. After the 
initial stages, if it appears that artillery will not be required except 
for special limited missions, it can be used to advantage in the 
defense of stabilized bases, and permanent stations and garrisons. 
The troops not needed with the artillery can be used to relieve 
troops on special guard duty, such as at headquarters, fixed bases, 
and on lines of communication. 

c. Unless information is available that hostile forces have 
heavy fortifications, or are armed with a type of artillery requiring 
other than light artillery for counterbattery work, the necessity 
for medium artillery is not apparent, except possibly in the initial 
stages ; and even then its use would be extremely rare. 

d. Considering the present type of machine guns and equip- 
ment, including the .50 caliber machine guns, and the fact that 
our forces would undoubtedly have sufficient control of the air to 
prevent an air attack in force, it would at first appear that a 
heavier type of antiaircraft weapon than the machine gun would 
not be required. However, with the improvement in types of planes 
and their use at present by even backward nations, it must be 
remembered that their tactics would be simplified if they knew we 
were armed with nothing heavier than .50 caliber machine guns. 
We must be prepared to protect our depots and aviation fields. 

e. Artillery to operate in the field in small wars must be able 
to go where infantry can go. It also must be of a type that can 
approach the speed of foot troops so that it will not materially 
reduce their mobility. For this reason the type of weapon employed 



will be pack or mountain artillery. Calwell's statement in Small 
Wars, Their Principles and Tactics (3d. Ed. 1906), quoted below, is 
more applicable today than when written : 

"An army which, owing to national conditions, is liable to be called upon 
at almost any moment to take part in irregular warfare, and which does not 
comprise in its normal peace organization a proportion of mountain bat- 
teries ready at a short notice for the field, lacks an important item in that 
aggregate of services which constitutes a force genuinely adapted for con- 
ducting a campaign against savages, hill-men, or guerrillas operating in 
broken ground." 

f . Some artillery should accompany every expedition for pos- 
. sible use against towns and fortified positions, also for defense of 
towns, bases and other permanent establishments. It has not been 
used by patrols in jungle warfare, but it might be useful against 
occupied positions. The opposing forces are likely to have artil- 
lery and almost sure to have machine guns, which should be over- 
come by artillery- See Chapter XIX. 

"In the defense of isolated posts guns are of course invaluable. Gen- 
eral Skobelef in forming the advanced depots on the line, his troops were 
to follow toward Denghil Tepe, told off several guns to each, the infantry 
garrisons being very small. In such fortified positions artillery can very 
largely take the place of infantry, and, as only the guns themselves, with 
their detachments and ammunition are required, permanent arrangements 
for their transport can often be dispensed with." (Calwell 437). 
4- — 4. Mounted Troops.— a. In many past operations mounted 
companies have played an important role. Training of officers and 
men, armed with the same weapons employed by dismounted troops 
is an essential part of the preparation of Marines for small wars. 

b. There is lack of sufficient naval transport for animals. 
The need of animals is disclosed after the operations have started. 
Experience has demonstrated that local animals, accustomed to the 
climatic conditions and forage of the country, are more suitable for 
mounts then imported animals. These conditions force dependence 
on local animals. Therefore, preparation for mounted duty in 
small wars will consist only in training for this duty and the pro- 
vision of necessary equipment. 

4 — 5. Engineers. — a. The most important engineer mission is 
the construction, improvement, and maintenance, of routes of com- 
munication and movement. Experience in all types of operations 
has demonstrated that the opening up and maintenance of routes 
of communication and movement have been one of the first re- 
quirements toward a successful campaign against irregular troops. 
See Appendix No. 4. 

b. The lack of accurate maps and the limited supply of those 
available has handicapped all operations in the past. A trained 
engineer unit supplemented by the aerial photographic facilities of 
aviation is practically indispensable. Much of this work will neces- 
sarily be performed by personnel of all units. However, not only 
the basic preparation but also the completion and reproduction of 
maps require trained and skilled individuals. 


4—5— 3 

c. With the increased use of demolitions in all trades and 
occupations, as well as in military operations, demolition materials 
are more readily available to irregulars and are being more exten- 
sively employed. A demolition unit is required not only for our own 
tactical and construction needs, but also, for counter demolition work. 

d. Engineers are trained and equipped to function as light 
infantry as they are not armed with machine guns and howitzer 
weapons. They should not be so used, except in an emergency, but 
they form a potential reserve both for combat, and for guard duty 
at bases and depots. 

4 — 6. Aviation. — a. The use of aircraft in warfare has intro- 
duced a new arm to cooperate with the ground forces. Its use in 
major warfare has developed distinct types for well defined pur- 
poses. Its use in small wars appears at first to be a far cry from 
that visualized in major warfare by the press of the country, but in 
recent operations of the Marine Corps, and by the British and 
French in similar operations, the airplanes have proved their worth 
and developed their use in cooperation with ground troops. The 
combat duties most required of planes have been observation and 
ground attack with machine guns and bombs. Observation planes 
primarily developed for these duties are necessary to a rapid and 
successful operation. If hostile aviation is sufficiently strong to 
offer a threat of attack on our troops and bases a suitable unit of 
fighters should be employed to combat them. Light bombing planes 
have recently been developed which are suitable for use in small 

b. An important function of aviation is the transportation of 
combat units, munitions, supplies, and equipment. Before deciding 
to use aviation for transport purposes to a theater of operations 
the question must be carefully considered. This is so well expressed 
by Major General Gwynn in 'Imperial Policing" that his conclusion 
is quoted. 

"The speed with which the ships arrived brings out the point, which 
is sometimes overlooked in comparing the pace at which reinforcements 
can be conveyed by air or water, that ship's passages are uninterrupted 
whereas troop-carrying aircraft, as a rule, cannot proceed during the hours 
of darkness unless fully organized landing-grounds are available and suitably 
spaced in respect to refuelling necessities." 

c. The use of transport planes for purposes of evacuation is 
of incalculable value not only for rapid recovery of sick and 
wounded, resulting in quicker return to duty, but also, in a saving 
of lives. Troops knowing of this service have a higher morale. 
The tendency to expect aviation to run a complete transport service 
should be guarded against, for it may result in lack of development 
of other means, and not only overtax the aviation units but also 
result in lack of supplies if the operations suddenly call for a marked 
increase in transport by air in some other area. 

d. It has been amply demonstrated that aviation as a com- 
munication agency is invaluable to a force operating over unde- 
veloped and difficult terrain. Its use greatly increases the radius 
of action of advanced combat elements. Development of alternate 



means of communication to outlying stations should be instituted 
in order to release air units for other missions and to avoid the 
dangers of interruption to which this method is subject. 

4 — 7. Tanks. — a. The general role ascribed to tanks is to 
assist the assaulting riflemen by overcoming hostile machine guns, 
cutting lanes through wire entanglements, and reducing other ob- 
structions blocking the advance of the infantry. If information dis- 
closes that the hostile force is well trained in organizing and con- 
ducting a prepared defense, and if it has adequate and appropriate 
material for the purpose, tanks would give the force an advantage 
in overcoming that opposition, and would tend toward reducing the 
numerical strength required. When strong opposition to initial 
landings is expected or encountered, the employment of tanks will 
be a material aid and will reduce the number of casualties. 

b. Tanks are particularly valuable in an assault on villages 
as they can advance boldly along the streets through which an in- 
fantry advance is usually slow, cautious, and costly, due to the 
activities of hostile snipers and machine gun detachments. When 
buildings occupied by the enemy are of frame or light masonry con- 
struction tanks can be used to crush them ; barricades hastily pre- 
pared can be broken up or hurdled. Heavier barricades can be 
brought under heavy fire, thus permitting troops to storm them. 
In controlling and mopping up a city or town which has a turbulent 
population, the moral effect of the employment of tanks must be 
considered. Infantry will always remain the most suitable arm 
for employment in street fighting and dealing with riots, but that 
is no reason why they should be denied the assistance which armored 
fighting vehicles can give them. 

4 — 8. Armored Cars.— Armored cars, with their speed, silence 
and protection, in suitable country can be put to many uses, and when 
infantry is moving by motor transportation, they become almost an 
essential addition. Acting alone, their inability to take prisoners and 
to travel cross-country are obvious disadvantages. The cars are use- 
ful in patrolling roads and present possibilities for dispatch service 
and combat liaison. Cars have their limitations and in a country 
where rivers form considerable obstacles the lack of bridges capable 
of standing the weight of the cars may render them of little value. 
The cars depend on their mobility, and, their employment against 
resistance in force, even though the resistance be unarmed and un- 
organized, is not practical when they operate without an infantry 
escort. However, they can be used effectively, after the force has 
been dispersed, to patrol streets and keep them clear. 

4 — 9. Signal Troops. — Communications are important in all types 
of operations, and as a result, communication units are an inherent 
part of all Marine Corps organizations. If the basic allowance of 
communication personnel in any unit is deficient an increase in the 
numerical strength of an existing organization rather than the or- 
ganization of special units should meet all requirements. Com- 
munications will be discussed in detail in Chapter XVII. 

4 — 10. Chemical Troops. — The inclusion of a unit of chemical 
troops in the Force is dependent on considerations previously dis- 
cussed. See Chapter XXVIII. 




General 4-11 

The Rifle Platoon 4-12 

The Rifle Company 4-13 

The Machine Gun and Howitzer Company 4-14 

The Infantry Battalion 4-15 

The Infantry Regiment 4-16 

The Marine Corps Force for Small Wars 4-17 

Special Troops 4-18 

Headquarters Company (Force) 4-19 

Service Company (Force) 4-20 

Engineer Company (Force) 4-21 

Military Police Company (Force) 4-22 

Artillery 4-23 

Aircraft 4-24 

Motor Transport 4-25 

Medical Service 4-26 

Reinforced and Detached Units 4-27 

The Fleet Marine Force 4-28 

Organization of the Staff (s) 4-29 



4—11. General. — a. Organization may be defined as the process 
of arranging the constituent or interdependent parts into an or- 
ganic whole. There must be organization in an armed force 
designed to achieve success with the least possible cost in effort, 
time, men, and materiel. A Marine Corps force for small wars' 
has territorial, strategical, and tactical functions. It should comprise 
in its organization the essential combatant and admistrative bran- 
ches, well proportioned, and so organized as to make it tactically 
and administratively a self sustaining unit. The organization will 
depend upon the purpose in view (mission), the forces available, 
always an important item in the Marine Corps, and the character 
of the operation. In addition any force must be so constituted as 
to overcome the armament and organization of the opposing force, 
and be suitable to the country in which the operations are to take 

The purposes in view may be: 

Protection of national interest. 

Protection of life and, in certain cases, property, 
g n Pacification. 

Supervision of elections- 

Seizure of a port to collect customs. 

A demonstration against, or a seizure of ah 1 important lo- 
cality, to avert further hostile action or for redress of an insult. 

Protection of a productive area. 

Breaking up of guerrilla organizations. 
The armament and organization of an opposing force may range 
from only small arms to the more advanced types of weapons and 
modern organization. The force must be organized to combat 
them, not only to accomplish the purpose in view, but also to 
insure the maximum results with a minimum loss. Less than 
a quarter of a century ago a Marine Corps force consisted of 
riflemen, perhaps some more or less perfected automatic weapons, 
and very little, if any, light artillery. As pointed out in Section I, 
minor powers have acquired new armament, and our organization 
must contain elements to offset their improvement. 

b. The nature of the country in which operations are to take 
place will have a marked influence on the organization. Distances, 
the terrain, climate and weather, bases, fortified positions, rail- 
roads, and other means of transportation, sources of, and lines of 
supply are considered. Past campaigns and a survey of the possible 
spheres of operation indicate that the size of units should not be 
as large as in major operations. They must be highly mobile, and 
adaptable and tactical units, such as the battalion, must be prepared 
to act as administrative units. 

c. Our war time, organization having been determined, the 
organization and strength of our peace time units require more 
than an arbitrary paring down. The underlying principle is that 
duty in a peace strength organization should constitute real training 



for duty with the corresponding war strength organization, to the 
end that it must permit the same tactical formations and dispositions 
as the war strength organizations. Another principle affecting 
the infantry peace time units which are used in small wars is 
the small number of men that can be controlled by one officer in 
such operations. 

4 — 12. The Rifle Platoon. — a. The rifle platoon is the basic 
combat unit in small wars. A combat unit may be defined as a 
fighting unit : a unit, the organization, equipment, and training 
of which are designed primarily to fit it to engage in combat. 
The rifle platoon, peace strength (Table No. IP) consists of three 
squads and a platoon headquarters. (Note, unless otherwise 
stated all further reference to organizations will be to peace 
strength tables which are the tables governing organizations 
in small wars). The strength and organization of the platoon 
readily adapts itself to patrol operations of this nature. 

b. The squad of the rifle platoon consists of eight enlisted 
men. By numbers in the squad organization, the numbers and 
distribution of weapons and duties is as follows: — No. 1 front 
rank and No. 1 rear rank are riflemen trained as scouts ; No. 2 front 
rank is a rifleman with grenade discharger; No. 2 rear rank is 
a Thompson submachine gunner ; No. 3 front rank is the substitute 
automatic rifleman; No. 3 rear rank is the automatic rifleman; 
No. 4 front rank is the corporal (squad leader and rifleman) ; No. 4 
rear rank is a rifleman, second in command. All members of the 
squad should be trained in the use of the automatic weapons, 
rifle and hand grenades. 

c. The platoon headquarters is composed of a platoon com- 
mander, a lieutenant or gunnery sergeant; a platoon sergeant; 
platoon guide; and three privates who are runners (agents and 
signalmen). They assist the platoon commander in directing and 
controlling the platoon. 

4 — 13. The Rifle Company. — a. The rifle company (Table No. 
IP), is the basic unit of infantry organization and is the smallest 
unit having administrative duties. The war strength unit is the 
three unit system in order to combine mobility and fire power. 
Mobility and control are essential. By maintaining the three unit 
system the principles of major warfare can be readily followed in 
training; and a company of three platoons of three squads each, 
with a company headquarters gives us a unit, which due to its size 
and mobility is suitable for operations in small wars. 

b. Difficulties of communication, supply, and administration 
are increased in small wars, particularly after organized resistance 
has been overcome and guerrilla operations have commenced; 
accordingly the company headquarters is comparatively large. 
The headquarters is divided into two groups; the command group, 
and the administrative and supply group. In the command group 
are the company commander, the signal corporal, drummer, trump- 
eter, and four privates who are runners (agents and signalmen). 
In the administrative and supply group are, the first sergeant, the 
mess sergeant, the supply sergeant, a corporal (company clerk), 



two privates (cooks), one private (mechanic or carpenter), and 
a private available for other duty. The first sergeant has been 
placed in the administrative and supply group in order to have a 
noncommissioned officer of command ability in that group. Such 
transportation as may be assigned the company will logically come 
under the control of the supply sergeant. 

4- — 14. The Machine Gun and Howitzer Company. — a. The ma- 
chine gun and howizer company is an organic part of the infantry 
battalion. This organization places the machine guns under the 
direct control of the battalion commander, both for training and 
combat, and greatly facilitates the coordination and cooperation 
between the machine gun and rifle units which they normally 
support. Instead of having a howitzer company as a separate 
organization of the regiment, attaching a platoon (s) to a battalion 
a howitzer platoon is an organic part of the battalion. This not 
only does away with the overhead required for company head- 
quarters, but also places the platoon under the direct control of 
the battalion commander, both for training and combat. The 
company consists of three machine gun platoons, a howitzer 
platoon, and a company headquarters. 

b. (1) The machine gun platoon (Table No. 3P) consists 
of a platoon headquarters and two sections of two squads each. 
The machine gun squad is composed of five privates (includes 
privates first class) . One private first class is designated as squad 
leader; of the remaining four, No. 1 is the gunner, No. 2 is the 
loader, Nos. 3 and 4 are ammunition and water carriers. Each 
squad is armed with one Browning machine gun, caliber .30. In 
addition to its armament, each squad has two Cole carts assigned 
for transportation. The two machine gun squads of the section 
are directed and controlled by a corporal (section leader). 

(2) To assist the platoon commander in controlling the 
platoon and supplying ammunition there is a platoon head- 
quarters consisting of the commander, one sergeant, a corporal, 
and eight privates. The platoon sergeant assists the platoon 
commander in directing and controlling the platoon and super- 
vising the ammunition supply. The corporal, designated ammuni- 
tion corporal, and six privates, constitute an ammunition squad. 
The ammunition corporal is charged with the supply of ammunition 
to the platoon and would logically be in charge of the belt filling 
point. One private, a runner, represents the platoon at the head- 
quarters of the unit to which the platoon may be attached. One 
private is a signalman (visual). For transportation a Cole cart 
is provided. 

c. (1) The howitzer platoon consists of a one-pounder sec- 
tion, a light mortar section, and an ammunition squad. 

The one-pounder section is composed of a sergeant (section 
leader) , one corporal and six privates. The section leader controls 
and directs the fire of the weapon, the corporal is the gunner; 
of the six privates, No. 1 is assistant gunner and loader, Nos. 2 
to 6 are ammunition carriers. The armament consists of one 37- 
mm gun mounted on a carriage. 



(2) The light mortar section consists of one sergeant 
(section leader) , one corporal and five privates. Their duties are 
analogous to the duties of the members of the one-pounder section. 
A Cole cart is provided for transportation. 

(3) The ammunition squad consisting of one corporal 
(ammunition corporal and squad leader) and six privates, is 
charged with the supply of ammunition for the platoon. Three 
Cole carts furnish transportation for the squad. 

d. (1) The platoon headquarters consists of a lieutenant 
(platoon commander), a warrant officer, a gunnery sergeant, and 
four privates who are runners (agents and signalmen). The 
warrant officer is second in command and assists the platoon com- 
mander in controlling and directing the platoon. If the weapons 
are widely separated he takes direct charge of one of them. The 
gunnery sergeant is the range finder and platoon sergeant. One 
of the runners represents the platoon at company headquarters 
or the headquarters of such unit as the platoon may be supporting. 
The other runners remain with the platoon commander. 

(2) To enable the company commander to control, supply, 
and administer his organization, a company headquarters and a 
communication detail is provided. The headquarters consists of 
the command group and the administrative group. The command 
group, which includes the communication detail, consists of a 
captain (company commander), a lieutenant (reconnaissance of- 
ficer), the first sergeant, a gunnery sergeant (ordnance), a reconn- 
aissance sergeant, a signal corporal, one signal private (visual), a 
drummer, a trumpeter, and three privates (runners). The ad- 
ministrative and supply group consists of a lieutenant (executive 
officer), the mess sergeant, the supply sergeant, a corporal (com- 
pany clerk), and five privates, of whom three are cooks, one a 
mechanic (ordnance) , and one for other duty. A Cole cart is provided 
for transportation of the command group equipment. If additional 
transportation for ammunition and supplies is furnished, it is 
placed under charge of the supply sergeant. Every member 
of the company is normally armed with the pistol. There are 
sufficient rifles and bayonets carried in arms chests with the 
organization to arm the company for functioning as a rifle company 
(less automatic weapons). 

4—15. The Infantry Battalion.— a. Three rifle companies and a 
machine gun and howitzer company constitute the combat units 
of the infantry battalion. For the purpose of assisting the bat- 
talion commander in the direction and control of the training and 
combat of the battalion, a battalion headquarters is provided. For 
the purpose of assisting the battalion commander and staff in their 
various administrative, combat, and training duties there is a head- 
quarters company. The battalion headquarters is incorporated 
with the battalion headquarters company for purposes of record 
and administration; it consists of: the battalion commander 
(lieutenant colonel), a major, and two captains, who form the 
staff, and four enlisted men (the sergeant major, and three privates, 
two of whom are clerks and one a cook) . 

b. The battalion headquarters company consists of a compa- 



ny headquarters, an intelligence section, a supply section, a medical 
section and a communication platoon, placed in one organization 
for purposes of administration. The company is commanded by 
a member of the staff (Bn-1 and Bn-2) . A company headquarters 
to assist him in administering and supplying the company is 
constituted as follows: A first sergeant, a sergeant (mess and 
supply), a corporal (clerk), and two privates (cooks). The intelli- 
gence platoon, supervised in training and controlled in combat by 
a staff officer (Bn-1 and Bn-2), consists of: a sergeant (chief of 
section), two corporals (one draftsman and one topographer), 
and two privates (scouts and observers). The supply section 
is composed of a quartermaster sergeant and a corporal and a 
private (both clerks). The medical section has a medical officer 
in charge and eight enlisted. 

c. The duties of the communication platoon are so multi- 
tudinous that it is subdivided into platoon headquarters, a message 
center and messenger section, a wire section, a radio and panel 
section, and a visual section. The communication officer assisted 
by the staff sergeant (mechanical) directs and controls the sections 
of his platoon. The message center and messenger section consists 
of a corporal (chief of section) and seven privates, of whom one 
is a clerk, two are bicycle messengers, and four are runners. The 
wire section has a sergeant chief of section, a corporal (construc- 
tion) and four privates ; one of whom is a line guard and the other 
three are operators. The radio and panel section is composed of 
a sergeant (chief of section), two corporals and two privates, all 
of whom are operators. The visual section has two enlisted, a 
corporal (section chief) and a private (operator). 

4 — 16, The 'Infantry Regiment .—a. The infantry regiment 
(Table 9P) is both a tactical and an administrative unit. It is 
a self-contained independent unit, except for transportation to 
insure replenishment of supplies. The organization of the regi- 
ment is not based on tactical considerations alone, because the 
factors of control, supply, and administration are important matters 
seriously affecting the form which the regimental organization 
will take. Regimental personnel is required for command, supply, 
and administration; the agencies which are furnished for these 
purposes are the regimental staff and the regimental headquarters 
company for command, and the service company for supply and 
administration. The regiment is organized into a regimental head- 
quarters company, a service company, and three battalions. The 
two battalion regiment has been found uneconomical in the matter 
of overhead since the personnel and materiel involved in the 
regimental headquarters company is about the same as that 
needed for a three battalion regiment, while the service company 
required for a three battalion regiment involves an increase of 
only about twenty percent over that required for a two battalion 
regiment. These considerations together with the tactical ad- 
vantages when expanded to war strength have resulted in the 
three battalion regiment. 



b. (1) The regimental headquarters company (Table No. 
7P) is organized for the purpose of assisting the commander and 
his staff in their various duties. The company consists of regi- 
mental headquarters, a company headquarters, intelligence platoon, 
pioneer platoon, a medical section, and a communication platoon. 
The company headquarters consists of ten enlisted to provide for 
the administration and supply of the company. They are the first 
sergeant, two sergeants (one mess and one supply), one corporal 
(company clerk) , a drummer, a trumpeter, and four privates (two 
cooks and two for general assignment) . The company is command- 
ed by R-l. 

(2) The regimental headquarters consists of the regimental 
commander, the principal members of his staff, and a regimental 
headquarters detail. In general it may be said that the purpose of 
the regimental staff is that of assisting the regimental commander 
in the direction and control of the training and combat of the regi- 
ment. The regimental headquarters detachment consists of: a 
sergeant major (assistant to R-3), a sergeant (assistant to the 
munitions officer), and three privates for duty with the head- 
quarters mess (two are cooks). 

(3) The intelligence platoon is under the direction and 
control of R-2. It consists of a sergeant who is a topographical 
draftsman and clerk (chief of section), a corporal (in charge of 
field force) and five privates trained to act in the capacity of either 
scouts or observers. 

(4) The pioneer platoon is provided to take care of the 
numerous minor engineering problems which confront infantry 
organizations and require trained personnel, but which do not 
warrant the attachment of engineers to the regiment. Its en- 
gineering equipment consists of a set of demolition equipment, a 
set of pioneer equipment, and a set of carpenter equipment. These 
tools are sufficient to equip the platoon for its normal duties. The 
organization is composed of one corporal (section chief) and ten 
privates of whom one is a carpenter and one a mechanic. The 
remaining men of the squad should each have a special training 
in some technical field but all receive sufficient training to super- 
vise any pioneer work required. The platoon handles all the 
engineering problems of the regiment which are compatible with 
its strength and equipment. It is not capable of extensive road 
work or construction unless reinforced by specialists and laborers 
from the units of the regiment. The principal duties which the 
platoon is prepared to meet are, construction of fortifications and 
shelter in the vicinity of the regimental headquarters, demolition 
and counter-demolition, minor construction and repair work, and 
maintenance of roads and bridges. 

(5) The communication platoon, for the purpose of control 
and administration, is divided into the same sections as the com- 
munication platoon of the battalion (Par. 4-15.). To provide 
for the additional duties the platoon consists of one first lieutenant 
(communication officer) and thirty-four enlisted, an increase of 
twelve over the enlisted strength of the battalion communication 



(6) The medical section consists of two commissioned 
medical (regimental surgeon, and dental officer) and eight enlisted 
medical. The section maintains a regimental aid station and 
personnel for duty with the service company and other elements 
of the regiment, except the battalions, when they are separated 
from the regimental headquarters. 

c. (1) The service company (Table No. 6P) is provided 
to maintain the supply of the regiment and to administer and 
supply the administrative and supply units of the regiment which 
do not accompany the combat units in action. It is divided into 
a company headquarters, staff section, supply section, pay section, 
and a band section. The company commander is a captain (R-4 
and quartermaster.) The other members of the headquarters are, 
first lieutenant (second-in-command and supply officer), the first 
sergeant, three sergeants (mess, supply, and general assignment) , 
two corporals (a company clerk and general assignment), a drum- 
mer, a trumpeter, and seven privates (two cooks, two mechanics, 
and three for general assignment) . 

(2) The staff section handles the regimental mail and super- 
vises all the routine paper work of the regiment. In these latter 
duties the staff section is assisted by the company clerks; these 
clerks, one from each company, join the staff section and remain 
with it during combat when the regiment is operating as a unit. In 
addition to its routine work the staff section prepares casualty and 
strength reports during action. It consists of one first lieutenant, 
a sergeant major, three sergeants, two corporals, and six privates. 
The lieutenant is in charge of the section and personnel officer 
of the regiment. The sergeant major is his principal assistant and 
supervises the work of the six clerks (one sergeant, two corporals, 
and three privates) . Two sergeants are color sergeants ; in addition 
one is in charge of the postal service and the other performs the 
duties of provost sergeant. There are three privates available for 
general assignment and assisting the sergeant in charge of the 
postal service. 

(3) The supply section keeps the supply records of the 
regiment. Among its various duties are those of consolidating and 
preparing requisitions, procuring supplies and issuing them to the 
units of the regiment. This section also assists the various regi- 
mental officers with supervising the handling of ammunition and 
other supplies. In the platoon are a first lieutenant (commissary 
officer), a warrant officer (assistant to R-4), and three quarter- 
master sergeants, QMD, who perform such duties as directed ; gen- 
erally one will be with the warrant officer to assist in preparing 
requisitions and in some cases purchase and distribution of quarter- 
master funds, one will be in the commissary section, and one in 
charge of property and clothing; one sergeant (supply), three cor- 
porals (clerks) and twelve privates (four storekeepers and eight for 
general assignment). 

(4) The pay section and band section are in the service 
company for mess and quarters. The pay section, consisting of a 
pay clerk, two paymaster sergeants, one sergeant, one corporal and 
two privates, are a clerical force to assist the regimental pay- 



master in his duties and perform no other duty. The members of 
the band normally perform no other duties but during a campaign 
should be available for guard duty in the vicinity of the location 
of the service elements of the regiment. 

4—17. The Marine Corps Force for Small Wars. — a. The 
strategical and tactical organization of a Marine Corps Force will 
depend upon the nature of the country where operations are to 
take place, the purpose in view, and the size and composition of the 
forces engaged. It will be organized throughout both for operation 
and administration and will be capable of independent action. It 
must be a flexible organization permitting the troops such as artil- 
lery, engineers, and machine gun units to become infantry rifle 
units when the situation changes from action against organized op- 
position to one of operating in small forces over extended areas 
against bands of guerrillas. 

b. Tables of Organization (Peace Strength) U. S. Marine 
Corps, Approved 6 February, 1935 do not provide for a fixed Force 
or Brigade. For any particular operation, a Force or a Brigade 
would be made up by selecting the necessary units, including Motor 
Transport and Medical units appropriate to the size of the Force 
and the estimated nature of the operation. The maximum force 
normally would be a reinforced brigade, consisting of the following 
units : 

Force Headquarters. (Brigade.) 
Special Troops. 
Field Hospital Class A. 

Separate Marine Artillery Battalion. (75-mm Pack How.) 

Motor Transport Company, 

Two Marine Infantry Regiments. The following organizations 
or combinations of them may be attached in lieu of some of the 
organizations mentioned above: 

Batterv (Separate) 75-mm Pack Howitzer. 

Field Hospital, Class B or Class C. 

Separate Observation Squadron. 

Motor Transport Platoon or Motor Transport Section. 

c. The Force headquarters consists of the commander and 
the principal members of his staff. In general, it may be said that 
the purpose of the staff is that of assisting the commander in the 
direction and control of the training and combat of the force. The 
detailed organization and functions of the staff will be presented in 
other sections. 

4—18. Special Troops.- — In order to reduce the number of per- 
sons with whom the Force (Brigade) commander and his staff have 
to deal in the matters of administration, several of the smaller 
purely force organizations, including service and combat troops, 
have been combined in a group known as special troops (Table 
No. 16 P) and have been placed under an officer known as the Com- 
manding Officer of Special Troops who is also Force Headquarters 
Commandant and Provost Marshal. The grouping of these troops 
is not physical and in no way affects the location or operation of 



those troops; it merely gives them a common commander charged 
with administration and disciplinary control. The special troops 
consist of the following: Headquarters Company, Service Com- 
pany, Engineer Company and Military Police Company. This group- 
ing is provided for a force of about five thousand officers and men. 
However, the grouping is not permanent, nor is blind adherence 
to it required. It merely gives a starting point to work from in 
determining what grouping shall be made after the strength of the 
force and the type of troops required are determined. 

4 — 19. Headquarters Company (Force). — a. The Force Head- 
quarters Company (Table No. IIP) is organized to furnish person- 
nel and equipment necessary for the commander and his staff to 
function efficiently in combat. The company consists of the fol- 
lowing groups: 

Company headquarters 

Communication platoon 

Intelligence platoon 

Staff platoon 

Detachment for duty with headquarters of the special troops. 

b. The company headquarters provides personnel for the ad- 
ministration and supply of the company and a headquarters group 
for duty with the headquarters officers' mess. The company head- 
quarters personnel are: a captain (company commander and as- 
sistant F-l), a first lieutenant (second in command), the first ser- 
geant, one sergeant (mess and supply) , one corporal (clerk) , a drum- 
mer, a trumpeter, and three privates (two cooks, and one mes- 
senger and orderly). The headquarters group consists of a ser- 
geant (mess and supply) and two privates, one of whom is a cook. 

c. The composition of the intelligence platoon and communica- 
tion platoon is analogous to that in the battalion and regiment. To 
provide for the additional duties of the higher headquarters there 
is an increase in the enlisted personnel. 

d. The staff platoon provides personnel for the assistance of 
the executive and special staffs. The sections comprising it are as 
follows : 

Force Headquarters section 
Quartermaster section 
Pay section 
Law section 
Inspector's section 
Medical section. 

The last four sections supply the office forces for the special staff 
officers performing the duties of paymaster, law officer, inspector, 
and surgeon. The quartermaster section furnishes the office force 
for the fourth section (F-4). The force headquarters section pro- 
vides personnel for clerical assistance for the Commander, Chief 
of Staff, F-3, F-l, and a clerk for the brigade chaplain. Included 
are two sergeants major, one for duty with the first section, the 
other for duty with the third section. A postal detail consisting of 
a sergeant and a corporal is provided for the operation of the post 



4 — 20. Service Company (Force).— The Service Company (Table 
No. 13P) provides the personnel for the operation of the brigade 
quartermaster department and the post exchange. It is divided into 
a company headquarters, supply depot and service platoon, post 
exchange section, and bakery section. The company headquarters 
provides the personnel for the supply and administration of the 
company and a sergeant and two privates to assist the, company 
commander in the performance of his additional duty as munitions 
officer of the force. The supply depot and service platoon provide 
the personnel for the quartermaster activities functioning under the 
headquarters of the brigade. The assignment of its personnel is 
flexible, depending on whether the force quartermaster can operate 
directly with the troops or must maintain a base depot from which 
the supplies are forwarded to other distributing points. In the 
initial stages all supplies may be provided from supply ships or a 
depot established at a port of entry. In the later stages procure- 
ment of many supplies may be by local purchase. The post ex- 
change section provides trained personnel for the operation of the 
post exchange. The bakery section is composed of two bakery units 
in order to provide a bakery detachment for a detached regiment 
when necessary. 

4 — 21. Engineer Company (Force). — a. The engineer unit nor- 
mally assigned to the force consists of one company (Table No. 15P) 
of two platoons and a headquarters section. The headquarters sec- 
tion provides a lithographic and topography detail in addition to 
an administrative and supply group. Each platoon is a complete 
unit from an engineering point of view, thus permitting it to be 
assigned to any engineer mission and to be attached to an infantry 
regiment or battalion to assist in carrying out an engineer task. 
The engineer company may be a combat unit in emergencies, al- 
though it is primarily intended for general engineering and not for 
combat purposes ; the rifle strength is that of the infantry company 
and it has eight automatic rifles, but no grenade dischargers or 
Thompson submachine guns are provided. 

b. The engineer unit is small for the duties required of it. 
This fact makes it necesary to confine the use of engineers to 
major engineer projects such as construction and maintenance of 
roads, bridges, and buildings ; their technical training permits them 
to be employed as overseers, the workers being furnished by other 
organizations. It is equipped with a map reproduction outfit which 
is of great importance. Some of the other duties it will be prepared 
to execute are : 

Construction of temporary docks. 

Construction of base warehouses, semi-permanent camps and 

Preparing landing fields for aviation. 

Operation and maintenance of any existing railways and util- 
ities such as, power plants, water works, and ice plants. 
Demolitions and counter-demolitions. 
Necessary provision for adequate water supply. 
The personnel will be composed of specialists who can act in- 



dependency in charge of details of troops or labor hired locally. 

4 — 22. Military Police Company (Force). — The Military Police 
Company (Table No. 14P) consists of a company headquarters for 
administration and supply of the company and a detail for general 
service; this detail consists of two officers and fifty-one enlisted, 
of whom eleven are noncommissioned officers. The personnel of 
the company are armed with both pistol and rifle except the 
officers, two senior noncommissioned officers, and the drummer and 
trumpeter. The duties of the military police company embrace 
the following: 

To enforce traffic regulations. 

To give directions to the location of the elements of the com- 

To arrest all stragglers. 

To protect private and public property. 

To protect inhabitants from pillage and violence, and, in the 
absence of control by local authorities, to maintain order among 

To report immediately details of accidents involving govern- 
ment vehicles. 

To maintain a list of civil employees and maintain discipline 
among them. 

To arrest any suspicious person, military or civil, in the limits 

To take charge of prisoners. 

Cooperate with the intelligence section. 
4- — 23. Artillery .—a. The largest unit of artillery provided is 
the Separate Marine Artillery Battalion, 75-mm Pack Howitzer, 
Motorized (Table 22P). It consists of a headquarters and service 
battery, and three batteries. Each firing battery has four 75-mm 
pack howitzers. The personnel is trained as infantry in addition 
to their duties as artillerists. Each battery has sufficient grenade 
dischargers, rifles and automatic rifles to permit the organization 
to operate as infantry. When fuctioning as artillery, all personnel 
are armed with pistols. 

b. The principal mission of the artillery is to support the 
infantry units by fire, or to fuction as infantry when artillery is 
not required. The use of artillery has been limited in the past 
but the increase in the armament of the enemy and the better 
organization for both attack and defense may require the employ- 
ment of artillery, at least until organized opposition is broken 
and guerrilla warfare begins. Thereafter the artillery may have 
special missions as against a mountain stronghold, as a defense 
unit at a base, or in an important city. As in the past, the scarcity 
of artillery missions may result in all or part of the battalion 
operating as infantry. The importance of maintaining the inte- 
grity of artillery groups indicates that they should not be used 
for extensive field operations but should relieve the infantry units 
from duty at ports, bases, in cities where duty approaching mili- 
tary police duty is required, and along lines of communication 
such as railroads where they may be readily available if needed. 



c. A detached battery (Table No. 20%P) is provided by 
attaching a liaison officer (lieutenant) , a radio detail of a corporal 
and two privates, and an enlisted medical, to battery headquarters 
and a lieutenant (amunition and rear echelon), a staff sergeant 
(mechanical), a corporal (ordnance), and a private (ordnance me- 
chanic) to a firing battery. 

4 — 24. Aircraft. — a. The Aircraft is composed of a Head- 
quarters Squadron, a Service Squadron, an Observation Squadron, 
a Fighting Squadron, a Bombing Squadron, and a Utility Squadron. 
In aviation units all officers, noncommissioned officers of the first 
three pay grades and field musics are armed with the pistol; all 
others are armed with the rifle. 

b. The Headquarters Squadron (Table No.23P), and Service 
Squadron (Table No. 24P), provide the command, administrative, 
technical, transportation, supply, and service units of the aircraft. 
The headquarters squadron is divided into the following sections: 
headquarters, aerology, communications, operations, ordnance, para- 
chutes, quartermaster and photography. The service squadron is 
divided into the following sections: headquarters, transportation, 
engineering, mess and police. Neither squadron is equipped with 
planes but ten flight orders are avilable in each. The service squad- 
ron is provided with four machine guns, ground type. 

c. The Observation, Fighting, and Bombing Squadrons are 
organized and equipped along the same lines. Each squadron is 
composed of a headquarters, and three divisions of two sections; 
each section consists of three planes. There are nine spare planes 
in each squadron, making a total of twenty-seven planes. Each 
squadron has twenty-five flight orders ; four machine guns, ground 
type; and twenty-two Thompson sub-machine guns, when ordered. 

d. The Utility Squadron is composed of a headquarters and 
three divisions. Each division is equipped with four planes; the 
first division, transport; the second division, amphibian; the third 
division, observation and fighter. 

e. The principal duties are reconnaissance, security, exploiting 
the success of the infantry, assisting in the adjustment of artillery 
fire ; communication with mobile columns, patrols, and outposts ; and 
emergency transportation of supplies and personnel. 

f . In cases where fighting and heavy bombing planes are not 
required, a Separate Observation Squadron is provided which can 
accomplish the missions required of aviation under those conditions. 
The squadron headquarters is increased over that of a squadron, 
a part of aircraft, and is divided into an administrative, and a 
service section which makes the unit self contained including motor 
transportation and medical personnel, both commissoned and en- 
listed. A transport plane is provided and the same number of 
observation planes. Flight orders are increased from twentj^-five 
to thirty-two. Auxiliary and individual armament is the same as 
in the basic squadron. If additional transport planes are required, 
which will normally be the case, a transport division could be 
added without increasing the headquarters. 

4 — 25. Motor Transport. — a. The amount of motor transporta- 
tion to be assigned to the force will vary with the size of the 


force and local conditions in the theater of operations. The ar- 
tillery units and aviation units, as ordered, provide their own 
motor transportation. To provide motor transportation for the 
other units of the force a truck company or more, a motor trans- 
port platoon, or motor transport section, or combination of them 
may be assigned depending on the size of the force. The platoon 
and section are not an integral part of the company but are 
separate units. Situations might arise, due to conditions such 
as the dispersion of forces, or areas being separated by natural 
barriers, where it would be logical to assign a motor transport 
company and a platoon, a platoon and a section, or similar com- 
binations depending on the amount of transportation required. 

b. (1) The motor transport company (Table No. 31P) is 
a self contained unit provided with administrative, supply, operat- 
ing, and maintenance personnel and equipment. For the purpose 
of discipline and administrative control and in order to reduce the 
number of persons with whom the commander and his staff have 
to deal, the motor transport company could logically be placed in 
the special troops. 

The transportation supplied by the company is listed below : 
Cars, 5-passenger 6 
Motorcycles, with side cars 8 
Motorcycles, solo 2 
Trucks, 1/2-ton 8 
Trucks, 2-ton or Tractors with trailers 24 
Trailers, water 8 
Truck, tank, gasoline 1 
Truck, machine shop 1 
Truck, wrecking and repair 1 
Filtration unit 1 
Ambulances (ambulances and drivers to be assigned to 

(2) The strength of the company is two commissioned of- 
ficers, one warrant officer (marine gunner) , and eighty-five enlisted. 
Of the enlisted personnel sixty are assigned to duty as chauffeurs ; 
the remainder provide the operating, administrative, supply, and 
maintenance sections. The officers and twenty-nine enlisted are 
armed with the pistol, the remaining fifty-six enlisted are armed 
with the rifle. 

c. (1) The motor transport platoon (Table No. 30P) and 
motor transport section (Table No. 29P) are provided with operat- 
ing personnel and a small maintenance force but not complete main- 
tenance facilities. For the purpose of administration, supply, and 
discipline they must be assigned to some company. When the 
force has a service unit the motor transport unit should be in- 
corporated in it. Major repairs and shop work will be performed 
by other agencies of the force or by local facilities as available. 

The transportation provided is listed below: 

Medical units) 


Cars, 5-passenger 
Motorcycles, with side cars 

Plat. Sec. 
4 1 

4 1 



Motorcycles, solo 2 1 

Trucks, y 2 -ton 4 1 

Trucks, 2-ton (or tractor with trailer) 12 4 

Trailers, water 4 1 

Filtration unit 1 — ;'j 
Ambulances (ambulances and drivers to be •* 

assigned to Medical units) 4 1 

(2) The strength of the platoon is one warrant officer 
(marine gunner) and- thirty-eight enlisted of whom thirty-one are 
assigned to duty as chauffeurs. The remaining personnel provide 
the operating and repair sections. The warrant officer and fifteen 
enlisted are armed with the pistol, the remaining twenty-three are 
armed with the rifle. The strength of the section is twelve enlisted of 
whom nine are chauffeurs, the others are the noncommissioned of- 
ficer in charge and mechanics. The noncommissioned officer in charge, 
and four enlisted are armed with the pistol, the remaining seven 
are armed with the rifle. 

d. Marines have used local transportation in many lands and 
it will always be required to supplement motor transport. In the 
past it was partly due to lack of facilities for transportation of 
animals. Today we have modern vehicles which can be readily 
transported but localities are not always developed for the use of 
motor vehicles. See Appendix No. 6. 

4 — 26. Medical Service. — The type of operation, the size of the 
force, the nature of the country in which operations will take place, 
the health conditions to be expected, and the estimated casualties 
from combat will determine the class (es) of field hospitals that 
will be attached to a force. To provide for the various situations 
three types of field hospitals may be organized. The internal 
organization in each is the same: a headquarters section com- 
prising, the staff and medical supply unit; a hospital section; a 
field section; and a service section. The strength of the personnel 
with each hospital is based on the number of patients which can 
be hospitalized. The hospitals are classified according to the num- 
ber of beds. The Class A hospital has 264 beds ; Class B, 132 beds ; 
and Class C, 66 beds. 

4 — 27. Reinforced and Detached Units. — Definitions: 
A reinforced unit is one strengthened with additional troops. 
A separate unit is one not incorporated in a higher unit of the 
same kind. 

A detached unit is one body of troops sent from a main body on. 
special service. 

Appendices 1, 2, and 3 indicate separate, detached, and reinforced 
units that have been or may be used. 

4 — 28. Fleet Marine Force.-— The organization of this force 
varies from time to time in accordance with the availability of troops 
and material and the requirements of the service. See Appendix 
No. 6. 

4 — 29. Organization of the Staff (s) .—a. The battalion is the 
smallest organization provided with a staff. The battalion com- 
mander is a lieutenant colonel. The executive staff consists of 



one major and two captains. The major is the battalion executive 
officer (Bn-Ex) and chief of the third section (Bn-3). One cap- 
tain is chief of the first section (Bn-1), adjutant, and chief of 
the second section (Bn-2) . He also commands the battalion head- 
quarters company. One captain is the chief of the fourth section 
(Bn-4). The special staff has two officers carried in the battalion 
headquarters company, a first lieutenant (communication officer) 
and a naval officer (the battalion surgeon). The company com- 
mander of the machine gun and howitzer company, in view of 
the small size of the staff and the fact that the platoons of the 
company will usually be attached to other units, is logically a 
member of the special staff working primarily with Bn-3. A com- 
mander of attached troops, such as the battery commander of an 
attached battery of artillery, would perform the duties of a special 
staff officer. Since the designations Bn-1, 2, 3, and 4 designate 
division of duty and responsibility and not individuals, the above 
assignments, while they will function in training and in some 
operations, are not inviolable and may require another assignment 
m some types of operations. A logical distribution in the situa- 
tion, often met, where Bn-2 must be absent on patrols and re- 
connaissance, often for an extended time, would be to assign the 
battalion communications officer, to duties of Bn-1 and adjutant. 
In some situations Bn-4 could perform the duties of Bn-1 and 

b. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. There are in 
his headquarters five executive staff officers, one lieutenant colonel 
and four captains. For special staff duty there are a major and a 
captain and two naval officers. The officers provided for the 
executive staff are assigned as follows: the lieutenant colonel 
is the regimental executive (R-Ex), the four captains are chiefs 
of the four sections and are designated R-l, R-2, R-3, and R-4. 
R-l is also adjutant. In addition to their duties as staff officers 
R-l and R-4 have command duties, R-l commanding the regimental 
headquarters company and R-4 commanding the regimental 
service company. Of the special staff group, the major is machine 
gun, howitzer, and munitions officer; the captain is the paymaster. 
One naval officer is a chaplain, the other is a medical officer (regi- 
mental surgeon) who has a dental surgeon as his assistant. In 
addition to these officers there is a first lieutenant (communication 
officer) from the headquarters company. 

c. The headquarters of the force is composed of the force 
commander, (a brigadier general), one colonel, two lieutenant 
colonels, six majors, one captain, two first lieutenants, and two 
naval officers. These officers provide the executive staff and, in 
part, the special staff of the brigade. The aides are the personal 
staff of the brigade commander but may be utilized as assistants 
to the executive staff if so authorized by the brigade commander. 
The executive staff consists of the chief of staff and the chief of 
the four sections, F-l, F-2, F-3, and F-4. The colonel is chief of 
staff. One lieutenant colonel is the F-3, the other is F-4. Two 
of the majors are F-l and F-2. The other four majors are special 



staff officers, assigned as follows: air officer, law officer, inspector, 
and paymaster. The captain is force communication officer. Of 
the two naval officers one is brigade chaplain, the other is brigade 
surgeon ; both perform special staff duties. There are additional of- 
ficers on the special staff, some in command of units reinforcing the 
brigade, some in command of special units, and others, who by 
nature of their duties, are assigned to other units of the brigade 
for the purpose of administration. The brigade quartermaster (a 
major) and post exchange officer (a captain) , carried in the service 
company for the purposes of administration, are members of the 
special staff. The lieutenant, commanding the communication 
platoon of headquarters company, is also a special staff officer, 
assistant to the force communication officer. 

d. An officer of the special staff who is in command of a unit 
has a staff to assist him if the unit is of proper strength; if the 
unit is not large enough to have a staff he has either commissioned 
or noncommissioned officers as assistants. Of the officers not 
having command of units, the quartermaster is the only one except 
the communication officer, having commissioned assistants whose 
duties approach those of special staff officers. The assistants to 
the quartermaster are the munitions officer, who also commands 
the service company, the disbursing quartermaster, and the depot 
quartermaster who is also commissary officer; all have the rank 
of captain. 

e. The staff of the force commander of a force in small wars 
should be comparatively large. The principal reasons for this are : 
the extent of the theater of operations which results in the staff 
being required to handle all the details of a general headquarters ; 
civil relations are multitudinous and of great importance; in some 
cases certain functions of the local government are taken over and 
must be coordinated with the military functions. In some cases 
the civic authority is taken over in its entirety; when this occurs 
the staff will require additional members. There should be sufficient 
members of the staff to permit officers performing related duties to 
perform dual functions, temporarily, in order that all members, in- 
cluding the special staff, may make extended inspection trips; it 
is impossible for a staff to function properly unless its members are 
familiar with the conditions under which the troops are operating. 
Reports are valuable and necessary, but a staff which depends upon 
reports alone does not deserve that designation. The commander 
of the force in a small war often delegates more authority to make 
decisions and to issue orders in his name than is normally en- 
countered in regular warfare. The areas covered are extensive 
with means of communications generally limited, and as a con- 
sequence, in the absence of the commander or when situations 
on inspections require immediate action a delay might result in 
failure of a specific operation, delay the accomplishment of the 
purpose of the entire operation or result in unnecessary loss of life. 





















Group 10 

Group 11 

Group 12 

Group 13 



4 — 30. General. — a. The materiel pertaining to Marine Corps 
Organization, Peace Strength, is divided into nine groups of equip- 
ment and four groups of supplies as follows: 

Individual Combat Equipment 
Office Equipment 
Organization Combat Equipment 
Supplementary Equipment 
Mess Equipment 
Camp Equipment 
Special Equipment 

Automatic Supplies 
Post Exchange Supplies 

b. Equipment includes all articles prescribed by equipment 
tables for initial issue to individuals or organizations. 

c. Supplies include those articles required for the operation 
and maintenance of the organization, such as ammuntion, sub- 
sistence, replacements for initial equipment, and articles sold by 
the Post Exchange. The quantities of supplies will vary according 
to the nature of the duty and should be prescribed in each par- 
ticular case. Normally all initial equipment listed under Group 
1-5, inclusive, and Group 8 is issued to companies, batteries, or 
squadrons. Equipment and Supplies in Groups 6 and 7, and Groups 
9-12 inclusive are normally retained in the custody of Force, Re- 
gimental, Battalion, or Squadron Quartermaster, as directed, until 
actually required by the companies, batteries or squadrons. 
Group 13 (Post Exchange Supplies) is under the custody of the 
Post Exchange Officer. 

4 — 31. Equipment. — a. (1) Group 1. Individual Combat 
Equipment.— This includes equipment needed in field operations 
and combat which is issued to the individual officer and man and 
is normally carried on his person. Some items such as intrenching 
tools and shelter tents are not issued to the individual until arrival 
at the mobilization point. At certain times it may not be found 
advisable to issue individuals all articles of equipment, as for 
example, the rifles of the machine gun and artillery units when not 
acting as infantry, brassards, extra field message books, and some 
types of intrenching tools. Such articles are listed under Group 1, 
but may be actually stowed in chests provided under Group 5, 
(Supplementary Tables). Extra blankets, flannel shirts, and 
other clothing may be carried in seabags provided for under Group 
2 (Baggage). 



(2) The weight of a marine, with his individual combat 
equipment, rations, water, and ammunition carried on the person, 
is assumed to be 220 pounds (one-tenth of a long ton) . No baggage 
or hold space will be required for this equipment in movements by 
rail or on board ship where it will be stowed in the troop spaces 
and will be taken ashore by troops. In a truck movement the 
average weight will reduce the normal man capacity of the truck. 

(3) The equipment for officers and men is prescribed in the 
Marine Corps Manual, Article 5-42 and Articles 17-103 to 17-106 
inclusive. The clothing required to be in the hands of each enlisted 
man is set forth in Uniform Regulations, U.S.M.C., 1929, Paragraph 
19; Article 5-42, paragraphs (6) (6c) and 7, Marine Corps Manual 
provides that overcoats be carried with the Marine, on the person 
or in seabag according to weather, field hats to be worn and issued 
at base if not required at home station, and flannel shirts to be 
available for issue to men returning home if season of year requires 
it. These items while required on the person may be classed as 
supplementary equipment, baggage, or replacement equipment ac- 
cording to circumstances. 

(4) The intrenching tools prior to mobilization may be 
classed as supplementary equipment and some advocate not issuing 
it to the man in small wars. However, with the development of the 
new armament in the hands of the enemy, light intrenching tools 
should be issued for the initial landing and operations against or- 
ganized resistance. When the operation develops into guerrilla and 
jungle warfare some types may profitably be changed for more 
machetes either of the standard type or of the type used as working 
implements in the locality^ There has been a great deal of discus- 
sion relative to neckwear, footwear, headgear, and the use of the 
flannel shirt in the tropics. The tie is more than an article of dress , 
in the field, it can be used to improvise a sling, secure bundles when 
loaded on pack animals, and a light but strong improvised rope can] 
be made of several of them. The field hat is dependable; it is light' 
and protects the back of the head and neck as well as providing 
shade for the eyes. The form is not too symmetrical or rigid ; on the 
contrary its irregular shape and its color cause it to blend in the 
background and prevent the wearer's head making a distinct target. 
A writer on the Boer War had this to say of the helmet, which has 
many advocates : "throughout the campaign the ponderous helmets 
covered with khaki duck, have served sometimes as a beacon of 
warning, and at others as a death warrant for its wearer as its 
regular shape stands out in relief and makes a splendid target." 

(5) It is of great importance that the men be well shod. The 
shoes should be sufficiently rugged to withstand the difficult trails 
in wet and dry season where replacement is difficult ; at the same 
time they must be sufficiently supple to be serviceable to the troops 
destined to do much patrolling. The regular issue shoe is service- 
able under many conditions but fails to stand up on hard rocky 
trails. If hobnailed shoes are not available it may be possible to 
have extra soles sewed on and hobs fitted, as is done with the golf 
shoe. Boots have many advocates but have not been used suf- 



fiicently to demonstrate their superiority over a good high shoe with 
proper soles. The flannel shirt has been used a great deal in moun- 
tainous countries ; some units wore the cotton shirt during the day 
and carried the flannel shirt for wearing at night. Some officers 
have advocated light sweaters for wear in the mountains. As they 
are an extra burden in the pack and uncomfortable to wear in a 
great many places, the best solution appears to be to have flannel 
shirts ready for issue to troops in areas where they are required. 
The clothes to be worn and carried by the soldier are a matter to 
be decided at the time of mobilization; clothing required enroute, 
availability of seabags on board ship, and the clothes required on 
arrival are to be considered. 

(6) The need to increase the armament of small units to 
make up for their lack of numerical strength has usually been 
overcome by increasing the number of men equipped with automatic 
weapons and having several members of the squad carry grenades. 
This increase of armament will change the equipment allowance 
in Group 1. However, until the necessity arises the increased num- 
ber of automatic weapons should be carried in Group 5 (Supple- 
mentary Equipment) . The means provided for the individual to 
carry grenades requires consideration. A small leather pouch or 
a leather belt with leather pockets should be provided when 
operations take place in areas having heavy rainfall. The number 
carried varies, but an average of four carriers (2 hand and 2 rifle) 
per squad appears reasonable; when not issued to individuals such 
pouches are carried as supplementary equipment. 

b. Group 2. Baggage.-— This includes trunk lockers, cloth- 
ing and bedding rolls, seabags, and clothing in the hands of 
individuals. A part of this baggage (blankets and clothing) may 
be carried on the individual. Baggage allowances for officers 
and first grade noncommissioned officers are listed in Article 5-42 
Marine Corps Manual and Paragraph 21, Uniform Regulations, 
U.S. Marine Corps, for the remaining enlisted personnel it is listed 
in Article 17-104, Marine Corps Manual. Normally no hold space 
will be required for this equipment as it will be stowed in troop 
compartments when space is available. The assumed weight of 
baggage is 44.8 pounds (.02 of long ton), per individual. A part 
or all the baggage may be prescribed to accompany troops when 
landing. On later movements baggage allowances may be curtailed, 
officers' baggage being reduced to a clothing or bedding roll and 
men's baggage (except for men of the first grade), being reduced 
to that carried on the person. 

c. Group 3. Office Equipment. — This includes organization 
records, stationery, field desks, typewriters and similar equipment 
not needed in combat but required for the administration of the 
organization. The initial issue is estimated as sufficient for ninety 
days. This equipment will be needed during the sea voyage and 
will, ordinarily, be stowed in the troop offices, no hold space being 
required. It should accompany the headquarters of an organization 
on any change of station. 



d. Group 4. Organization Combat Equipment. — This includes 
equipment essential in the combat but not issued to individuals, such 
as machine guns, 75-mm pack howitzers, airplanes, ammunition 
carts, signal and medical equipment. It includes hand drawn ve- 
hicles but does not include motor vehicles which are classed as 
transportation. Where practicable the arms and other equipment 
necessary for training and immediate use on landing will be carried 
in troop space. The signal equipment, after the initial landing 
and reduction of organized resistance, may need an increase es- 
pecially in pick-up equipment and panels carried by companies. 
Signal equipment in excess of initial needs could be carried with 
Group 5. 

e. Group 5. Supplementary Equipment.-— This includes 
miscellaneous company, battery, or squadron property such as a 
limited quantity of cleaning and preserving materials, spare parts, 
repair kits for weapons, surveying instruments, lanterns, tool chests, 
and similar items. While this material is not absolutely essential 
in the early phases of combat, if the landing is against opposition, 
a part of it will be needed and should be made available during 
a period of active operations. Included in this group as previously 
set forth, may be some items of Groups 1 and 4. 

f . Group 6. Mess Equipment. — This includes equipment 
required to run a mess in the field, such as ranges, water cans, 
mess chests, baking pans, kitchen cutlery, and butchers equip- 
ment. It does not include fuel, rations or matches, candles and 
articles of similar nature (Automatic Supplies, Group 11). When 
packing, the components of the marching kit should be packed 
as a unit; at least two for each infantry company should be 

g. Group 7. Camp Equipment. — This group is divided into 
sub-group 7- A and sub-group 7-B, sub-group 7- A includes the 
minimum of articles which will normally be needed and issued 
for the establishment of a camp such as tentage, brooms, brushes, 
and buckets. Sub-group 7-B includes articles which are not need- 
ed immediately for the establishment of a camp. To insure that 
a reasonable amount of the expendable articles in this sub-group 
are available (in case replacements do not accompany the troops) 
the quantities for approximately thirty days are listed under 
"initial Issue." The articles in this sub-group (both Initial and 
Replacements) are retained by the Quartermaster and issued 
as required. 

h. Group 8- Transportation.— This includes motor cars, 
trucks, tractors, trailers, ambulances, and motorcycles ; spare parts 
for these vehicles are included in this group and may be loaded on 
the vehicles. This group does not include hand-drawn vehicles, 
such as Cole carts, which are classed as Organization Combat Equip- 
ment. The size of the transport unit will vary with the size of the 
organization, the road conditions, the type of operation expected, 
and the amount of equipment and supplies carried. Tables of 
organization provide for a motor transport company, motor trans- 
port platoon, or motor transport section. In some cases combina- 



tions of these units might be required. Our basic equipment tables 
for initial issue do not contemplate the use of animal-drawn trans- 

i. Group 9. Special Equipment.— (1) This group includes ma- 
terial the need for which depends upon conditions imposed by the 
operation. Included are such articles as barbed wire ; construction 
materials both, for fortification and general use such as docks, 
bridges and buildings ; gas masks, and steel helmets, all of which are 
only issued upon specific authority and when the probability of 
their need is indicated. If boats and outboard motors are required 
they would be placed in this group. Horse equipment, pack equip- 
ment, containers for, or materials designed for making containers 
for airplane drops will also be included when required. 

(2) Every article of this group in the Master Table of 
Tonnage Data and Basic Allowances must be considered separately 
for each organization and orders issued as to the amount, if 
any, to be furnished as initial equipment and replacement there- 
for. In the Equipment and Supply Tables for each organization, 
the articles of this group which may be required by the organiza- 
tion, for any operation are listed, thus providing a space for con- 
veniently entering the quantity, if any, after decision is made of the 

4 — 32. Supplies. — a. Group 10. Ammunition. — (1) This 
group includes all types of ammunition (including chemical am- 
munition) , pyrotechnics and demolition explosives. It also includes 
additional empty magazines for automatic rifles and Thompson sub- 
machine guns, and similar material which should be supplied, in the 
quantities indicated, at the same time as the ammunition, in order to 
replace articles damaged or lost in combat . All figures in this 
group indicate "ONE UNIT OF FIRE". Articles are divided into 
two sub-groups, NORMAL and SPECIAL. NORMAL articles are 
those supplied for any type of operation, decision being necessary 
only to as to the number of UNITS OF FIRE to be taken. SPECIAL 
articles are those which may or may not be supplied depending upon 
the contemplated operation. Orders will be issued in any opera- 
tion covering the number of UNITS OF FIRE of NORMAL am- 
munition and the articles and UNITS OF FIRE of each type of 
SPECIAL ammunition to be carried. In the Equipment and 
Supply Tables for each organization, the articles of special am- 
munition in this Group that may be required by the organization, 
for any operation, are listed, thus providing a space for con- 
veniently entering the quantity, if any, after decision is made as to 
the requirements. 

(2) A unit of fire is an arbitrary unit of measure for am- 
munition supply expressed in rounds per weapon. The actual 
expenditure per day by a command varies with the situation. For 
example a command may expend several units of fire in one day 
of a critical engagement while on other days the expenditure may 
be little or none. In the absence of a more accurate method of 
determining future requirements the unit of fire is used as a 
basis of calculation. Total amounts of ammunition and 



technics are calculated for every class of weapon in an organiza- 
tion based on definite allowance per weapon. Units of fire for 
some of the principal items are: 

For each rifleman in squad : 120 

For each machine gun k .6000 

For each piece of light artillery 300 

b. Group 11. Automatic Supplies. — This includes supplies 
which are consumed at a fairly uniform daily rate in every type of 
operation, such as subsistence, kerosene, gasoline, and oils. Ar- 
ticles in the group are, for the purpose of stowage, classed as 
Inflamable and Non-Inflamable. The amount listed in the tables 
are for ninety days supply. The bulk of the tonnage under this 
group is composed of rations, gas and oil, and the amount of these 
articles will vary according to the theater of operations and avail- 
ability of transportation. If animals are to be used, forage may 
be added. In considering the amount and kinds of rations, oil, and 
gasoline to be taken, the local supply must be considered; for 
example, the handling of gasoline in drums is laborious and waste- 
ful and it is often practicable to obtain it locally; the supply of 
meat may be such that canned meats and fish will be reduced to 
the amount required for the initial landing and a short period 
thereafter; to provide for the protection of flour it might be 
necessary to carry it in tins; a large proportion of small size 
tinned goods for use of patrols may be required ; a certain quantity 
of the individual ration, packed for special shipment such as plane 
transportation or drops, may be required. It will not be found 
economical to take less than ninety days supply of the remaining 
articles of this group such as the capdles, matches, and toilet paper. 

c. Group 12. Replacements. — This group includes replace- 
ments for articles of equipment; 

Group 1 Individual Equipment. 
Group 2 Baggage. 

Group 4 Organization Combat Equipment. 
Group 5 Supplementary Equipment. 
Group 6 Mess Equipment. 
Group 7 Camp Equipment. ^ 
Group % Special Equipment. 

As the initial issue is estimated to be sufficient for ninety days 
no replacements are provided for: — 
Group 3 Office Equipment. 
Group 8 Transportation. 
Group 9 Special Equipment. 

The amount listed under replacements is for a period of ninety 
days. Due to the desirability of utilizing unit packing it is not 
economical to assemble replacements for a period of less than ninety 
days. Individual articles of replacements are shown in a column 
marked "90 days Replacements" in Groups 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of 
the tables in order to avoid a repetition of these articles in Group 12. 

Replacements for Groups 1, 2, 4, and 5 will normally be packed 
separately and retained in the custody of the Quartermaster for 
issue as required. For Groups 6 and 7 the initial requirements and 
the replacements therefor may be packed together and carried by 



the Quartermaster until required by organizations. Replacements 
in Group 9 if authorized, will be packed separately and retained in 
the custody of the quartermaster for issue as required. 

d. Group 13. — Post Exchange Supplies.— This includes articles 
intended for sale by the Post Exchange based on a ninety days sup- 
ply for one thousand men. The financial arrangements will be gov- 
erned by the provisions of Article 12 — 2, Marine Corps Manual. 
Certain articles such as cigarettes, tobacco, toilet articles should be 
so stowed as to be available for sale when automatic supplies ar'e 


4 — 33. General.— a. When a Marine Force is mobilized for a 
small war, training is controlled and conducted by the same agen- 
cies and in accordance with the same doctrines, principles, and 
methods as in time of peace with the following exceptions: 

(1) The control of all training is vested in the commander 
of the Force. 

(2) The conduct of training is not decentralized to as 
great an extent. If necessary, higher commanders may, in order 
to gain speed in training, prescribe subjects, time allotments, and 
methods; and conduct central schools for the training of specialists. 

(3) Essential subjects are given first priority in all training 
programs. Training is intensified and the amount of training per 
day is increased. 

(4) Inspections should not interrupt the combat training. 
They should be designed solely to insure that the combat training is 
being conducted efficiently and that the proper routine condition 
of sanitation and cleanliness is being maintained. 

(5) Other exceptions may be prescribed in Marine Corps 
mobilization plans. 

b. Information concerning special training and essential 
features to be stressed may be announced by Headquarters Marine 
Corps. After operations have commenced, such announcements for 
training centers for replacements will be based on recommendations 
received from the commander of the Force. The training mission 
of stations and posts furnishing troop units and replacements is 
to turn over to the commander of operations, when needed, troops 
trained to prescribed standards. 

c. The amount and character of training required by any unit 
upon mobilization depends upon the time available, the state of 
training of the individual units mobilized, the nature of the country 
in which operations are to take place, the character and arma- 
ment of the enemy, 5 and the type of operations which will be em- 
ployed. . " 

d. For details as to the particular type of training applicable 
to this kind of operations and information as to programs and 
schedules, see Chapter VII. 






General 4-34 

The Commander 4-35 

The Staff 4-36 

The Chief of Staff 4-87 

The First Section 4-38 

The Second Section 4-39 

The Third Section 4-40 

The Fourth Section 4-41 

Special Staff 4-42 

4 — 34. General. — a. This section deals with the duties of the 
Commander and his Staff during base concentration. Some of 
the important considerations pertaining to the executive staff 
sections and special staff are briefly discussed but each of these 
sections will normally function as described in Chapter XVI, Or- 
ganization and Functions of the Marine Force Staff. Each staff sec- 
tion should foresee the problems with which it may be confronted 
and plan ahead accordingly. This entails a comprehensive know- 
ledge of all of the staff functions. It should be understood that 
most of the details are worked out by special staff officers. The 
responsibility of coordination remains with the chief of the execu- 
tive staff section concerned. 

b. The functions of corresponding staff officers in all head- 
quarters of combat units are similar in character but differ in scope 
and detail depending upon the size and nature of the units. The 
discussion of the employment and preparation of the various staff 
officers and sections will be comprehensive enough to apply to all 
units. The staff of the force commander only will be dicussed 
herein, the duties or functions not applicable to staffs or smal- 
ler units or special arms may be disregarded when considering 
such smaller units. The duties of the executive staff and some 
special staff officers are well defined; some special staff officers 
are normally in close contact with one or more of the executive 
staff groups. Special staff officers are not under the direct com- 
mand of any particular chief of the four executive sections. 
Prompt consideration should be given as to the necessity for staff 
officers or assistants in addition to those included in the tables of 
organization, such as Morale Officer, Postal Officer, etc. Pending 
the assignment of such additional staff officers to the command, 
their duties will be allocated to other staff officers by the com- 

4 — 35. The Commander. — a. The first action of a commander 
after receipt of an order setting forth a specific mission or "purpose 
in view" should be to make a study, or estimate, arrive at a decision, 
and formulate his plans. In case the commander's orders read 
in part, (as is not unusual) : "report to the Commander Special 
Service Squadron at 'Blank' "; he should still be able to make 
an estimate and decide as to the probable employment of his com- 
mand. He can then decide, what types of equipment in general 



will be required at variance with existing tables. He can also 
decide on policies and training plans, all these decisions being 
based on the probable employment of his command. 

b. Irrespective of whether or not he is furnished complete 
information on which to formulate a detailed plan, there is one 
important decision which he can make, namely: the extent to 
which he will decentralize authority to his staff and subordinate 
commanders. This decision will greatly influence his assignment 
of officers to specific staff and command duties. With the decision 
relative to authority once made, the commander may assign officers 
to staff duties, or to command of combat or other subordinate units. 
The assignment of officers to duties according to their attainments, 
temperaments, and special qualifications, is one of the most im- 
portant measures to insure smooth and efficient operation of the 
organizations or establishments. The larger the unit the more 
important this becomes, and it is also of importance in small units. 
A good company commander may be a mediocre adjutant. An 
efficient staff officer in a post under centralized control may be a 
misfit on a staff where responsibility is decentralized. A good bat- 
talion commander in a closely knit regiment where control is direct 
and duties are well defined, may fall down as a district or area 
commander where his contact with both higher and lower units are 
less frequent and many of his decisions must be based on reports 
instead of on personal observation. 

c. After the officers have been assigned, the commander 
will initiate an exhaustive study of the probable theater of opera- 
tions of his unit. If sufficient information is not furnished, he 
will on his own initiative obtain maps, monographs, and other 
current data concerning the country, and will inaugurate pro- 
cedure to keep the data up to date. The most helpful information 
is the following: political situation, past and present with causes 
thereof; economic situation; population, with classes and distribu- 
tion thereof; psychological nature of inhabitants; military 
geography, both general and physical; and military situation. 
With this information as a background, the commander will be 
assisted in deducing his mission or "purpose in view" if not in- 
formed of same in his original orders. Regardless of how made, 
he will inform his staff of his decision and the operating plan. 

d. The next step will be to determine the scope and nature 
of training. The prior study will have provided much of the 
necessary information upon which to determine these. The time 
available for training is generally given in orders or can be deduced 
from thern. The state of training of his own troops, if not known, 
must be determined. It's determination involves not only inspec- 
tion of records, but also personal inspections. 

e. The nature of training having been determined the com- 
mander will decide upon the amount and class of equipment, 
armament, and supplies required. Equipment tables are avail- 
able, but the commander knows from past experience that needless 



quantities of trucks, often tela heavy, have sometimes been taken 
and not used, except for a few utilized at bases. Quite often 
patrols must be given an increased amount of automatic weapons. 
Sometimes canned meats have been carried and not used, except 
by forced issue, due to the availability of fresh meats. The com- 
mander will probable find, in his study of the theater of opera- 
tions, that supply will influence his plan of campaign. After 
giving his general instructions, he will closely examine supply 
matters in order to have revised tables of equipment and allow- 
ances approved. Transportation will be of vital importance. The 
commander must not overburden himself with modern transport- 
ation when lack of roads will not prevent its use. He must be 
prepared to use local means if that is most practicable in the 
theater of operations. If such is the case, a study will be required 
to determine, what they are, whether sufficient equipment can 
be procured locally, and what funds must be requested in order 
to purchase or hire it. The amounts of ammunition both normal 
and special must be determined by the commander. In mobilization 
for small wars operations, the problem for the commander is seldom, 
what additional supplies and equipment is desirable, but rather, 
what is the best use that can be made of those actually available. 

f. These problems having been solved, the commander will 
keep himself informed as to the progress of training and equipping 
the troops by conducting inspections with the assistance of his 
staff. With the most important decisions and plans completed, 
the commander will be free to spend his time with the troops 
and by direct contact influence the training and development of 
his command. The details must be left to his staff. 

g. As the fire power and mobility of weapons has increased, 
smaller units, operating at greater distances, and responsible for 
larger areas have become the basis of operation to a greater extent. 
This has caused greater decentralization through the units. Peace 
time administration leans toward over centralization; head of de- 
partments concern themselves with details that should be entrust- 
ed to subordinates, thus depriving themselves of time to attend 
their proper work of supervision. Good administration involves issu- 
ance of directives by heads of services who leave details to their sub- 
ordinates, contenting themselves with seeing that the work is 
properly done, that the principle of the directive is not departed 
from, but who hold themselves ready to rule on doubtful points 
and to advise subordinates who are having difficulty. Too often 
administration tends to place economy before efficiency, which is 
clearly wrong. Efficiency is the goal to be obtained, most certainly 
with economy ; for in the long run, efficiency means economy. To 
attain efficiency, forethought and imagination are needed. In 
peace time a system of hand-to-mouth existence must often be 
endured due to lack of funds. There is a tendency ot regulate 
everything by rigid scales, allowing only the narrowest margins. 
This system may suffice in normal times, but in active military 
operations it invites disaster. Some officers are unable to rise 
above it when occasion demands. They fear to look ahead, they 



are afraid to order more equipment than the amounts provided 
by the tables. The commander must guard against this limited 
vision throughout his command. He must, without encouraging 
waste, see that his immediate staff realize the necessity of ample 
provision, and he must guard against arbitrary reduction of 
requests approved by subordinate unit commanders; encouraging 
them, on the contrary, to make increases where required. 
Among other policies laid down by the commander in this period 
of organization and preparation, which will have an important 
bearing upon the morale of the organization, is that concerning 
rewards, punishments, and promotions. A workable system should 
be selected at the start and adhered to until it can be improved up- 
on for the benefit of the command and not individuals. With the 
foregoing plans, decisions, and policies promulgated, the command- 
er will leave the details to his staff and by personal inspections 
augmented by reports, prepares himself to make other decisions 
as their need arises. 

4—36. The Staff.— The duties of the staff during concentration 
will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. For a full discus- 
sion of the staff, see Chapter XVI. 

4—37. The Chief of Staff.— a. The principal duties of the 
chief of staff are to act as military adviser to the commander and 
to coordinate the activities of the staff. On receipt of orders of 
any type, the first action of the chief of staff is to study the infor- 
mation available. This study is made from the viewpoint of a plan 
of campaign, rather than of a single operation. The study of avail- 
able information having been made the chief of staff, through the 
proper member (s) of the staff, takes measures to obtain such ad- 
ditional information as is required. From his studies he is prepar- 
ed to advise the commander relatives to changes in organization 
and armament, and the kind of training required to meet the situa- 

b. His next step, which will usually run concurrently with his 
study, is to supervise the development of the executive staff team- 
work. The interior organization of the sections as prescribed by 
the chief of staff is such as to fix responsibility for the initiation 
and supervision of work so as to secure efficiency and teamwork 
throughout the command. He must study the personnel of the 
staff, both executive and special, to see that they are fitted for 
their tasks. He decides what members of one staff section will 
understudy members of another staff section. He makes sure that 
the special staff, is properly organized. His organization should be 
such as to free him from attention to details, thus enabling him to 
study pending operations, plans, or training, and to make frequent 
visits throughout the command. 

c. Each chief of section will be so deeply engrossed in his 
own work that at times one section will infringe on the duties 
of another. The chief of staff must adjust this at once. His diplo- 
macy and tact in adjusting harmoniously such situations at the start 
will have a favorable reaction on the entire command. The staff 


reflects the ability of the commander and the chief of staff. There 
are few things that will react more adversely upon the commander 
and chief of staff than a disjointed, inharmonious staff. 

d. As the organization progresses it often develops that 
certain duties should be shifted from one staff unit to another, or 
that operative functions should be shifted from one unit to another. 
The chief of staff should see that such changes are made promptly. 
The map section of the engineers has logically, at times, been shift- 
ed from that unit and placed in the second section. Where 
military government has not been established civil relations have 
been shifted from the first to the second section. The organization 
of the staff should be completed rapidly and provisions made 
for the staff to observe the training of the troops and make visits 
to all organizations. 

e. During base concentration the Chief of Staff will be 
particularly interested in the plans of the staff sections and their 
arrangements for: 

(1) Receiving incoming details and individuals. 

(2) Prompt issue of equipment. 

(3) The prompt completion of medical and other ad- 
ministrative inspections. 

(4) The provisions of training fields and facilities for 

(5) Establishment of schools for officers and enlisted men. 

(6) The organization of the Provost Service to meet ade- 
quately the probable demands that will be made upon it in the 
theater of operations. 

(7) The organization of the Intelligence Service to meet 
the probable requirements of the particular situation. 

(8) The coordination of training of all units with that of 
the infantry units. 

f. The chief of staff should make a plan for increase of 
the intelligence personnel and establishment of provost services 
if it can be foreseen that the operations may result in occupation 
of a country or a large section of it. The principal feature to be 
dealt with, at this time, would be for providing for the prompt 
forwarding of replacements for officers and men detailed to these 
services, if and when increased. 

g. Immediately upon the occupation of any portion of foreign 
territory the peculiar problems of small nation occupation will 
present themselves for solution. The operations staff section, 
heretofore occupied with using military means for the purpose 
of fighting, faces about and bends its effort toward using them for 
the purpose of avoiding fighting. The methods employed to effect 
this determine the organization, strength, and distribution of the 
forces of occupation. 

h. In most small nations the chief danger to a peaceful 
occupation is the effect of hostile propaganda initiated and spread 
by the agitator class (aided by the activity of the lawless element) 
against the producer class, especially during economic crises. In 
fact, there can be no serious uprisings unless the producer class 
joins in the movement. The problem thus resolves itself into a ques- 
tion of keeping information of the revolutionary propaganda of the 
agitator class, together with the movement of the lawless elements, 


and the economic conditions surrounding the producer class; and 
acting with the means at hand to forestall evil effects. 

i. The forces of occupation have four weapons with which to 
act: (a) Moral effect of the presence of troops; (b) Intelligence 
Service; (c) Provost Service, (including Exceptional Military 
Courts) : and finally (d) Fighting action. It is well to consider 
the second two weapons very closely in connection with "peaceful 
occupation." The intelligence and provost services belong to that 
class of services which may be indifferently provided for with im- 
punity so long as brave men are available and ready to sacrifice them- 
selves. Hence in the past the scant attention that has been given to 
these services in the preparation of operation plans, tables of organi- 
zation, school curriculums, and similar preparatory measures. As a 
rule, they have been established only when the necessities of 
operations forced it upon higher command. As far as the intelli- 
gence service is concerned the defects have been corrected except 
for providing units of sufficient strength. In most cases an increase 
of personnel in intelligence units will be required over that allowed 
in orgaization tables when the operations include a complete occupa- 
tion of a country or large areas of it. 

j. The provost service, including the exceptional military 
court system, represents the military government to the mass of 
the people, with whom it comes in direct contact, and is the 
normal active instrument for the maintenance of tranquility, 
and to free the natives from agitation and intimidation by their 
own countrymen. The provost service, more than any other 
element of the forces except the intelligence service, should under- 
stand the people, their temperament, customs, activities, and the 
everyday working of the average native mind. Its functions 
warrant a well founded and complete organization including 
provost marshals and judges with legal knowledge, good and 
loyal interpreters and sufficient clerical assistance to dispatch 
business with justice and celerity. One unfortunate characteris- 
tic of the usual provost service is that it is required to maintain 
itself by the fines which it inflicts as a result of sentences of 
exceptional courts; this, notwithstanding the fact that the more 
efficient the service becomes the less liability there is of orders 
being violated and hence fines being available for maintenances of 
the service. 

4 — 38. The First Section. — a. This section is charged with the 
executive functions which relate to the personnel of the command 
as individuals. The following sub-paragraphs discuss some of 
the more important problems that require prompt attention upon 

b. The first section organizes the personnel of the staff 
section. The assignment and replacement of the clerical personnel, 
orderlies, and specialists is made promptly. Desks, stationery, 
and standard forms are requisitioned and drawn. A study is made 
of new types of forms required and of the probability of increases 
being required in the allowances of stationery. There is hostility 



towards paper work, particularly in the lower units where little 
time is available for it, and the availability of sufficient material 
and standardized forms will aid in removing such hostility and will 
result in better reports and records. 

c. The section is charged with the general regulations and 
routine administration which especially concerns individuals, and 
routine not specifically assigned to another staff section. An early 
decision as to what routine is not specifically covered by any section 
and what section is to be responsible, and a prompt issuing of 
general regulations, and instructions relative to matters of routine, 
will aid in the rapid development of a systematic administration 
of the force. 

d. The classification, priority of assignment and allocation 
of personnel in conjunction with the other sections of the executive 
staff, attached, and technical troops will be the first important step 
after the organization of the headquarters and establishment of 
the routine adminstration. The class of examinations, both 
medical and professional, the place and time for them to be held 
must be determined in order to receive troops and replacements 
promptly and have them turned over promptly to the combat, 
administrative, and technical units. In this connection, existing 
mobilization instructions fix the allocation of the troops, state the 
length of service that enlisted personnel must have in order to be 
available, and the required physical and professional standards. 
However, mobilizations are usually rapid and the basic plans are 
general and' will require modifications to meet the situation. The 
first section is responsible that decisions are made relative to 
these matters, that instructions are issued, that the examinations 
and classifications are made promptly, and that the assignment 
of replacements, and the elimination of the unfit are made in 
accordance with the approved priorities. 

e. This section formulates a replacement plan covering 
the replacements to accompany the force, numbers and classes 
of replacements to be dispatched later, dates that such replace- 
ments are desired, and priorities. It should appear as an annex to 
an appropriate administrative order. In determiinng the number 
of replacements to be provided, the losses which may be incurred 
among the various classes of troops must be estimated. In this 
estimate an ample margin should be allowed for casualties in transit 
and during the landing, and consideration given to the climatic and 
sanitary conditions enroute and within the area of operations, the 
types of operations contemplated, the branch of the service, and the 
time required for replacements to arrive. 

4 — 39. The Second Section.— a. The second section will be 
primarily concerned with the obtaining of all available information 
relative to the country in which it is proposed to operate. Mono- 
graphs, maps, and other pertinent information will normally be 
furnished. The chief of section will make a study of these and 
determine what additional information is required. This informa- 
tion can be obtained from Headquarters Marine Corps. To facili- 
tate obtaining information and determine what is required it 


would be feasible to designate the chief of section as liaison 
officer with the corresponding branches of the naval and military- 
services and with the nearest representative of the State Depart- 
ment since our operations bring us in contact with that Department. 
The latter should provide the latest' current information and in no 
type of warfare is current information more vital. 

b. Concurrently with the studies of the section, the selection, 
organization, and training of the commissioned and enlisted intelli- 
gence personnel, both the headquarters and combat units will go 
forward. Schools and special instructions may be required in addi- 
tion to the field work with their organizations. In the selection 
of personnel every endeavor should be made to obtain personnel 
conversant with the language of the country. Schools should be 
started immediately to bring these men to the highest state of 
efficiency both as translators and interpreters. The force of inter- 
preters will unfortunately, generally be augmented by the em- 
ployment of natives. The tables which give the classifications and 
pay of interpreters in different localities do not always provide this 
information for the countries in which a Force may operate. After 
a study of the scale of wages of that country it will be an advantage 
to have an allowance and pay table approved and funds allocated 
for payment prior to departure. This should be done in conjunc- 
tion with the fourth section but the second section should originate 

c. The study of the theater of operations should be completed 
and approved as soon as practicable in order to have it promptly 
reproduced and disseminated throughout the command. Original 
source of material is generally limited and of little value, certain 
parts are obsolete, and current information is lacking; for this 
reason it is more practicable to have the study published and 
distributed throughout the organization to all officers and offices 
of record than to distribute the original material. This being 
completed or under progress, the units being organized and under 
training, the chief of section will be free to procure required 
equipment and supplies; and to inaugurate policies pertaining to 
dealing with the press, visitors, propaganda, and civil relations. 

d. (1) Maps are generally of a small scale and inaccurate. 
The procurement of them is costly and consequently the supply 
is limited. This will necessitate prompt reproduction of such 
sections as are most likely to be required. The demand cannot 
always be met and this will necessitate a careful check of allow- 
ances of map making material and of supplies for making overlays. 
Maps have often proved to be so unreliable as to detail, that they 
are valueless except for the purpose of correction. It will often 
prove more practical and economical to obtain maps for head- 
quarters and executive staff sections of all units, and provide 
means for reproduction of corrected sections, or new maps made 
after arrival. In small war situations where engineers have not 
been present, map reproduction has been made a responsibility 
of the second section; in other cases the map reproduction section 
of the engineers has been transferred to the brigade headquarters 
intelligence platoon. 

(2) Aerial photography, in addition to its other military 
uses, will play an important part in the development of new maps 



and obtaining accurate information for correction of old ones. 
Often films and other materials for this purpose are inadequate. 
The procurement of an initial supply is essential ; also, an allotment 
of funds should be asked from the fourth section to make local 
purchases. It is better to spend some money in this manner than 
to lose film from too long storage or be without it because delay 
in shipment has resulted in shortage of film. 

(3) Whether the second section is furnished with a 
photographic section and map reproduction section or not, it is 
responsible for the procurement of the supplies for them, and for 
issuing instructions relative to the distribution of maps and the 
release of photographs. 

e. Favorable press relations should be established at the 
start. Often the operation will be too small to have correspondents 
and photographers attached for the entire operation but they will 
invariably be present at the start. The section should have a 
definite liberal policy of dealing with them and should give them 
all the help practicable. In some cases, at the request of agencies, 
officers have been permitted to act as correspondents; if this is 
done, care should be taken that a definite agreement is made 
relative to the class of information desired, and to be furnished. 
When a definite policy has been established as to who will receive 
press representatives, what information will be furnished, and 
means provided for the obtaining of it, the press representative 
can be dealt with in a business like way without probability of 
friction, and of harmful and incorrect information being published. 

f. Civil relations, in cases where military government is 
not established, logically become a function of the second section. 
These relations are not only with the native civilians and officials 
but also with foreign nationals, including citizens of the United 
States. From the information available in the State Department, 
a study can be made of existing conditions in the probable area 
of operations and causes therefor. A definite policy for dealing 
with the various elements should be established before the force 
arrives in the country where the operation is to take place. Of 
course changes may be required after arrival but this is a study 
that can produce best results from a distance. After arrival 
the local representative of the State Department should be con- 
sulted to obtain additional information. 

g. Organizations which are opposed to intervention in the 
affairs of other nations, regardless of the cause, have at times 
disseminated their propaganda to the Force. The second section 
is responsible for guarding against this by locating the sources 
and notifying, through official channels, the proper civilian 
officials. The counteracting qf this propaganda requires careful 
study. The best method, if it' can be accomplished, is to prevent 
its circulation. If this cannot be accomplished a general denial 
or reference to it results only in material for discussion. An 
early statement of the facts relating to the situation, by the 
commander, will usually forestall not only any ill effects of such 
propaganda, but will even result in lack of interest in it. 

h. Censorship policies are formulated and recommended by 



the second section for the approval of the commander. True censor- 
ship gives the power to examine wxitten or printed matter in 
order to forbid publication, circulation, or representation, if it 
contains anything objectionable. For military purposes it has 
extended to the verbal presentation. In small wars, rigid censor- 
ship is not feasible and is of doubtful value ; however, a censorship 
in the broader sense must be exercised. This is accomplished 
by prompt decision as to what orders, instructions, and information 
are confidential and are to be treated as such. Whether it is 
called counter-propaganda or censorship, an indirect means of 
restricting the result of harmful information is always at hand. 
The prompt release of orders, publications, and news items pre- 
senting information which should be known throughout the com- 
mand furnishes it with unobjectionable information which can be 
transmitted without harm to the organization or to the ac- 
complishment of its mission. 

i. The preparation of the intelligence annex (the intelli- 
gence plan) to accompany the campaign plan will be one of the 
most important tasks. The various instructions, policies, and 
information contained therein must often be issued separately 
and in advance of the annex. It would be better to have it all 
incorporated in the annex and issued on mobilization; however, 
various factors not within control of the second section or the 
staff will often prevent this. 

j. Funds for intelligence operations are required, to enable 
the section to function properly. These funds are not a part of 
the quartermaster allotment. The chief of section should initiate 
promptly a request for the allotment of such funds for the organi- 
zation. It may be that the allotment will not be made direct but 
through other agencies after arrival at the scene of action. This 
must not be taken for granted. Unless funds are furnished, or 
information given relative to the individual or agent who will 
furnish them and the time they will be furnished, it is the duty 
of the chief of section to inaugurate promptly a request for funds. 

4 — 40. The Third Section. — a. The chief of the third section 
will organize the section, make a study of the theater of opera- 
tions and the campaign plan in order to prepare the details of 
the operating plan and prepare training plans for the Force. 
These studies having been completed, and with them as back- 
ground, the third section will make an informal inspection of the 
command, and then will prepare plans for the completion of the 
organization of the combat units. One of the most important 
features will be the priority of the assignment of replacements. 
Another important feature may be the preparation of recommenda- 
tions for changes in armament and equipment. This may take the 
form of immediate changes by replacement or distribution, or 
by the procuring of additional armament and equipment to be 
issued later as the occasion arises. 

b. The foregoing studies and changes may precede the prepara- 
tion of the training orders and programs for the organization. This 
would be an ideal situation because any new or modified armament 



and equipment of the command would affect training; however, the 
availability of troops may require an immediate issuing of training 
orders and programs. In connection with this it will be necessary 
to develop the methods of handling the distribution of training in- 
formation and to check the training programs and schedules of sub- 
ordinate and attached units to insure that all phases of training 
are covered, and that there is proper division between disciplinary 
training and field training.The assignments of training sites, such 
as drill grounds, ranges, training grounds, and field training areas 
are coordinated at this time. 

c. One of the most important duties will be to arrange the 
details for coordination of the training and preparation of plans of 
the combined arms. To this end full use will be made of the expert 
advice and assistance of the commander of the artillery and engi- 
neers; the air officer, and other special staff officers such as the 
communication officer and chemical officer. If no chemical officer 
is available, the chief of section must either personally make the 
study of the probable or possible use of chemical agents and defen- 
sive measures against them, or have some qualified officer do it. The 
use of gas, at present time, is not confined to the major powers and 
regular troops. When necessary, special staff officers are called 
upon for plans, special maps, and reports, or annexes to plans 
and orders. In this manner full advantage is taken of the detailed 
technical knowledge of these officers while at the same time causing 
their plans to harmonize with the general plan of training and 
employment of the arms and services. 

d. After the foregoing phases of preparation and employ- 
ment are initiated the chief of section keeps in touch with the 
commander of subordinate combat units and with the commanders 
of attached units and technical troops, personally and by means 
of assistants, and maintains direct observation of the training. 
By this means marked deficiencies are discovered quickly and 
corrected promptly. This may require the organization of schools. 
The organization and conduct of these schools and procurement 
and distribution of publications to them is the responsibility of the 
third section. 

e. The section prepares the necessary movement, com- 
munications, and tactical plans. The preparation of signal com- 
munication plans is very important. The means of communication 
available must be used to the utmost; generally additional means 
will be required, and the lack of certain types will influence the 
plan of campaign. The prompt preparation of the air-ground 
liaison code is very important. 

f. The determination of the number of units of fire of 
normal ammunition, and the articles and number of units of fire 
of each type of special ammunition to be carried is of the utmost 
importance. The third section must: make a study of the am- 
munition requirements; require the commanders of attached and 
supporting units to make their recommendations; confer with the 
fourth section relative to transportation available and how often 
and in what amounts replacements can be expected; and be pre- 



pared to make recommendations to the commander relative to the 
ammunition requirements. 

4 — 41. Fourth Section. — a. Some of the more important 
questions requiring early attention from the chief of this section 

Equipping of the organization. 
Amounts and kinds of supplies to be carried. 
Hospital facilities to be provided. 
Amount and type of transportation required. 
Real estate, shelter, and other facilities in the theater of opera- 

Training of service troops. 
Administrative plan. 

Procurement of funds and priority of expenditures. 
His study of the theater of operations will be primarily from the 
viewpoint of supply and transportation with its effect on strategical 
and tactical plans. The difficulties of supply and transportation 
may cause a change in the operating plan, or the operating plan may 
be based in great part upon the availability of supplies and means of 

b. In coordination with the third section, a study will be 
made and decision reached relative to changes in types and amount 
of individual, organization combat, supplementary and special 
equipment, to be taken, and the units of fire of normal ammunition, 
and articles and units of fire of each type of special ammunition 
to be carried. 

c. In conjunction with the first section a decision will be 
reached relative to baggage ; clothing, individual and replacement ; 
office equipment ; mess equipment, camp equipment, post exchange, 
athletic and welfare supplies and equipment; hospital facilities 
to be taken. The class of, and number of field hospitals will 
influence the transportation unit required. The first and fourth 
sections will cooperate in arriving at an estimate of the civilian 
labor needed and obtainable in the theater of operations and the 
number and composition of specialists units to be attached to the 
Force for the service of supply, hospitalization, communication, 
and transportation. 

d. When it appears that an organization will remain in a 
definite locality for some time, availability of real estate, shelter, 
and other facilities ; and availability of local construction facilities 
relating to supply, shelter, transportation, and hospitalization 
must be estimated in order to form a basis for the amount of 
tentage and construction material to be taken. 

e. This section will prepare the allowance tables for auto- 
matic supplies, replacements, and transportation, to accompany 
the organization, determine the amount of supplies that can be 
obtained from local resources, and prepare a schedule for ship- 
ment of supplies following the expedition. The amount of trans- 
portation to be taken must be decided and the availability of 
gasoline and oil locally must be determined before the amount of 
automatic supplies to be taken can definitely be determined. The 
amounts and types of transport to be taken will be determined by 
tactical and administrative requirements. Facilities for transporta- 



tion on board ship, types of small craft for landing, general nature 
of the terrain in the theater of operations, distances to be covered, 
availability and suitability of native transport will be important 
factors in determining the transportation required. The types and 
amounts taken should be reduced to the minimum. In specific 
situations, a large reduction in allowances or a complete change in 
type from that specified in organization tables or both may be 

f. (1) The fourth section will, notwithstanding the fact 
that training is primarily a function of the third section, take a 
close interest in the training of service, transportation, and engi- 
neer units. Such schools as inspections disclose the need of, may 
be established and supervised by the fourth section. Schools for 
supply officers, veterinarians, farriers, motor mechanics, cooks and 
bakers (stressing field cooking and baking), packers, and other 
artificers may be established if inspections show lack of ability 
or the need of certain types that are especially required by the 
conditions in the country in which operations are to take place. 

(2) The section will prepare the administrative plan to 
accompany the operation plan, and annexes to accompany the 
movement, embarkation, and debarkation orders. If the movement 
of the unit is on one transport the debarkation plan may be delayed, 
but since loading will often depend on debarkation plan it might 
be necessary to issue it prior to embarking. A continual study of 
the situation will be carried on so as to be ready to meet prospec- 
tive or emergency changes with adequate supply arrangements. 

4 — 42. Special Staff.— a. In addition to all of the duties per- 
taining to their specialty, special staff officers upon concentration 
should give particular consideration to the following: 

Requests for replacements for their sections or units. 

Training of units from which they are responsible. 

Supplying, throughout the force, equipment and 'material and 
replacing worn out equipment. 

Inspections as prescribed by the Force Commander. 

b. They should anticipate the demands that may be made 
on their organization, unit, or service, and take the preparatory 
steps to meet all requirements promptly. The following sub- 
paragraphs indicate a few of the more important items that 
should receive early consideration, but are in no way intended 
to be a complete discussion of special staff officers and their duties. 

c. The Adjutant is ordinarily assigned the duty of initiating 
the establishment of a Force post office. This is of primary 
importance and eventually may require the detail of an officer 
for this duty alone. Precedent may be found for the assignment 
of the Force Paymaster as Postal Officer in addition to his other 
duties. Although this is not prohibited by law or regulations, 
the custom is not established or generally recommended. Detail 
of suitable mail clerk (s) should be made and their appointment 
and bond forwarded for approval by the Post Office Department 
at an early date in order that approval be had prior to departure. 
Postage stamped paper will not be issued to a Navy (Marine) 


mail clerk until the bond has been approved and accepted by the 
Post Office Department. The postmaster, New York, N.Y., will 
issue an initial supply of postage stamped paper, the amount 
issued, to be fixed by the postmaster, not exceeding the amount of 
the clerk's bond. In requesting stamps a good guide is a dollar 
per man per month. In connection with the detail of a clerk it 
must be remembered that it is a responsible position requiring 
a man of integrity and ability. A man of service, preferably a 
noncommissioned officer with administrative training, is preferable. 
Provision should be made for money order service. Money order 
blanks are also obtained from the Postmaster, New York, N.Y. 
The members of the command should be informed that even if the 
force post office is not ready to cash money orders at the start it 
will be eventually, and if they expect money, to notify the senders 
to use United States postal money orders. The cashing of inter- 
national money orders is difficult and they can be cashed only at the 
important native post offices, and sometimes only at the one 
situated in the foreign capital. The command should be informed 
constantly of the correct current address. This will insure prompt 
deliveries and aid the post offices from which the men have been 
receiving mail. An aid in informing correspondents of the correct 
address is to have address slips printed which can be given to 
members of the command to send to their correspondents. 

d. The communication officer should promptly establish the 
message center. The classes of communication to be handled 
as wire or radio messages, and the classes to be handled by letter 
should be determined in advance. Prior to departure, authority 
should be secured to handle Class E (personal messages) by radio. 
Steps should be taken to insure replacements of communication 
personnel who are due for discharge or return to the United 
States, by qualified personnel from schools conducted by the Marine 
Corps, in the United States. 

e. (1) The Force Surgeon is in close contact with the first 
section as the care of the sick, hospitalization, and evacution 
deals entirely with personnel. In major warfare where hospitaliza- 
tion and evacuation are greatly dependent on transportation, the 
surgeon is more closely related with the fourth section. 

(2) A sanitary plan covering inspections and the usual 
measures for sanitation should be prepared for the mobilization 
area, the voyage, and the theater of operations. A large supply 
of wire screening and disinfectant materials will be needed for 
tropical duty. Our standard mosquito nettings have been found 
to have too large a mesh to exclude some insects. Sometimes they 
have not been taken ashore initially. A study of insect life in 
the theater of operations should be made and any change or increase 
of protective means be made promptly. 

(3) In addition to the continual study of and improvement 
in medical equipment and supplies, including the kind, size, and 
weight of containers, by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, a 
further study should be made during the period of mobilization. 
The difficulties of returning men long distances for dental treat- 



ment in case of a large dispersion of the forces should be considered 
and, if not provided, portable dental outfits obtained. The prepara- 
tion of supplies for airplane drops should be studied and any 
protective packing material available obtained prior to leaving the 
mobilization point. Large, heavy containers and equipment 
chests are a handicap not only in initial landing but also in move- 
ments inland and by patrols. If small and light containers and 
equipment are not available, a means of repacking the large con- 
tainers should be provided. If time is not available to repack 
prior to departure, a set of instructions governing the size and 
weight of containers and classes of equipment and supplies to 
be packed as a unit should be prepared and issued. 

(4) The operating plan may require operations in different 
localities with limited means of communication between units or 
organizations. In such cases the use of two or more field hospitals 
instead of one might be required. The proper types should be 
decided upon prior to departure. The Tables of Organization, 
Peace Strength, 1935, give wide latitude in making this decision. 

f. (1) The Post Exchange Officer should arrange for the 
establishment of a Post Exchange upon arrival at destination. 
If the organization does not have an exchange or its capital is 
small, necessary funds must be obtained. It can be obtained by 
borrowing from the Headquarters exchange funds. This may be 
augmented by the proportionate share of exchange profits received 
from the organizations or posts from which transfers to the force 
are effected. Since this money may be, and often, is turned over 
to the important amusement fund, it would probably be better 
to borrow the entire amount required from the headquarters 
exchange fund. 

(2) Exchange supplies should be obtained and carried with 
the organization. To comply with regulations relative to the 
amounts of supplies purchased, an exchange council is appointed 
at an early date. The experience of the past has shown that a 
balanced supply is hard to estimate and an aid to the exchange 
officer and council is needed in the form of a table showing an 
initial supply for one thousand men for a period of time sufficient 
to care for the command until the regular shipment of supplies 
can be inaugurated. When the length of stay is indeterminate 
it has been found to advantage to buy on consignment, which 
requires less initial capital, facilitates closing of the exchange, 
and the distribution of profits. See 1935 Equipment and Supply 

(3) A plan for the supply of post exchange stores to out- 
lying garrisons and patrols should be drawn up. It should include: 
means of supply, methods of survey of supplies damaged or lost 
enroute or by plane drops, means of extending credit, means for 
transmitting funds in payment of purchases, decision as to whether 
stations not having an exchange shall share in profits of the main 
exchange by donation of supplies or by donations to the amusement 
and company funds. The procedure decided upon may require 
approval of higher authority than the force commander and such 
approval should be obtained prior to departure. 

l a. ci 

I I I I 
I I I I 

4 Headquarters 

3 Infantry Battalion 

2 Headquarters 

1 Machine Gun an 
Howitzer Compa 

Condensed, Peace 
Strength Tables 
(Transpor tat i on) 

3 Q - 



Carts, Cole 




1 Carts, Reel, R-L16 




Cars, 5 Passenger 

Filtration Unit 

Motorcycle, with side car 


| Motorcycle, Solo 

Trailers, Water 


Trucks M ton 


Trucks, 2 Tons 


Truck, Tank, Gasoline 


Truck, Machine Shop 


Truck, Wrecking & Repair 



| Carts, Cole, Ammunition 

Carts. Cole, Signal 

Tractors. No. 25 

Trailers, 3-Ton 




Truck, 1-Ton 


Cars, Cross Country 

Aviation, Crash Boat 


| Aviation, Crash Truck 



j Bicycles 



| Mowing Machine 



j Tractor, with Crane 


1 1 

j Tractor, 2 Ton 


| Trailer, Field Lighting 


1 1 

| Trailei , Machine Shop 



| 1 

| Trailer, 1^-2 Ton 



1 1 


Truck, % Ton 




Truck, 1 M Ton 



1 i 


Truck, 3 Ton 

1 11 


Truck, Radio 



Table No. 



ft ft 


H | I 
•a j 

- E? 










Condensed Peace Strength Tables (Transportation) 
See paragraph 4 — 27. 



15F I 

Appendices, Chanter -1 


Tables Showing Possible Organization of Separate, Detached, 
and Reinforced Units. 
See paragraph 4 — 27. 

Special Troops 

iS'Fb'roe Service 

13 Military Police 

Company 3 57 

nfontry Raiment N(6)32- 

Brli tde(2R< its 









Appendices, Chapter 4. 


Historical Examples of Factors Influencing Composition of 
Expeditionary Forces. 

In the Boer War the British were compelled by the nature 
and preponderance of mounted troops against them to change their 
force from one predominantly of infantry with artillery, to one 
predominantly .mounted, with artillery. Mounted forces were the 
main reliance for the pacification of the Indian tribes in the United 
States. On the other hand, the trails in Nicaragua were such that 
even our pack howitzers were an encumbrance ; this and the dearth 
of suitable artillery targets resulted in non-employment of artil- 
lery. However, the weapons of the infantry howitzer platoon were 

Examples of Engineering Work. 

1. It was the improvement of the road system in Santo Domingo 
with the resulting increase of mobility of the Marine forces that 
made guerrilla resistance unprofitable. 

2. In Chontales in 1932, Juigalpa was inaccessible by road 
during the worst rains. A small amount of work on the road to 
Puerto Diaz and the construction of a simple cable bridge for which 
material was available on the spot would have obviated this 

3. Forces in Nicaragua in 1912 frequently repaired the railroad. 

An Example of Transportation Difficulties 

The following quotation from an article on the Supply Service in 
western Nicaragua shows what a problem the "Train" can be : 

"In the practical application of the general principles as laid down in 
Command, Staff and Logistics in the planning for the supply of troops in 
Western Nicaragua during the period 1927-29, there was only one serious 
obection to the fixed rules: 

No Roads 

The use of a map measurer for the determination of distances and the 
preparation of graphs for extensive motor trucks movements were out of the 
question and resort had to be made to any and all means which offered a 
solution to a most difficult problem. Troops were stationed in areas where 
it was mandatory to furnish and store six months' supply for the rainy 
season, which required that during six months dry season one year's supply 
was required to be hauled and stored to the posts in the northern area. The 
bulk of the stores, after arriving at distributing points along the railroad, were 
hauled by native bull cart, augumented by every other known means of trans- 
portation. As a matter of interest, the following is a list of the methods 
used, viz. 

Cargo plane Airplane 


Appendices, Chapter 4. 

Motor truck 

Outboard motorboats 

Native pack mule 
Native carriers 

Bull cart 
Pulling boats 
American pack mules 
Pack bulls 
Pitpans (dugouts)." 

Establishment of the Fleet Marine Force. 

1. Navy Department General Order, No. 56 and Marine Corps 
Order, Number 84, which follow, establish the Fleet Marine Force 
and provide for the administration and control of that Force: 
"Navy Department General Order No. 56. The Fleet Marine Force. 

1. The force of Marines maintained by the Major General 
Commandant in a state of readiness for operations with the Fleet 
is hereby designated as Fleet Marine Force (F.M.F.), and as 
such shall constitute a part of the organization of the United 
States Fleet and be included in the Operating Force Plan for each 
fiscal year. 

2. The Fleet Marine Force shall consist of such units as may be 
designated by the Major General Commandant and shall be main- 
tained at such strength as is warranted by the general personnel 
situation of the Marine Corps. 

3. The Fleet Marine Force shall be available to the Commander 
in Chief for operations with the Fleet or for exercises either 
afloat or ashore in connection with Fleet problems. The Com- 
mander in Chief shall make timely recommendations to the Chief 
of Naval Operations regarding such service in order that the 
necessary arrangements may be made. 

4. The Commander in Chief shall exercise command of the Fleet 
Marine Force when embarked on board vessels of the Fleet or when 
engaged in Fleet exercise either afloat or ashore. When other- 
wise engaged, command shall be as directed by the Major General 

5. The Major General Commandant shall detail the Command- 
General of the Fleet Marine Force and maintain an appropriate 
staff for him. 

6. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, shall report 
by letter to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for 
duty in connection with the employment of the Fleet Marine Force. 
At least once each year, and at such other times as may be 
considered desirable by the Commander in Chief, the Commanding 
General, Fleet Marine Force, with appropriate members of his 
staff, shall be ordered to report to the Commander in Chief for con- 

7. Correspondence relating to the employment of the Fleet 
Marine Force shall be conducted directly between the Commander 


Appendices, Chapter 4. 

in Chief and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force. 

8. The Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, shall at all 
times keep the Commander in Chief informed of the strength 
and distribution of the units comprising the Fleet Marine Force, 
as well as the efficiency, readiness, and adequacy of the Force to 
accomplish successfully the task assigned to it by the Commander 
in Chief. 

9. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, shall keep 
the Major General Commandant informed of all matters pertaining 
to the employment of his command, in order that the Major General 
Commandant may provide an adequate strength and armament for 
the Force and otherwise assist in maintaining a high standard of 
efficiency in the organization." 

2. Marine Corps Order, Number 84. — "Fleet Marine Force. — 1. 
The following regulations supplementary to those contained in Navy 
Department General Order No. 56, dated 13 May, 1935, will govern 
the control and administration of the Fleet Marine Force, and will 
supersede those contained in Marine Corps Order No. 66, dated 
December 8, 1933, which is hereby rescinded effective upon day of 
receipt of this order : 

a. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, is re- 
sponsible for the preparation of operating plans for the employ- 
ment of the Fleet Marine Force, and for the training, equipment, 
and general efficiency of th Force as a whole. 

b. The Major General Commandant will announce from 
to time the units that compose the Fleet Marine Force, and their 
stations. These units will be under the command of the Com- 
manding General, Fleet Marine Force, and will be available to 
him at all times for such training and exercises in the locality of 
their respective stations as he may direct. Plans of the Com- 
manding General, Fleet Marine Force, for the employment of 
these units that involve a movement from their stations will 
be submitted to the Major General Commandant for appropriate 

c. Correspondence within the Fleet Marine Force and 
between this Force and the Major General Commandant shall 
be conducted directly except on such matters as affect the post 
at which a unit is serving. 

d. Commanding officers of posts at which elements of the 
Fleet Marine Force are stationed will provide ample and appropriate 
facilities for the training and exercises of the units stationed at 
their posts." 


8128 MCS QUANTICO. VA. 10 30 35- 400 



Quantico, Viriginia. 

1935 Revision 



Section. I. Reference Data, Materiel 5- 1 to 5-15 

II. Motor Transport 5-16 to 5-19 

III. Railway Transportation 5-20 to 5-29 

IV. Water Transportation 5-30 to 5-32 

V. Air Transportation 5-33 to 5-36 

VI. Animal and Porter Transport 5-37 to 5-40 



Marine Corps Materiel 5-1 

Equipment 5-2 

Supplies 5-3 

Tables 5-4 . 

Cargo space required for Groups 1, 2, and 3 5-5 

Group 4 loads 5-6 

Group 8, Transportation 5-7 

Characteristics data sheets 5-8 

Plans of vehicles 5-9 

Broken stowage allowances 5-10 

Stowage plans 5-11 

Loaded vehicles 5-12 

Automatic Supplies 5-13 

Aeronautical Materiel 5-14 

Medical Materiel and Supplies 5-15 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 




5-1. Marine Corps Materiel. — In the tables of equipment and 
supplies Marine Corps materiel is divided into two general classes: 

a. Equipment. 

b. Supplies. 

5-2. Equipment. — Equipment includes all articles prescribed by 
the Equipment Tables for initial issue. Equipment is subdivided 
into nine groups as follows: 

Group 1, Individual Combat Equipment. 

Group 2, Office Equipment. 

Group 3, Office Equipment. 

Group 4, Organization Combat Equipment. 

Group 5, Supplementary Equipment. 

Group 6, Mess Equipment. 

Group 7, Camp Equipment. 

Group 8, Transportation. 

Group 9, Special Equipment. 

5-3. Supplies. — Supplies include those articles required for the 
maintenance of organizations such as ammunition, subsistence, 
replacements for initial equipment, and articles sold by the Post 
Exchange. Supplies are subdivided into four groups, as follow: 

Group 10, Ammunition. 

Group 11, Automatic Supplies. 

Group 12, Replacements. 

Group 13, Post Exchange Supplies. 
For a detailed description of these groups see Chapter IV Section III. 

5-4. Tables. — a. Equipment and Supply Tables list all art- 
icles and the amounts required for each organization. These tables 
are essential for procuring, storing, and issuing the materiel for 
an expedition. As a rule only such articles as are on hand or the 
procurement of which has been planned before-hand can accompany 
a hastily embarked expedition. On the other hand it is compara- 
tively simple to leave behind articles that are in store and are 
not required on the expedition. 

b. A Master Table of Tonnage Data and Basic Allowances is 
prepared for each organization. This data shows in terms of cubic 
feet and long tons the amount of each group of equipment and 
supplies to accompany the organization. From these tables and 
from characteristic data sheets we get the basic data for all ship- 
ments of the materiel pertaining to organizations. 

c. The figures as given in the table include a 20 percent allow- 
for broken stowage. See paragraph 5-10. 

5 — 5. Cargo Space Required for Groups 1, 2 and 3. — a. When 
embarked on transports no cargo space is required for these groups. 
Groups 1 and 2 go in troop spaces or state rooms. Group 3 is 
placed in passage-ways, troop spaces, or in other convenient places 
where organization offices can function while embarked. 

b. In moves by railway, troops take their individual equip- 


!— 9— 10 

ment (Group 1) into troop accommodations iwth them. Groups 
2 and 3 go on the same train with the troops in the baggage car. 

c. In moves by water or small boat Group 1, included with 
the man, occupies one boat space. Groups 2 and 3 require space 
according to weight, volume, or dimensions, depending on which 
is the limiting factor. 

5-6. Group 4. — Vehicles, chests, etc in Group 4 include the 
loads or contents. For example in taking the weight and dimen- 
sions of a machine gun cart, everything that goes on that cart is 
included. To get the data the loaded cart is weighed and measured- 

5-7. Group 8. Transportation. — a. This includes motor cars, 
trucks, tractors, trailers, ambulances, and motorcycles. Spare 
parts for these vehicles are included in this group and may be loaded 
on the vehicles. 

b. In order to be prepared for rapid embarkation, organiza- 
tions must furnish sufficient slings of proper type for hoisting 
vehicles, guns, etc., on board vessels. 

5-8. Characteristic Data Sheets. — a. In a pamphlet entitled 
Characteristic Data Sheets is found loading data on Marine Corps 
materiel, such as guns, tractors, trailers, trucks, and planes 
requiring special consideration in loading and stowage. 

b. Each Characteristic data sheet contains the following: 

(1) Name of vehicle and Marine Corps classification 

(2) A photograph, not to scale 

(3) Dimensions 

(4) Stowage requirement 

(5) Unit fuel requirement 

(6) Unit lubricant requirement 

(7) A plan, drawn to scale, 1 inch=5 feet. 

Marine Corps materiel, packed in boxes, crates, bales, barrels 
and bundles is not shown in this pamphlet as no special provisions 
are necessary in stowing this class of cargo (in cubic feet). The 
data required is given in Master Tables of Tonnage Data and Basic 
Allowances for the various organizations. 

5-9. Plans of Vehicles. — The plans given for various articles 
except aircraft are on a uniform scale of 1 inch equals 5 feet; 
for aircarft the scale is 1 inch equals 10 feet. Where several 
vehicles of the same type would normallly be loaded in the same 
hold, and a distinct saving in space effected, the most economical 
method of nesting is indicated (See 75 mm gun, M 1897, M.C. 
Classification No. 302). Where only one vehicle of a type would 
normally be loaded in a hold, a method of nesting is not indicated 
(See Battery Reel, M 1917, M.C. Classification No.307). 

5-10. Broken Stowage Allowances.-— a. General cargo, which 
includes boxed, baled, or crated materiel, as given in Tonnage 
Tables includes a 20 percent broken stowage allowance. The 
reason is that it is impossible to stow a volume of such cargo into 
a hold equal to the cubic capacity of the hold. There is necessarily 



space lost between boxes and on account of stanchions, hatch 
combings, and other irregularities in the shape of the compart- 

b. The figures given under "Stowage Requirements ,, on the 
data sheets show the cubic feet of hold space and square feet of 
deck space which would be allowed each article in estimates of 
shipping requirements. These figures are based on the assump- 
tion that, with combat unit loading, there will be 33-1/3 per cent 
broken stowage. Under this assumption, 50 percent has been 
added to the actual area of the various articles. (Note — Adding 
50 percent to the cargo is the same as deducting 33-1/3 percent 
from the capacity of the hold) . Where vehicles are shown nested, 
the average per vehicle is taken. 

c. The percentage of broken stowage for the materiel listed 
in Characteristic Data Sheets will vary between wide limits depend- 
ing upon the shape and dimensions of the available hold space and 
the type of materiel to be loaded therein. In practice, therefore, 
the figures given under "Stowage Requirement" should be used only 
for making preliminary estimates of shipping requirements and 
a tentative allotment of materiel to holds. The figures should be 
checked by a detailed stowage plan as given below. 

5-11. Stowage Plans. — a. In a large embarkation or where time 
in loading is an important factor, the preparation of stowage plans 
in advance is absolutely necessary. Without previously prepared 
plans, improvised plans will have to be prepared as the loading 
progresses. With complete stowage plans the arrival of cargo 
at piers can be planned beforehand, and traffic congestion and 
confusion can be saved in this way. Furthermore the stowage 
plan as actually executed furnishes a complete record of the place 
of stowage of each article. In debarkation a stowage plan insures 
debarkation in the required order. 

b. The stowage plan is intended primarily for transport 
loading, but it is also applicable to transportation by rail, by 
truck, or by small boats. 

c. A plan of the hold and each vehicle to be loaded therein is 
prepared on the scale of 1 inch equals 5 feet. The hold plan should 
show all stanchions, hatch openings and obstructions. The vehicle 
plan can be traced from the data sheet and cut out around the outline 
of the vehicle. The pieces of paper representing the vehicles can 
then be moved about to secure the most economical loading. Care 
should be exercised to see that the vehicles can actually be lowered 
or moved into assigned space, due consideration being given to the 
location of the hold opening, turning radius of the vehicle, and 
stanchions, hatch combings, and other obstructions. As a rule 
vehicles are stowed fore and aft, and must be well secured in place. 
General cargo may be used for dunnage in some instances. 

d. Prior to loading, the deck of the hold should be marked 
out in chalk according to the stowage plan. The spaces should 
be numbered in order it is desired to load each piece and the 
corresponding number put on the vehicle. These same numbers 
appear on the stowage plan and may be used as reference to a 


descriptive legend. These numbers are also used to determine the 
order in which vehicles arrive at the pier or alongside the ship. 

5-12. Loaded Vehicles. — The load in vehicles will vary in different 
organizations. For simplicity the term "weight loaded", as used 
in the data sheets, means the combined weight of the vehicle and 
its maximum load. The weight capacity of a vehicle can be 
exceeded when conditions warrant. 

5-13. Group 11. Automatic Supplies. — a. Articles in this group 
are, for the purpose of stowage, listed under two headings: 

(1) Inflammable, which includes gasoline, oils, and all 
other inflammable substances or substances subject to spontaneous 
combustion or explosion. These articles require special stowage 
as dangerous cargo. 

(2) General cargo or non-inflammable. 

5 — 14. Aeronautic Materiel.— Equipment and supplies for avia- 
tion units are furnished by the Marine Corps and by the Bureau 
of Aeronautics. The Equipment and Supply Tables list Marine 
Corps materiel in detail. Materiel furnished by the Bureau of 
Aeronautics is shown the Equipment and Supply Tables as one 
item in each group, and is listed in detail in Annex No. 1 to those 
tables. The Master Table of Tonnage Data and Basic Allowances 
shows the total cubic feet and long tons of both Marine Corps and 
Bureau of Aeronautics materiel. Shipping requirements for 
aviation units vary as follows: 

(1) If aviation flies to the theater of operations cargo 
space is required only for ground equipment and supplies. 

(2) If aviation is transported with planes crated it requires 
more cargo space. 

(3) If aviation is taken on transports partially set up, it 
requires an enormous amount of cargo space. Such planes as are 
carried set up on deck, as seaplanes, require no cargo space, but only 
a few planes can be carried set up on a single vessel. 

5-15. Medical Materiel and Supplies. — Equipment and supplies 
for medical units are furnished by the Marine Corps and the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The Equipment and Supply 
Tables list Marine Corps materiel in detail. Materiel furnished 
by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is shown in the Equipment 
and Supply Tables as one item for each class of outfit. The note 
in the Note Index pertaining to each outfit gives the number of 
chests the outfit contains with their weights and cubic dimensions. 
Details of the contents of the various chests will be found in the 
Field Supply Table, Medical Department, U.S. Navy. Master 
Tables of Tonnage Data and Basic Allowances give total weights 
and cubic dimensions of both Marine Corps and Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery materiel. 






Types of motor transport for small wars 

Classes of Transportation 

Transportation pool 

Native motor vehicles and labor 


5-16. Types of Motor Transport for Small Wars. — a. Prior 
to the embarkation of the expedition, a careful study of the theater 
of operation is made. This study includes an estimate of the types 
of motor vehicles to be taken and where each type can be used. 
In almost any country motor trucks can be used to advantage in 
some localities. Tractors with trailers can usually be used more 

b. In the countries where small wars usually take place the 
roads are generally bad, and exist in only a few localities. In 
certain other localities there are trails and terrain passable for 
tractors. When there is a season of heavy rains, it is most 
probable that practically all roads and trails will become impassable 
for tractor and truck transport. For that reason other means of 
transport must be at hand. This may mean that railroads will 
have to be used for very short hauls. Where there are no passable 
roads or trails and no railroads, animal, cart, boat, or porter trans- 
portation will have to be used. 

c. Prior to the embarkation phase full preparations are made 
to solve the transportation problems to be met in the theater of 
operations. No amount of forethought can successfully solve all of 
these; therefore the commanders in the field must have the in- 
genuity and resourcefulness necessary to work out knotty situations 
involving transport. 

d. The trucks should be of uniform type, generally light, but 
sturdy enough to stand heavy usage. The tables provide for 
light half ton trucks and two-ton trucks. These seem to be best 
for our situations. The half ton is particularly well suited for 
transporting passengers. 

e. Tractors are of three sizes, No. 10, No. 20, and No. 25. 
Each has its particular use and all should be provided. The No. 
10 has many advantages due to its lighter weight and narrow 
guage which permits its use over trails which are too narrow for 
the Nos. 20 and 25. However the heavier tractors are capable 
of taking much heavier loads. On steep grades with heavy loads 
two or more tractors can be used in tandem. 

f. Trailers vary from the heavy three ton with caterpillar 
tread to the light one ton with rubber tires. The heavy type is 
better for moving loads, but is not so easily handled as the light 

g. Motorcycles, with or without side-cars, are of very little 
use in small wars. They require good roads and are easily put 
out of commission by mud. 



5-17. Classes of Transportation. — a. The transportation in 
the present tables of Organization (Peace Strength) approved 6 
February 1935 is divided in to 2 general classes: 

(1) Organization transportation. 

(2) Force transportation. 

b. Organization transport belongs to artillery battalions and 
batteries of 75 mm pack howitzers, the service squadron of Marine 
Aircraft, and the separate observation squadron. 

c. Transportation assigned varies in different expeditions 
according to the situaton. Motor transportation is attached to 
the force by section, platoon, or company as the case may be. The 
section has for general cargo hauling four two-ton trucks, the 
platoon twelve, and the company twenty-four. 

d. In the case of an independent infantry regiment a section 
or more of motor transport is attached. 

5-18. Transportation Pool. — One way to operate motor trans- 
port efficiently in a force is to pool all trains and organization 
transport under one agency. Certain organizations and detach- 
ments habitually require the use of and have assigned to them, 
certain vehicles in their supply and operations. Transportation 
from the pool is released to units in accordance with their needs. 

5-19. Native Motor Vehicles and Labor. — Where needed, native 
owned motor transport may be hired sometimes to great advantage. 
Native chaff eurs, mechanics, and laborers are used when practicable. 
Of course the hiring of native vehicles and labor must be approved 
by proper authority in order to cover disbursing officers paying 
for the services. 



General classes 5-20 

Railway equipment 5-21 

Entraining and detraining stations and points 5-22 

Procuring rolling stock for a train movement 5-23 

Orders for entraining 5-24 

Entraining and detraining troops . . . 5-25 

Loading cargo 5-26 

Detraining cargo 5-27 

Railway transportation in the theater of operations ! 5-28 

Summary of reference data 5-29 

5-20. General Classes. — a. The railway transportation to be 
employed in connection with a small wars expedition falls into two 
general classes. 

(1) That used in the United States for shipping troops and 
supplies to the port of embarkation. 



(2) That used in the theater of operations for troop move- 
ments and supply. 

b. Arrangement for railway transportation in the United 
States is made by The Quartermaster, Marine Corps. 

c. The Force Quartermaster arranges for the use of rail- 
ways within the theater of operations. 

5-21. Railway Equipment. — a. The Official Railway Equipment 
Register is a monthly publication and furnishes data on all railway 
equipment in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It shows the 
rolling stock owned by each railway or other corporation, showing by 
car numbers, the marked capacity (usually in pounds), length, 
dimensions, and cubical capacity of freight cars used to transport 
freight. It does not set forth the gallonage of tank cars, however, 
this data may be found in "The U.S. Canadian and Mexican Rail- 
roads' Freight Tariff No. 300" which shows capacities of tank 
cars used in the transportation of liquid freight. 

b. Railway equipment is designated by letters in a manner 
resembling the designations used by the Navy for vessels. Some 
of the most usual types as given in the register are: 

(1) BA — Baggage Car. A car constructed to render it 
suitable for passenger train service, having wide side doors for 
the admittance of baggage, with or without windows and end 
doors. A car suitable for passenger train service has passenger 
type truck, passenger brake, air signal, and steam train line. 
There are a number of similar types of cars in general use; such 
as the BE, baggage express; the BX, express; and CA, baggage 
and passenger car. The most general type of baggage car is about 
70 feet long, and can take between 4000 and 4500 cubic feet of 
baggage and equipment. 

(2) DB — Buffet Car. Car for transportation of passengers 
and fitted with small broiler or buffet to serve simple meals to 

(3) Kitchenette cars are 16 section tourist sleepers with 
sections removed and mess equipment installed in their places. 
With a cook and cook's helper, provided by the Pullman Company, 
one of these cars is capable of serving 200 men. With an additional 
cook it is possible to serve 300. There were only 9 of these cars 
available in the United States in 1927. 

(4) Baggage car as kitchen. (See also Par. 16-27 M.C. 
Manual). If kichenette cars are not available, baggage cars, 
with end doors can be fitted up as kitchen cars. Such cars can 
serve meals to all troops on a single train. The regular Marine 
Corps mess sergeant, cooks, and messmen operate these cars. 
List of articles required to furnish baggage car as a kitchen car: 

4 Buckets, G.I. 

1 Broom 

2 Brushes, scrubbing 

2 Boxes, wood, No. 5 (for provisions) 

1 Box, ice (600 lb. capacity) 

6 Cans, garbage 



1 Cart, water, wagon 

1 Can oil, 5 gallon 
25 Cleanser, Kirkmans, pkgs 
25 Cleanser, oakite, pkgs 
2000 Coal, semi-bit, egg, pounds 

1 Extinguisher, fire, pyrene 

1 Hatchet 

5 Kerosene, gallons 

2 Lanterns, oil 
36 Matches, boxes 

6 Paper, toilet, rolls 

4 Pitchers, water, aluminum 

2 Pokers, stove 

1 Pot, stock, alum, w/spigot 

3 Pans, dish 

24 Powder, soap, pkgs 

2 Ranges, field, No. 1, complete, w/utensils (23"x23"x3') 
30 Soap, laundry, cakes 

2 Scuttles, coal 

1 Steel wool, roll 

4 Stools, camp 

10 Toweling, yards 

1 Wrench, monkey 

3 Lumber, Ixl2"x6', pes, (for temp, tables) 

5 Nails, lbs. asstd, for emergency work 

2 Elbows, stove-pipe, extra, w/one length (for emergen- 


2 Lumber, 2x6x3' (for box around range) for each range) 
2 Lumber, pieces, (2x6x4') (for around range) for each 

Galvanized iron or zinc (to line box around range) 
8 Bricks, (to support range) 

Sand, (for fitting range box and for fire protection) 
to be filled within two inches of top level of box 
8 Lumber, 2x6x8", to support range on side after prop- 
erly placed in fire box (to be nailed on box edge with 
one end against band on bottom of range) 
50 Feet wire for securing stove pipe and for emergency 
lines for dish-cloths 
Lumber, (4 pieces 2x4x3' to support fire box around 
bottom, 4 pieces 2x4x2' to support fire box around 
bottom, nailed to deck of baggage car. 

(5) PB — Passenger Car. A vestibule car for through 
service, fitted with seats or reclining seats, and having toilet rooms 
for men and women; also wash basins. Coaches have a seating 
capacity of from 54 to 86, usually about 70. 

(6) PS — Sleeping Car. A car for passenger service having 
seats that can be made up into berths, and usually having one or 
more separate stateroom compartments, also toilet and washroom 
facilities for men and women. These cars have 14 to 16 sections 
and one or two compartments. Each car can carry 28 to 32 men. 



(7) PT — Tourist Car. A second-class sleeping car, fitted 
usually with cane seats convertible into berths and used mostly 
on transcontinental trains; cars fitted with smoking compartment, 
toilet and washrooms. These cars usually have 16 sections and 
can carry 32 men. 

(8) XM — Box. A house car used for general service and 
especially for cargo requiring protection from the weather. 
Usually equipped with side doors, but some have side and end 
doors. These cars vary in capacity from 40,000 pounds to 100,000 
pounds, but the majority of modern cars are of 80,000 or 100,000 
pounds capacity. A good average type car is the RF&P No.2251. 
Inside dimensions : 40 feet, 6 inches long, 8 feet, 6 inches wide, and 
9 feet high. Capacity 100,000 pounds or 3,098 cubic feet. 

(9) G.A. An open top gondola car, having fixed sides 
and ends and drop bottom, consisting of doors hinged crosswise 
of car to dump between rails. This car is NOT suitable for military 

(10) GM — An open top gondola car, having low fixed sides, 
and drop ends, and solid bottom, suitable for mill trade, but not 
having sufficient cubic capacity to carry its "marked capacity" of 
coal. These cars are well suited for vehicles. This is not a very 
common type car. Pennsylvania No. 880,101 is a type of this car, 
having inside dimensions of 40 feet, 6 inches long; 8 feet, 9 inches 
wide; and 2 feet 6 inches high; capacity, 100,000 pounds. 

(11) FM — Ordinary flat car for general service. This 
car has flooring laid over sils and without sides or ends. These 
cars are in general use throughout the country. Pennsylvania 
No. 436,002 is a good type to use as an illustration. It has di- 
mensions of 40 feet by 9 feet; capacity 100,000 pounds and 362 
square feet floor space. 

(12) Stock Cars — Class "S" — Used for transportation of 
stock on hoof, poultry, etc. Various types are in use. Some 
equipped with roof, slatted sides and side doors, single or double 
deck, with or without feed or feed and water troughs; others 
with roofs and sides of poultry netting, shelves for storing crates, 
feed and watering facilities; another type that has convertible 
single or double deck; and those specially fitted for transportation 
of horses. In all, about seven (7) different types available, ranging 
from the smaller type holding about 50,000 pounds with a cubic 
capacity of 1800 cubic feet to the largest type capable of trans- 
porting 100,000 pounds with a capacity of over 3000 cubic feet. 

5-22. Entraining and Detraining Stations and Points. — a. The 

terms entraining stations and detraining stations are used to 
designate the city or town in which the troops are entrained and/or 
detrained. Example: Entraining Station — Philadelphia. 

b. Entraining or detraining points merely designate the 
particular place in the town at which troops are entrained or 
detrained. Example: Entraining Point: Foot of Snyder Avenue 
(Philadelphia) . 



c. It is possible to entrain personnel at points where there are 
no sidings, but sidings are essential for loading certain materiel. 

d. In order to determine the suitability of an entraining or 
detraining point, calculation must be made as to the length of 
siding required. In making this calculation take the length of a 
locomotive and tender as 70 feet, the cars at their actual length, 
and add 4 feet per car for end sills and couplers. 

e. How long must a siding be to accomodate a train con- 
sisting of a locomotive, 5 box cars 42 feet 2 inches long, 5 gondolas 
(GM) 40 feet 6 inches long, 15 flats 40 feet long, and a caboose 
30 feet long. 

1 Locomotive 70 feet 

5 Box cars 210 feet, 10 inches 

5 Gondolas (GM) 202 feet, 6 inches 

15 Flats 600 feet 

1 caboose 30 feet 

4 feet per car, 26x4 104 feet 

Total 1216 feet, 16 inches 

1217 feet, 4 inches=406 yards or .23 mile. 

f. When there is a shortage of siding tracks, plans should 
include a carefully worked out schedule for the time of arrival 
of trains, the time of loading, and the time of departure. It should 
be so worked out that the loading is continuous, and that means 
an empty train will be ready to occupy the siding as soon as a 
loaded train departs. This requires cooperation of the highest 
order between the troop commanders and railway officials. 

5-23. Procuring Rolling Stock for a Train Movement.— -a. The 

Federal Traffic Board at Washington, D.C., furnishes the routing 
for shipments aggregating two or more carloads, and requests for 
routing of two or more carloads should be made by writing to the 
Quartermaster at Headquarters. 

b. Likewise any troop movement will be arranged directly 
by Headquarters and all applications for railway transportation 
for troops (exceeding 15 in number) go to Headquarters. 

c. In order to determine the amount of rolling stock required 
the Force Commander directs all organizations to make estimates. 
These estimates are then coordinated and the total rolling stock 
actually required is requested from Headquarters. 

d. The estimate of the amount of passenger cars required is 
based on the number of seats or berths in the cars. There should 
be a sleeper on each train for officers. 

e. The number of baggage cars per train is computed by 
finding out how many cubic feet of baggage and office equipment 
the troops on the train have. Then determine how many baggage 
cars are required; as a rule one per train will be sufficient. 

f. When the train trip exceeds 800 miles, a kitchen car is 



takeirtfor each train. Every effort should be made to procure 
baggagg o£ expreess cars, having end doors. This permits troops 
to move to and from galley while the train is under way. 

g. General cargo is usually carried in box cars. 

h. Vehicles, tractors, guns, etc., are usually stowed on flat 
or gondolas with solid bottoms and drop ends. To determine the 
nuiriber of cars required stowage plans are prepared for all organi- 
zations. Plans of the cars are drawn on a scale of 1 inch equals 5 
feet. Plans of the vehicles ae then cut out of paper and fitted on 
the car plans. In this way the most economical methods of 
stowage can be found. (See stowage plans for ships and 
"Characteristic Data Sheets"). 

i. Additional cars are taken for high explosives, chemical 
ammunition, and other dangerous cargo. Interstate commerce 
commission regulations must be followed in regard to these ship- 

j. Railway officials will decide on the length of trains. A 
passenger train seldom exceeds 14 cars in all. A mixed train 
cannot exceed 25 cars in all. If a passenger train carries one or 
more freight cars, its speed is limited to 25 miles per hour. At 
best we can expect to average only 20 or 25 miles per hour for troop 

k. When troops are moving to an area where combat is 
expected troops and their equipment with necessary supplies should 
be on a mixed train together. 

5-24. Orders for Entraining. — a. For entraining the Force is 
divided into "entraining groups." Each group constitutes a train 
load. In making up these groups due consideration is given to the 
order in which troops should reach the port of embarkation. 

b. Warning Message. — As soon as it is decided to move the 
Force, it is customary to send the Commanding General a warning 
message containing the following: 

(1) Destination, except where secrecy is desired. 

(2) Date to commence move. 

(3) Any instructions for quartering parties or preliminary 

(4) Information in regard to supplies, equipment, and re- 
enforcements from other stations. 

c. p Operation Order. — Based on the information given above, 
instructions from the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, 
and information from other staff sections, F-3 prepares the Opera- 
tion Order for entraining. This order includes the following: 

(1) Task organization, giving entraining groups designated 
by number; as: 'Train No. 1," etc. 

(2) Paragraph 1: Information of enemy and our own 
troops if advisable. 

(3) Paragraph 2: Decision of commander or mission as 
given by higher authority — to move by rail to port of embarkation- 
refer to embarkation plans — destination, if not secret— when move- 
ments begins — reference to entraining table. 


5— 24— 25— 2G 

(4) Paragraph 3: Lettered sub-paragraph for each en- 
training point — entraining groups to entrain there — roads available 
for march to entraining point — detail of and instructions for of- 
ficers and men in charge of entraining points — reference to entrain- 
ing table. Under sub-paragraph "X", duration of journey — detail 
of officers in charge of detraining points — precautions as to secrecy 
and security — detachments left behind (if any) with instructions 
relative to train guards for freight trains carrying equipment and 

(5) Paragraph 4: 

(a) Number of rations and amount of water (per man) 
to be taken by troops. 

(b) Instructions regarding resupply en route- 

(c) Method of rationing at destination. 

(d) Time baggage and office equipment must arrive 
at entraining point, and instructions regarding loading passenger 

(e) Instructions for loading freight trains — give for 
each organization time to begin loading, place, and car numbers — 
refer to stowage plans and entraining tables for equipment and 

(f) Evacuation of the sick and injured. 

(g) Composition of quartering parties — where to report 
for quarters — instructions. 

(6) Paragraph 5 : Date and hour of opening and closing 
old and new CP's. 

d. Entraining Tables. — (1) In order to shorten the oper- 
ation order, entraining tables are prepared for both troop and cargo 

(2) Entraining tables for troop (passenger) trains include: 

(a) Number of train. 

(b) Entraining point. 

(c) Troops composing entraining group. 

(d) Date and hour of departure. 

(3) Entraining tables for cargo trains include: 

(a) Number of train. 

(b) Entraining point. 

(c) The organization to load materiel on board — when 
each begins loading. 

(d) The car numbers assigned each organization or type 
of supplies. 

(e) Date and hour of departure. 

5-25. Entraining and Detraining Troops. — a. Troops load their 
own baggage. A section of the baggage car is assigned to each 
organization of the entraining group, in proportion to the amount 
of baggage it has. Troops take their individual equipment with 
them in the passenger cars or sleepers. 

b. It is estimated that a train can be loaded at the rate of 50 
men per minute ; this includes troops and their baggage and indi- 
vidual equipment. 



5-26. Loading Cargo. — a. Each loading point for cargo should 
have a convenient "turn-around" for trucks and a storage area near 
the tracks. 

b. Before the arrival of cars, ramps should be provided for 
loading box cars and also for loading vehicles on flats and drop-end 
gondolas. These ramps are of various types, some built of timber 
and other improvised using railroad ties. 

c. If stowage plans have been prepared for all cars carrying 
vehicles, much time will be saved, because all the arguments as to 
where to put vehicles will have been thrashed out and settled in 

d. Vehicles can be loaded on flats from the side, but it is 
usually more satisfactory to load from the end. To load a flat from 
the end, the wheels of the car must be chocked, and the brake 
wheel and shaft removed. Ramps are then put in place and timber 
put over rails to allow vehicles to run over tracks. It is not 
necessary to put up ramps for each flat car, for vehicles loaded on 
the rear car can run on to other cars; it being only necessary to 
provide timber to bridge interval between cars. The wheels of each 
vehicle are chocked and lashed down. 

e. As a rule set up planes fly to the port of embarkation, and 
only crated planes are loaded on flat cars. These are usually loaded 
with a crane. 

f . In the past canvas has been used to protect vehicles loaded 
on flats from the weather. This was found to be very unsatis- 
factory and destructive to the canvas, and furthermore covering 
is not necessary. 

g. Speed of loading depends on the thoroughness of prepara- 
tions, the equipment at entraining points, the materiel to be loaded, 
the nature of the rolling stock, the weather, and the number of 
entraining points. The following rough estimate is given for one 
loading point : 

(1) 8 vehicles can be loaded per hour. 

(2) 2500 cubic feet of general cargo can be loaded per 
hour. If more than one car can be loaded simultaneously, the 
amount of cargo is increased accordingly. 

5-27. Detraining Cargo. — On arrival at the detraining point 
in the port of embarkation, equipment and supplies are unloaded as 
follows : 

a. The cars are run alongside the ship and the cargo trans- 
ferred to the holds. 

b. The cars are run on car floats and brought alongside for 
transfer of cargo. 

c. The cars are unloaded at the warehouse or motor transport 
parks of the forwarding quartermaster, for further transfer to 
the vessels. 

5-28. Railway Transportation in the Theater of Operations. — 

a. The principles governing railway transportation in the theater 



of operations are the same as those governing troop movements in 
the United States. However, the railways may be expected to 
be defficient in road beds, bridges, rolling stock, equipment, and 

b. The force quartermaster arranges with railway officials 
for transportation. 

5-29. Summary of Reference Data. — 
Baggage car — 70 feet long — can take 4000 to 4500 cubic feet. 
Kitchenette car — feeds 200 men. 
Kitchentte car — with extra cooks, 300 men. 
Kitchen car (Baggage car specially equipped) — an entire train. 
Passenger car — 60 to 70 feet long — 54 to 86 seats, usually 70. 
Sleeping car — 28 to 32 men. 
Tourist car — 32 men. 

Box car (a type) — length 42 feet — capacity 100,000 pounds 3,098 
cubic feet. 

Gondola (drop ends and solid bottom) — length 42 feet — capacity 
100,000 pounds. 

Flat (a type) — 40 feet long — capacity 100,000 pounds, 362 square 

Locomotive and tender — 70 feet. 

One mile of siding will take 120 cars (40 feet long). 

Interval between cars — 4 feet. 

One kitchen car required per train when trip exceeds 800 miles. 

A train can load 50 men per minute (estimate) . 

8 vehicles can be loaded per hour at one loading point. 

2500 cubic feet of general cargo can be loaded per hour at one 

entraining point (one car at a time). 

5-30. Water Transportation in Mobilizing. — a. River boats 
are frequently used in moving troops to the port or embarkation, 
this method of transportation is frequently used from Quantico 
to Norfolk. Such transportation is arranged by Marine Corps 
as in the case or railway movements. 

b. Lighters are sometimes used for moving materiel to 
the port of embarkation. Where the means exist this method 
can be used to great advantage, for it can save handling the 
materiel within the port of embarkation. This labor saving is 
practicable only when the lighters are loaded to permit transfer 
to the transports in conformity with embarkation plans. 




Water transportation in mobilizing 

Movement to theater of operations 

Water transportation within theater of operations 




c. In other cases it may be advisable to transfer troops to 
the port of embarkation by naval or commercial vessels. 

d. It is an important part of a Marine's training to practice 
embarking and making sea voyages. Every opportunity should 
be taken to rehearse movement by water. 

5-31. Movement to Theater of Operations. — See Chapter VI. 

5-32. Water Transportation Within Theater of Operations. — 

a. If a navigable stream, lake, or other inland waterway exists 
within the theater of operations, a most valuable method of trans- 
portation may be open to the force, and every effort should be 
made to utilize all water transportation facilities available. 

b. Suitable types of boats may be taken with the expedition 
when it leaves the United States. Outboard motors should be 
carried, also, if it is estimated that they will be needed. (See 
Chapter XXVI). 

5-33. Value of Airplanes in Transporting Personnel and Cargo. — 

a. The amount of personnel and materiel that can be transported 
by large planes is astounding to one who has not had experience in 
this line. In a recent operation a Fokker made two trips per day 
for the first month after its arrival, and the average load per 
trip was about two thousand pounds. 

b. One drawback to the use of transport planes is the 
necessity for a proper landing field. To some extent, this difficulty 
can be avoided by using amphibian planes where water is available 
for landing. 

c. Even where the big transports cannot be landed, the 
transportation system can be greatly reenforced by the use of 
smaller planes that can operate from small landing fields. The 
maintenance of landing fields is important and troops in the im- 
mediate vicinity should be utilized for this purpose. 

d. A most important feature of air transport is its great 
service rendered in evacuating the sick and wounded. This saves 
the casualties great suffering and delay in reaching the hospitals. 

5-34. Autogyro. — The autogyro type of plane appears to offer 

great possibilities in small wars. 




Value of airplanes in transporting personnel and cargo 


Plane drops 




5 — 35. Plane Drops. — a. Where no landing fields exist, air- 
planes can still supply troops by dropping supplies and other 
articles from the planes. 

b. Marine aviators have become highly skilled in dropping 
and are able to deliver all kinds of material in this way. See 
Chapter XXV, Aviation. 

b. Responsibility For Wrapping Drops. All material to be 
transported to marines by plane is sent to the aviation quarter- 
master for further shipment. The material to be dropped to 
troops is wrapped and prepared for dropping by the aviation 
quartermaster personnel. When necessary additional personnel 
should be provided and trained for this purpose. 

5-36. Reenforcements. — Transport planes may be used for 
rapid reenforcements in districts where trouble breaks out. By 
this method a considerable body of troops can be ferried to a 
danger spot in a remarkably short time. 

5-37. Native Transportation. — a. Each small wars brings with 
it new transportation problems The organization's motor trans- 
port will carry out its functions in certain areas, but in active 
field operations it will almost always be necessary to supplement 
it with native transportation. 

b. During the embarkation phase, when preparations for the 
expedition are in process, it must be realized that transportation 
in all parts of the world is a problem, and the people everywhere 
have developed methods of transportation peculiar to their loca- 
tion and suitable to their needs. It may be camels in the desert, 
dogs in the artic, burros (borriques) in the tropics, native porters 
or coolies. In each locality the natives concerned understand 
their means of transportation, and they and their transportation 
are usually available for hire. 

5-38. Bull Carts. — a. In some localities the bull or ox drawn 
cart is the principal means of transporting bulky articles. It 
is a suitable means of transport when motor trucks are impractic- 
able, and when the time element does not require supply by the 
somewhat faster pack animals or the very rapid transport planes. 
Supplies shipped in bull-carts will ordinarily arrive in good 
condition, if properly loaded and protected. Munitions so transported 
should be under special observation constantly to prevent theft. 

b. Bull-carts are suitable when speed is not essential and when 
supplies are required in large quantities. The pack animal will 




Native transportation . . . 

Bull carts 

Pack-Mule Transportation 




negotitate terrain that a bull-cart cannot travel; the pack animal 
has another advantage in being not quite so slow as a bull-cart. 
There will be more loss from breakage when using pack animals 
than when employing bull-carts. 

c. Much that is associated with the handling of bull-carts must 
be learned from experience but, assuming a situation somewhat 
similar to the one that existed recently in a foreign country, the 
following information, if followed by the inexperienced bull-cart 
train commander, will greatly lessen his difficulties. These notes 
are prepared from the experiences of marines who handled these 
bull-carts : 

(1) The bull-cart is a simple outfit but it requires an experi- 
enced bull- whacker and guide to man it. The bull-cart guide is a 
boy who walks in front of the bulls. He selects the route and the 
bulls follow faithfully. The following features of bull-cart driving 
are obstacles to the novice: 

(a) Securing the yoke to the bull's horns by means of 
rawhide thongs. 

(b) Urging four bulls, one team ahead of the other, to 
pull together. 

d. Unless previously agreed upon to the contrary, native 
contractors are responsible for feeding their oxen and pack animals 
at their own expense. It may be necessary to advance small sums 
for payment of pasture to insure that unpaid bills will not be left 
behind. It is well to assure oneself that all such bills are paid 
before clearing camp as drivers often attempt to impose on local 
civilians, especially if the drivers think they are intimidated by the 
marines' display of arms. Local civilians will generally report the 
non-payment of pasturage before the departure of the column from 
the locality. 

e. Several North Americans in a foreign country tried to in- 
troduce the U. S. method of employing the yoke. The U. S. bull- 
whacker secured the yoke to the ox team by laying the yoke over 
the back of the neck of the ox and then passing the bow from 
below the neck through the yoke in such a way that the bow 
encircled the ox's neck and held the yoke in place on the neck. This 
method requires some sort of braking power. Either there must be 
brakes on the cart or some form of harness on the ox that will 
enable him to hold the load back. The local method of lashing the 
yoke to the bull' horns eliminates this braking question and does 
not seem to decrease the pulling power of the animal. Do not 
accept bulls without horns. 

5-39. Pack-Mule Transportation. — See chapter XXVI. 

5-40. Porters. — In some localities it may be necessary to depend 
on porters entirely for supply. Such means of transport is sufficient 
for only small bodies of troops. The conditions which require the 
use of porters are found in some mountainous countries and dense 
forests. Loss of local animals due to disease or other cause may 
necessitate the use of porters. For historical example showing use 
of porters see chapter XI. For historical example showing use of 
variety of transportation, see chapter IV. 


8126 MCS QUANTICO. VA. 9-30-35—4:0 

Quantico, Virginia 

1935 Revision 

Port of Embarkation 


Embarkation of Marines 6-1 

Importance of Proper Embarkation 6-2 

Embarkation Plan 6-3 

Responsibility 6-4 

Kinds of Loading 6-5 

Transports 6-6 

Preparation of Embarkation Plans 6-7 

Ports of Embarkation 6-8 

Loading 6-9 

Appendices: Page 

No. 1 Embarkation of U.S. Forces at Tampa for Cuba 1898 7 

No. 2 French Expedition to Algeria 1830 9 

No. 3 The Marines move to China 1927 11 

No. 4 Force Personnel and Tonnage Table 12 

No. 5 Embarkation Table 13 

No. 6 Loading Plan 14 

No. 7 Stowage Plan Diagram 15 

No. 8 Stowage Plan Legend 16 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 

6-1-2-3-4 p r ^ 


6 — 1. Embarkation of Marines. — The principles governing the 
embarkation of a Marine Force are the same whether they be for peace 
time maneuvers, small wars, landing operations, or the movement 
overseas for land operations. The problem of embarkation varies with 
the size of the force and the strategical, tactical, and logistical situation. 
In the past operations generally have been relatively small involving 
the movement of not more than one ship at a time. However, at some 
time in the future it may be necessary to embark quite a large force to 
cope with a formidable hostile force. In this chapter, the discussion 
will be confined to a force of such strength that more than one transport 
will be required. 

6 — 2. Importance of Proper Embarkation. — After a force is 
embarked it is partially committed to action, because the distribution 
of personnel and materiel is such, when finally loaded, that certain 
courses of action can be followed and certain others are precluded. 
For instance a certain vessel received unexpected orders to land a part 
of the troops embarked thereon? If that ship is so loaded that the 
necessary equipment and supplies for the troops to be landed are not 
available, those orders could not be effectively executed. Therefore it 
is of greatest importance that the embarkation be made in such manner 
as to permit the force to carry out any one of several alternate tactical 
and logistical plans. 

6 — 3. Embarkation Plan. — The embarkation plan is made as early 
as possible. This is essential for proper mobilization at the port of 
embarkation. Also the movement of troops and materiel within the 
port depend on the embarkation plan. Often it will be impossible for 
these plans to be made early, for it may not be known on what vessels 
the force will embark. Whenever the situation is uncertain, troops and 
materiel are mobilized at the port(s) by tactical groups. 

6 — 4. Responsibility. — The Navy Department will designate where 
and on what vessels a force will embark. The captains of the respective 
vessels are responsible for the proper loading of their ships. However* 
it is the responsibility of the commander of the force to inform the 
proper ships captains of the requirements for the distribution and load- 
ing of personnel, equipment and supplies. The fourth section of the 
force prepares the loading and stowage plans. The commanding officer 
of troops to embark in each ship designates a transport quartermaster 
(APQM), to work with the ships cargo officer in the coordination of 
embarkation plans. The cargo officer is responsible for loading the 
materiel in such manner as to insure safety of the cargo and the ship. 
He is also responsible that cargo is so stowed that it can be discharged 
promptly at debarkation. The APQM is responsible that the manner 
of loading will permit the troops to debark, with necessary equipment 
and supplies, in accordance with tactical plans. The APQM is re- 
sponsible for the delivery of the material at the water s edge in the 
order required by loading and stowage plans. The designation of an 
APQM to deal with the ships cargo officer in these matters saves an 
enormous amount of confusion. 



6 — 5. Kinds of Loading. — a. Loading is classified as follows: 

(1) Commercial loading. 

(2) Unit loading. 

(a) Combat unit loading. 

(b) Organization unit loading. 

(c) Convoy unit loading. 

b. Briefly stated, commericial loading utilizes shipping to maxi- 
mum efficiency without regard to the subsequent employment of the 
troops. It precludes landing operations. 

c. Lnit loading provides for the emp'oyment of the troops in 
combat on landing. There are three degrees of unit loading as indicated 
in a. (2) above. 

(1) Combat unit loading, in which certain units, completely 
loaded in one transport with at least their essential combat equipment, 
transportation and supplies immediately available for debarkation 
with troops. 

(2) Organization unit loading, in which organizations, with 
their equipment and supplies, are loaded in the same transport, but not 
so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simul- 
taneously. As to ship space, this method is more economical than 
combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units avail- 
able for tactical employment as soon as the troops and essential materiel 
have been assembled on shore. Like combat unit loading, this method 
permits diversion enroute of complete ship loads from destination 
originally intended. 

(3) Convoy unit loading, in which the troops with their equip- 
ment and supplies are loaded in transports of the same convoy but not 
necessarily in the same vessel. This allows a considerable utilization 
of ship space, particularly by using this method to fill in space in 
transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which 
are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when 
landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary 
to assemble them on land with their equipment and supplies. 

d. It will be seen then that when troops are expected to land 
against opposition and must have a portion of every needed item 
immediately available upon debarkation, combat unit loading is em- 
ployed. This requires the preparation of detailed plans showing exactly 
where everything has been placed aboard the transport, i.e.: Loading 
Plans and Stowage Plans. These plans show in detail where everything 
in the way of equipment, transportation and supplies have been loaded 
aboard and the organizations that have been assigned to each vessel. 
These plans are Annexes to the Embarkation Plan which shows in 
detail complete ship assignments of everything that goes aboard, 
including troops, and sets forth the assignments of how the ships are 
to be loaded and by whom. These are all worked out ahead of time 
and are influenced solely by the manner in which troops are to 
be employed upon debarkation as set forth in the Commander's 
Operation Plan. 

6 — 6. Transports. — a. Generally troops will be transported in reg- 
ular navy ships; combatant vessels, transports, or vessels of the train. 
In exceptional cases chartered commericial ships may be employed. 

b. For embarkation to be efficient, it must be planned to the most 
minute details. This means that accurate data must be available on 
all ship space available for the troops and their cargo. To get this 



most essential data, blueprints and diagrams of the vessels must be 
obtained. The Navy Department (Bu. C. & R.) has these for Naval 
vessels and can readily procure blue prints of commercial ships. These 
blueprints show the troop and cargo capacity for each compartment. 

c. As soon as the APQM for a certain vessel receives the plans 
of the ship and is informed of the assignment of space available for 
the Marines and their cargo, he should have a conference with the cap- 
tain of the ship or his representative. They should make their plans as 
far as practicable, in collaboration. 

6 — 7. Preparation of Embarkation Plans. — a. The forms to be 
followed in preparing embarkation plans will be found in appendices 
numbers 4 to 8. 

b. These plans consist of : 

(1) Assignment of units, equipment, and supplies to vessels. 

(2) A loading plan allocating all equipment and supplies to the 
available cargo spaces on the ship. 

(3) A stowage plan for each cargo space, showing the loca- 
tion of each article of special equipment and the class of materiel in the 
cargo space. 

(4) Allocation of personnel to troop spaces. This allocation 
is a function of the first section of the staff. 

c. Troops and cargo are so assigned to vessels, that each vessel 
will embark one or more complete combat teams, consisting of the 
necessary infantry, supporting units, and supplies, to constitute a force 
capable of independent action. To do this involves a great deal of 
calculation, as follows: 

(1) First calculate the total amount of equipment and supplies 
to be embarked, by taking the totals of each organization from the 
Master Tables of Tonnage Data and Basic Allowances. 

(2) Assign to each vessel the units and materiel required by 
the tactical and logistical situations. Often it will be found that such an 
assignment does not utilize all troop and cargo space. 

(3) If there are remaining organizations these are divided among 
the vessels so that all space will be utilized to maximum efficiency. 

d. After making assignments to vessels, the next task is to prepare 
loading plans for each vessel. The necessary equipment and supplies 
belonging to those units likely to land first are assigned to the most 
accessible holds. Other materiel is assigned space according to priority 
in debarkatoin. 

e. In assigning cargo to space use the thirteen groups of equip- 
ment and supplies (See Chapters IV and V) to designate materiel; for 
example "1st Bn. Organization Combat Equipment" or "Replacement 
Supplies, all organizations." Each box, bundle, crate, etc., should have 
stenciled on it its contents or marked in some simple way so that its 
contents may be known without reference to a list or lists. 

f. After the loading plans are completed a stowage plan is pre- 
pared for each hold or cargo compartment. 

g. In assigning personnel to troop spaces, three groups of equip- 
ment are included. These are individual equipment, baggage, and 
office equipment, which go in troop spaces with the troops. 

6 — 8. Ports of Embarkation. — a. Norfolk, Philadelphia, San 
Francisco, San Diego, or Quantico are likely ports of embarkation. 
Complete data on these ports will be available in advance, or in planning 



for projected operations, from the Government Printing Office publica- 
tions, "Port Series, "and from the Chambers of Commerce at the sea 
ports. Wherever available government piers probably will be used. 

b. In a small embarkation it may be advisable for troops to go 
directly from the train to the ship. In a large embarkation this will 
usually be impracticable, therefore barracks, camps, or other shelter 
should be arranged for the troops prior to their arrival at the port. If 
the troops are to be in the port any considerable time, arrangements for 
additional training must be provided. This is particularly applicable 
to troops from small posts where no adequate facilities are available 
for training troops in landing operations. For any kind of expedition, 
all Marines must be trained in landing operations before embarking, 
and the providing of necessary training facilities is a part of the pre- 
paration of the port to receive the troops. 

c. For the sake of coordination, there must be one quarter- 
master to receive and forward all materiel arriving in the port of em- 
barkation. This officer may be the force quartermaster, the depot 
quartermaster functioning at the port, or a forwarding quartermaster 
appointed for the purpose. Who would carry out this duty depends 
on the existing conditions but in any case one and only one officer should 
perform this function. 

d. Sufficient warehouse space must be available to permit the 
receipt and stowage of materiel in an orderly manner. It is quite prob- 
able that some organizations may arrive without certain necessary 
equipment and supplies. It is very important that these be issued 
prior to embarkation. It is also essential that the supplies carried by 
all quartermasters be sorted and issued so that they will be readily 
available for loading in the proper hold of the proper vessel. 

e. While in the port of embarkation, plans are made to supply 
the troop messes as required. These arrangements should include 
feeding all troops on arrival without unnecessary delay. 

f. The question of transportation in a port is of great importance. 
Rail and truck transportation are both used. Great advantages may 
be gained by using lighters or car floats. If tractors or trucks arrive 
on flat cars, the simplest method of getting them aboard ship may be 
to run the flats on floats and bring them alongside the proper hatch. 
Frequently stores of all kinds can be loaded on board vessels from lighters 
with great saving in labor. 

g. Arrangements must be made at the port for hospitalization 
of the current sick and injured. These arrangements must include 
provisions for leaving the sick behind when the expedition sails. 

h. To assist the troops in getting oriented on board the vessels, 
it is advisable to give them certain instructions in the drills and routine 
they are to experience when on board ship. It is essential to make 
assignment to stations at emergency drills prior to embarkation. In 
making these assignments care should be exercised to insure that troops 
can reach their station from their troop spaces with minimum confusion 
and interference with other personnel. 

i. An adequate force of military police, guards and secret service 
agents should be employed to maintain order among the troops, prevent 
theft and pilferage, guard against me, and to prevent sabotage and the 
distribution of unpatriotic propaganda among the troops. 



6 — 9. Loading. — a. The actual loading is done by civilian long- 
shoremen, enlisted men or a combination of both. 

b. All equipment and supplies are moved to the piers in the order 
called for in loading and stowage plans. 

c. Before going aboard, all organizations are instructed as to 
what space they are to occupy. Guides from each orgainzation are 
sent aboard ahead of the troops, so that all units can be led to their 
proper places without confusion. 

d. Care must be exercised during the embarkation to avoid 
confusion. This can be accomplished only by careful planning before 
hand and efficient execution of the plans. Every precaution must be 
taken to assure that orders be given only by officers who are responsible 
for the loading. There will be a commanding officer of troops on each 
vessel and the APQM is his representative for loading cargo. All 
orders to the APQM must emanate from the commanding officer of 
troops or from the captain of the ship. 


Appendices, Chapter 6. 



1. Lack of Preparation. — a. The embarkation at Tampa in 1898 
of the Lnited States troops for Cuba offers a great many lessons, which 
we can study with profit. It contains many valuable lessons for pro- 
cedure to be avoided. The force originally destined for Cuba in 1898 
was 25,000 strong. As we will see later no such force was embarked 
in the first convoy. There was a spirit of eagerness on the part of all 
officers and men to go to Cuba and get into the war, but unfortunately 
no amount of eagerness to fight, patriotism, or zeal could produce a 
corps of trained staff officers overnight. The price for failure to use 
the long period of peace for preparation for war had to be paid. Fortun- 
ately this expedition did not meet disaster. If it had landed in face of 
a determined and well trained opposition, disaster would have been 
inevitable. 1 1 is most dangerous to base calculations on meeting a poorly 
trained, badly led, half equipped force ; even in a small war situation we 
must be prepared to meet an opponent who has and knows how to 
employ the most improved instruments of war. 

b. Tampa was selected as the port of embarkation, being only 
1080 miles from Santiago de Cuba. There appears to have been no 
systematic plan worked out for the organization and operation of the 
port. Apparently no one knew what a port of embarkation should be. 
There was no provision made for camp sites for the troops as they ar- 
rived. No plans were made for the orderly receipt of freight. No 
arrangements were made for providing proper warehouses or improving 
pier facilities. 

c. The lack of foresight resulted in troops arriving before any 
camp sites or supplies were available for their use. Tampa just grew 
and its facilities became inadequate. When supplies began to arrive 
no one seemed to know what they were or who they were intended for. 
To add to the confusion there were no adequate facilities for unloading 
cars. In fact pandemonium reigned. 

d. At one time there were 1000 cars on the sidings and only 5 
escort wagons and 12 civilian wagons to unload them. Sixty cars 
were arriving each day, and they were being unloaded at the rate of 
2 or 3. As a result railway sidings became jammed and important 
supplies were on sidings as far north as Columbia, S. C. 

e. To add further to the confusion in railway shipping, the two 
railways serving Tampa, refused to shift cars to one another's tracks. 
The railroad tracks were 50 yards from the piers; so everything had 
to be manhandled to the ships. As a rule cars bore no labels to show 
their contents. In order to get complete rations on board the vessels 
it was necessary to go from car to car to look for the proper components 
of the ration. In the end cars were loaded into the nearest ship regard- 
less of requirements. Naturally this resulted in many units being sepa- 
rated from their stores and baggage, and as no check was kept of what 
was put into each ship, it is easy to understand why batteries were on 
one ship and their guns and horses on another. 

f. Finally 32 transports were procured with a total of 53,000 
gross tons. It was calculated they would carry 25,000 men. It has 
been alleged that the method of calculating tonnage requirements 
was taken from the British. An excellent British work, including de- 


Appendices, Chapter 6. 

scription of embarkation of troops, had been published in 1897. If 
this British method of calculating had been followed it would have been 
found that 53,000 gross tons shipping should have taken around 17,000 
men, with their animals, vehicles, and other materiel. This refers to 
a short voyage only, such as a crossing from England to the Continent; 
far more tonnage would be required to take 17,000 men, with animals 
and materiel to the Near East or to India. Strange as it may seem 
the convoy loaded to capacity took just about 1 7,000 ; the others stayed 
behind; and, at that many cavalry horses of the units loaded were left 

g. Many of the vessels were unsuited for the service and should 
have been rejected. They did not sink, but good fortune and good 
weather helped this expedition "get by". They had plenty of trouble 
with the fresh water supply. The whole embarkation was very much 
hampered, owing to the fact that the authorities had insufficient data 
on the characteristics of the vessels and their troop and cargo capacities. 
While all this was taking place, the expedition was needed in Cuba. 
Finally the Secretary of War wired General Shafter: "The President, 
directs you to sail at once with what force you have." Then the real 
confusion began. 

h. One regiment is reported to have been ordered to entrain at 
midnight for the port of embarkation 9 miles away. The orders stated 
they must be on board by 0900 the next day or be left behind. No 
train came for them; so they held up a freight train headed in the op- 
posite direction, and forced the crew to take them to Tampa, where 
everything was found to be in a state of confusion, and a crowd of 
10,000 of all ranks, generals to privates, was milling around on the 
wharves, trying to find where to go. Apparently many units had not 
been assigned to transports beforehand, and it was difficult to find a 
staff officer with a list of the ships or authority to make assignments. 
The commander of the regiment in question finally succeeded in finding 
the name of a vessel he could have. In the meantimehe heard that other 
organizations were to embark on this vessel. This difficulty was over- 
come by seizing the vessel and holding it against all comers. They piled 
their baggage in disorder on top of stores to be consumed enroute, 
making still more difficulty. 

i. The expedition had boats to disembark 3400 men, but had 
neglected to bring along steam launches to tow them. Even if steam 
launches had been on board, the ships had no booms to put them in the 

water.. ? ; i' - - r , ■ ■- j u 

j. The supplies taken included 60 days field rations, certain 
quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, and medical supplies supposedly 
for 60 days. The medical supplies proved to be insufficient, thereby 
causing great suffering among the sick and wounded. 

k. Even if this expedition had been loaded rapidly, great time 
would have been taken to untangle such a confused mass of disorder. 
We cannot claim efficient embarkation just because of speed. An 
efficient embarkation must tend to facilitate debarkation according to 
the situation. To be really efficient an embarkation must be so worked 
out that unforseen contingencies aro provided for.; ' 5 


Appendices* Chapter 6. 



1. Careful Preparation.- — a. Just as we can learn from the 
mistakes and lack of foresight exhibited at Tampa, there are other 
expeditions from which we can find excellent examples pf careful pre- 
paration and proper planning. Prominent among these : is the French 
expedition to Algeria in 1830. . ' ' . 

b. Few, if any expeditions, have been more judiciously arrangeci 
or more carefully planned. However we must note that it topk this 
expedition a long time to prepare for embarkation. All preparation? 
for embarkation are included in the embarkation phase of an expedition, 

c. In planning this expedition the first step was to plape a very 
accomplished and energetic officer, Baron Dennier, in charge of the 
administrative arrangements. In spite of his great experience and 
ability, he sought out a staff of energetic and capable assistants. All 
worked tirelessly and covered every detail that should be attended to. 
The greatest care was exercised in collecting the personnel, the equips 
ment, the supplies, and the vessels. All. was in readiness before th§ 
expedition sailed. ' . 

d. A most careful study of the theater of operations had been 
made in Napoleon's time. This study indicated that difficulty was 
likely to be experienced in debarkation. Very careful preparations- 
were made to provide proper landing boats. ■> These preparations 
included: • < • 

124 — Bateaux Catalan del' I le, one masted boats for landing 
horses. . ' ; 

55 — Chalands, special landing boats, 30 of these to carry 140 
men each, and 25 to carry artillery. 

30 — flat bottomed boats. " ; ; 

e. Baron Dennier kept in mind that he would find rio supplies' 
in Algeria initially. He anticipated that he would probably lose boats 
in a rough sea on that coast. The supplies loaded on the vessels consisted 
of 78,645 sacks, bags, barrels, chests, and bales. As a precaution these 
were all covered with double wrappings of watertight materials. This 
was a method for providing for the contingency of interruption of 
debarkation by bad weather. The history of overseas expeditions to 
Africa for 2000 years showed continued interference with landings by 
bad weather. In case heavy seas interrupted the operation of landing 
boats, he planned to throw these supplies in their watertight wrappings 
into the sea and have them wash ashore. A storm did come up, com- 
munication with shore was interrupted, the troops and animals on 
shore were threatened with a shortage of supplies, however the seas 
were such that the forage and food thrown overboard did was ashore. 
This furnishes an excellent example of how a serious situation was 
avoided by careful foresight in providing for contingencies. Provision 
for contingencies must characterize every embarkation from the smallest 
to the largest, whether for a peacetime expedition or for the seizure of 
a base against opposition. 

f. As it was believed that bo';h pack and light wagon transport 
would be needed ashore, special wagons were procured. The harness 
was so arranged that it could be used with packs where the vehicles 


Appendices, Chapter 6. 

could not be employed. This illustrates how a careful estimate of 
required transportation must be made before embarking on any 
expedition. ; « h 

g. It was felt that there should be hospital facilities closer to the 
theater of operations than France. Arrangements were made with 
'Spain to permit the establishment of a 2,000 bed hospital at Mahon on 
the Island of Minorca. 

' h. As has so often been the case with our Marines, the fighting 
•ships carried troops, about 2,400 on board each large vessel. This 
'practice is perfectly sound in many instances, when there is no enemy 
i* fleet to contend with. However there is a great disadvantage to this, 
for it is usually impracticable to carry all necessary equipment and sup- 
plies on the fighting ship with the troops. The particular advantage 
^derived from embarking troops on war vessels is to speed them to the 
theater of operations without delay. Where there is an enemy fleet to 
('contend with, it has been found in the past that embarking troops on 
[fighting ships is unsatisfactory. 

',:-<: i. This expedition was in reality a small war expedition, where 
.^opposition to landing was anticipated and experienced. In our Marine 
expeditions of the past we have been fortunate in receiving but little 
resistance in landing. At some time in the future, one of our landings 
^nay be met with a burst of fire from well emplaced machine guns; 
therefore we must, during the embarkation phase, make complete 
preparations to debark in face of opposition; otherwise we invite un- 
forseen disaster. The French gained tactical success in this expedition. 
It is an excellent example of success resulting from thorough planning 
and efficient execution. We must do better than this, for our Fleet 
Ivlarine Force must be so prepared that it can embark with speed and 
without delay. We cannot do as Baron Dennier did, that is spend six 
or eight months in preparation. In the course of ordinary peacetime 
routine we must so train our force and so prepare materiel and supplies 
that we are ready to move on signal. 

jf" * ' ■ - ' ' ' .' ... . -1 w -r--i±;^ r 

»"•• •• . - ■■• ' ■ 






Appendices, Chapter 6. 



1 . One of the largest peacetime movements of Marines was to China in 
1927. The USS Chaumont and the U§S Henderson took full cargo arid 
troops to capacity. There were still about 1,600 Marines tp go and no 
government vessel available to take them, consequently trie SS Presi- 
dent Grant of the American Mail Line was engaged to carry these 
troops and a great amount of equipment and supplies. installing 
standee bunks in certain cargo spaces the Grant in three ajnd one half 
days was converted to take 1,600 men. Conditions on the; ship were 
far from ideal for the troops. Toilet facilities were inadequate, mess- 
ing arrangements were insufficient, and certain compartments were 
poorly ventilated. On this voyage the weather was good and the 
troops were saved many days of poor air and seasickness, j 

2. Commercial Loading. — a. The loading of cargo was done ef- 
ficiently by civilian longshoremen. Although all equipment and supplies 
pertaining to the troops were on the same ship with them, this loading 
was purely commercial loading, for economy of space was! given first 
consideration. Such commercial loading precludes landing operations. 
The method of embarkation influences debarkation even in such a peace- 
ful landing alongside a dock at Olongapo. The mess equipment was 
loaded under so much cargo that it was inaccessible up until just before 
the ship was unloaded. This resulted in the troops having ho cooking 
facilities in operation for the noon meal the day the ship failed. By 
careful and painstaking planning such things as this can Be avoided. 
The latest method of grouping equipment and supplies tends tjo facilitate 
embarkation and to permit debarkation in proper order. . . |, : 

b. There was no likelihood of the troops on the Grantj having to 
land against opposition, as she made the voyage from alongside a pier 
at San Diego to alongside a pier at Olongapo, where she unloaded. The 
troops and cargo were reloaded on the Henderson and the Chaumont 
and taken to Shanghai later. In this instance, loading to secure tha 
most economical use of cargo space was proper procedure, for the vessel 
could not have taken so much cargo if it had been unit loaded. 
















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Appendices Chapter VI 



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8129 MCS QUANT1CO, VA. 1I-2S-M— 4M 




Quantico, Virginia 



1935 Revision 

Chapter VII 

x raining; lTiaiicLgeiiieiii lur 0i1ia.11 fioia 



Character and Piittvosp of Small Wars Trainiiic 

7- 1 to 7- 7 


Peace-Time Training for Small Wars 

7- 8 


Training During Concentration for a Small War . . 

7- 9 to 7-18 


Troop Training Aboard Ship 

7-19 to 7-23 


Training in the Theater of Operations 

7-24 to 7-29 


Training Programs and Schedules 

740 to 7-32 

Appendices: Page 

No. 1 Training Centers in the Dominican Republic, West Indies . . 20-21 

No. 2 Troops Schools in the Dominican Republic, West Indies .... 22 

No. 3 Enlisted Instructors for a Troop School 23 

No. 4 Example of a Battalion Training Program . 24-30 

No. 5 Example Of a Company Training Program 31 

No. 6 Example of a Company Training Schedule 31 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



Character and Purpose of Small Wars Training 


Relation to Other Training 7-1 

Organization and Training of Line Companies for Independent Missions 7-2 

Tactical Training 7-3 

Versatility in Handling Weapons 7-4 

The Springfield Rifle and Bayonet . 7-5 

Troop Schools 7-6 

Group Method of Instruction 7-7 

7 — 1. Relation to Other Training. — a. With the exception of 
the troops in the theater of operations, the training of Marine Corps 

organizations for small war missions should be supplemental to 
that for naval overseas operations, and major warfare on land. 
Much training that is generally associated with naval overseas 
operations and major warfare on land has found application in 
past small wars while, on the other hand, many important opera- 
tions conducted on the fringes of the principal fronts in major wars 
have been of a guerrilla nature. 

b. This chapter, in so far as is compatible with a comprehen- 
sive discussion of the subject, is limited to the features of training 
management that might be considered peculiar to small wars. It 
is assumed herein that the organizations assembled for small war 
purposes have the ability to function efficiently in naval overseas 
operations and major warfare on land or, if lacking the ability, have 
the personnel and facilities necessary to bring them up to the proper 
degree of proficiency. See T.R. 10 — 5, Military Training (Basic), 
paragraph 9. 

7—2. Organization and Training of Line Companies for Inde- 
pendent Missions. — a. Organization and training within line com- 
panies should be such that they and their subdivisions are prepared 
to perform independent missions of the most difficult nature, mis- 
sions which will include the establishment of small garrisons in 
isolated communities and military operations conducted by small 
patrols which will often be separated beyond supporting distance 
from their bases or friendly patrols. In addition, there are the 
difficulties of command within a large patrol that is ambushed, 
difficulties that include the inability of the patrol leader to direct 
his subdivisions, thereby creating a situation in which subdivisons 
must act independently under their respective leaders. 

b. The Machine-Gun Company. — Machine-gun companies 
should be organized as such for administrative purposes and for 
uniformity and efficiency of instruction but during active opera- 
tions these companies will generally be assigned by platoon, sec- 
tion, or single guns to various widely separated rifle units. In some 
instances, patrolling for example, machine-gun units will function 
as rifle organizations (without machine guns) and in other situa- 



tions, guarding mines for example, they will operate as combination 
machine-gun and rifle units. 

c. Organization of the Company's Subdivisions. — When con- 
ducting independent operations, each subdivision of the company 
must have appropriate leaders and suitable weapons and equipment. 
See Chapters XVIII, XXIII, and XXIV. 

d. Military Qualities. — The separation of units in the field 
and in action requires that all military qualities be well developed 
in the individual and unit. Particular attention should be given 

initiative and adaptability, leadership, teamwork, ana tactical pro- 
ficiency on the part of all members of the platoon and these qualities 
should be more highly developed in the peace-time Marine engaged 
in a small war than is considered possible during a major war. See 
T.R. 10—5, paragraph 3. 

7 — 3. Tactical Training. — a. The training regulations describ- 
ing the combat principles for the various infantry units will serve 
as the basis of tactical instruction for infantry units preparing for 
or participating in a small war. These combat principles will be 
supplemented or modified to conform with the requirements of the 
anticipated or existing operations. 

b. The usual tactics encountered by the Marines in past small 
wars have been those associated with the ambushing of patrols 
and convoys, river fighting, and surprise attacks against garrisons 
in towns. The tactical features of these operations are described 
in the chapters pertaining to these subjects. 

c. One of the peculiarities of many small wars is the difficulty 
encountered by irregulars in procuring their supply of automatic 
weapons. When this situation prevails, every effort should be made 
to capture them. A very methodical attack, including fire and 
movement, will generally fail to reach the enemy automatics; the 
enemy appreciates their great value and will seldom risk their 
capture. When endangered, these weapons are sent to the rear 
before the withdrawal of the riflemen. 

d. A study of recent small wars in which the Marine Corps 
has been engaged shows that none of its enemies have withstood 
an aggressive assault, regardless of how they may have outnum- 
bered the assaulting troops. In view of this common characteristic 
of the irregular, all schemes of maneuver should be based on as- 
saulting at the earliest possible moment. The quicker this bayonet 
charge follows the initial firing, the better. "Fire and movement" 
may, in some instances, result in fewer casualties to the Marines 
than savage bayonet attacks in the face of automatic weapons fire. 
However, rapid bayonet attacks in the early battles of the war that 
succeed in seizing the enemy's automatic weapons will, in the course 
of the war, result in fewer Marine casualties. The sooner the enemy 
is deprived of his automatic weapons the safer it will be for Marine 
patrols which are subject to ambush. 

e. To make an aggressive bayonet attack requires much train- 
ing with the bayonet and a thorough indoctrination of the spirit of 



the bayonet. At "Fix Bayonets!", all BAR and., Thompson jnen 
should be required to set their weapons on semi-automatic. Some- 
times they may be able to lay down a covering fire to assist the 
bayonet men but, as a general rule, this is impossible. In the latter 
case they accompany the assaulting bayonet men, but must use 
great care when firing their weapons. 

7 — 4. Versatility in Handling Weapons. — One of the Corps' 
problems is making weapons replace men. Frequently an organiza- 
tion charged with a mission involving the possibilities of combat 
will find itself undermanned for the job at hand. This shortage in 
man power must be compensated for by an increase in effective 
fire power. Each Marine must receive thorough training in the use 
of the Springfield rifle and bayonet and in the individual employ- 
ment of the weapon he carries. Also, he should be as well trained 
as possible in the use of all the other weapons carried in his or- 
ganization. The latter is necessary because frequently units in the 
field and small garrisons will have their fire power increased by the 
inclusion of additional weapons in their armament. These additional 
weapons will generally be Browning automatic rifles, Thompson 
submachine guns, and rifle grenades. On occasion, particularly in 
the defense of towns, the armament of rifle units will include 
Browning machine guns, trench mortars, and 37 mm guns. 

7 — 5. The Springfield Rifle and Bayonet. — a. The Springfield 
rifle and bayonet should be made the main reliance of the rifle- 
company Marine in most small wars situations. To accomplish this 
he must be trained to hit battlefield targets with the bullet and 
have complete confidence in his ability to use the bayonet. He must 
be thoroughly indoctrinated with the "spirit of the bayonet" — the 
desire to close with the enemy in personal combat and destroy 

b. The Accuracy of the Rifle. — The Springfield is the most 
accurate military shoulder weapon in the world. In the hands of a 
deadly battlefield rifle-shot (sniper) it has a place in small wars 
which cannot be usurped by any of the present infantry weapons. 
In an infantry weapons fire fight of a small war nature, the Spring- 
field, properly handled, can get in very effective work. However, 
without proper training in small wars shooting, this accuracy will 
be lost on over 90 per cent of the peace-time Marines. The other 
10 per cent, the best men and deadly shots, will be noncommissioned 
officers not participating in the fire fight or men armed with BAR'S 
or other infantry weapons. 

c. A Discussion of Course A, Record Practice. — The purpose 
of this course is to develop individual skill in hitting a clearly 
defined target at a known range. Such instruction is essential prior 
to taking up the more difficult art of hitting an indistinct fleeting 
target at a range which must be estimated. Without this latter 
training the rifleman is not equipped for small wars operations. 



d. Difference Between the Army and the Marine Corps Ob- 
jectives. — Existing legislation governing record rifle practice and 
extra compensation requires that the Marine Corps fire the Army 
courses but, for combat purposes, the objectives of the two services 
are not exactly similar. In general, training in rifle shooting in the 
Army has for its objective the training of units of men in a manner 
that will enable them to distribute their bullets uniformly over 
an enemy formation or terrain feature as, for example, "the edge 
of that woods from the road to the lone tree/' The target is a 
sector of the frontage and not lone idividuals. Marines must be 
able to do this but in addition, for small wars purposes, the men 
must be so trained that they can detect an individual on the enemy's 
side and deliberately hit him. A patrol of one platoon, ambushed 
and surrounded, must hesitate to distribute its ammunition uni- 
formly over the sides of two mountains, particularly if it is a long 
way from its base. The invaluable Marine in battle is the one who 
can detect an individual enemy in jungles and mountains and de- 
liberately hit him, even though he presents a small, indistinct, mov- 
ing target at an unknown range. 

e. Methods of Developing Every Man into a Sniper. — As in- 
dicated above, the Marine participating in a small war must not 
only be able to do his part in the collective fire of his fire unit, but 
he must also be a sniper. This problem is difficult to solve in a 
satisfactory manner. Two solutions are set forth below. They have 
the advantage of having been tried out in a limited way. 

(1) A one or two days sniper's course to be fired by each 
Marine immediately after firing for record. The course to be 
fired over the regular class A range. The targets to be of the 
silhouette type and firing conditions to be as near those of the 
battlefield as the particular range regulations will permit. A 
modification of the "Skirmish" course, and "Sharpshooter" 
course, U.S. Navy, has been suggested. 

(2) The following method is effective in the field of hostile 
operations, particularly when troops are not held too close to 
an ammunition allowance. Select suitable terrain and place small 
individual targets at unknown ranges. Then take the men out 
one at a time and require them to detect the targets and to hit 
them within a time limit. 

f . The Bayonet. — All Marines who are liable to serve as rifle- 
company men in a small war should be thoroughly trained in the 
use of the bayonet and thoroughly indoctrinated with the "spirit 
of the bayonet," this whether they are to be armed with a bayonet 
or not. A man properly indoctrinated with the "spirit of the 
bayonet" has the spirit of combat. He will retain that spirit even 
though he enters the assault with a weapon that does not carry a 
bayonet. An overwhelming desire to engage the enemy at close 
quarters, even in personal combat, can be better developed through 
the medium of the bayonet than in any other way. This desire to 
close with the enemy is essential for a rapid, aggressive assault that 
will overrun the enemy and secure his automatic weapons. 



7 — 6. Troops Schools. — a. Troop schools are important agen- 
cies of the unit commander for the training of his own personnel 
to meet the requirements of the training program. They may take 
any form which produces effective results, varying from informal 
conferences or lectures, demontrations, and sand table or squadroom 
instruction, to a formal organized school with detailed instructors, 
a definite course, and class room periods. 

b. The objects of these schools are: 

(1) To prepare the personnel of the command to carry 
out the current training program. 

(2) To coordinate and insure uniformity in the training 
of the command. 

c. Certain technical subjects in which a comparatively few 
men from each organization are to be qualified, frequently can be 
more economically and thoroughly taught in classes or schools con- 
ducted by a higher echelon. 

d. Instruction in centralized classes, whether company classes 
or in a higher unit, does not relieve the subordinate, in whose sub- 
division of the organization they are to function, from further 
training of them when under his command. On the contrary, 
it is his duty and responsibility to train them to practical pro- 
ficiency as individuals in his team. Thus, a scout may be given 
special instruction in scouting and patrolling in a centralized class, 
but when he returns to duty in his squad, his squad leader is re- 
sponsible for continuation of his training as a scout. 

e. Instructors Classes. — A course in a troop school should be 
planned with one of the following objectives in view: 

(1) A course conducted for the purpose of developing 
instructors in the particular subject. As a rule these classes 
will be conducted by the battalion or higher echelon. Graduates 
of these classes are particularly valuable as instructors, and also 
find a place as "key men" on weapons in newly organized units. 

(2) A course conducted for the purpose of teaching the men 
the mechanics and technique of their work and equipment, but 
not with the end in view of making qualified instructors of them. 
As a rule these classes will be conducted within the companies 
of the men concerned and will be of much shorter duration than 
those for developing instructors. 

7 — 7. Group Method of Instruction. — a. The group method of 
instruction may be used in the training of any group, regardless of 
size or organization. It provides careful, systematic instruction 
under the direct supervision of an instructor, and centralizes con- 
trol within the group for the purpose of teaching the mechanics of 
any subject. It is the preferable method in introductory training 
and is especially well adapted to instruction in basic military sub- 
jects. It consists of five distinctive steps, as follows: 

(1) Explanation of the subject or action by the instructor. 

(2) Demonstration of the subject or action by the instruc- 
tor or his assistant. 

(3) Explanation and demonstration of common errors, by 



the instructor or his assistant. 

(4) Imitation (application) by all undergoing instruction. 

(5) Correction of errors by the instructor and his assist- 

b. Instruction should be given with clarity and precision. 
Every error made during the applicatory step should be immediately 
corrected to avoid the formation of faulty habits and wrong im- 
pressions. It is frequently much easier to train a raw recruit than 
an experienced soldier who has cultivated faulty habits and wrong 


Peace-Time Training for Small Wars 

7 — 8. Subjects Peculiar to Most Small Wars. — a. During the 
periods the Marine Corps is not engaged in small wars its organiza- 
tions should conduct training in certain subjects that are peculiar 
to such operations. Some of these subjects are: 

(1) Infantry Patrols: To include; 

(a) Composition, armament, and equipment. See Chap- 
ter XXIII. 

(b) Formations, and tactics. See Chapter XXIV. 

(c) Transportation of the wounded. See Chapter XXIX. 

(d) Planned schemes of maneuver to engage ambushes. 
See Chapter XXIV. 

(e) Reconnaissance (Security on the march) . See Chap- 
ter XXIV. 

(f) Security during halts and in camp. See Chapter 

(g) Employment of weapons. See Chapters XXIII and 

(h) Feeding. To include selection of foodstuffs, menus, 
cooking, and transportation of food supplies. 

(2) Laying ambushes. See Chapter XXIV. 

(3) Attacking a house. See Chapter XXIV. 

(4) Surprise attacks on small enemy camps. See Chapter 

(5) Stratagems and ruses. See Chapter XXIV. 

(6) Scouting (To include tracking). See Chapter XXIV. 

(7) Combat practice firing with the Springfield rifle, Brown- 
ing automatic rifle, and Thompson submachine gun with a view 
to developing snipers. 

(8) Sketching involving the making of hasty maps of 
large areas. 

(9) Marching. This is something which is being neglected 
in this day of motorization and mechanization. 

(10) Cooking on the trail. Particular stress to be laid on 
the difficulty of feeding small groups. 

(11) Bivouacs and camps. Troops should know how to 
make camp and how to provide it with the proper security 



Training During Concentration for a Small War 


Training Objective During Concentration -. . 7-9 

Factors Influencing Character of Training . . 7-10 

Scope of Training During Concentration 7-11 

Disciplinary Training 7-12 

Test-Firing of Weapons 7-13 

Individuals Embark with Their Weapons in Their Hands 7-14 

Safeguarding Automatic Weapons 7-15 

Ammunition for Training Aboard Ship 7-16 

Organizing the Hastily Assembled Company 7-17 

Inspecting the Hastily Assembled Company 7-18 

7 — 9. Training Objective During Concentration. — The training 
during concentration should prepare the troops for : 

a. The ship to shore movement, both against organized op- 
position and without opposition. 

b. Reorganization preliminary to movement inland. 

c. The movement inland, including the seizing of defended 
cities and towns and operations against guerrilla bands whose 
tactics include surprise attacks and ambushes. 

7 — 10. Factors Influencing Character of the Training. — The 
character of the training required by the units upon concentration 
depends upon the time available, the state of training of the in- 
dividual units concentrated, the nature of the country in which 
operations are to take place, the character and armament of the 
enemy, arid the character of operations which will be required. 

7 — 11. Scope of Training During Concentration.— -a. During 

concentration it will be necessary to verify the fitness of the troops 
for the conduct of naval overseas operations, and orthodox major 
warfare on land. See T.R. 10— 5, paragraph 9. Such deficiencies 
in training as are liable to find application in the expected opera- 
tions will have to be corrected. Serious shortcomings requiring im- 
mediate attention will generally include : 

(1) Lack of training in the combat principles of the unit 
concerned. See Training Regulations applicable. 

(2) The inability of the individual man (crew) to hit a 
battlefield target with the weapon (s) with which armed. 

(3) Small boats; the embarking and disembarking of per- 
sonnel and materiel. 

(4) Communications within the organization and with ad- 
jacent and supporting units. Emphasis must be given air-ground 
liaison by panel, pick-ups, drops, and radio. 

(5) Lack of proficiency in the packing of supplies to be 
dropped by planes and the dropping of them. 

b. Intensive training in the subjects described in paragraph 
7—8 will have to be conducted. 



c. In addition to the subjects embraced by "a" and "b", the 
training should, where applicable, include : 

(1) An observers course, aviation. For all officers but 
particularly company commanders and above. 

(2) Intensive bayonet training. 

(3) Mounted Detachments; to include animal management, 
pack transportation, equitation, and mounted patrols. 

(4) Special field exercises requiring: 

(a) Attack against an organized position on land, based 
on an approach from the sea combined with a land approach. 

(b) Attack of cities, street fighting, and riot duty. 

(c) Defense of bases and garrisons in towns, particularly 
by small units. 

(d) Organization of the ground for all-around defense 
when attacked by superior numbers. 

(e) Actions in meeting engagement, particularly those 
of the advance guard. 

(f ) Night operations, both offensive and defensive. 

d. Subjects for Training En Route. — -After determining the 
most serious deficiencies in training it may be desirable to select 
those subjects that can be taught aboard ship and plan on conduct- 
ing the training in them while en route to the theater of opera- 
tions. Such subjects include: 

(1) Sanitation, first aid, and hygiene. 

(2) Mechanics of weapons and equipment. 

(3) Map reading. 

7— -12. Disciplinary Training. — Where time is short all training 
in ceremonies and close order drill should be reduced to a minimum. 
The disciplinary value of close order drills may, to a large extent, 
be achieved through the efficient conduct of and close supervision 
of field exercises, bayonet fighting, and training in the use, function- 
ing, and care of weapons and equipment. Smartness, prompt 
obedience, and orderly execution can be exacted of the troops in 
such exercises, all of which increases the efficiency of the instruc- 
tion as well as develops a higher degree of battle leadership in the 
noncommissioned officer. 

7 — 13. Test-Firing of Weapons. — The firing of weapons, par- 
ticularly automatic weapons, is the only sure way of determining 
that they are in proper condition and serviceable in every way. 
Spare parts should be inspected and an adequate supply secured, 
particularly of the parts most often replaced in weapons. 

7 — 14. Individuals Embark with Their Weapons in Their Hands. 

— All the weapons of the infantry battalion should be carried aboard 
by the actual individuals manning them. They should be stowed 
in readily accessible places for the purpose of having them available 
for training on the transport. Machine gun and howitzer units 
should have their weapons available, even though it may be neces- 
sary to stow the carts and other company property in places that 
are difficult of access while under way. 



7 — 15. Safeguarding Automatic Weapons. — Existing regula- 
tions regarding the security of automatic pistols which have been 
placed in the hands of individuals, and which are not in actual use, 
can be made applicable to all automatic weapons with which the 
company is armed. See 17 — 41 (4) Marine Corps Manual. Par- 
ticular precautions must be taken aboard ships and, if space is avail- 
able, automatic weapons should be stored in the ship's armory. 

7 — 16. Ammunition for Training Aboard Ship. — Ammunition 
necessary for training en route, or which may be required without 
delay upon arrival at the point of debarkation, must be in an ac- 
cessible magazine. 

7 — 17. Organizing the Hastily Assembled Company. — a. In the 

event a company commander is assigned to a company that is being 
hastily assembled he must take immediate steps to get it or- 
ganized. As rapidly as the individuals report the company com- 
mander assigns them to his headquarters or platoons. To place the 
men to the best advantage the captain should make a study of each 
man's service record book and interview the man in person. The 
presence of the lieutenants and senior NCO's at these interviews 
will not be amiss. The sooner individuals can be fitted into their 
places in the organization the sooner they can function in their 
respective tasks. The development of "esprit de corps" within the 
company and efficiency within its subunits cannot be expected prior 
to organizing the company. 

b. The platoon leaders must organize their squads, sections, 
and platoon headquarters. The organization of their squads, in- 
cluding the selection and designation of each individual within the 
squads, is very important and must be done before the various in- 
dividuals can be armed with their proper weapons, and the second 
in command, third in command, substitute automatic rifleman, and 
scouts designated. 

7 — 18. Inspection of Hastily Assembled Company. — a. After 
getting the hastily assembled company organized the company com- 
mander's next important duty is a thorough inspection of personnel 
and company property. The object of this inspection is to verify 
that each individual is provided with required clothing, and his 
weapon (s) and equipment are in proper condition, and that the 
company property is as desired. This inspection should be com- 
plete to the smallest detail and should be done by the company 
commander in person. The thorough check of company property 
is particularly important in a hastily assembled company and will 
usually disclose that some items are missing or worn out. When 
a piece of property consists of several parts, a range finder for 
example, it should be set up to determine that all parts are present 
and that it works. A blackboard is an excellent article to include 
in the company property, particularly for training aboard ship. 

b. Clothing Left at Post. — Clothing which is not to be taken 
on the expedition must be boxed or bundled and properly marked. 
See 4 — 8, Marine Corps Manual. Furnish the men appropriate 



facilities for marking and tagging their bundles and boxes, and 
sufficient camphor flakes. After each man has his effects prepared 
for storage have this bundle or box inspected to verify that it is 
properly marked or tagged. Most privates are very careless about 
effects they are leaving behind when going on an expedition and 
it is advisable to inform them that a hundred dollars worth of 
clothing (five months pay) deserves careful marking and inspecting. 
Remind men that they may not return to the place of departure 
and that their effects may have to be shipped to them at a distant 
station. Loss of clothing left in storage causes discontent. 

c. Officer's Personal Effects.—-Officers must make an inspec- 
tion of their own personal effects, including uniforms, authorized 
equipment, and professional books. See 5 — 42, Marine Corps 
Manual. It is important that each officer have in his possession, and 
readily accessible, training regulations and manuals pertaining to 
the weapons with which his company is armed, and such other 
publications as may be required for an intensive course of training 
after the transport clears. After embarking it is generally incon- 
venient to overhaul personal effects, "dig out" required publications, 
and correct discrepancies in uniforms and equipment. 

7 — 19. Importance of Training Aboard Ship. — The relative value 
of training conducted aboard ship depends on: 

a. The necessity for the training. The more an organization 
is in need of training the more it will profit from every hour of 
intensive training; the more advanced an organization is in its 
training the more dfficult it is to prepare a profitable schedule that 
can be carried into effect within the limitations of a ship. 

b. The time available. Some organizations will remain aboard 
ship the several days spent en route to the scene of operations, 
disembarking upon arrival; other organizations, "floating bat- 
"talions," may remain aboard for months. 

c. Thoroughness of the training. The thoroughness of the 
training in the various subjects will be in direct proportion to: 

(1) Skill in planning the schedules. 

(2) Ability of the instructor. 

(3) Time alloted each subject. 

(4) Facilities made available. These should include use 
of ships' facilities that are made available. Some of the latter 
facilities are ; placing men as cooks in the galley, assigning radio 
personnel to duty in the radio room, and use of the spotting board 
for artillery personnel. 


Troop Training Aboard Ship 

Importance of Training Aboard Ship 

The Ship's Routine 

System of Training Aboard Ship 

Troop Schools Aboard Ship 

Suitable Subjects for Training Aboard Ship 




7 — 20. The Ship's Routine. — a. Any training to be conducted 
aboard ship will usually have to be fitted into the ship's routine. 
The troop commander is in command of the troops aboard the 
transport but the commanding officer of the ship is responsible for 
all the ship's activities, and the troops' activities must not interfere 
with those of the ship. The normal ship's routine will usually call 
for breakfast about 0730, inspection of quarters by the First Lieu- 
tenant 0830 to 0900, quarters 0900, dinner 1200, and supper 1700. 
Usually Friday is a field day and Saturday morning is ordinarily 
given over to Captain's inspection. Thus only four full days for 
training are available per week, or possibly five if Friday can be 

b. Messing Arrangement. — Normal mess facilities of the ship 
are usually inadequate to take care of the troops and they will in 
all probability have to use their mess gear. Usually one hour will 
be ample time for the men to be served and complete any meal ; this 
includes sufficient time for them to get their mess gear, be served, 
wash their mess gear and stow it. Facilities for serving the food 
and washing the mess gear will have to be provided and working 
parties from the troops will be required for serving, working in the 
galley, and handling of stores. 

c. Guard Details and Working Parties. — Guard details and 
working parties will be required each day. In order to have these 
duties interfere as little as possible with the training, it is desir- 
able to detail an entire platoon or company each day to do all 
guard and police duty for that day. Platoons or companies may 
rotate daily. 

d. Emergency Drills. — Another thing which may interfere 
with the regular training is the holding of emergency drills. These 
drills are important and prepare the personnel for abandon ship, 
collision, fire, and rescue. They are usually held immediately after 

e. Period Available for Troop Training. — The time available 
for troop training is usually limited to the period from 0900 to 
1130 and from 1300 to 1600, a total of five and one-half hours daily, 
and for four or five days per week. 

7 — 21. System of Training Aboard Ship. — a. Due to lack of 
space and facilities, the establishment of troop schools and the 
group method of instruction is the most desirable system of train- 
ing. Classes are organized in essential subjects for the officers, 
noncommissioned officers (including selected privates), and privates. 

b. Company formations are generally limited to assemblies 
for quarters and inspections. At these formations the manual of 
arms, setting up exercises, and physical drill under arms are some- 
times possible. 



7 — 22. Troop Schools Aboard Ship. — a. Classes are organized 
in all necessary subjects with a view to preparing each member 
of the command to carry out most effectively his mission as a 
member of his organization. 

b. Size of Classes. — Training aboard ship is generally sur- 
rounded by so many distractions and annoying features (sea-sick- 
ness, wet paint, scrubbing decks, heat, etc.) that it is well to keep 
classes very small. Groups of over twenty persons are difficult 
for one able instructor to handle. Too many students should not 
be assigned to a single weapon: Two students per BAR and 
Thompson and three students per BMG are sufficient. Men learn 
very little about weapons by watching others and it is only by hav- 
ing the weapons in their own hands that they attain proficiency. 

c. Classes Within a Rifle Company, Example. — An example 
of the assignment of the personnel of a rifle company to the classes 
of a troop school aboard ship might be as follows : 

Class Operated by Attendance and Remarks 

BAH Company 2 men per Squad (18) plus instructors. 

TSMG Company 2 men per Squad (18) plus instructors. 

Grenade Company 2 men per Squad (18) plus instructors. 
Scout Company 2 men per Squad (18) plus instructors. 

Signal Company 3 men from Company Headquarters and 

3 men per Platoon Headquarters (12) 

plus instructors. 

Communi- Battalion Cpl. "Signal" and 1 Pvt. "Agent" from 
cation Company Headquarters are in the Bn 

Communication Class. The senior in- 
structor is the Bn Communication Of- 

The above classes are of convenient size and serve to get the 
men into organized groups under qualified instructors. The princi- 
pal subject of each class is indicated by the name of the class but, 
in addition to its principal subject, each class receives schooling 
in such other subjects as are considered necessary. An example of 
a day's schedule for the BAR class might be: 

0930 to 1030 Functioning of the BAR. Lt. "1st Platoon", 

senior instructor. 
1045 to 1130 Stoppages of the BAR. Lt. "1st Platoon", 

senior instructor. 
1300 to 1330 Bayonet training. Lt. "Bayonet Instructor", 
a rifle company Lt. designated by Bn Comdr., 
is senior instructor. This Lt. coordinates the 
bayonet training of all Bn units. 
1345 to 1430 Tactics. Street fighting. The company com- 
mander as instructor. The scout class will 
join the BAR class for this period. 
1445 to 1530 First aid. Application of tourniquets. Wounds 
will be simulated and tourniquets actually ap- 
plied. Bn Surgeon senior instructor. 
1545 to 1600 Country of destination. Racial characteristics. 

Talk by the Bn Commander. The entire com- 
pany will assemble for this talk. 



7 — 23. Suitable Subjects for Training Aboard Ship. — a. Para- 
graphs 7 — 8 and 7 — 11 contain many pertinent subjects suitable 
for training conducted aboard ship. Officers acquainted with the 
troops and the problems existing can determine the training needs 
of the organization and select their subjects and prepare schedules 

b. In addition to the subjects listed in paragraphs 7 — 8 and 
7 — 11, the following subjects are of particular importance and 
should be emphasized during the training aboard ship: 

(1) Information of the country of destination; chiefly, its 
people, language, topography, and political and military situation. 

(2) Tactics necessary to cope with the nature of the fight- 
ing expected. 

(3) Relations with the inhabitants. 

c. Essential Training. — In the event the expeditionary force 
consists of partially trained troops the training will have to be 
intensive and include the following subjects : 

(1) Weapons. — Every man should be made as well ac- 
quainted with the mechanics, technique, firing, and tactical em- 
ployment of the weapon (s) with v/hich to be armed as time and 
facilities will permit. In any event, the training should be such 
that every man in the organization can fire his weapon in the 
field. Every effort should be made to get permission to fire the 
weapons from the deck of the ship. Targets may consist of 
articles floating at sea or articles thrown overboard (chiefly tins 
and boxes from the galley). If the targets are thrown from 
the ship the shooting will have to be conducted over the stern, 
unless the ship circles around among a number of boxes thrown 
overboard. If there are no targets, shoot at the whitecaps. 

(2) Tactics. — The initial instruction in tactics should be 
sufficiently adequate to give the entire enlisted personnel a knowl- 
edge of scouting, patrolling, security measures, and troop leading 
problems appropriate to their respective ranks. 

The Training Regulations and Small Wars Operations should be 
used as a basis of the instruction. Methods of instruction have 
included sketches on blackboards (the most satisfactory), chalk 
sketches on the deck, and matches laid out on the deck. Instruc- 
tors should explain the situation (and sketch) and ask different 
men for their decisions and reasons for their decisions. Initiative 
and discussion should be encouraged; some of the Corps' most 
brilliant exploits in small wars have been performed by units led 
by noncommissioned officers and privates. 

(3) The Bayonet. — It may be difficult to get much room for 
bayonet drill but a space sufficiently large to permit one group at 
a time to practice should be set aside. 

(4) First Aid, Hygiene, and Sanitation. — These subjects 
should be taught with particular reference to the country of 
destination and the problems that will probably confront the 
troops. See Chapter XXIX. 




Training in the Theater of Operations 

System of Training in the Theater of Operations 7-24 

Facilities for Training 7-25 

Suitable Subjects for Training in the Theater of Operations 7-26 

Training Centers 7-27 

Troops Schools in the Theater of Operations 7-28 

Source of Instructors and Students for Training Centers and Troop 

Schools 7-29 

7 — 24. System of Training in the Theater of Operations. — 

a. Upon arrival in the theater of operations immediate steps 
must be taken to have the training continued along methodical 
and progressive lines. The training should be governed by the 
training programs and schedules prepared by the various organiza- 

b. Troop schools will not be resorted to as much as aboard 
ship. For each training subject use functional units (squads, 
sections, and platoons) as much as possible. This places the 
responsibility where it is always highly desirable that it be placed, 
that is, on the unit leader. Unfortunately, all training subjects 
cannot be so handled. In many instances, subjects must be taught 
by classes made up of individuals from several of the subdivisions 
of the unit. 

7 — 25. Facilities for Training. — a. As early as possible after 
the Force is established on shore the various organization com- 
manders should make available to their respective commands 
the facilities that are considered necessary for the conduct of 
training. Whenever practicable these facilities should include 
the establishment of training centers, weapons ranges for record 
practice, ranges for combat practice firing, troop schools, and 
access to terrain suitable for the conduct of field exercises. See 
Appendices, Nos. 1 and 2. 

7 — 26. Suitable Subjects for Training in the Theater of Opera- 
tions. — a. Paragraphs 7 — 8, 7 — 11, and 7 — 23 list subjects suit- 
able for training conducted in the theater of operations. 

b. All training should, where applicable, include many field 
exercises involving the tactical employment of troops in military 
situations peculiar to the particular hostile area. 

7 — 27. Training Centers. — a. Indications are that future small 
wars are going to be more difficult to wage than those of the past 



and, in this event, it will be desirable to establish training centers 
soon after arriving in the theater of operations. 

b. Advantages of a Training Center. — Some of the advantages 
of a training center are: 

(1) It can be made the central agency for the receipt and 
and dissemination of information on all the unusual features of 
the campaign as they develop during operations in the field. 

(2) It can be sufficiently extensive to include terrain for 
field exercises and ranges for combat practice firing that will 
afford training facilities to battalions and companies that might 
otherwise be denied them. 

(3) A place to train replacements. All replacements from 
the States, both officers and men, should, before being assigned 
to units in the field, be put through an intensive course of 
training that will fit them for service under the conditions known 
to exist. 

(4) A site for troop schools. 

(5) A site for the ranges necesary for firing all weapons 
for record. 

c. Activities. — A training center should, in so far as necessary, 
include the following activities: 

(1) Ranges for Record Practice. To include the ranges, 
courses, and courts necessary to make it possible to fire all 
weapons for record. 

(2) Ranges for Combat Practice Firing. — These ranges 
to be sufficiently extensive to permit the maneuvering of units 
and the firing of all weapons under conditions similiar to those 
encountered in the combat peculiar to the country in which 

(3) Troops Schools. — In some instances the unit in charge 
of the training center will be better able to conduct classes in 
certain subjects than some of the other units in the Force. 
These latter units can send their students to the training center. 
7 — 28. Troop Schools in the Theater of Operations. — Each 

theater of operations will present problems that will require a 
knowledge of unusual subjects, and courses can be established 
which will prove of much value. For example, some courses which 
would have been of outstanding value in recent operations are: 

Packing. (Pack animals, pack saddles, and their cargos). 

Boats. (Native) . 

Scouting. (To include tracking). 

The language of the country. 


Bull carts. (Bull carts, and their cargos) . 

First Aid, Hygiene, and Sanitation. (An advanced course) . 


Saddlers. (Leather worker). 
Trail cooks and butchers. 
Stable Sergeants. 

Aviation Observers' Course. (For all officers) . 



7 — 29. Source of Instructors and Students for Training Centers 
and Troop Schools. — a. The chief objection to organizing training 
centers and troop schools is the feeling among the officers that 
instructors and students cannot be made available. This object- 
tion is particularly strong during active operations in a hostile 
area. In this connection, it is well to remember that during the 
darkest days of the World War the British, and United States 
Expeditionary Forces in France saw fit to organize and maintain 
extensive schools. Obviously, everything else being equal, nine 
patrols composed of personnel that have completed a good course 
at a training center will be a stronger force in the field than ten 
patrols that have not received such a course. A patrol of thirty 
men, graduates of good courses in their respective weapons and 
duties, will be a stronger force than a patrol of thirty-five men 
who have not had a similar opportunity to become skilled in their 
weapons and duties. Personnel can be assigned to training centers 
and troop schools and, with the gradual rotation of schooled per- 
sonnel for unschooled, the combat organization will be actually 
stronger in "force" though slightly weaker in numbers. In the 
event of extreme necessity, the training center can be closed and its 
personnel assigned where required. 

b. Companies to be Kept Intact. — From past experience at 
training centers it has been determined that it is desirable, when- 
ever practicable, to assign intact companies to the training center 
and to furnish them such facilities and supervision as are necessary 
to enable them to conduct an intensive course of training. 

c. Permanent Patrols to be Organized.— In some situations 
permanent patrols should be organized, given a thorough course 
in patrol tactics and weapons at a training center, and then sent 
into the field to operate intact. This idea is particularly applicable 
to "roving" patrols, both mounted and dismounted. This method 
of training found much application during the World War. On 
the Western Front it was customary to train intact patrol groups 
(French), and trench to trench raiding teams (British). 

d. Selected Students and Replacements. — In many instances 
it will be necessary to detail selected officers and men from the 
organizations in the field and give them training in certain 
specialties or new developments in weapons and tactics. Replace- 
ments will require training upon arrival. 

e. Instructors. — Instructors can be made available for a 
training center by : 

(1) Assigning an intact unit to operate it. 

(2) Getting the Force increased by the required personnel. 

(3) Companies training intact furnishing their own in- 
structor personnel: the training center furnishing what super- 
vision is necesary. 

(4) Selecting competent personnel from within the Force. 
This method of selecting instructors often causes dissatisfaction. 
Company commanders complain when they lose some of their 



best men to the school. Some officers will hesitate to detail 
outstanding men as students for fear of losing them upon the 
completion of the course. 

The proportion of instructors assigned to the school from any 
given unit should be about equal to that unit's proportion of 
students in the school. Company commanders will then understand 
that their portion of the instructors are utilized for training a 
proportion of the students that is about equal to the number of 
students they have present; that did they have the facilities for 
training their own men they would require at least the same number 
of instructors. See Appendix No. 7. 

Training Programs and Schedules 

Training Instructions 
Training Programs 
Training Schedules 

7 — 30. Training Instructions. — Training programs and train- 
ing schedules are the means generally used to outline the training 
for the various units and to provide for uniform training. Train- 
ing memoranda may be used to supplement training programs 
and schedules. 

7 — 31. Training Programs.— a. Training programs are issued 
by all commands down to and including companies. They express 
the general plan of training of a command over a considerable 
period of time, usually a training cycle of one year. 

b. The three essential elements of a training program are: 
First, the training objective or objectives; second, the time avail- 
able in which to accomplish the mission or missions; and finally, 
such instructions relative to the conduct of training as are ne- 
cessary. A feature of the training program that unit commanders 
are concerned with is the amount of time they will have out of the 
training cycle, whatever its length, for their own unit training. 

. The authority issuing the program should clearly indicate this, 
whether the program covers a year or just a few weeks. 

c. Preparation of a Training Program. — An estimate of the 
training situation is necessary for the preparation of a training 
program. The following factors must be taken into consideration : 

(1) Analysis of order from higher authority. 

(2) Mission (training objective). 

(3) Essential subjects. 

(4) Time available. 

(5) Equipment and facilities available. 

(6) Personnel. 

(7) Local conditions (Climate and Terrain). 

(8) Existing state of training. 




(9) Organization for training. 

(10) Obstacles. 

d. The amount of information that should appear in the 
order relative to the conduct of training will depend on the size of 
the unit and the particular situation; a small unit requires a 
program in more detail than a large one, and a mobilization situation 
will demand more centralized control than will the normal peace- 
time status. In the latter case, only brief orders containing just 
the essentials should be necessary, as the unit will be composed 
largely of experienced officers. See Appendix No. 4. See page 
137, Staff Officer's Field Manual, Part one ; a form for a unit trains 
ing program. 

e. Form of Company Program. — Most company programs are 
now issued in a tabular form which lists the training subjects, 
the estimated number of hours to be devoted to each, and the 
allocation of these hours by weeks. These forms are convenient 
and useful, provided they are regarded as being flexible. At best, 
they only estimate the time factor and a scheme for using it ; there- 
fore, they are entirely tentative and must be so considered. See 
Appendix No. 5. 

7 — 32. Training Schedules. — Training schedules are issued by 
a commander for that part of the training of his unit that is 
to be done directly under his own comand, and are based upon 
the programs and orders of higher commanders, and upon the 
present stage of training of the unit for which intended. They are 
generally in tabular form and outline what is to be done ; how, when, 
and where it is to be done; and the equipment required. If 
complete, no additional information is required for training during 
the period covered by the schedule. Only short training periods 
should be covered. A weekly schedule is customary; a longer 
period is liable to interruptions. In addition to imparting the ne- 
cessary information to carry on the training, schedules should be 
arranged so that the required standards of proficiency are reached 
in the minimum of time. When approved by higher authority, 
they become the instruments of execution. This does not mean, 
however, that they are to be followed blindly. If, at any time, 
it becomes apparent that interest is lagging, and that the instruc- 
tion is not having the desired result, it should be varied immediately. 
See Appendix No. 6. See page 140, Staff Officer's Field Manual, 
Part one ; a form for a unit training schedule. 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

Appendix 1. 



1. Where Established. — Two training centers were established 
in the Dominican Republic, W.I., during the occupation of that 
country by the U.S. Marines (1916 to 1924.) Each infantry 
regiment established one; the First Regiment within its area at 
Santo Domingo City, and the Fourth Regiment within its area at 

2. Training Center at Santo Domingo City. — a. The training 

center at Santo Domingo City was a camp established about seven 
kilometers from the city. The enlisted personnel were housed 
in wall tents. Portable barracks (Adrian) were erected for the 
headquarters building, galley and mess hall, storerooms, and officers 
quarters. Frame buildings were erected for latrines, bath-house, 
range house, and ammunition magazine. 

b. When the training center was disbanded in 1924 it con- 
sisted of the following activities: 

(1) Rifle Range. — This was a six hundred yard range of 
, eight targets and was used for record practice with the rifle 

by all the personnel of the First Regiment, Brigade Headquarters, 
and other Brigade activities. In addition, many men fired the 
pistol for record, and some the BAR. During the last several 
years it was found that eight targets were insufficient for the 
expeditious firing of the available personnel. Twelve targets 
would have been much better but were not installed because 
evacuation was imminent. 

(2) Range for Combat Practice Firing. — This was a large 
area of uninhabited land about ten kilometers from the training 

i center. It was used for combat practice firing, and field exercises 
involving the firing of rifle, grenades, machine gun, and howitzer 
company weapons, and three-inch naval landing guns. 

<■ (3) Brigade Infantry Weapons School (Troop School.) — 
This was a Brigade activity and though established at the First 
Regiment Training Center, came under Brigade. It was com* 
manded by the Brigade Machine Gun and Howitzer Officer. See 
Appendix No. 2. 

c. The Course of Training. — In general, the course of training 
was about as follows: An intact rifle company would be trans- 
ferred to the Training Center and kept there for two months. 
During these two months the company would be given an intensive 
course in training, including: 

(1) Firing the Springfield rifle for record (course A). 


Appendices, Chapter r L 

(2) Individuals armed with the pistol would fire the pistol 
for record. 

(3) Scouting and Patrolling. 

(4) Close and Extended Order. 

(5) Combat problems in the field for the squad, section, 
platoon, and company. These included night problems. 

(6) First aid, hygiene, and sanitation. 

(7) Field Exercises. At the completion of the two months 
course the combat efficiency of the company was tested by putting 
it in bivouac on the range for combat practice firing and con- 
ducting day and night field exercises that required the firing 
of live ammunition by all weapons. A favorite field exercise 
included the attack on and seizure of a village. The village 
would be constructed of target muslin and frames, and poles. 
This attack included an artillery preparation with a three-inch 
landing gun and trench mortar, and direct overhead fire with 
machine guns. These field exercises were very instructive, and 
a fitting way to terminate the intensive training period. 


Appendices, Chapter 1, 

Appendix 2. 


1. The Second Brigade Infantry Weapons School. — a. The 

Second Brigade, Marines, organized an infantry weapons school in 
1922 in the Dominican Republic. This institution produced 
highly skilled instructors and other personnel for the various 
infantry weapons, particularly the new types that had been adopted 
by the Marines during the World War. 

b. Just before the Marines evacuated the Dominican Re- 
public in 1924 the I.W.S. consisted of the following: 

(1) School Staff. — The Staff of the school consisted of: 

(a) The Commanding Officer and Senior Instructor. He 
was also the Brigade MG-How Officer. (A Captain) . 

(b) The Second in Command. (A Lieutenant). This 
officer was a graduate of the school and well acquainted with 
all the infantry weapons employed in an infantry battalion. 

(c) Enlisted Instructors. An excellent group of about 
twelve enlisted instructors were selected from among the 
graduates of the school. They were assigned as follows: 

School Clerk. He had charge of the office and also in- 

Property Sergeant. He also instructed. 

Instructors. These were assigned according to their abil- 
ities. Due to the dispersion of companies throughout the 
country, the enlisted instructors were transfered from their 
respective companies to the Brigade Hq. Co., Santo Domingo 
City, and kept permanently on the staff of the school. They 
were housed in hospital and wall tents at the I.W.S. and messed 
with the Training Center mess. 

(2) The Classes. Classes in various subjects were or- 
ganized and conducted as required. After the school was organ- 
ized the introduction of a new subject was quite simple; it con- 
sisted chiefly of appointing a competent instructor and ordering 
the students to attend. The classes at the time of evacuation 
consisted of: 

(a) The Machine-Gun Class. This class consisted of 
sufficient students from each regiment to organize a complete 
MG Sec. for each Regt. Each Regt sent one or more officers. 
The two sections formed a platoon when desirable. It was a 
three months course and the machine gun part covered mech- 
anics, all drills, record firing on the 1000-inch range, direct 
and indirect overhead fire, map reading, indirect fire, tactics, 
and construction of emplacements. In addition, the MG stud- 
ents were given a thorough course in the pistol and hand 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

(b) The Howitzer Class. This was a six weeks course 
and was generally attended by one officer and six men from 
each Regt. It covered the 3-inch trench mortar (Stokes), 37 — 
mm cannon, pistol, and hand grenades. The howitzer subjects 
included mechanics, firings, map reading, direct and indirect 
fire, overhead fire, tactics, and emplacements. 

(c) The Rifle Company Class. This was a six weeks 
course and was generally attended by two men per rifle com- 
pany and one officer per Regt. It covered the BAR, pistol, 
hand and rifle grenades, map reading, scouting and patrolling, 
tactics, and field fortification. 

(3) School Demonstrations and Field Exercises. Each 
class received one or more opportunities to participate in dem- 
onstrations and field exercises that involved the coordinated 
employment of all weapons. The students, upon their return 
to their respective regiments, were incorporated into their 
original companies and used as instructors and for manning 
the weapons in which schooled. 

Appendix 3. 


Quantico, Virginia. — Instructors for the Infantry Weapon's 
School, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia (1924-1926) were se- 
cured from the companies which sent students to the school. It 
was the policy to return an instructor to his unit for duty after he 
had instructed two classes. By doing this there was a large turn- 
over in instructors, many more instructors were developed, and 
the companies eventually had the assistance of their own experi- 
enced instructors. This was a satisfactory arrangement and com- 
pany commanders were eager to have their best man developed into 
experienced instructors. These enlisted instructors remained on 
the rolls of their own companies and messed with them. However, 
it was found desirable to have them quartered at the I.W.S. Hav- 
ing them quartered apart from the students eliminated the intimacy 
of being quartered together and gave the instructors more prestige. 
Another excellent reason for having instructors quartered together 
was that they had a tendency to "talk shop" among themselves 
and in that way discussed and solved many pertinent school 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

Appendix 4. 


For the purpose of this appendix it is assumed that Lieutenant 
Colonel "1st Battalion - Marines" has received the regimental 
training order (program), with annex showing "Regimental 
Losses," for the training period 1 October 1934 — 31 March 1935. 
He has accordingly prepared the following battalion training 
program (order) and annex showing "Battalion Losses", and sends 
copies of the training program and of the annexes showing both 
"Regimental Losses" and "Battalion Losses" to all concerned. 

Headquarters 1st Bn Marines, 

Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. 
20 August, 1934. 


No. 10 ) 

1. The following training program governing the training of the 

1st Bn Marines during the period 1 October 1934, — 31 March 

1935, is published for the information and guidance of all con- 

2. A conference on the program, attended by all officers of the 
battalion, will be held at battalion headquarters at 0930, 25 August 
1934. Each officer will make a careful study of the program prior 
to that time. 

A B. C , 

Lieut-Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, 


D E. F_ 

1st Lieut., U.S. Marine Corps, 

Distribution : 

s (Omitted.) 



Headquarters 1st Bn Marines, 

Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. 
20 August, 1934. 

1. Training Missions. — The training missions of this battalion 

a. To secure in this command a maximum of efficiency for the 
march, camp, and battlefield, with a view to possible active service 
at any time. 

b. To prepare organizations for expansion to war strength. 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

c. To develop instructors for duty in training recruits in the 
event of an emergency. 

d. To provide cadres for use in reconstituting inactive units 
or organizing new units. 

e. To develop the science and art of war. 

2. Time Available. — a. Training Period. — Six months, 1 Oc- 
tober 1934, to 31 March 1935 (both dates inclusive). 

b. Training Week. — Six days, except when shortened by holP 
days, guard duty, or police or working details. 

c. Training Day.— (1) Normally four hours (0730 to 1130).; 
During the periods devoted to marksmanship, the training day will 
be lengthened to seven hours (0700 to 1200 and 1300 to 1500) . For 
field exercises, no limiting daily hours are prescribed; however, 
calculations for these programs may be based on a seven-hour work- 
ing day. No instructions will be held on mornings following night 

(2) Ordinarily afternoons are available for administrative 
work, additional training for deficient men, athletics, and for schools 
and ceremonies. Rifle companies will have rifle marksmanship at 
least once every week during the afternoon ; this may take the form 
of gallery practice and competitions. No training will be scheduled 
for Wednesday or Saturday afternoons, except during markmanship 
periods and field exercises, when training will be scheduled ori 
Wednesday afternoons. Saturday mornings will be set aside for 
inspection except when they occur during markmanship periods, 
or when used by the battalion commander for other instruction. 1 

d. Training Losses. — (1) The necessary guard duty and 
police and working parties for the regiment will be performed by 
the detail of a company each day. All companies except the head- 
quarters company and the service company will be detailed. Guard 
schedules will be issued every two weeks. The normal order of 
tour will be A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M Company. Dur- 
ing the regimental and battalion field exercises, the necessary guard 
duty will be performed by the band. Guard mounting will occur 
at 1145 daily, commencing 30 September, when Company A will 
be guard company. Further details relative to guard mounting will 
be issued later. Instruction in interior guard duty will be incident 
to that duty. 

(2) The following holidays are announced: 
29 November (Thanksgiving Day). 

24 December to 1 January (both inclusive) . 
22 February (Washington's Birthday) . 

(3) Losses deducted by the regiment during the period 
October to March, inclusive, are shown in Annex No. 1. 

(4) Losses deducted by this battalion are shown in Annex 

No. 2. 

3. Scope of Instruction. — a. (1) Training Subjects and Ref- 
erences. — Training of units and individuals will be conducted as 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

prescribed in the following training orders and publications, as 
applicable : 

Marine Corps Order No. 41, as modified by Marine Corps Orders 
No. 50, 55, 60, 65, and 68. 

TR 10—5, War Department. 

TR, Military Training, War Department, up to and including 
the battalion, including communications^ except such as have been 
superseded by the Basic Field Manual. 

Landing Force Manual, U.S. Navy, 1927. 

Staff Officers' Field Manual, Parts I and II. 

Basic Field Manual, Volume I, Chapter 8 ; Volume II, Part Two, 
Volume III, Part One, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; Part Two; Part 
Three ; Part Four ; Part Five ; Part Six, Chapter 2 ; and Volume VII, 
Part Two. 

Manual for Naval Overseas Operations. 

(2) The applicatory system of training will be used. 

b. Use of Schools. — Schools will be established and conducted 
as follows: 

(1) For officers: 

(a) Advanced course, 
i (b) Current training orientation course. 

(2) For enlisted men: 

(a) Basic course. 

(b) Specialists' Course. 

(c) Drills and tactical training. 

(d) Field training. 

i (3) Subjects and instructors for officers' schools will be 

designated in schedules issued by this headquarters every two 

! (4) Specialists' schools for enlisted men will be conducted 

. by the heads of their respective sections; i.e., communications 

personnel by communication officers, pioneer personnel by pioneer 
: officers, etc. All other schools for enlisted men will be conducted 

under the direction and supervision of company commanders. 
; c. Standards of Proficiency. — (1) The standard prescribed 
for all physical things is that the thing or things inspected be 
present, immaculately clean, and serviceable. 

(2) In all training in which there are exact prescriptions 
in published regulations, the standard for all ranks will be accuracy 
as to knowledge, and precision as to execution. In tactical training, 
the objective will be the development of tactical judgement in all 
leaders and their replacements, through the knowledge and the 
application of those tactical principles and methods which are found 
to apply in a given tactical situation to the organizations concerned, 
at varying strenghts and under a variety of situations. 

d. Inspections. — (1) A proficiency test will be held at the 
conclusion of each phase of training. The last day of training in 
any subject is the date of expected proficiency, and the day upon 
which the final test will be conducted. However, instruction will 


Appendices, Chapter 7- 

cease at any time when it becomes apparent that the desired stand- 
ard has been reached. The time thus saved can be utilized for other 
instruction. Unit progress charts will be kept by each organization 

(2) As far as practicable, inspections to test proficiency will 
be practical and informal in nature, and will not interfere with the 

(3) No commander other than the respective unit com- 
manders will require proficiency in a subject prior to the date set 
forth in his program. 

4. Miscellaneous, — a. Programs and Schedules. — (1) Train- 
ing Programs. — Company commanders will prepare programs for 
the training of units during the period designated and submit them 
to this headquarters prior to 15 September. The program must not 
be regarded as a rigid schedule of execution. It is merely the plan 
of the company commander, showing his approximate allotment of 
time and the general scheme for using that time. It is intended 
to be flexible, and must be so considered. 

(2) Weekly schedules. — Weekly schedules will be submit- 1 
ted to this headquarters before noon on each Wednesday preceding 
the training week. Alternate instruction for one day of inclement 
weather will be added to the schedule. *U 

b. Attendance. — Men detailed on special duty will receive 
not less than eight hours instruction during weeks that are not 
shortened by holidays or guard. Company commanders will sub- 
mit requests for their men to this headquarters, one week in ad- 
vance of the time such attendance is desired. Administrative de- 
tails will be arranged so that every man will receive at least four 
hours training each week. 

c. Ceremonies. — Weather permitting, one battalion ceremony 
for each battalion and one regimental ceremony will be held weekly 
except during the marksmanship period. All units will usually 
participate in the regimental ceremony. The ceremony days are 
as follows: 

Monday 1st Battalion. 

Tuesday 2d Battalion. 

Thursday 3d Battalion. 

Friday Regiment. 

d. Athletics. — Participation in athletics is voluntary. Or- 
ganization commanders will encourage inter-company sports and 
company competitions. The battalion athletic officer will coordinate 
the use of the various athletic facilities with commanders con- 

e. Junior Officers. — Except as otherwise prescribed in regu- 
lations, each lieutenant will be given an assignment to a clearly 
defined duty, of a permanent nature, pertaining to the daily com- 
mand training and administrative activities of his organization. 

f . Exercises in Leaving Post. — Organizations will be prepared 
to leave the post at any time, either for prolonged field service 
with full equipment, or brief field service with limited equipment. 
These exercises will be ordered by the regimental commander. 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

g. Uniform and Equipment.— Post regulations prescribe the 
uniform of the day for different seasons of the year. During 
training, the uniform of the day may be modified according to the 
nature of the training ; i.e., dungarees for gun drill in the machine- 
gun company and for scouting and patrolling in all companies, coats 
equipped with shooting pads for rifle marksmanship, etc., at the 
discretion of company commanders. However, all personnel present 
with a company will wear corresponding uniforms at the same 

h. Instructional Methods. — Instruction in oral orders, mes- 
sages, estimating distance, patrol sketches, care and display of 
equipment, and similar subjects will not be confined to periods set 
aside for such purpose. In order to provide variety and create 
interest, such instruction will be carried on concurrently with other 

A B. C , 

Lieut-Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, 


D E. F , 

1st Lieut., U. S. Marine Corps, 


No. 1, Regimental Losses. 

No. 2, Battalion Losses. 



Appendices, Chapter 7. 

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Appendices, Chapter 7. 

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Appendices, <Jha#ter 7.*' 

Appendix 5. 


For the purpose of this appendix it is assumed that Captain 
"Company B" — Marines received his copy of the battalion train- 
ing program included in Appendix No. 4. He accordingly prepared 
the following training program for his company for the period 1 
October 1934—31 March 1935. 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 

Appendices, Chapter *. 

Appendix 6. 


For the purpose of this appendix it is assumed that Captain- 
"Company B", — Marines, received his copy of the battalion train- 
ing program included in Appendix No. 4, and from it prepared the 
company training program included in Appendix No. 5. He accord- 
ingly prepared the following weekly training schedule for his com- 
pany for the week ending 6 October 1934. 


Appendices, Chapter 7. 


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CHAR 6, SECT, r— Iff 
TR. 200-8, SECT. I 

TR. 420- 80, SECT. I-BL 

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TR. 420-110, SECT. I— IT 



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1935 Revision 



Orders for Debarkation 9-1 

Priority Table 9-2 

Capacity of Boats 9-3 

Calculating boat spaces required 9-4 

Landing conditions 9-5 

Ships tackle and booms 9-6 

Temporary piers or landings 9-7 

Time of unloading 9-8 

Responsibility 9-9 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of U.S. Naval or Military i 


9 — 1. Orders for Debarkation. — The landing schedule prepared 
by the force and approved by the Attack Force commander shows 
in general terms the priorities of landing troops and materiel. 
This schedule is amplified on each transport by orders prepared 
jointly by the commanders of the landing group and boat group 
under the direction of the transport commander. These orders 
prescribe in detail the order of landing personnel, equipment, and 
each group of supplies. The orders, diagrams, and schedules 
governing the landing of combat troops in small wars are similiar 
to those in major operations. 

9—2. Priority Table.— a. In order to regulate the landing of 
rear echelons and materiel, a priority table is prepared as an annex 
to the debarkation orders issued on each transport. These tables 
show: the priority number, the organization, designation of 
materiel, were stowed, number of personnel to accompany, total 
boat spaces, and other pertinent remarks as required. 

b. In landing whether against opposition or unopposed, the 
usual priority of landing supplies is as follows: 

(1) With the Combat troops: 

(a) Ammunition belts filled, extra bandoleers if required. 

(b) A cooked ration, more if required. 

(c) One or two canteens of water. Each boat carries at 
; ^ least 20 gallons of water in 5 gallon cans. » 

(2) As soon as practicable after landing combat troops-: 
fw; (a) One or more units of fire according to the situation* 

T (b) Several days rations and water. It is important to 
' send enough supplies for several days, because bad 

- weather frequently interrupts landings. 

(3) Other supplies. 

c. Mess f ^ujj^^t^ccoiipLpanies tfcfi .first uncooked . rations 
landed after tne troops. Camp equipment if required is landed- 
soon as practicable after the materiel having priority. 

d. For disembarking motor transportation, see paragraph 7d. 

9 — 3. Capacity of Boats— a. The unit of measure used in 
determining the capacity of boats is the "BOAT SPACE" which is 
224 pounds or 0.1 long ton ; or 13.5 cubic feet. 

b. In a small war situation only regular navy boats, and such 
lighters as can be obtained locally, will be available for landing. 
The capacities of several types of Navy boats are : 

(1) 50 Foot Motor Launch 110 boat spaces. 

(2) 40 " " " 50 " 

(3) 36 " " " 38 " 

(4) 35 " " Boat 12 " 

(5) 26 " " Whale boat 12 " 

NOTE:. Boat spaces equal about 60 percent of the rated maximum person- 
nel capacity of the boat less crew. This is approximately 80 percent of the 
maximum capacity of the boat by weight. 

c. Lighters and barges have varying capacities. Standard 
Navy lighters are of 250 and 500 ton capacity. 

9 — 4. Calculating Boat Spaces Required. — a. Each fully equip- 
ped man with the supplies he carries occupies one boat space. 

b. Heavy material such as ammunition and rations is calcu- 
lated by weight; that is for each long ton, 10 boat spaces arc 

c. Bulky material is calculated by volume; that is, one boat 
space is required for each 13.5 cubic feet. 

d. Large vehicles and other articles require special arrange- 
ments for landing, and boat space calculations do not apply to 
these. The principles of stowage plans do apply, however. In 
order to land these vehicles in motor launches, it is necessary to 
put a boat rig in the launch. This rig consists of a track running 
fore and aft from the bow, on over the engine, and so arranged that 
a ramp fits the rig over the bow to allow landing. This rig works 
well in a calm sea, but the center of gravity is so high that the 
boat may become unstable in a choppy sea. In a 50 foot motor 
launch equipped with one of these rigs there is room for a tractor 
and two trailers. The space below the rig should be filled with 
water in cans, rations, and other cargo. This vacant space should 
be used, as this heavy weight low in the boat has a stabilizing 
effect on its sea-worthiness. Guns and vehicles have been landed 
on platforms built over two motor launches. 

9 — 5. Landing Conditions.— a. Landings may be made from 
ships alongside a dock; from ships at anchor in a harbor where 
pier facilities are available, or from small boats directly on a beach. 
Of course it is desirable to land on a dock. If that is not practicable, 
transports should move to positions close inshore in order to 
facilitate the movement of supplies ashore. 

b. Weather conditions frequently interrupt the landings for 
hours or even days at a time. 

c. At ports where it is impracticable to dock and it is the 
practice for commercial vessels to discharge cargo at anchor, it 
is most probable that lighters or barges and tugs are available for 

9 — 6. Ships Tackle and Booms.— a. Naval and commercial 
vessels are equipped with booms and winches, so located that they 
can be used to unload the cargo holds. As a rule, the booms are of 
about 6 ton capacity which is ample to handle any equipment that 
would accompany a peacetime expedition for a small wars opera- 
tion. The winches usually operate in pairs, and are capable of 
handling any probable loads. 

b. If there are special type heavy lighters carried on hatches, 
a special rig or heavy boom is required to handle these. The 
U.S.S. Antares has a 30-ton boom at No. 2 hatch. With a 6-fold 
purchase rig 155 mm guns and 15-ton boats can be handled with 
ease. The same vessel has a 15-ton boom for launching her boats 
from the boat skids aft. This boom has ample capacity to handle 
the guns and heavy boats mentioned above. 

c. As a part of the preparations for an expedition, special 
slings are procured for all vehicles and heavy lifts. These slings 
are of wire cable, fitted with necessary hooks and spreaders. 

d. The providing and launching of boats is a Navy function 
and the ship furnishes slings for these. 

e. General cargo is usually handled in cargo nets. A cargo 
net can handle about 1 long ton per load. A long ton of ammunition 
is about 40 cubic feet, rations 68, and light matrial about 140. 

f. At commercial piers special equipment is prepared for 
handling each type of cargo. For military supplies the cargo 
net will probably be used for cargo composed of boxes, bales, 
crates, or bundles. Special hooks or slings are better for gasoline 
drums, as it is easier to detach the drums from hooks than to 
unload them from a cargo net. This is particularly true in unload- 
ing into small boats. Ordinary slings are best for many loads. 

g. In unloading, naval personnel operates the ship's tackle 
and the boats; the marines manhandle the cargo in loading and 
unloading the nets and slings. 

9 — 7. Temporary Piers or Landings. — a. If there are no piers 
available at which to unload small boats and lighters, or if the pier 
space available is insufficient, piers should be constructed to facili- 
tate landing of supplies in quantity. These temporary piers should 
be fabricated prior to embarkation. These may be on piles, 
trestles, or floats. Pontoon equipment has many possibilities for 
excellent service along this line. The type depends on the depth 
of water, the strength of current, and the nature of the bottom as 
found from the study of the theater of operations. 

b. The problem of landing vehicles from motor launches in 
a rough sea is difficult, for use of the boat rig, in landing vehicles, 
tends to render the boat unstable. If there is a crane on a small 
boat-pier available, vehicles can be lowered into the boat by ships 
tackle and unloaded by the crane. A 5-ton portable crane would 
be a decided advantage to an expedition. 

c. When landing on a beach from boats or lighters, it will 
usually be found that timber, corduroy, or chicken wire will have 
to be used to facilitate getting wheeled vehicles across the sand. 

d. When landing on piers or the open beach, there will be a 
tendency for materiel to collect near the shore and on the pier. 
Sufficient labor and transportation must be provided to keep the 
docks or landings clear. 

e. In only few instances will it be found that trucks and 
trailers can operate on piers. A most useful agent in clearing 
piers is a narrow gauge railway, even if operated by man power. 

9 — 8. Time of Unloading. — a. Any figures given on the speed 
of unloading a vessel are dependent on so many varying conditions, 
that the following figures should be considered as nothing more 
than rough estimates. 

(1) A vessel at anchor using boats and lighters can dis- 
charge 30,000 cubic feet per day (very general). 

(2) A vessel at a pier can discharge 50,000 cubic feet per 
day (very general) . 

b. The time of loading a boat will vary according to the rela- 
tive amount of personnel and material comprising the loads, the 
facilities on a transport for handling cargo, the training of the 

troops and the condition of the sea. The indicated times are based 
on average troops and distribution of personnel and material, 
fairly smooth sea, and the use of cargo nets or ladders over the side 
in place of gangways, (two cargo nets side by side for 40 or 50 
foot motor launches and one for smaller boats). The time ne- 
cessary for loading various equipment into small boats is as follows : 

(1) Personnel and Combat equipment — 8 boats spaces per 
minute by day and 6 by night. 

(2) General Cargo — 3 boat spaces per minute by day and 
two by night. 

(3) Vehicles — 12 minutes per vehicle by day and 20 
minutes per vehicle by night. 

NOTE: The above estimates are for one hatch or gangway or loading 
point (cargo nets over the side). 

c. In planning an actual landing, the speed and time of loading 
every boat space should be determined by test during training 
maneuvers, using the actual load contemplated. The test should 
be conducted under the worst sea conditions to be reasonably ex- 
pected during the landing, and due allowance should be made for 
delays incident to a landing under war conditions. 

d. When discharging general cargo on lighters or piers, the 
following rates are estimated for each hatch worked: 

Density of cargo ; 
Cubic feet per long ton 

Discharge per 
in cub 

hatch per hour 
ic feet 


: By Day 

By Night 

: 720 
: 1080 
: 1440 


e. Breakdowns and other contingencies may prevent the ships 
winches from working more than 16 hours per day, and estimates 
for discharging cargo should be made accordingly. 

9 — 9. Responsibility. — The commanding officer of each trans- 
port is responsible for landing the troops and cargo on shore. The 
responsibility of marine commanders begins on landing. The Navy 
is responsible for the preparation and assembly of boats, special 
equipment for the landing, and the assembly and training of the 
necessary naval personnel for the operation of the boats and land- 
ing equipment. 

8160 MCS QUANTICO. VA. 10 31-35- 400 



1935 Revision 
Supply Plans 


Procurement in United States 10-1 

Loadings at Embarkation Points . . . ,., 10-2 

Last Minute Requirements 10-3 

Liaison , 10-4 

Manner of Loading 10-5 

Essential Information 10*6 

Storage 10-7 

Supply Base — Location of 10-8 (a) 

personnel 10-8 (b) 

" replacements 10-8 (c) 

" Shelter for 10-8 (d) 

" transportation units for 10-8 (e) 

" water transportation to 10-8 (f & g) 

Distribution 10-9 

Chain of Responsibility 10-10 

Accountability 10-11 

Funds 10-12 

Supply Suggestions 10-13 

Influence of Supply on Small Wars 10-14 

Appendix: Page 

No. 1 Procurement and Distribution Chart with Description 10-11 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 


Supply Plans 

10 — 1. Procurement in the United States. — The present supply 
plan of the Quartermaster's Department includes the designation 
of five (5) points of supply in the United States at which stocks 
are maintained to provide equipment and supplies, with certain 
modifications, in the quantities shown in tables of equipment (1935) . 
These supply points are Philadelphia, Quantico, Hampton Roads, 
San Diego and San Francisco. The modifications are the elimination 
of certain items, procurement of which has been deferred because of 
(1) the uncertainty of their need, such as horse equipment for 
a mounted rifle company, and (2) because of the inability of 
other items, such as batteries, etc., to withstand storage conditions 
for any great length of time. Such items have been placed on a 
"deferred list" and will be procured when, and if, decision for their 
need by an expeditionary force is determined. The number of 
items on such deferred lists is constantly being reduced as con- 
ditions permit. The quantities of items that have been procured 
and so stored are based on figures shown in equipment tables for a 
period of ninety (90) days. 

It is anticipated that weapons and equipment issued to posts 
and used for training members of various expeditionary units, will 
accompany these units to mobilization points. Stocks of these 
items, at different points of supply, have therefore been reduced 

10 — 2. Loadings at Embarkation Points. — Based on quantities 
determined by the size and mission of the expeditionary force, 
equipment and supplies will be loaded on the ship at place and time 
of embarkation. Those items not immediately available at point of 
embarkation will either be sent to this point or the ship will stop 
at another supply point to take on the remaining items before 
sailing from the United States. For example, in case of mobiliza- 
tion and embarkation at Quantico, subsistence stores procured from 
the Navy, might be placed aboard at Hampton Roads. 

10 — 3. Last Minute Requirements. — Last minute requirements 
involving the procurement of those deferred articles that the ex- 
peditionary force is to take, would, of course, have to be speeded 
up in order to have them accompany the force. Procurement of 
these articles would undoubtedly be handled by the Quartermaster's 
Department at Headquarters Marine Corps. Procurement, in 
some instances, might be handled by the representative of the 
Quartermaster's Department at the point of embarkation. 

10 — 4. Liaison. — a. The senior supply officer of the expedition- 
ary force should maintain close contact with the senior officer of 
the Quartermaster's Department at the point of embarkation in 
order that the former may be kept informed of the details of the 
supply situation. 

b. If the local representative, for any reason, is not involved 
in this procurement, contact should be established with the officer 
in charge, Supply Division, Quartermaster's Department, Head- 



quarters Marine Corps, or, where applicable, with Headquarters, 
Dept. of the Pacific. Such a condition is likely to exist in connection 
with the procurement of special items that have been the subject 
of direct correspondence between Headquarters Marine Corps and 
the expeditionary force. At this stage of the progress of ex- 
peditionary supply, coordination of effort is most desirable and 
necessary and it is best obtained by continuous contact with those 
responsible for supply. 

10 — 5. Manner of Loading. — The loading plan and manner of 
loading equipment and stores aboard ship is controlled by the 
anticipated tactical employment of the force upon arrival at destina- 
tion. See Chapter VI. 

10 — 6. Essential Information. — To supply successfully an ex- 
peditionary force, it is imperative that these facts be known : — 

What equipment and supplies should the force have. 

What equipment and supplies does the force have. 

Where are the needed items, if any, to come from and when. 

How must equipment and supplies be loaded aboard ship in 
order to further the tactial mission. 

What individuals must be contacted in order to secure the 
desired decisions. 

When, how, and in what quantities will replacements be 

10 — 7. Storage. — Upon arrival of the expeditionary force at 
port of debarkation, one of the first decisions to be made, if not 
already made, is the location of the supply base or depot. The 
following factors are of importance in reaching this decision: — 
Docking facilities. 

Availability of suitable shelter for stores. 
Railroads, highways, water routes available for supply purposes 
and types of carriers. 

Availability of civilian labor. 
Mission of expeditionary force. 

Location of troops ; distance from supply base. 

10 — 8. Supply Base. — a. While it is always desirable to have 
the supply base near the point of debarkation in order to facilitate 
unloading and segregation of stores, there will be occasions when 
this may, for various reasons, have to be modified by establishing 
at the debarkation point a forwarding depot and placing the main 
depot or base at an intermediate point between the forwarding 
depot and the area to be supplied. From the main depot, or base, 
the flow of supply would ordinarily be to and through advance 
supply points and forward to organizations in combat zones. See 
Appendix No. 1. The usual route would be railroad, where it exists, 
or highways, using motor transportation in the latter case, to ad- 
vance supply points in organization areas. It will almost always 
be found advantageous to build up small stocks of essential supplies 



at these advance supply points or even farther forward at the dis- 
tributing points in order to insure a continuous supply. This is 
especially necessary when operating in a theater that has a rainy 

b. At the depots, or bases, will be personnel of the Quarter- 
master's Department. These units will ordinarily be organized so 
as to handle the main sub-divisions of supply with warrant officers 
or staff non-commissioned officers of the department as assistants 
or section chiefs. At these points, the enlisted force would be 
augmented by civilian labor, when available. 

c. Routine replacements of depot stocks will ordinarily be 
maintained by timely requisitions submitted by officers in charge 
to the proper supply depot in the United States or, in the case of 
articles not normally carried by these depots, by requisitions sub- 
mitted direct to the Quartermaster, Headquarters Marine Corps. 
Lists of articles of normal supply by Marine Corps depots are shown 
in the annual price list of clothing and equipment circulated in 
the form of a Marine Corps Order. Such supplies are also procured 
in the United States from the following sources: — 

By purchase in commercial markets. 

By purchase from other government stocks. 
The foregoing replenishment should be augmented by local 
purchases of items available locally at reasonable prices. See 
Appendix No. 1. 

d. It will be necessary to survey existing local facilities 
regarding shelter for depot stocks and possibly service units, in 
order that proper recommendations may be made to Force Head- 
quarters relative to preparation of formal agreement for rental. 
Failing this, it would be proper, in the event a long stay is anti- 
cipated, to recommend construction of suitable buildings for this 
purpose. Ordinarily, in tropical countries, service units may be 
quartered in tents. 

e. The location of transportation units employed in the depot 
supply plan will usually be controlled by the location of depot or 
bases. Such units should be reasonably close to the depots and 
subject to depot control. 

f. Naval transports will, when available, be utilized in ship- 
ping supplies (replacements) from the United States to the port 
nearest to the main depot or forwarding depot. 

g. When naval transportation is not available, commercial 
water transportation may be used. In some cases, though not 
often, Army transports have been used for this purpose. These 
transportation decisions are always made in the Quartermaster's 
Department, Headquarters Marine Corps, based on known schedules 
and recommendations of the supply officer of the expeditionary 
force. The latter must consider available transportation facilities 
in determining time factors involved in the supply of the force. 

10 — 9. Distribution.— a. Depots.— Ordinarily, depots with force 
transportation will supply as far forward as consistent with exist- 
ing conditions. Organization transportation either motor or pack 



will carry forward from this point either directly to troops or to 
positions from which troops may be supplied by carrying parties. 
Force Headquarters units and rear echelons of all organizations 
will normally be supplied directly by supply depots or bases. 

b. Supply Steps. — From a study of Appendix No. 1, it will be 
apparent that some of these successive steps may, in certain situa- 
tions, be eliminated, such as the Forwarding Depot and carrying 
parties where step No. 7 supplies directly to step No. 10. 

c. Local Purchases.— Local purchases may be made at any of 
the five places shown along the chain of supply (Se,e Appendix No. 
1), and sent to troops in combat areas. Where this is done by one 
other than a regularly detailed purchasing officer, it will be neces- 
sary to secure authorization for such practice from Force Head- 

d. Requisitions. — Requisitions for replacements of equipment, 
supplies, ammuntion, etc., are submitted to the nearest accountable 
or supply officer by the officer responsible, usually company com- 
manders, to and through Bn- 4's. Sufficient fore-thought must be 
employed to permit procurement and distribution by the required 

e. Depots, Dumps, and Distributing Points. — The Advanced 
Distributing Points may be at Area Headquarters or merely a 
selected site close to combatant troops. In countries where the 
condition of roads in forward areas will not permit a daily delivery 
routine, and such occasions will be common, it will be necessary to 
maintain small stocks of essential supplies at these Advanced 
Distributing Points. In most systems of supply operating in the 
field there exists the necessity for establishing permanent and 
temporary points of storage and points where distribution takes 
place. The terms commonly used to designate such points are 
"depot", "dump" and "distributing point", the latter often called 
"DP". The word "depot" is used to designate a place where 
supplies in bulk are stored permanently and from which the first 
step in field distribution takes place. Such a point requires shelter, 
security and close proximity to some good means of transporting 
supplies. Such a point is usually established by the organization 
carrying the bulk of replacement supplies and bears the name of 
it. Thus, in a Force is found a Force Depot; in a Brigade acting 
separately, a Brigade Depot and so on. The word "dump" is used 
to designate a place of temporary storage of supplies. It first 
came into being when it became necessary to "dump" the loads 
from rolling stock in order to free it for other transportation needs. 
It is practically always a temporary arrangement, bearing the name 
of the organization controlling it and often designated by the kind 
of supplies dumped thereat. Thus, such a place established by 
and controlled by Force for the purpose of placing temporary 
stock of engineer supplies, would be known as a Force Engineer 
dump. The word "distributing point" or "DP" signifies a posi- 
tion or site selected for the transfer and distribution of supplies 
to consuming units. It is most often used in connection with the 



daily distribution of supplies used up by troops at a fairly uniform 
rate, such as rations, oil, fuel, forage, etc., (automatic supplies). 
It simply means a spot or area to which supplies are brought by 
one means and turned over to another for purpose of inter-orga- 
nizational distribution. It is known by the name of the largest 
unit distributed to thereat, thus such a point to which a Force train 
would bring certain supplies for one of its brigades, would be 
known as a Brigade D.P; when the regiments carry their portion 
to another point and distribute it to their battalions, this latter 
place would be known as a Regiment D.P. 

10 — 10. Chain of Responsibility. The usual chain of respon- 
sibility of individuals connected with procurement and distribu- 
tion of equipment and supplies in the field is: — 
Force Headquarters F — 4 

In each company is a company supply Sergeant, whose duties 
include the preparation of company requisitions and through whom 
requests for replacements of any kind emanating from squads, 
sections and platoons should be sent to the company commander. 
When these requisitions are filled, the Company Supply Sergeant 
is in charge of proper distribution of the new material to the lower 
units and individuals. This man holds the rank of Sergeant and 
is entrusted with matters of company supply. He should not be 
confused with one who holds the rank of Supply Sergeant, a non- 
commissioned rank designated for duty in the Quartermaster's 
Department only. 

10 — 11. Accountability. — a. Extent. Ordinarily, accountabili- 
ty when it exists, extends down to the battalion in field organiza- 
tions. From there on down to the individual, responsibility obtains. 

b. Discontinuance. There is no set rule by which decisions, 
may be reached relative to recommending the discontinuance of 
all, or part of, accountability. In any event, such dicontinuance will 
have to be authorized, if at all, by The Quartermaster, Head- 
quarters Marine Corps and approved by the Major General Com- 

c. Surest and Safest Plan. The surest and safest way to 
protect your interest and the government's interest is to have a 
record of property, etc., on hand; keep it up to date by current 
adjustment, as necessary; and render periodical reports to the 
Quartermaster's Department, Headquarters Marine Corps, for 
audit, as outlined in Chapter 17 Marine Corps Manual. There 
is no satisfactory substitute for this method which, over a period 
of many years, has proven its worth. 


Force QM 
Force Depot QM 
B— 4 
R— 4 
Bn— 4 

Company Commander 
Platoon Leader 
Section Leaders 
Squad Leaders 



d. Modifications. There will be occasions when some modi- 
fication of this system may be desirable and necessary but, 
normally, the regiment and, when acting separately, the battalion, 
will be able to establish and conduct the routine of its rear echelon 
so as to permit and justify the continuance of accountability and 
proper records involving responsibility. 

The absence of accountability promotes carelessness and waste 
and presents a serious obstacle to intelligent and economical supply. 

e. Field Conditions. Field conditions are recognized by every- 
one connected with our service of supply and consideration is 
always given to such conditions. Certificates of adjustment to 
accountable officers' accounts, approved by proper authority, are 
quite frequently necessary under field conditions involving active 
engagements. The Quartermaster's Department recognizes this 
fact and acts accordingly but the point is, that, in continuing ac- 
countability, there is a certified record of all such unusual occurren- 
ces instead of an entire lack of knowledge on the part of those 
responsible for supply in its initial stages of just what is taking 
place and why. 

It may be entirely impossible for a regiment to obtain proper 
receipts for its issues, but a record for such issues can and should 
be kept in order that requests for replacements within the regiment 
can be intelligently supervised by R — 4. If the entire regiment has 
taken the field actively, such record should be kept by the account- 
able officer in the last step of the supply chain before it reaches the 

f. Final Decision. Final decision as to the discontinuance 
of accountability for any unit once charged with it lies solely with 
Headquarters Marine Corps. 

10 — -12. Funds. — Public funds for procurement of such material 
and services as expeditionary forces may find desirable and econom- 
ical are usually entrusted, through official channels, to an officer 
designated as a disbursing officer. Such designation involves the 
procurement of a bond by the officer concerned and an accounting 
for all money transactions to the Treasurer of the United States. 
These officers, when authorized by competent authority, may ad- 
vance public funds to officers in outlying stations for certain local 
, purchases. When such purchases are made, standard forms of 
vouchers are either prepared by the officer making the purchase 
or ordinary receipts taken by him and furnished the disbursing 
officer concerned. In order that such transaction may have proper 
basic authentication, it has been the usual practice to write into 
the orders for such officers when detailed for duty at outlying points, 
a specific designation as agent for the disbursing assistant quarter- 
master concerned which becomes the authority for advancement 
of public funds. An officer receiving such designation should, be- 
fore entering on his new duties, confer with the disbursing assist- 
ant quartermaster in order that there will be complete understand- 
ing of how the money in the possession of the agent is to be ac- 
counted for when expended for public needs. If such a procedure 



is impracticable, the matter should be made the subject of im- 
mediate correspondence between these two officers. There exists 
such a multitude of regulations and decisions governing the ex- 
penditure of government funds that no one should undertake dis- 
bursing even to the extent of a very small sum, without first learn- 
ing the proper method to pursue. Such procedure will avoid ex- 
planation and correspondence later and may be the means of sav- 
ing the one concerned the necessity of making good from personal 
funds an amount of public funds spent in error solely because of 
lack of sufficient and proper advance information. It is desired to 
stress this point most emphatically. 

10 — 13. Supply Suggestions, a. Basis. — Experience is the 
basis for the following suggestions. The aim is the one common 
to all military operations, i.e., success in battle. The well-supplied 
fighter needs but proper leadership to win; therefore the task of 
the supply officer becomes one of considerable importance from 
the commander's view point. 

b. The Old Idea.™ Not so long ago, the too prevalent idea 
of supply was to lock everything up somewhere and say "No" to 
all comers. There are, of course, times when "No" is the right 
answer, but such answer should be controlled by orders, regulation 
or policy covering the matter rather than the personal character- 
istic of the one who gives it. Generally speaking, a supply of- 
ficer is the medium by which the supply system is administered. 
But the system exists for the purpose of supplying, not for the 
purpose of creating a supply officer. 

c. Requisitions. — Probably the most important function of a 
supply officer is the supervision of requisitions. To know what, 
when, where and how to get what the command needs, and then 
get it and distribute it, is perhaps the whole story of supply insofar 
as it affects the one to be supplied. The remainder consists of 
proper recording of what has been done; this is known as ac- 
countability. But the requisition is the starting factor to the 
whole process. If it is wrong, everything else can't help but be 
wrong, also. Never pad a requisition on the assumption that it 
will be cut down. Sooner or later, this will become known and 
your requisitions will be worthless to the one who reviews them. 
If your real needs are cut by someone, find out why and, if you 9 
can, insist on what you ask for. But be sure you know what you 
want, and why. 

d. Supply Force. — Until your immediate supply force has 
proven its worth, be curious enough to find out answers for your- 
self. It is surprising how such an arrangement will keep your force 
on its toes. Watch for display of merit and place those responsible 
for it in positions of trust. And tell them why, when you do so. 

e. Accumulation of Stores. — Do not permit the accumulation 
of slow-moving stores. Particularly clothing in extreme sizes. 
If it fails to move, report its presence and ask for disposition. 
Someone, elsewhere, may want the very sizes that are in excess 
of your needs. Arrange so as to turn over subsistence stores of a 



staple nature at least once every ninety days. Report your excess 
quantities to your nearest senior supply officer, through official 
channels. As a rule, provide an air space under all stored articles. 
It prevents deterioration. In the absence of buildings for storage, 
request that necessary security measures be taken to safeguard 
your stores. Visit the units that you supply. Find out how your 
system works and adjust it where necessary. Watch your stock 
of subsistence stores. Become familiar with the data contained 
under "Minimum safe-keeping period" for subsistence stores under 
Article 14 — 54 in your Marine Corps Manual. Note particularly the 
remarks in this table. Ask for an audience from time to time with 
your commander. Keep him apprised of the supply situation. Do 
not subject him to a long drawn-out story or a batch of complaints. 
Give him your picture, clearly and briefly, and then recommend 
desirable changes if any. Above all, make your supply system fit 
into his plans. Keep in close touch with YOUR source of supply. 
Know what is there and how long it will take you to get it. Get 
a receipt for everything that leaves your control. If field conditions 
are such that this is, in part, impracticable, then keep a record 
of all such transactions and set down the reasons for not being 
able to obtain proper receipts. Keep your own supply records up- 
to-date and render necessary reports regarding them. While it is 
not possible for any individual to guarantee the honesty of human 
beings or the security of stores there are precautions which one 
must take to insure that everything has been done to provide these 
features. Having accomplished this, the supply officer need have 
no fear of eventualities. When you need help, ask for it and STATE 
FACTS. Camouflage, or any attempt at it, in the supply game 
is fatal. If your best judgement has failed, admit it. It is a human 
characteristic, and can rarely be cloaked by a garment of excuses. 

10 — 14. Influence of Supply. — The influence of the question 
of supply upon small wars is well set forth in the following extract 
taken from "Small Wars" by Callwell — "The fact that small wars 
are, generally speaking, campaigns rather against nature than 
against hostile armies has been already referred to. It con- 
stitutes one of the most distinctive characteristics of this class of 
warfare. It affects the course of operations to an extent varying 
greatly according to circumstances, but so vitally at times as to 
govern the whole course of the campaign from start to finish. It 
arises almost entirely out of the difficulties as regards supply 
which the theatres of small wars generally present. Climate affects 
the health of troops, absence of communications retards the move- 
ment of soldiers, the jungle and the bush embarass a commander; 
but if it were not for the difficulty as regards food for man and 
beast which roadless and inhospitable tracts oppose to the opera- 
tions of a regular army, good troops well led would make light of 
such obstacles in their path. It is not the question of pushing 
forward the man, or the horse, or the gun, that has to be taken 
into account, so much as that of the provision of the necessaries of 
life for the troops when they havo been pushed forward" — (See 
Chapter XI, Appendices, Historical Examples.) 


Appendices, Chapter 10. APPENDIX I 



U. S. A. 


U. S. A. 






















9. 1 




10. *~ 



R.O. 1239. 

Appendices, Chapter 10. 

L Description of Chart. — Step (1) — Procurement here and (2) 
transportation to depot or forwarding depot is, of course, con- 
tinuous, based on requisitions from the expeditionary force. These 
requisitions are varied, consisting of periodical requirements sub- 
mitted on usual forms together with letters and, in emergencies, 
radio, telegraphic or cable despatches. Decisions as to quantities 
for, and places of, storage depend upon the particular situation 
and the mission. In some instances the port of debarkation might 
be selected as the site of the force depot or base. If the operation 
necessitates the presence of the bulk of the force far inland, it is 
probable that only a forwarding depot or segregation point would be 
maintained at the port and the main depot established further in- 
land along the line of communications. There can be no set rule 
regarding this arrangement. From the depot or main base, field 
distribution begins. Those nearest the main base would probably be 
supplied through the medium of advance supply points at which 
small stocks would be maintained. If possible, a daily distribution 
would be made to points beyond. Failing this, a periodical system 
of distribution would be made, carrying forward to combatant units 
sufficient supplies and ammunition to meet their needs for stated 
periods. This would entail the establishment of additional advanced 
dumps from which troops could be supplied either by means of 
their own transportation or, in some instances, by pack trains. 
Carrying parties might be employed at this point. It is doctrine 
that supplies are echeloned in depth to the rear, and that some 
system be decided upon that results in a proper distribution for- 
ward. In most small war situations almost every accepted principle 
of warfare on a large scale is subject to modification due to the 
irregularity of the operation itself. It is this characteristic that 
sets the "small war" in a class by itself. It is obvious then, that 
a successful supply plan in any small war theater must be ready 
to meet these irregular conditions. It is considered safe to say 
that conditions in Nicaragua necessitated the employment of a 
service of supply never before used by a Marine Corps organiza- 
tion. Naturally the system suffered many changes due to lack of 
precedent. But it is the sort of situation that we may expect to 
confront us again in some part of the world. If Nicaragua taught 
anything in the way of supply, it showed conclusively that the 
means offered by any country and used extensively by it should 
most certainly be exploited, modified, improved, where necessary, 
and adopted to the use of our expeditions. This is particularly 
true of methods of transport. Transportation and supplies are 
inseparable. They form the basis, together, of all supply systems 
and the supply officers of a small war operation should never over- 
look the fact that it is always possible to learn something from 
close observance of local facilities and customs. They may need 
modification or improvement, or both, in order to meet our require- 
ments but basically there will almost always be found something 
of value that can and should be used. 


8161 VICS QUANT1CO. VA. 12-13 35- 400 


1935 Revision 


Chapter XI 

Neutral Zones and Movement Inland 


Section. I. Neutral Zones 11 — 1 to 11 — 3 

II. Movement Inland 11 — 4 to 11 — 12 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1 Historical Examples of Neutral Zones 22 

No. 2 Historical Example of Protected Train 25 

No. 3 Historical Examples of Supply to Columns 30 

No. 4 Historical Example of Artillery with a Column 35 

No. 5 Historical Examples of Security Measures 40 

No. 6 Historical Examples of Movement Inland 51 



General 11 — 1 

Purpose, Occasion and Circumstances 1 1 — 2 

Orders and Instructions 1 1 — 3 

Not to Pass Out of the Custody of Members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



11 — 1. General. — a. A neutral zone is an area in which no hostilities 
are permitted. The establishment of neutral zones is not of recent 
origin; the system has been employed not only by civilized nations 
but also by early American Indians and by African tribes. The pro- 
cedure at the beginning of a small war operation often follows a sequence 
that is more or less a matter of routine. First, a cruiser or two arrive 
off a foreign port in consequence of actual or potential danger to for- 
eigners and their property. Then a ship's landing force is sent ashore 
at this port to suppress disorder, provide a guard for the foreigners 
and their property in the port, protect the property belonging to the 
state represented by the cruiser, such as the legation or consular build- 
ings, and, in addition, certain local government buildings, such as 
customs houses. If there is a prospect of fighting between the local 
factions, the cruiser's commander (or senior naval officer in command 
locally) forbids combat in areas where foreign life and property might 
be endangered. This' is done -by the establishment of neutral zones; 
and this procedure frequently results in the cessation of hostilities. 
When the establishment of neutral zones does not terminate hostilities, 
the internecine strife may become so severe that absolute chaos is 
imminent, and neither "faction is capable of guaranteeing the security 
of life and property. Then the neutral forces may be forced to enlarge 
their sphere- of action by a movement inland. 

: b. . The foreign .policy of the United States relative to domestic 
disorders in unstable countries is one of non-intervention. However, 
as a measure to safeguard our nationals and, incidental thereto, other 
foreign nationals, havens of refuge will no doubt be established at certain 
seaports of an unstable country whenever the domestic disorder threatens 
the lives of these nationals. To provide protection enroute to the haven 
of refuge, certain routes of evacuation, such as railroads, highways and 
rivers leading to the seaports may also be designated as a part of the 
neutral zones. In such cases, a definite time limit may be set for refugees 
to clear the routes. Situations undoubtedly will arise where individual 
nationals will not seek, safety within, the . neutral zone established at 
the seaport but will elect to remain with their property and goods in 
the interior. In such cases the responsibility of the commander of the 
U.S. forces at the seaport neutral zone should be considered to be at 
an end with regard to any protection to be afforded these nationals. 
Should any harm come to these nationals who elect to remain with 
their property and goods in the interior of the country, recourse must 
be had later to diplomatic action for redress and recompense. Similarly, 
action for redress and recompense for loss of goods and property must 
be made in the case of those nationals who seek safety in the neutral 
zone seaports and abandon their property in the interior. 

c. The establishment of a neutral zone may not necessarily be 
followed by further military operations; however the prolongation of 
the unsettled condition in the country may necessitate such action, 
involving a movement inland from those zones. Accordingly, Neutral 
Zones and Movement Inland are presented in that order in this chapter. 

11 — 2. Purpose, Occasion and Circumstances. — 
a. Purpose. 

(1) Protect treaty rights. 



(2) Assist in maintaining the existence of, or the independence 
of, a government in accordance with treaty provisions. 

(3) Protect lives and property of nationals located in disturbed 
areas and unfortified cities. 

(4) Further the provisions of a national policy. 

(5) Protect and prevent depredations on neutral territory of 
adjacent countries. 

b. Occasion. 

(1) In time of revolution, during riots, or when the local govern- 
ment has ceased to function. 

(2) In time of war between two nations. 

c. Circumstances. 

(1) At the request of a recognized government, or at the insis- 
tence of regular local officials. 

(2) At the request made to a neutral power by opposing factions. 

(3) By forces of another power, or group of powers, without 
the invitation of any faction. 

(4) By agreement between contending states or forces. 

11 — 3. Orders and Instructions. — a. Basic Orders. The orders 
directing the establishment of a neutral zone should be brief and con- 
cise, and should contain the following information : 

(1) Designation of the military force to be employed in the 
establishment and maintenance of the zone and the zone force com- 

(2) The mission of the force. 

(3) Information relative to the purpose, occasion and cir- 
cumstances necessitating the establishment of the neutral zone. 

(4) The exact time after which an area shall be considered as a 
neutral zone, relative to movements by land, water and air. 

(5) The limits of the neutral zone. 

(6) Logistic provisions, including those pertaining to the re- 
quirements of refugees. 

(7) Reference to the communication plan and notification of 
the location of the zone force commander. 

b. Instructions. Additional information required should ac- 
company the Basic Order in the form of an annex, or if there are ex- 
isting general instructions relative to the establishment of neutral zones, 
reference should be made to them in the order. These instructions 
should contain, when applicable, stipulations covering the following 
matters : 

(1) Control to be exercised by the zone force commander and 
the local civil authorities. 

(2) Restrictions placed on opposing force(s) within limits of 
neutral zones at the time of establishment. 

(3) Instructions relative to local authorities and civilians bear- 
ing arms within the zone. 

(4) Acts to be prohibited, such as the delivery from, or passage 
through the zone, of supplies destined for the contending forces 
who are prohibited the use of the zone. 

(5) Type of vessels and also land and air transportation carriers 
prohibited entrance to or passage through the zone. 

(6) Restrictions upon the communication facilities. 



c. Zone Force Commander's Order. — The operation orders of 
the zone force commander should contain so much of the information 
furnished him in his orders from higher authority as will be of value 
to his subordinates, and also any additional information that may be 
pertinent. The order should contain detailed instructions for each 
task group of his force. If general instructions for the establishment of 
neutral zones have been issued by higher authority, those parts that 
are applicable to the immediate situation should be promulgated to the 
task groups of the local zone force either in the zone force commander's 
order or as an annex thereto. Logistic provisions, communication plan 
and location of the zone force commander should complete the order. 

d. Proclamation. — The civilian population of the neutral zone 
and its vicinity, as well as the factions to be prohibited the use of the 
zone, should be informed of its establishment as early as practicable. 
This may be accomplished by the delivery of a written memorandum 
to the local authorities and to the heads of the contending factions, or 
by the publication of a proclamation in the local newspapers with a 
delivery of same to the local authorities and to the heads of the contend- 
ing factions. Such memorandum or proclamation should be published 
both in English and in the local language. The delivery of the memo- 
randum or proclamation may be made direct or through the diplomatic 
agent of the country represented by the zone force commander. Regard- 
less of the method of transmission or its form, the proclamation should 
contain stipulations regarding the following matters: 

(1) Precise date, and hour at which the establishment of neutral 
zone becomes effective. 

(2) Area included in the neutral zone, with the boundaries 
or limits clearly denned by terrain features. 

(3) Relationship of armed forces of contending factions with 
the neutral zone. 

(4) Relationship of the zone force with the civilian population 
and local authorities within the zone. 

(5) Acts to be prohibited in or over the zone. 

(6) Transportation restrictions on routes of communication 
through the zone. 

(7) Communication restrictions within the zone : 

(8) Conduct or status of armed vessels within the zone. 

(9) Such other information as may be necessary for a clear 
understanding of the purpose to be accomplished, and the means 
to be used. See Appendix No. 1 . 







Movement to Point of Departure 

Mobile Columns and Flying Columns ... 

Influence of Supply on a Column 

Strength and Composition of Columns . . . 

Transportation for Columns 


Protective Measures Covering Movement 
Establishment of Advanced Bases Inland . 

U— 12 


11 — 4. General. — a. As in all forms of warfare, logistic require- 
ments must be given careful consideration in preparing strategic and 
tactical plans; in fact such requirements are frequently the deter- 
mining factor. Before a movement inland is undertaken, an analysis 
and estimate of the local transportation and supply facilities must be 
made in order to insure a reasonable rate of advance with replacement 
of supplies. 

b. The movement inland will not always be a movement from a 
seaport to the interior. Frequently the movement will be made from 
the capital or principal city, located at the terminus of a railroad, at the 
head of navigation on the upper part of a large river, or on a well 
developed highway, with well defined lines of communication con- 
necting it with the seacoast In any case the point of departure be- 
comes a base of operations as well as a base of supply until other bases 
more advanced are established. Should the small wars operations be 
initiated by the establishment of neutral zones, one or more of them may 
later become a base for extended operations. 

11—5. Movement to Point of Departure. — a. If the point of 
departure for the movement inland is to be other than a seaport, the 
movement to the point is made by the most convenient means. The 
movement will be of the same general nature as an advance in major 
warfare in the presence of the enemy. The special features of a move- 
ment by water are presented in Chapter XXVI. 

b. If the movement to the point of departure is opposed, or the 
adjacent territory not under complete control, a movement by rail 
will involve many tactical features not encountered in a simple rail 
movement. Even after the railroad is functioning and the hostile 
forces dispersed, raids and other operations by guerillas may require 
the use of armored trains with train guards. Guards may be necessary 
at stations, bridges, junction points and other critical points along the 

c. In case a country, or an extensive part of it, containing railroads 
is to be occupied as a part of the campaign plan, then the operation 
order for the seizure of the seaport terminus of the railroad should in- 



elude instructions directing the seizure of the rolling stock and the term- 
inal and shop facilities. This action may prevent their destruction or 
their removal from the seaport area. Rolling stock having been seized 
in accordance with the aforesaid instructions, measures must be taken 
to continue the operation of the railroad service, provided the strate- 
gical plan involves the establishment of a point of departure at some 
place along the railway line or at some inland terminus thereof. Op- 
position to such use of the railroad may be encountered in the form of 
organized military resistance or by sabotage. 

d. The first step taken to operate a railway train over the line 
where opposition may be expected, is to provide a pilot train. The 
engine of this train should be protected by placing armor, usually 
improvised, over the vital parts, supplemented by additional protection 
of sandbags or similar material. Several cars loaded to full weight 
capacity preferably flat cars or gondolas that do not obstruct the view 
from the engine and rear cars, should be placed ahead of the engine 
to serve as a buffer. These flat cars will then serve as a test load element, 
over mines laid in the road bed, or over bridges and viaducts that have 
been weakened through sabotage. The car immediately in rear of the 
engine should be a box or cattle car from the top of which rifle and ma- 
chine gun fire may be directed over the engine to the front. The re- 
maining cars in the pilot train should be flat cars, gondolas or cattle 
cars, from which troops protected by sandbags or similar material may 
deliver all-around fire. Some of the personnel accompanying the pilot 
train should consist of engineer troops to be employed in counter- 
demolition work and in inspecting the road bed for mines and the bridges 
and viaducts for structural weakness. Where such mines are found 
these engineer troops should accomplish their destruction and in the 
case of weakened bridges, etc., should make the necessary :j repairs. 
The -main body of the troops embarked on the pilot train should consist 
of sufficient personnel to protect the train and the working parties of 
engineers and laborers. A number of volunteer local civilian laborers 
may be added to the complement in order to obviate the necessity of 
using the combat troops as working parties with the engineers, The 
combat troops should be armed with a large proportion of automatic 
weapons, light mortars and 3 7 m m guns. If the use of artillery is contem- 
plated later in the combat operations, it" should be carried on the sup- 
porting train which follows the pilot train. Some fire fighting equip- 
ment should also be carried with this pilot train. A few light chemical 
tanks, water barrels and tools for beating out a fire should be placed 
in one of the cars. Irregular forces not provided with demolition equip- 
ment will probably resort to burning the wooden bridges arid railroad 
trestles usually found in the theater of operations in small wars: Material 
available for putting out a fire of this nature in its initial stage will gain 
many hours of valuable time in the advance inland. 

e. The next train, a troop train, should follow the pilot train 
within close supporting distance. These troops should be of such 
strength and so armed as to be capable of dispersing any hostile forces 
opposing the advance, or of protecting the pilot and troop trains until 
the arrival of other troop trains. This train should have some flat 
cars or gondolas ahead of its engine and should also be equipped with 
improvised protective material for the troops. The troops on the for- 



ward flat cars or gondolas should be armed with machine guns and 
howitzer platoon weapons. The remainder of the train should be 
composed of railroad cars readily adapted to all-around defense and of 
such type as to permit the rapid debarkation therefrom of the troops. 
Depending on the capacity of the trains available, detachments of 
troops from the first troop train or another closely following it should 
be debarked at critical points along the railroad line for its protection. 
These protective detachments should institute a system of patrols 
along the line to prevent sabotage and interruption of the railroad line 
at points intermediary between the critical points. Aviation may render 
most valuable aid to these trains in the initial movement inland as 
well as during the period of operation of the line, by reconnaissance, 
communication, contact and combat missions. On the approach to a 
city, defile, or other critical points, the troop train should close up on the 
pilot train and a reconnaissance should be made by ground troops to 
supplement the information furnished by the aviation. Positive in- 
formation from the aviation can usually be acted upon; however, 
negative data from the aviation may be misleading and if acted upon, 
may lead to fatal results. For the tactics employed in the attack of a 
town, see Chapter XX. 

f. Where a good road parallels closely a railroad, a flank covering 
detachment in trucks may expedite the train movement. See Appendix 
No. 2. 

11 — 6. Mobile Columns and Flying Columns. — a. When the 
successful prosecution of the campaign requires the execution of 
measures beyond and /or supplementary to the establishment of neutral 
zones, the control of seaports, or key cities along lines of communication 
in the affected areas, mobile columns must be projected inland from the 
points of departure, for the purpose of pursuing, rounding-up, capturing 
or dispersing any existing irregular forces; of covering productive areas; 
or of establishing chains of protected advanced bases in the interior. 

b. Mobile columns as such differ from the so-called flying columns 
in one great essential-supply. A flying column is defined as a detach- 
ment, usually of all arms, operating at a distance from and independent 
of, a main body or supporting troops, lightly equipped to insure mobility 
and sufficiently strong to exempt it from being tied to a base of supplies 
through a fixed line of communications. A mobile column is of the 
same description as the flying column with the exception that it is 
self-supporting to a lesser degree and is dependent for its existence on 
its base of supplies. 

c. The movement may be made by a large force operating along 
a well defined route, but will usually be made by several mobile columns 
operating either along separate lines of advance or following each other 
independently along the same route of advance at an interval of about 
one day. In some situations, columns may start from different points 
of departure and converge on a city or productive area. The columns 
may vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced regiment, 
but the size best adapted to such operations has been found to be a 
reinforced battalion. 

d. When fortified posts with permanent garrisons are established, 
flying columns should operate therefrom. This is the most arduous 
of all operations; the idea being to combat the native guerilla at his 



own game on his own ground. At the beginning of such operations, 
the column may be of considerable strength — a company of infantry 
accompanied by a machine gun and howitzer detachment preceded by 
a mounted detachment. As the guerilla forces are dispersed, combat 
patrols (mounted or dismounted) consisting of one or more squads 
may suffice. The mission of the flying column will be to seek out the 
hostile groups, attack them energetically and then pursue them to 
the limit. Therefore, there should be nothing in its composition or 
armament that would tend to reduce its mobility or independence of 
action beyond that absolutely necessary for combat and subsistence. 
Except for supplies which can be carried by the men, the column as a 
rule will depend upon the permanent garrisons. These posts must be 
established in sufficient numbers to permit of such supply — a post 
always being within one or two days' march of another post. 

e. In future small wars operations, tactical requirements may 
necessitate the establishment of fortified camps or towns, but they 
Will probably not be of such importance as supply bases for flying 
columns. In actual operations, patrols have been supplied with pro- 
visions, ammunition and equipment by aeroplane drops. It is not 
difficult to visualize a column moving out with only a reserve ration 
on the man, and remaining in the field for several days, obtaining its 
fresh food locally, supplemented by plane drops of dry stores. On the 
other hand, a force moving through a barren, unproductive area may 
be furnished all of its supplies by plane drops. The question of air 
supply to columns and garrisons is not so much the ability of the Marine 
Corps Transport Squadron as at present organized to function suc- 
cessfully, as it is one of economy, money, and troops. If a commander 
in the field determines that the most economical means of supply for 
his entire organization is by air, and if this decision is concurred in by 
higher authority, transport planes can be purchased quickly and per- 
sonnel to operate them furnished by the present Marine Corps Aviation. 
In one small war, it was estimated that the cost per ton for supply by 
air was almost exactly the same as the cost per ton for supply by bull 
cart, and the time required was about one hour by air against nearly 
a month by bull cart. Use of air transport exclusively would naturally 
release a large number of troops from duty as convoy guards. One 
disadvantage of plane drops must not be overlooked — such a procedure 
discloses the presence of the colimn to any hostile forces in the vicinity. 
Where tactical considerations are not adversely affected by this dis- 
advantage, the use of plane drops for supply will be utilized by a column. 

f . A flying column should never be dispatched to any area unless 
it is amply supplied with CASH. With available funds, not only may 
subsistence be purchased, but often information of the hostile forces 
and the terrain (guides and interpreters). The money supplied the 
flying column should be in SMALL denominations, principally silver; 
it is difficult, frequently impossible, to change bills in rural communities. 

11 — 7. Influence of Supply on a Column. — a. The Big Three of 
Supply are Ammunition, Food and Water. Combat troops can 
operate in the field for a very limited time in actual combat with only 
AMMUNITION, but their continued existence requires the other two, 
FOOD and WATER. Therefore in order to conduct the advance 



inland, one of the first considerations in such a movement must be the 
means of supply. See Appendix No. 3. 

b. Supplies may be obtained as follows: 

(1) From the country en route, by requisition or other author- 
ized method. 

(2) By continuous resupply via convoys despatched from the 

(3) By taking sufficient supplies with the column for its main- 
tenance from the base to its destination; resupply to begin after 
arrival at destination. 

(4) By the establishment of fortified advanced bases along 
the route. These advanced supply bases are established by detach- 
ments from the column initially and supplies built up at them by 
convoys despatched from the rear or main supply base; thereafter 
the column draws its supplies from these advanced supply bases 

(5) By airplane, either in plane drops or landing of transport 
planes on favorable terrain at the camp site of the column. 

11 — 8. Strength and Composition of Columns. — a. The strength 
and composition of mobile columns will depend upon the probable 
resistance to be encountered, the terrain to be traversed, the type and 
condition of existing transportation, and the means of communication. 
Normally, the addition of mounted detachments, armored cars and 
aircraft is desirable in such columns. If a march through an extensive 
area of undeveloped country is contemplated, an engineer unit should 
be included. The use of light field pieces has been limited in the past, 
but with the increase of armament by all classes of powers and the 
improvement of defensive means, they cannot be dispensed with unless 
there is every assurance that they will not be needed. However 
as a general rule, nothing should be added to the mobile column that 
would tend to decrease its mobility and which is not absolutely necessary. 
See Appendix No. 4. 

b. The column should be of sufficient strength to enable it to 
cope with the largest force likely to be encountered. While weakness 
in the strength of a column is dangerous yet excessive strength should 
be avoided. The supply requirements of a large column necessitate 
considerable transportation, and results in a proportionately larger 
train guard as the length of the column increases. A large train also 
decreases the mobility of the column. 

e. If the movement is made over broken country with poor roads 
and trails, the column often will be forced to move in single file. A 
column of excessive strength for its mission will march irregularly due 
to the elongation of the column. Such a column will arrive at its desti- 
nation in a more exhausted condition than a smaller force which is 
able to maintain a regular rate of march. In case an operation neces- 
sitates a large column with the corresponding large train, the train may 
be broken up into two columns in addition to separation of the combat 
force. This will prevent elongation of the column and allow a regular 
rate of march. 

d. The numerical strength of a column may be decreased by the 
inclusion of an increase of automatic weapons and supporting infantry 
weapons above the normal allowance. The increase of ammunition 



necessitated thereby will not be proportionate to the decrease in the 
amount of subsistence. Such a decrease will also decrease the amount 
of transportation required. 

e. By means of the modern portable light radio sets (one of which 
at least should be assigned to the column) and contact planes, a column 
can be readily reinforced when necessary. Columns moving in the same 
general area are better able, due to these means of communication, 
to keep in close touch and to render mutual support than in the past. 
This, with the offensive support available from aviation, must be con- 
sidered in determining the composition and strength of the column. 

f. Radio and contact planes may be the only reliable means of 
communication at the beginning of a movement. However, all means 
of communication must be considered, not only in deciding upon the 
strength of the column but also the route to be followed. Telegraph 
and telephone lines may be destroyed, and in the early stages of the 
operations it may not be worth while to repair and maintain them. 
If not interfered with, or when control is established and repairs effected, 
these land lines should be utilized. Dispatch riders (runners, foot or 
mounted) may not be of much value until conditions become fairly 
settled but at times they may be the only means available or they may 
be used to supplement other means. Where the country lends its- 
self to the employment of armored cars, they may be used for courier 
service. Any courier service on a regular time schedule and via restricted 
routes is dangerous. 

11 — 9. Transportation for Columns. — a. The land transportation 
normally assigned a Marine Corps force is usually limited, and most 
of that necessary for the supply of columns must be requisitioned or 
otherwise procured at the seaports or other points of departure. This 
additional local transportation must be obtained when such points are 
occupied preparatory to the movement inland. In certain areas roads 
may be found suitable for truck movements — this is the type of trans- 
portation in limited amount that normally will accompany any Marine 
Corps force. Where such good roads exist, truck convoys may be 
escorted by armored cars or trucks adapted to such use. Where the 
condition of the roads and trails necessitate the use of local bull cart 
or pack animal transport, mounted troops may form a part of the escort 
for such a convoy. However the foregoing statement should not be 
interpreted to mean that a foot escort could not be an efficient escort 
for an animal drawn convoy ; on the contrary, the foot escort may prove 
to be far better as a combat unit against any hostile force, and at the 
same time be able to march with as great a rate as the animal drawn 
convoy. In the majority of cases, the foot escort will prove more satis- 
factory than the mounted escort. See Chapters XXI and XXII. 

b. The column may initiate its movement over good roads where 
truck transportation may be used; later the condition of the route 
may necessitate the use of bull carts or other animal drawn vehicles; 
beyond that point, pack animals may be the only practicable means 
of transport. This shift from truck transport to animal drawn trans- 
port may require a halt at the end of the truck movement in order to 
procure other means. It has been found practicable to assemble both 
animal drawn vehicles and pack animals in a combined train to cover 
the distance over which both can be used. When the animal drawn 



movement is completed, these vehicles may then be employed as a 
relay unit between the truck terminal and the animal drawn terminal 
in the system of supply for the column. During the combined vehicular 
and pack train movement, it has been found economical to draw daily 
supplies from the pack animal loads thus preserving the strength of the 
pack animals for the time when they will be the sole means of transport. 
Also, the pack train will be well organized and operated by the time 
dependence is placed on it alone. 

11 — 10. Shelter. — a. Whatever the plan of supply, shelter for troops 
at halts for the night should be restricted to the use of any available 
buildings, the shelter tents carried by the individuals, or improvised 
covering. It is impracticable to burden the column with a supply of 
tentage or materials for camp construction. 

b. Buildings are the most desirable type of shelter since they 
offer more protection from the elements, are more convenient than 
camping in the open and primarily since they obviate the necessity of 
transporting shelter. Sometimes, likely buildings may contain mines 
or bombs laid by the hostile forces to explode on contact; all buildings 
should therefore be inspected before occupancy by the troops. Similarly 
inspection of suitable native huts and houses should be made for vermin 
and any other unsanitary conditions. Towns, plantations, and mine 
quarries will often provide sufficient cover for the troops. The routes 
traversed and the length of the marches, in so far as the tactical situation 
permits, should be governed by the availability of buildings for camp 

c. In areas where materials such as brush and long grass used 
for thatching are available, improvised shelters such as lean-tos and 
roofs may be constructed from this material. These improvised shelters 
can be left standing for use by other troops using the same route of 
march. This will develop camp sites which can be speedily occupied 
and thereby permit more time for movement. 

d. If fortified depots of supplies are to be established, the decision 
relative to their location will be influenced by the suitability of the sites 
as camps. The type of shelter utilized will depend on the availability 
of buildings or construction material in the vicinity, or the feasability 
of transporting shelter material to these sites from the main or inter- 
mediate base. In the latter case, the decision will be influenced by the 
amount of transportation available at the time the depots are being 
established. If local shelter or transportation for such construction 
material is not available, the vicinity of the depots should at least be 
cleared and developed as a camp site. An adequate water and fuel 
supply should be available. 

11 — 11. Protective Measures Covering Movement. — a. When 
a column starts its movement, it is immediately concerned with the 
general means of insuring its uninterrupted advance through hostile 
territory. Usually all parts of a column are vulnerable to attack. In 
major warfare an army usually has such an extent of front that its 
rear and base are reasonably secure and attacks are launched by the 
enemy at the flanks and front. In small wars however, the frontage 
of the regular force is relatively narrow and the column of regular 



troops is liable to attack by encircling detachments of the irregular 
forces. Therefore the column must insure itself from an attack from 
every direction. 

b. In major Warfare, this security is effected by outposts, by 
advance, flank and rear guards, by scouts, by combat patrols and con- 
necting groups, by deployment in depth, and by means of air recon- 
naissance. In small wars, the principles of security are the same but 
their application varies with the hostile tactics, armament and the 
terrain over which the forces operate. The guiding principle of security 
in small wars is to prevent the hostile fire from being effective against 
the main body of a march column. The enemy should be denied all 
terrain from which he may inflict losses upon the column, and the ad- 
vantage of superior armament and accuracy of fire maintained to pre- 
vent the opponent from closing into effective range of his own weapons 
even though he be superior numerically. 

c. The nature of the terrain has a marked influence on security 
measures. Often in the theaters of operations, thick low brush inter- 
spersed with cactus extends along the main trails and roads making 
an almost impenetrable jungle, too thick for the movements therein of 
even small combat groups. In such cases the use of flank guards for 
a marching column is practicably imposssible, the lack of which at 
times permits the hostile force to establish favorable ambushes along 
such a route. 

d. An active hostile force bent on small depredations and armed 
with rifles and automatic weapons will have ample opportunity to 
ambush the main body of a column after the advance guard has passed 
unless patrols are kept continually moving through the underbrush on 
both sides of the road at a distance from which the ambush position 
would be effective (normally about 20 to 40 yards). The progress of 
such flank patrols however will be slower than that of the main body 
with the result that these patrols will be continually falling behind. 
This necessitates sending out frequent patrols from the head of each 
organization. To prevent uncovering the head of each organization by 
these detachments therefrom the patrols should be started out well 
ahead of the organization at intervals along the route, each patrol 
rejoining its organization when opposite the rear. 

e. On mountain trails with heavy growth of brush and timber 
which restricts or prohibits the use of flank patrols, a column may be 
obliged to march in single file. Its only security in this case will depend 
upon a prompt return of a heavy volume of fire from the part of the 
column attacked. When the column is restricted in its march formation, 
it should be divided into a number of small combat teams, each being 
capable of independent action. See Appendix No. 5 and 6, and Chapter 

11 — 12. Establishment of Advanced Bases Inland. — a. After 
the mobile columns have successfully dispersed the larger groups of the 
hostile forces in any area, the next step is the establishment of advanced 
bases and fortified posts inland for the prosecution of the next phase — 
the operation of flying columns into the interior. 

b. The particular functions of a fortified post are as follows : 

(1) To cover productive areas and their lines of communication 
with their markets. 

(2) To afford protection to the local population in that area. 



(3) To form a base of supply, rest, replacement and information 
for flying columns. 

c. As a general rule, these posts should be located at the heads 
of valleys on main roads of waterways leading from seaports, and at 
the apexes of valley and inter-valley roads and trails leading to the more 
difficult wooded and mountain regions — the final theater of operations. 

d. The site of the post should have the following requisites: 

(1) Be capable of defense by a relatively small detachment. 

(2) Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of a flying 
column of not less than one hundred men, with a mounted detachment. 

(3) Be so situated as to control any town in the vicinity and 
all approaches thereto, especially roads and ravines. 

(4) Be located on commanding ground overlooking the sur- 
rounding country. 

(5) Be accessible to water supply and main roads. 

(6) Be located near terrain suitable for a landing field. 

e. In many cases, old forts, redoubts or isolated masonry buildings 
with compounds can be organized for defense. Often however it will 
be found that conditions will warrant the construction of an entirely 
new fortified post from the material available in the vicinity. 

f. The main requirement of a fortified post, garrisoned as it will 
be by only a few men, is that it must not be vulnerable to a sudden 
attack or rush. This requirement can be met by the construction of a 
double line of defense ; an outer line of defense (occupied only when the 
flying column is present) to inclose the bivouac area, and an inner line 
of defense to enclose the depot facilities and permanent garrison, 
provision being made in both lines for free use of automatic weapons 
and grenades. (For further details concerning the defense of towns, etc, 
see Chapter XX). 

g. Communication with fortified posts should primarily depend 
upon radio and aviation. All such posts must be equipped with a radio 
set capable of communicating not only with its headquarters and other 
nearby posts, but also with the air service. A landing field at times may 
not be available in the vicinity of the post so recourse must be had to 
the use of the pick-up and drop message method of communication. 
See Chapter XVII. 


Appendices, Chapter 11 


1. MONTEVIDEO, URAGUAY.— One of the earliest of interest 
was at Montevideo, Uraguay in 1858 where naval forces of the United 
States acted in conjunction with forces of other powers, at the request 
of the regular government, during a revolution. 

2. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1904.— a In January, 1904, 
a revolution was going on in the Dominican Republic and the Navy 
Department had sent the U.S.S. Detroit, Commander A. C. Dillingham 
commanding, to Puerto Plata, on the north coast, to protect American 
lives and property. H.M.S. Pallas, C. Hope Robertson commanding, 
was also there for a similar purpose. 

b. The Jiminez faction, with Eugenio Deschamps in local com- 
mand, had possession of the city of Puerto Plata. Forces under General 
Cespedes, operating in behalf of the Morales Provisional Government, 
approached the place along the coastal plain from the east with the 
declared intention of attacking and taking it. It was unfortified, and 
the Deschamps troops intended to defend from the shelter of the 
dwellings and business houses. 

c. Commanders Dillingham and Robertson established a cordon 
of flags outside of and around the entire town, notifying Deschamps and 
Cespedes that no fighting would be permitted within that area. A 
few days later Cespedes commenced an attack, and Commander 
Dillingham placed his vessel in such a position that her fire could aid 
in preventing armed bodies entering the town. He also landed a guard 
which had instructions to prevent armed bodies crossing the line. The 
British ship seemed to have been absent at this time, probably to get 
coal. The Deschamps forces sallied out to meet their enemies and 
fought them beyond the cordon of flags. Being defeated, they retreated 
within the cordon, throwing down their arms as they passed it, and the 
town was immediately surrendered to the Cespedes forces. 

3. NICARAGUA, 1910.— a. Consul Moffat at Bluefields tele- 
graphed the State Department on May 17, 1910, that Commander 
Gilmer, of the U.S. Navy had issued a proclamation demanding certain 
conduct of the generals commanding the forces of Estrada and Madriz 
and of the commander of the Nicaraguan vessel, the Venus, for the 
purpose of protecting the lives and property of American citizens and 
other foreign non-combatants; viz. "First, that there be no armed 
conflict in the city; second, that until a stable government is established, 
only such armed forces not to exceed 100 men, will be allowed in Blue- 
fields as are necessary to police the town and preserve order; third, 
there being no armed men of the revolutionary forces in Bluefields, 
no bombardment of the city will be permitted, as it could result only 
in destruction of lives and property of Americans and other foreign 

b. Notice of the issuance of this proclamation was given to the 
State Department in a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, dated 
May 18, 1910, in which was quoted a telegram from Commander Gilmer 
dated May 17. On May 19, 1910 the State Department was advised 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

by the Secretary of the Navy of the receipt of the following telegram 
from the commanding officer of the U.S.S. PADUCAH: 

"Bluefields, Nicaragua, (date and hour garbled in cipher). Have 
landed one hundred men at Bluefields to protect the lives and property 
of American citizens. The Estrada forces (are) in last line of defense 
three miles distant from the limits of the city. An engagement is hourly 
expected. Venus has not returned." 

c. On May 25, 1910, Consul Moffat forwarded a copy of the 
text of the above-mentioned proclamation, in the first part of which 
is quoted certain extracts from a note of the Secretary of State dated 
December 1, 1909 and addressed to the former charge d' affaires of 
Nicaragua accredited to the United States. The quotation went to 
show the neutral position of the United States Government as between 
the contending factions in Nicaragua and the purpose of this Govern- 
ment to hold such factions de facto in control strictly accountable for 
the lives and property of American citizens. The proclamation con- 
cluded with a statement that the above-quoted demands would "be 
enforced against offending forces of either government or revolutionary 
factions by armed forces under my command," and that, "in case of 
imminence of battle in the vicinity of Bluefields, this proclamation will 
be delivered through the American Consul to the commanding generals 

d. Consul Moffat added that the proclamation had been delivered 
through the medium of his office to the commander of the forces of 
Madriz" in the rear of Bluefields" and to the commander of those forces 
at Rama, and that Commander Gilmer, through one of his officers, 
had delivered the proclamation to the commander of the Venus. 

e. These operations of Commander Gilmer were thus referred 
to in a telegram from Dr. Madriz to President Taft, dated June 13, 1910: 

"On the 27th of May last, the forces of this Government stormed 
the Bluff stronghold which defends Bluefields." 

"The commanding officer of that force was under orders to proceed 
immediately and capture the city, which was without a garrison; 
that would have insured the ending of the campaign. This was frus- 
trated by the attitude of the commander of the American cruiser PA- 
DUCAH, who notified the commanding officer of our troops that he would 
oppose with his forces the capture of the city, and to that effect landed 
American seamen to occupy it, and thus the revolution, sure of its 
base of operations, was enabled to take all of its forces out of the city 
and bring them against one of our columns and so was a carefully plan- 
ned combination, the success of which was certain, defeated." 

f. In a telegram from President Taft to President Diaz of June 
19, 1910, the following comment was made upon the above statements 
of Dr. Madriz: 

"The Government of the United States took only the customary 
step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either faction within 
the unfortified and ungarrisoned commercial city of Bluefields, thus 
protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests, 
just as the British commander had done at Grey town, where there are 
large British interests." 

g. The matter of the bombardment of Bluefields was again taken 
up with the commander of the Madriz forces by Commander Hines, 
of the U.S.S. DUBUQUE, on July 31, 1910, in which the latter stated 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

that he had been informed by the American consul at Bluefields that 
projectiles from the former's guns had fallen "within one hundred yards 
of the town." It was stated in this communication that "if any of the 
projectiles from your guns fall within the limits of the town or injure the 
vessels at or near the wharves of the town, of Bluefields, I will consider 
this bombardment of the town, which you are aware will not be per- 
mitted"; and that "I have the honor to inform you, if a bombardment 
of the town of Bluefields takes place under the pretence of an attack 
on Halfway Cay, or if a shot from one of your guns strikes a vessel under 
my protection, I will immediately proceed to seize the Venus and San 
Jacinto, and if the use of further forces is nesessary, I will attack the 

h. In explanation of this order of Commander Hines, Consul 
Moffat telegraphed the State Department on July 31, 1910, as follows: 

"Yesterday conditions were such that I at once requested Com- 
mander Hines to warn Rivas against bombardment of Halfway Cay 
in such a manner as to permit shells to almost fall in city, two miles 
beyond the point of attack; also to cease desultory attacking of Half- 
way Cay under the pretext of bombardment, while vessels are entering 
or leaving the harbor, thereby endangering neutral property and lives. 
Commander Hines has warned accordingly." 

This telegram was confirmed by the consul under date of August 2. 

4. HONDURAS, 1911, 1919, 1924, 1925.— a During the revolu- 
tionary disturbances in Honduras in the year 1910, and in the early 
part of 1911, American naval detachments were landed at Amapala 
and Puerto Cortes for the protection of American interests. German 
and British forces were also landed for the protection of foreigners. 

b. The State Department received the following telegram from 
Consul Dawson on January 26, 1911: 

"Landing sixty men Cortes tonight. Reports Ceiba was captured 
Twenty-fifth after severe fighting. Commandant killed; also an 
American non-combatant." 

c. On January 31, 191 1, the Secretary of the Navy quoted to the 
State Department the following "corrected translation" of a telegram 
dated January 27 from the commanding officer of the U.S.S. MAR- 

"Revolutionary leader will move force to Puerto Cortes within 
5 days. Revolutionary forces (have been) exaggerated; (they) have 
probably 500 (men). (I) consider it absolutely necessary (that they) 
cannot fight in any town having American interests. (I) have forbidden 
fighting in Puerto Cortes. If the revolutionary leader (should) appear 
with superior forces I shall require Government of Honduras (force) 
to surrender town or fight outside. Will use force if necessary." 

d. On February 1, 1911, the consul at Puerto Cortes advised 
the State Department as follows: 

"On the night of January 26th the Tacoma arrived, reported the 
capture of La Ceiba the day preceding, landed a force of sixty men here 
in expectation of a possible attack on Puerto Cortes, and left the same 
night, returning the following Sunday evening. Saturday, the 28th 
instant, the British ship Brilliant arrived; and on Sunday the 29th the 
MARIETTA. On this latter date, also, we held a conference with the 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

Commandante, and the naval captains advised him that the entire 
town would be considered neutral and that under no circumstances 
would fighting be permitted in the town or near enough to allow stray 
bullets to enter." The consul further stated that, under orders from the 
President of Honduras and in agreement with the American and British 
consuls, made in pursuance of such orders, the commandante had evacuat- 
ed the city on January 3 1 , delivering it to the consuls under the protection 
of the warships, and had received for the Government forces 48 hours 
safe conduct to the interior. It was also stated that notice had been 
sent to General Christmas (commanding the revolutionary forces) to 
make no attack on the town until after 1 o'clock p.m., February 1, and 
informing him that he might enter the city after that hour. 

e. On September 8, 1919, at 7 p.m., a landing party disembarked 
from the U.S.S. CLEVELAND in order to cooperate with the forces 
of Honduras in maintaining order in a zone which was designated as 
neutral by the military commander of Puerto Cortes. Neither the 
armed forces of the Government of Honduras nor of the Revolutionists 
could enter this zone. 

f. On February 28, 1924, because of an attack by unorganized 
revolutionists, which was expected on La Ceiba, Honduras, 5 5 men and 
4 officers were landed as a guard for the American consulate. In order 
that protection might be given to Americans and foreigners the com- 
pound of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company was declared 
neutral ground, and this information was imparted to the leaders of 
the defacto government and the revolutionary leaders. It was explained 
to them that the landing in no way was to be considered as intervening 
or interferring with their military movements. 

g. In April, 1925, due to impending danger to American property 
because of an attack upon La Cieba, Honduras, by Red Ochoa, a land- 
ing force of 165 men was put ashore at La Ceiba from the U.S.S. 
DENVER by Captain Jeffers. These forces established a neutral zone. 
The fighting between the Government's soldiers and Ochoa's men took 
place outside of the city. The United States forces were landed with 
the consent of the Commandante and the Governor. It was reported 
that the presence of the landing force had a beneficial effect. The men 
were landed at about 3:15 am., April 20, 1925, and were withdrawn 
about thirty hours later as soon as the emergency had passed. 

5. NICARAGUA, 1926 to 1927.— a. In Nicaragua in 1926 the 
first landing was at Bluefields where a neutral zone was established. 
Fighting was prohibited in extensive areas by mutual agreement be- 
tween the two field commanders of the opposing Nicaraguan forces. 
Similar steps were taken at other points along the Mosquito Coast 
until there were in all six neutral zones in that part of the country alone. 
The motive officially stated for the establishment of these neutral 
zones was "for the protection of American lives and property." 

b. The following memorandum was given to the forces occupying 
Puerto Cabezas, after an order to disarm, or abandon the zone within 
twenty-four hours had been issued. "Confirming my conversation of 
this afternoon, the following territory is hereby declared a neutral zone: 
Puerto Cabezas and Bilway, including the outskirts, for a distance of 
two miles. There will be no carrying of arms, ammunition, or knives 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

etc., in the neutral zone. There must be no recruiting or any other 
activities carried on in the neutral zone which have any bearing on the 
prosecution of hostilities. Dr. Scasa and his forces may leave the neutral 
zone by 4 p.m. the 24th of December 1926, by water, with their arms if 
they so desire. Otherwise they must disarm and deliver such arms to 
the Cleveland's (U.S.S. CLEVELAND) landing force commander. 
The radio station may send only plain messages and these must have 
no bearing on the prosecution of hostilities." 

c. On January 7, 1927, the White House spokesman said at 
a press conference that the President had received several telegrams 
from publications in the country asking specific questions about the 
Nicaraguan situation. One question asked the President was what 
rights the United States had in the neutral zones established. The 
reply made to the newspaper men for the benefit of the inquirers was 
that the neutral zones have in some instances been established by the 
warring factions themselves which asked America to insure sessation 
of fighting in those zones and that the zones are inhabited by American 
citizens. Another question inquired as to the reason for landing Ameri- 
can Marines in Nicaragua. The purpose of landing Marines, it was 
stated, on behalf of the President, was to protect lives and property and 
the interests which the American government itself has in that terri- 
tory (American canal rights). 

d. On the same date American newspapers quoted dispatches from 
Managua, Nicaragua to the effect that the liberals were preparing for 
an attack on Rama, situated on the Escondido river, about thirty miles 
west of Bluefields (almost sixty miles by river route) on the east coast 
of Nicaragua. The report further stated that the conservative govern- 
ment under President Diaz had requested the United States legation to 
declare Rama a neutral zone, as American interests are represented 
there. On January 10, 1927, orders were issued by the Commander 
Special Service Squadron to establish a neutral zone at that place. 
The order follows : 

"File No. 
A4-3 (2573) 


U.S.S. ROCHESTER, Flagship. 
Bluefields, Nicaragua. 

10 January 1927. 



a. Marine Corps, Special Service Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Meade. 

1. Conditions unsettled in NICARAGUA. 

2. The special Service Squadron is protecting the lives and interests of United 
States and Foreign citizens. 

3. a. Marine Force, Special Service Squadron, when weather permits 
boating, proceed to RAMA, NICARAGUA and establish a Neutral Zone 
for the protection of the lives and interests of UNITED STATES and 
foreign citizens. The neutral zone will consist of all territory within rifle 
range of the property of United States and foreign citizens in RAMA, 
and such additional terrain as may be necessary to secure military control 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

of the Neutral Zone. Prevent interference with the trade of United States 
and foreign citizens on the ESCONDIDO RIVER assuring the free and 
safe movements of vessels and property of such citizens. Memorandum 
instructions concerning establishing of Neutral Zone herewith. 

4. Rations on person for two days — five days reserve. 

5. Commander Special Service Squadron in ROCHESTER. 

Copies to: 

Lt. Col. Meade /s/ J .L. LATIMER. 



U.S.S. ROCHESTER, Flagship. 

Bluefields, Nicaragua. 
10 January, 1927 


1. The Neutral Zone shall be of a local nature and will be established solely for the 
protection of the lives and interests of United States and foreign citizens. 

2. The United States forces will exercise Military Control only, the Civil Administra- 
tion being left in the hands of the Civil authorities found functioning at the time the 
Zone is established. 

3. Any military force found at RAMA will be permitted to leave the Neutral Zone 
with their arms, ammunition, provisions and supplies but thereafter all persons inside 
the neutral zone, except U.S. Naval Forces will be disarmed and no person will be allowed 
to enter the Zone bearing arms. 

4. The Neutral zone will not be permitted to be used as a base for the promotion 
of revolutionary operations. Neither arms nor ammunition destined for the revolution- 
ary forces nor any other type of army supplies, including provisions, will be allowed 
to pass through or be shipped from this Zone. 

5. Vessels operating with the revolutionary armed forces will not be allowed to enter 
the zone. 

Commander Special Service Squadron." 

e. The 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, Marines arrived at Blue- 
fields on January 10, 1927. The disembarkation was completed the 
following day. The force then left for RAMA, via the Econdido 
River. It was preceded by one officer who visited all revolutionary 
posts on the river and informed the local leaders that a neutral zone 
had been established by the American forces in which no fighting 
would be allowed. The same afternoon the battalion arrived at 
Rama and occupied the town establishing outposts and patrols. 

f. The establishment of these zones turned the fighting to the 
West Coast. On January 17th the battalion (less one company which 
remained to garrison Rama) embarked on tugs and barges for Blue- 
fields where it reembarked on the U.S.S. Argonne and proceeded to 
to Corinto, Nicaragua, arriving there on January 24th. On February 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

1st it proceeded to Managua where it took over the duties of Legation 
guard, relieving the landing force of the U.S.S. Galveston. 

g. On March 5 the American Consular agent at Matagalpa was 
attacked and severely injured by unknown parties. Two days later 
a force of 1 50 Marines was stationed at Matagalpa which was declared 
a neutral zone. The revolutionary force was informed of the establish- 
ment of the neutral zone by the following communication. 

"Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces, 
Matagalpa, Nicaragua. 
7 March, 1927. 

General Jose Maria Moncada, 

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, 
Matiguas, Nicaragua. 


Having arrived in Matagalpa, Nicaragua with a detachment of United States 
Marines, for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of the United States and 
Foreign citizens, I have to inform you that no fighting will be permitted by either Govern- 
ment or Revolutionary Forces within two thousand (2000) yards of the city of Mata- 
galpa and I will take such measures as are necessary to prevent such fighting. 

A copy of letter to General Salvador Reyes, Commanding Government Forces, 
Matagalpa, Nicaragua, on the same subject, is enclosed. 

Yours truly, 
Major U.S. Marine Corps 
Commanding Marine Forces, Matagalpa, Nicaragua." 

h. Continuance of the civil war made it advisable to have more 
United States forces on hand and by the fifteenth of March the Second 
Brigade was landed and maintaining neutral zones in the western part 
of Nicaragua. The field order issued by the 5th Regiment, Marines 
is quoted, in part: 


Fifth Regiment Marines 
U.S. Naval Forces Ashore 
In Western Nicaragua, 
Managua, Nicaragua. 

17 March, 1927. 

Number 1 J 

Map: Republic of Nicaragua, 1:500,000. 

1. (a) Situation in Nicaragua unsettled Lives and property of United States and 
Foreign citizens in danger. Railroad between CORINTO and GRANADA 

(b) Naval Forces will patrol the Western Coast of NICARAGUA, will maintain 
railroad communication between CORINTO and GRANADA and will 
protect the lives and property of United States and foreign citizens along 
the line of the railroad and in transit. 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

2. This Regiment will prevent any fighting within two thousand (2000) yards of 
the railroad from MANAGUA (incl) to GRANADA (incl), within two 
thousand (2000) yards of the cities along that line and within two thousand 
(2000) yards of the vicinities of posts that may be established along that 
line. It will further prevent any fighting within two thousand (2000) yards 
of the city of MATAGALPA and within two thousand (2000) yards of posts 
that may be established along the line of communication between MANAGUA 

3. (a) The command stationed at MATAGALPA will prevent any fighting within 
two thousand (2000) yards of the city of MATAGALPA and within two 
thousand (2000) yards of posts that may be established along the line of 
communication between MANAGUA (excl) and MATAGALPA. 

(b) The command stationed at GRANADA will prevent any fighting within two 
thousand (2000) yards of the cities of GRANADA and S. RAFAEL, and 
within two thousand (2000) yards of the railroad from GRANADA to S. 
RAFAEL, (incl). 

The command stationed at MASSAYA will prevent any fighting within two 
thousand (2000) yards of the city of MASAYA and within two thousand 
(2000) yards of railroad from S. RAFAEL (excl) to COMPAZANO (excl). 
The Fifth Regiment units stationed at MANAGUA will prevent any fighting 
within two thousand (2000) yards of the city of MANAGUA, and CAM- 
PAZANO and within two thousand (2000) yards of the railroad from MAN- 
AGUA (incl) to CAMPAZANO (incl)." 

i. The establishment of neutral zones had the desired effect 
insofar as the protection of American lives and property was concerned 
but the civil war continued unabated. Later when the opposing factions, 
with the exception of bands of guerrillas, surrendered their arms and 
ammunition some of the neutral zones became bases for operations 
inland against the guerrillas. 

6. SHANGHAI, 1932. — a. After the hostilities had ceased, a 
neutral or de-militarized zone was established, principally through the 
efforts of the neutral powers. This zone extended roughly from the 
International Settlement along the Whangpoo River to and including 
Woosung, and inland along the Shanghai-Nanking railroad. The agree- 
ment reached in the establishment of this zone was that, pending a 
permanent settlement of the controversy, both the Chinese forces and 
a certain interested foreign power would keep their troops out of this 

b. Shortly after the agreement, the Chinese Reds began getting 
the upper hand over the Chinese government troops to the north of 
Nanking, and were threatening the Nanking-Tsinanfu railroad. A 
large number of Chinese government troops were massed in the vicinity 
of Hangchow, a city about 80 miles south of Shanghai. The Nanking 
government began moving these troops north to the Red danger area, 
through the established neutral zone. 

c. An interested foreign power protested to the Neutral Council 
against this violation of the agreement. The Council was composed 
of one civilian, and one military member from each of the English, 
French, Chinese, Japanese, Italian and American forces. The Chinese 
government informed the Council that the Reds were about to seize the 
railroad and cut communications with the north; that it was a "grave 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

crisis"; that they had to get troops up to that area in the north as 
quickly as possible; and that to march their troops around the neutral 
zone would have delayed them at least one or probably two days. 

d. The Council met and decided that in view of the Red menace 
and urgent military necessity, the Chinese government troops would 
be allowed to route their troops through the zone, but that the troops 
must not linger in the zone longer than to change railroad cars. The 
protesting power somewhat reluctantly agreed to this decision of the 
Council, but specified that if any body of Chinese troops tarried for 
longer than 24 hours in the neutral zone, "suitable action "would be taken 
against them. 



NICARAGUA. — On the east coast of Nicaragua, the lumber 
company operating at Puerto Cabezas used only one flat car, well 
sandbagged, and attached ahead of the engine to cover the pay train 
during the worst of the troubles in 1931 when Captain Pefley was 
killed. It appears that the method used in 1927 of sending a gasoline car 
ahead of the train to reconnoiter the line was quite satisfactory. 


Appendices, Chapter 11 


1. SANTO DOMINGO.— a. From June 26, 1916 to July 6, 1916, 
a force of 850 U.S. Marines marched from Monte Cristi, DR. to San- 
tiago, D.R. against slight Dominican revolutionary opposition enroute. 
The column was based on Monte Cristi where was left a garrison of 200 
men. The supply train consisted of 24 mule carts, 7 motor trucks with 
trailers, 2 motor water cars and one water wagon, one Holt tractor and 
four trailers, and eleven Ford cars which were used as refilling means 
from the base at Monte Cristi. The route from Monte Cristi to Santiago 
lies along the valley of the Yaque del Norte river and is never more than 
a few miles from water. The road itself, however, through certain 
stretches is dry. That the Dominican revolutionists appreciated the 
necessity for water supply is evidenced by the fact that on the night 
of June 26th a company sent to the river for water was attacked in the 
gathering darkness and prevented from obtaining its supply until 

b. From Monte Cristi to Santiago is about 75 miles or 122 kilo- 
meters. A part of the force marched to kilometer 63 by July 1st leaving 
detachments at kilometer 27, 42 and 50 to guard the line of communica- 
tions with Monte Cristi. Daily communication with Monte Cristi 
and replenishing of supplies was maintained by the Fords of the train 
that, in spite of the detachments guarding the route, were occasionally 
attacked. At kilometer 63, Fords from Monte Cristi brought radio 
information from Puerto Plata that a cooperating force of 350 marines 
was working up the railroad from Puerto Plata towards Santiago. 
Detachments at 27, 42, and 50 were called in and with the Fords per- 
manently joined the march. Communications with the base at Monte 
Cristi were thereby cut and the force became a "flying column." On 
July 3, the revolutionists were definitely defeated at Guayacanes. 
On July 4 the Monte Cristi column was joined at Navarette (22 kilo- 
meters northwest of Santiago) by the column from Puerto Plata which 
had secured the railroad. Communication with the base at Puerto 
Plata was thereby assured. The united columns entered Santiago 
July 6, all organized opposition having ceased. 

2. ADVANCE DEPOTS OF SUPPLY. — "In 1879 a Russian 
army of some 16,000 men under General Lomakin was detailed 
to move from the Caspian Sea into the Turkeman country and 
subdue its people. A place called Chikislar, in somewhat un- 
healthy surroundings near the southern end of the sea, was made the 
base, and there elaborate preparation of all kinds was made for the cam- 
paign. But the enterprise failed disastrously. The country between 
the Chikislar and the Tekke oases is not a desert, but it is not on the 
other hand a district which a large army could live upon. The greater 
part of the distance to be traversed was practically free from any for- 
midable hostile force. But instead of keeping the bulk of his army west 
of the Caspian Sea while supplies were collecting, General Lomakin 
assembled his troops immediately at Chikislar. They ate up the supplies 
as fast as they were disembarked, and, as a consequence, the larger 
force was for months detained in an unhealthy locality. Depots of 
supplies were not formed in advance along the line to be followed, and 
when the army eventually moved forward it was followed by a gigantic 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

but nevertheless insufficient transport train. The difficulty of feeding 
the troops grew from day to day. Nothing could, indeed, more clearly 
show the fatal effects of a failure to grasp the essential principles of 
supplying an army operating in a desert country, and of a defective 
organization of the commissariat and transport services, than the fact 
that only 1,400 fighting men out of the original force of over 16,000 
could be assembled for the one battle of the campaign — the disastrous 
assault on Denghill Tepe. 

"General Skobelef the following year conducted the campaign on 
altogether different lines. He did not assemble his main body at Chikis- 
lar til the last moment. He pushed out small bodies and formed de- 
fensive posts on the intended line of operations, where he stored pro- 
visions for the army he was about to lead to Denghill Tepe. He recog- 
nized that the campaign he was undertaking hinged upon supply, and 
with this constantly in view, everything was arranged for deliberately 
and in advance. His system was slow, but it was absolutely sure. 
It is indeed a remarkable illustration of the great influence which the 
question of supply exerts over the conduct and course of small wars, 
that a leader like Skobelef, whose daring and resolution had been so 
signally conspicuous two years before in the campaign in Bulgaria 
against the formidable Turkish troops should, while operating against 
feeble military forces of the Tekke Turkomans, be found spend- 
ing months in organizing his commissariat and in forming advance food 
depots, while he must from his intrepid disposition have been even 
more anxious than were the Russian Army and the Russian people to 
wipe out promptly the disgrace of the previous year's disaster. In 
the end organization and calculation triumphed, and the campaign 
concluded with a brilliant success" — CALL WELL. 

3. CARRIERS. — Carriers (porters) have been used many times for 
the supply of advance depots. The organization and employment of 
carriers by the British for this work is well expressed in the following 
extract. Also, the system of employment may be used with other means 
of transportation. 

"The carriers on enlistment should be told off into corps of 500 men 
each. It is advisable to have at least one British officer, one British 
non-commissioned officer, and one clerk and interpreter to each corps. 
The corps should be split up into ten companies, each under a chief or 
a native of importance. Each company should be again subdivided into 
gangs of from twenty to twenty-five men, each having its head man. 
A corps will consist of, therefore : — 
1 British Officer. 

1 British Non-commissioned officer. 
1 Native Clerk and Interpreter. 
10 Native Chiefs, or "Bigmen." 
20 Headman. 
500 Carriers. 

"Corps should have distinctive colors — a broad band of cloth worn 
around the arm — the chiefs being distinguished by a particular head- 
dress, and the headsmen of gangs carrying flags of the corps color. 

"Take a line of communication from the sea to the advanced 
depot to be 100 miles in length, and that two corps (1,000) carriers are 
told off to each depot on the line, ten corps are required, supposing the 
distance between each depot be twenty miles. 


Appendices, Chapter 11 


o >P «o o 

# £ £ £ £ 

i / / / / 

20 20 20 20 


"One corps at the base, one at the advance depot, and two at each of 
the four depots along the line. In five days one corps will transport 
500 loads to the advanced depot, twp corps will in four days place 1,000 
loads at the next farthest depot, and so on. Therefore, by the time the 
advanced depot has received its 500 loads, all other depots will have 
received 1,000. Each depot along the line will now send one corps of 
loaded carriers ten miles forward, and one of empty-handed carriers 
ten back, loads at the half way places are transferred to the empty- 
hand carriers, who return them to their depot. "Thus 500 loads arrive 
each day at the advance depot. This method of working the carriers 
has been found the most satisfactory, for each man returns every evening 
to the same camp and is able to leave his private goods and chatties 
in one spot instead of carrying them about with him. Should any section 
of the line be liable to attack extra guards of soldiers will of course be 
required for the protection of the corps while at work. All depots, 
however, should be laid out so as to ensure safety against attack, and 
the bush should be cleared round them to give a clear field for fire. 

"Instead of giving each corps a color, there is anorher very simple 
and perhaps more satisfactory method. It was used with success on the 
Aro Expedition. Cheap metal discs with a hole in them for a string by 
which to hang them around a carrier's neck, can be obatined at very 
little cost; these can be stamped with figures and letters each having 
50 numbers, Al, A2, etc. 

"It is a thing to remember that should a man be killed, his friends 
and relations in another country, perhaps become impressed with the 
care with which the white man looks after each carrier. D-45 dies of 
pneumonia on 15 September, and has drawn no pay up to date of his 
death; his name and country are found opposite the letter and number 
on the roll, and his relatives receive what was due to him. They are 
conscious of the fair dealing methods of the white man, and should 
carriers be required at a future time these relatives can be relied upon 
to give us a good character. Carriers, as well as more highly civilized 
human beings are all the better for not being grouped and classed as 

R.D. 1252 

cattle."— HENEKER. 



Appendices, Chapter 11 


COLUMN. (Marine Corps Gazette — extract) 

1. WAZIRISTAN CAMPAIGN. 1919, 1920, 1923.— The following 
comments indicate the probable employment of light field guns and the 
type required: 

"There was little scope for the employment of artillery, except on 
a very modest scale. Due to the roadless, mountainous country, only 
a few guns of small caliber could be taken on the expeditions. 

"In 1923, the artillery assigned, while not greater than in former 
mountain expeditions, differed in the important respect that it included 
mountain howitzers. These were modern pieces of 3,7 inch caliber, 
using a high explosive shell weighing 20 pounds with a range of 5,900 
yards. Field Guns were of 2.75 inch caliber, using shrapnel and high 
explosive shell weighing 12^ pounds, and had a range of 8,000 yards. 
The gun was provided with full and half charges enabling it to use 
curved fire. The howitzer was very successful for the following reasons: 
"(1) The extra power conferred by the heavy projectile made 
it possible to clear thick scrub impervious to shrapnel, or other cover 
too resistant to be penetrated by small H.E. Shell. 

"(2) It possessed an all-around field of fire and due to its curved 
trajectory, it could come into action from any position in the line 
of march.- w >. 

"(3) It enabled dead ground and deep ravines to be searched 
that could not be reached by the gun. 
U - "The value of; the effects obtained with the howitzer may be gauged 
by the name given it by the tribesman, "the gun with the eyes, ' since 
they could not understand how ground invisible to any hostile observer 
could be searched by the somewhat deadly and very noisy shell of the 
howitzer. In the last campaign a section of six-inch howitzers was 
employed. With its 100 pound shell and 9,000 yard range, it evoked 
the uttermost consternation among the natives. 

"The value of artillery in mountain warfare was found to be as 
great as , even The killing effect of the howitzer was great, and increased 
the tribesmen's respect for artillery" The howitzer is, at present, the 
nearest approach to the ideal in mountain weapons. 

"During the campaign artillery was used on special tasks, as follows: 
(1) For the protection of camps to keep down sniping and to 
support outlying piquets': ; r ..... 

■ ■ (2) For- the destruction of villages, and frontier towns. 

(3) For the defense of fixed posts. r - - ' ■..*.> 

"The relative value of both artillery and machine guns was in- 
finitely greater, on the frontier than in Europe." 

Appendices, Chapter 11 



1. a. In the British Indian hill warfare, the terrain was very 
hilly. The valley and surrounding hills were usually bare of trees. 
The Indian hill men were very swift in their movements. They fought 
with rifles and knives. Their tactics were to seize the hill tops and from 
there fire into the slow moving British column below. In order to pre- 
vent this firing from the hilltops, the British were obliged to piquet the 
hill tops or as it is some times termed to crown the heights. The 
principle was to deny to the enemy the ground affording him use for 
his long range weapons. 

b. This crowning of the heights was accomplished occasionally 
by flanking parties that moved from hill top to hill top as the column 
progressed. Generally however, the difficulties of the ground did not 
permit this and hill tops were held by stationary picquets. 

c. Now if we consider a very different terrain, namely the African 
jungle or bush lands, we have the same principles of security under 
still different conditions resolving into the use of what is called the 
elastic square. Many African tribes attacked the European columns 
in the flanks and rear. These columns had no road to travel on and 
at the best only a trail. The enemy's custom was to allow part of a 
column to pass along the trail and then to open fire from the close bush 
at a range of a few yards. Usually they did not rush the column. It 
will be clear that under such circumstances the effectiveness of the long 
range rifle is largely lost. There is little time for its use, the dense under- 
growth prevents aim and the suddeness of attack disconcerts the fire. 
Where there is danger of only casual attack flanking patrols as in our 
first illustration suffice. When however the enemy is in great number 
and is formidable, this formation changes more definitely into the elastic 

d. The force may be formed into an advance guard and main 
body and rear guard, the advance and rear guard each being equal to 
about one half the size of the main body. When necessary to form the 
square the advance guard deploys to the front, the rear guard to the 
rear. The main body deploys half to its right and half to its left. A 
loose square is formed. 

e. Again the force may move in three columns cutting its trail 
through the bush. The center column is twice the size of the flank 
columns. When necessary the right and left columns face to the right 
and left and form the flank sides of the square. The center column is 
divided into two sections. The leading section deploys to the front and 
forms the front side of the square. The rear section deploys and forms 
the rear side. 

f. In either case, a line of scouts to the front and scouts on the 
flanks, to discover the enemy only and not to engage him, informs the 
face of the square concerned. If there be no scouts and if the enemy 
opens fire on a column from the bush, the column charges with the 
bayonet. To remain on the trail firing blindly into the bush, as the 
British did in some early African wars, and permitting the enemy to 
reload again has been found to be fatal. Troops should be well supplied 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

with hand and rifle grenades for use against hostile attacks at close 

2. a. We have considered so far three formations for a marching 

The chain of close-in, small flank patrols (like the treads of a tank). 
The stationary flank picquets on all heights flanking the line 
of march. 

The elastic square of varying formations, assuming the form of 
a loose square when actually attacked. 

This series of formations brings us by logical evolution to the rigid 
square. This is a double rank, four faced, man to man close formation. 
This formation is almost a defensive formation. Yet it was used by the 
British and French in Northern Africa, advancing slowly to the attack 
so as to draw the enemy's charge and then halting to check with its 
heavy fire the advancing crowds of Arab horsemen seeking hand to 
hand combat. The terrain for the mounted enemy was of course open 
and level or undulating. 

b. There are certain details concerning the square formation that 
require mention. 

(1) The square affords protection on all sides. 

(2) At the same time it offers only one fourth or at most one 
half of the fire of the command against attack from any one direc- 

(3) The ranks must be two deep to sustain the shock of a charge. 

(4) The corners of a square are its most vulnerable points 
(provided there are no gaps) since the fire at the corner is the most 

(5) Corners may be reinforced by machine guns in pairs. If 
the machine guns of a corner do not function, in effect a gap in the 
square is made. Hence the danger of reinforcing a corner by one 
unsupported machine gun only. 

(6) A gap in a square may be effected by enemy assault. 

c. It is more likely to occur by lagging in the flank sides while 
the square is advancing or by a lagging of impedimenta within the 
square causing the rear face to bulge and lose close touch of files. Lack 
of discipline may permit a side to advance to meet the enemy and form 
a gap. A gap once effected and a square entered by an enemy, the ad- 
vantage possessed by the square in fire arms is lost. A side of the square 
cannot face about and fire at the enemy within the square without 
endangering the opposite face. The fight therefore becomes hand to 
hand combat in which the square is probably at a disadvantage by reason 
of the superior numbers of the enemy. 

d. Reserves inside of a square seem to be the natural means of 
filling gaps. If placed at all four corners they cover these vulnerable 
places and in addition two sides (to put it differently, any one side is 
covered by two adjacent corner reserves). The fire of the whole force 
is of course lessened by the withholding of men for reserves. 

e. A square may be preceded by scouts. They will be of service 
in discovering a concealed foe in broken ground and compelling him 
by fire to come to action before the square has come so close to the 
concealed position as to render ineffective its superiority of fire action. 
Moreover the best way of replying to casual hostile fire is by independent 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

fire of skirmishers. The square itself cannot reply without halt and 
delay. A marching fire appears impracticable as likely to break up 
the rigidity of the advancing front. 

f. However, scouts at the same time mask the fire of the square. 
They must return to the interior of the square or be destroyed by the 
swiftly approaching enemy. Their withdrawal to the square by cir- 
cuitous routes on either flank of the line enemy approach-square seems 
practicable only when the enemy is attempting no enveloping move- 
ment. Scouts therefore can be used only with great care or the purpose 
for which the square is instituted, namely to afford protection in every 
direction by superior fire action, will be defeated. 


Appendices, Chapter 11 



SANTO DOMINGO. — a. The first phase of the operation in 
Santo Domingo outlined below is a good example of movement inland 
from seaports to cities to be occupied as advanced bases for further 
operations. From the Haitian border to Cabo Engano is about 225 
miles. From East to West, a mountain range (Cordillera Central) 
divides the country into a northern and southern district. Agriculture 
is the only developed resource of the country. 

b. The fertile sections are: 

(1) The valley of the Yuma from Santiago to Sanchez, called 
the Cibao. 

(2) The small valley north of San Pedro to Macoris. 

(3) The small valley north of La Romana. 

The last two sites are sugar plantations owned by foreigners and 
are of much less general importance than the valley of the Yuma. 

c. The capital and principal city is Santo Domingo City. San- 
tiago is the metropolis of the naturally wealthy section of the country. 
Its ports are Sanchez, Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi. Its neighboring 
towns in the rich valley are Moca, La Vega and San Francisco de 

d. The only railroads of consequence give outlet to the products 
of the Cibao. 

(1) From La Vega and San Francisco de Marcoris to Sanchez. 

(2) From Moca and Santiago to Puerto Plata. 

Fifteen miles of the length of the former runs on a causeway 18 
inches high over an otherwise impassable swamp. The latter cuts 
through a secondary mountain range, running east and west, the 
(Cordillera Setentrinal) or Monte Cristi range. 

e. San Pedro de Marcoris is the second town of importance on 
the South Coast. 

f. The Republic of Santo Domingo was occupied by United 
States forces in 1916. The reasons, unimportant for this discussion, 
were probably to prevent the occupation of the republic by some other 
nation in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine. 

g. Occupation was effected as follows: 

(1) Santo Domingo City (capital and largest city) was occupied 
in May 1916. Santiago and the Cibao was announced as the objective. 

(2) Puerto Plata, occupied June 1, 1916. 

(3) Monte Cristi, occupied June 1, 1916. 

(4) Advance on Santiago made via Monte Cristi-Santiago road, 
and Puerto Plata — Santiago railroad in conjunction commencing June 
26, 1916. (See Paragraph 11—12, Example (1). 

(5) Santiago occupied July 6, 1916. 

(6) Moca, La Vega, Sanchez and San Francisco de Marcoris 
occupied during July 1916. 

(7) Samana, San Pedro de Macoris, La Romana, Azura and 
Barahona were occupied or visited at later dates as conditions made 
this necessary. 

h. The Monte Cristi — Santiago route to the Cibao was preferred 
to the Sanchez — la Vega route because the former afforded a good road 


Appendices, Chapter 11 

always within reaching distance of the Yaque river for water, whereas 
the latter route was impassable in the event of the cutting of railroad 

i. With the seizure of Santiago, organized resistance ceased. 
Unorganized opposition from bands of outlaws continued. Cities 
occupied were garrisoned and used as bases from which expeditions 
against bandits were continually sent forth into the mountains. 

8200 MCS QUANTICO, VA. 12-13-35—300 



1935 Revision 




General 12-1 

Estimate and Plans 12-2 

Laws, Decrees, Orders and Instructions 12-3 

Manner of Collecting Arms 12-4 

Collecting Agencies 12-5 

Custody of Arms 12-6 

Disposition 12-7 

Restriction and Control of Manufacture, Importation and Distribution 

of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 12-8 

Measures following Disarmament 12-9 

Appendices Page 

No. I. Arms Collected 15 

No. 2. Historical Examples of Disarming Decrees and Orders . 15 
No. 3. Disarming Opposing Native Forces, Collection and Custody 

of Arms 23 

No. 4. Arms Surrendered by Opossing Forces 24 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



Disarming Population, Collection, and Custody of Arms. 

12 — 1. General. — a. The wisdom of disarming the inhabitants, 
if it can be done, is basically sound. It is not always possible and 
it is never done without assuming a certain responsibility. Peace- 
ful inhabitants, voluntarily surrendering their arms, should be 
guaranteed protection by those forces charged with the restoration 
and maintenance of peace and order. Were it possible to disarm 
completely the whole population, the military features of small 
wars would resolve themselves into simple police duties of a routine 
nature. Obviously, considering the size of the population, the 
extent of territory, and the limited number of available troops, 
any measures adopted will not be 100 percent effective. However, 
if properly executed, the native military organizations and a large 
proportion of the populace may be disarmed voluntarily; many 
others will be disarmed by military or police measures designed 
to locate and confiscate arms held clandestinely. These measures 
will limit the outstanding arms to those held by a few individuals 
who will seek to hide them. In many instances, these hidden arms 
will be exposed to the elements or to deterioration which in time 
will accomplish the purpose of the order. See Appendix No. 1. 
Although complete disarmament may not be attained, yet the 
enforcement of any ordinance restricting the possession of arms 
will result in the illegal possession of such arms only by opposing 
native forces, outlaws or bandits, and a few inhabitants who will 
evade this ordinance as they would attempt to do with any un- 
popular legislation. Comparatively few of this latter class will 
use their weapons except in self defense. Thus the inhabitants are 
partially segregated at the outset of the negotiations. The dis- 
arming order will probably not influence the professional guerrilla 
fighters to give up their weapons but such source of supply and 
replenishment in weapons and ammunition within the country will 
be practically eliminated. 

b. One of the initial steps in the usual small war which takes 
the form of an intervention in a country torn by revolution, is 
the disarming of the native factions opposing each other. If this 
action is successful, serious subsequent results may be averted. 
To be effective, this action must be timely, and the full cooperation 
of native leaders must be secured through the proper psychological 
approach. The disarmament can be effected only through the 
greatest tact and diplomacy. It is only one of several successive 
steps in the settlement of the local controversy, and any agreement 
effected must insure not only ultimate justice but immediate 
satisfaction to all contending parties. To secure this concesssion, 
the arbiter must have the confidence of the natives and must be 
ready, willing, and able to insure the provisions of the agreement. 
This involves the responsibility to provide security not only for 
the natives who have been disarmed but for the individuals depend- 



ing upon them for protection. This implies the presence of the 
arbiter's forces in sufficient numbers to guarantee safety. 

c. Due to the unsettled conditions ordinarily prevailing in a 
country requiring a neutral intervention, and to the existence of 
many arms in the hands of the inhabitants, the disarming of the 
general population of that country is not only extremely important 
as a part of the operations of the intervening forces but also to the 
interests of the inhabitants themselves. It is customary in many un- 
developed or unsettled communities for all of the male population 
upon reach maturity, to be habitually armed, notwithstanding that 
such possession is generally illegal. There is a logical reason for 
the large number of weapons in the hands of the inhabitants. The 
arbitrary political methods which frequently result in revolution, 
and the lawlessness practiced by a large proportion of the popula- 
tion, is responsible for this state of affairs. The professional 
politicians and the revolutionary or bandit leaders, as well as 
their numerous cohorts, are habitually armed. Legal institutions 
can not prevail against this distressing condition; persons and 
property are left at the mercy of unscrupulous despots, until in 
self preservation the peaceful and law abiding inhabitants are forced 
to arm themselves. 

d. If it has not been done previously by the intervening 
forces, the disarming of the people should be initiated upon the 
formal declaration of Military Government, and must be regarded 
as the most drastic step in the restoration of tranquility. The 
disarming of the native population of a country in which military 
occupation has taken place will be the invariable rule; its applica- 
tion is often an imperative necessity. 

12 — 2. Estimate and Plans. — Prior to the issuance of any order 
or decree disarming the inhabitants, it is necessary to make an 
estimate of the situation and analyze all features of the undertaking, 
the powers and limitations, the advantages and disadvantages, and 
make plans accordingly. 

The plans should include the following provisions; 

(1) The measures necessary to strengthen the local laws, 


(2) The civil or military authority issuing the disarming 
order, or decree. 

(3) The forces necessary to enforce the order or decree. 

(4) The form of the order or decree. 

(5) The method of promulgating the order or decree. 

(6) The measures and supplementary instructions to place 
the order in effect. 

(7) The designation and preparation of depots, buildings 
and magazines in convenient places for the storage of the arms, 
ammunition and explosives. 

(8) The disposition of the munitions collected. 

(9) The method of accountability for such munitions, 
including the preparation of the necessary forms, receipts, tags, 
permits, etc. to be used in this system. 



(10) The arrangements for the funds necessary to execute 
the disarmament. 

(11) The designation of the types and classes of munitions 
to be turned in. 

(12) The exceptions to the order or decree, definitely and 
plainly stated for the information of subordinates. 

(13) The agencies (civil officials, military commanders, etc.) 
who will collect, guard and transport the material. 

(14) The supplementary instructions for the guidance of 
the agencies charged with the execution of the order or decree. 

(15) The instructions governing the manufacture and im- 
portation of munitions. 

(16) The instructions governing the sale and distribution of 
munitions manufactured or imported. 

b. Small wars take place generally in countries containing 
primitive areas where many of the inhabitants depend on game 
for their fresh meat. The peasants in the outlying districts accord- 
ingly are armed with shotguns for hunting, as well as for self protec- 
tion. Many demands for the retention of such arms will be made 
on this score and they should be satisfied in accordance with the 
seriousness of the situation, the justice of the request, and the 
character of the individual making it. 

c. A feature of the disarming of the inhabitants which is 
a source of difficulty and misunderstanding is the question of 
retaining their machetes, cutachas, knives and stilettos. Machetes 
in these countries are of two general types; one is for work and 
the other is a fighting weapon. The working machete is practically 
the only implement found on the farms or in the forest ; it is used 
for clearing and cultivating land as well as harvesting the crops. 
It would be obviously unfair to deprive the natives of this general 
utility tool. It is distinguished by its heavy weight, the blade 
being broader and slightly curved at the end away from the handle, 
and without a guard or hilt. The fighting machete or cutacha has 
a hilt and is narrow, light, and sharp. Sometimes working ma- 
chetes are ground down into fighting weapons but these are readily 
distinguished. Directions issued for the collection of arms should 
contain instructions so that subordinates may be informed of the 
difference in order to insure the collection of the dangerous weapons, 
and to avoid depriving the peasants of their implements which 
mean their very livelihood. Similarly, one finds that the natives 
are almost always armed with some kind of knife. They are used 
when packing animals and for all kinds of light work ; they are often 
the only implements used in eating; they are used in butchering, 
in trimming the hoofs of their animals and for many other chores. 
These weapons however, may be used also as a fighting weapon. 
Certain weapons are obviously for fighting only and these are 
banned without question; these are the stiletto or narrow blade, 
dagger type of weapon. They have little or no cutting qualities 
but they are deadly. 



d. The disarming order, or supplementary instructions there- 
to, should describe these weapons sufficiently to properly guide 
the subordinates who will execute the order. They should provide 
that cutachas will not be permitted to be carried at any time; 
agricultural machetes will not be permitted on the public roads 
or in public gatherings ; stilettos will not be permitted at any time 
or place. 

12—3. Laws, Decrees, Orders, and Instructions. — a. In most 
countries, there are statutes restricting the possession of arms 
and explosives. As a rule these laws are not enforced rigidly 
and even at best are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the 
immediate requirements. The laws and their enforcement agencies 
must be strengthened by appropriate measures to insure the 
effective execution of the measures intended. 

b. The first step in disarming the population is to issue a 
disarming order forbidding all inhabitants to have in their pos- 
session firearms, ammunition or explosives, except under special 
circumstances to be determined by % specified authority. This 
order is directed to the authority who will be responsible for its 
execution. It specifies that the prohibited articles will be turned 
in to the proper officers of the forces of occupation, who will receipt 
and care for such as are voluntarily surrendered, but that such 
articles as are not voluntarily surrendered will be confiscated. It 
may further stipulate that after a certain date the illegal possession 
of arms, ammunition or explosives, will render the person appre- 
hended liable to punishment. The details of carrying out this 
order are properly left to the discretion of appropriate military 

c. The official who has the authority to issue the disarming 
order will be indicated by the nature of the intervention. In a 
simple intervention where the civil authorities are still in charge, 
a decree might be issued by the Chief Executive, or a law might be 
enacted in proper form and sufficiently forceful to fit the situation. 
Such decrees have been issued in emergencies in the past and have 
proven effective. In case a military government is established, 
the military governor would issue the decree or order. Under 
some circumstances the commander of the military or naval forces 
might issue the disarming order. 

d. To give the order the force and character of a public 
document it should be published in appropriate official publications 
of the government for the information and guidance of the citizens 
of the country. This method not only gives the order an official 
character but insures its prompt and legal distribution throughout 
the country. The order should be published in the native language 
and as necessary in the language of the intervening forces. Cir- 
cumstances will determine whether it will be advisable to indicate 
a time limit in which the prohibited munitions must be surrendered ; 



after which date their possession will be illegal. This will depend 
upon the ability of the natives to comply before a given date, or 
the availability of the forces to make it effective, and also upon the 
probable situation in case of failure to execute the order. Com- 
plying with the injunction that it is never wise to issue an order 
that cannot be enforced or complied with, it may be advisable to 
hold the limiting date in abeyance until the disarming situation 
is under control. 

e. Ordinarily the initial disarming order should apply 
its general provisions without exception to all persons and to all 
classes of weapons. No exceptions should be made until the 
majority of the natives have been disarmed. The necessity for 
explosives required for the routine peaceful occupation of some 
inhabitants should not be overlooked. Prohibitory restrictions 
against their possession or use would materially interfere with 
industrial and commercial enterprise and development. So, in 
keeping with the policy of fair and liberal treatment of the natives, 
provision must be made for these special cases. Before incorporat- 
ing in the disarming order any exceptions thereto, the military 
authorities should consider first, the conditions which might result 
under legalized use of firearms and explosives by certain favored 
individuals (civil officials, land owners, etc.), and second, the 
extent and character of supervision that will be required to control 
their use and their sources of supply. Once these points have been 
determined, the orders should be prepared to incorporate the 
necessary provisions. The disarmament of that portion of the 
native population living in remote and lawless districts should only 
be undertaken with a full appreciation of the responsibilities 
involved. Ranch overseers, mine superintendents, paymasters and 
local civil authorities, should be given special consideration in the 
matter of arms permits. There is such a thing as being over 
zealous in the matter of disarmament, and it is often advisable to 
make certain concessions to responsible parties in order to secure 
their full cooperation in the enforcement of the laws. See appendix 
No. 2, Historical examples of disarming orders. 

12 — 4. Manner of Collecting Arms. — a. For an example of a 
complete account of the manner in which arms were collected on 
one occasion, see appendix No. 3. When opposing native forces 
are operating in the field, the intervening forces, if acting as an 
arbiter, should institute measures to secure the arms of all the 
opposing forces by organizations and prior to the disbanding of 
those forces. Every endeavor should be made to have the full 
cooperation of the leaders and to prevent the escape or departure 
of any subordinate leader with his followers. Disarming such 
organizations involves disbanding them and providing for their 
return home. With the twofold purpose of insuring the turning 
in of their arms and the return of the natives to their homes, a 


price is often paid to individuals for their weapons in accordance 
with a schedule fixing the rates for the various types of firearms 
and ammunition. This is a reasonable charge against the native 
government and the money from this source must be assured before 
proceeding. This procedure may be a source of chicanery and fraud 
to deceive the authorities and get money dishonestly. Every pre- 
caution should be taken to see that money is paid only for the arms 
of men regularly serving with the units at the time of the agree- 
ment. Precautions must be taken that the armories and magazines 
are not raided after the agreement is in effect and that the same 
individuals do not repeatedly return with such rifles for payment. 
On the other hand, ready money in sufficient quantity from the 
local government must be available at the time and place of pay- 
ment agreed upon, or where the forces are found. 

b. If part of the native forces remain armed, the full benefits 
of disarmament are not obtained, and serious consequences may 
later develop. When this occurs, some of these small armed groups 
may take the field and continue their operations not only against 
the local government but also against the intervening forces. This 
would place the intervening forces in an embarrassing position. 
After having disarmed the forces who might have been capable of 
controlling the movement, the intervening forces may be required 
either to halt the disarming negotations and again rearm those 
forces or send out its own troops to take the field against these 
armed groups. In other words to be fully effective, disarmament 
must be practically complete. See appendix No. 4. 

c. If Military Government has been instituted, the Provost 
Department may very appropriately be assigned the task of collect- 
ing the munitions, the responsibility for the storage and custody 
of same, keeping records and submitting necessary reports. In 
other situations where a native constabulary has been organized, 
there may be advantages in assigning this duty to that organiza- 
tion. See appendix 5, Chapter XXXI. 

12 — 5. Collecting Agencies. — The following agencies may be 
employed to collect firearms, ammunition, explosives etc.: 

Provincial governors and local police authorities, particularly 
the communal chiefs, the chiefs of police, and the rural policemen. 
The military forces of occupation. 

Special agents or operators of the Force Intelligence office, or 
the Provost Department. 

The native constabulary forces. 

a. Civil officials and police authorities. -(1) When employed 
as a collecting agency, the civil authorities are issued supplementary 
instructions at the time the disarming order is promulgated, stating 
explicitly the manner in which firearms, ammunition and explosives 
will be collected and stored or turned over to the military forces. 
These instructions may be amplified where necessary by field com- 



manders who will visit the various communities and issue verbal 
instructions to the local officials, imposing such restrictions as to the 
time and place the prohibited articles will be surrendered. The 
civil officials may be required to make personal delivery of the col- 
lected articles to the military forces or to make report of same 
and the material collected periodically by designated agencies. 

(2) The success attained through the employment of civil 
officials depends upon the spirit and conscientious effort which 
they display. Some who have been thoroughly indoctrinated with 
the advantages of the idea will have remarkable success; others 
who consider the disarming order an unjust imposition will perform 
their duties in a perfunctory manner, and still others will use the 
order to promote dishonest practices, disarming some of the people 
and permitting others to retain their arms, for personal, political 
or monetary reasons. 

(3) The disarming of the inhabitants through the inter- 
vening instrumentality of the civil officials possesses many redeem- 
ing features over the utilization of the armed forces for the same 
purpose. It is the most peaceful means of accomplishing the desired 
object, less provocative, and the least likely to engender antagonism 
or create friction. It gives the peaceful law-abiding citizens, 
who are worn out by the constant political abuse of the past, the 
opportunity to hand over gracefully their weapons without being 
subjected to what they might consider the indignity of making a 
personal surrender to the military authorities. Misunderstanding 
will thus be avoided that might otherwise occur if the armed 
forces are employed, because of a difference of language and custom. 
Moreover, it relieves the armed forces of an unpleasant responsibili- 
ty and eliminates the factor of personal contact at a time when the 
population views the intentions of the forces of occupation with 
more or less doubt and suspicion. See appendix No. 3. 

b. Military Forces of Occupation. — It is not to be assumed 
that an order as exacting and far reaching in its effect as this, will 
meet with willing and universal compliance. As a conseqquenee, 
it may be necessary to resort to more stringent enforcement in 
order to compel the recalcitrants to surrender their weapons. The 
civil officials may be directed to secure the prohibited articles, or 
the armed forces may conduct a house to house search for concealed 
weapons. Both means may be employed simultaneously. Stringent 
measures may be unavoidable and wholly justifiable, in an effort to 
promote an early return to peace and order. 

c. Special Agents. (1) Special agents or operators of the 
Force Intelligence office or the Provost Department may trace, or 
make collections of weapons. Their action is taken on more or 
less reliable information and generally applies to comparatively 
large quantities of firearms and ammunition held by certain promi- 
nent individuals. The success of these operations depends upon the 
skill and courage of the agents who have to rely in a great measure 


upon their own initiative and resources. 

(2) The intelligence service through special operatives 
may be employed to trace important imports of arms and ammuni- 
tion during a period of several years preceding the occupation. 
Government permits and correspondence, custom house files and 
other records will aid in identifying receipts of these munitions, and 
a search for their subsequent disposition may be undertaken. 
Deliveries of rifles, special weapons, automatics, machine guns, 
howitzers, artillery pieces, ammunition and explosives are noted 
and compared with issues, sales and expenditures. 

d. The Native Constabulary Forces. (1) Upon the estab- 
lishment of a native constabulary, this organization may assist the 
military forces in the collection and confiscation of firearms. 
These troops may perform valuable service in this connection 
through their knowledge of the country and their familiarity with 
the habits of the people. 

(2) After a reasonable time has elapsed, or when it appears 
that the civil officials have exhausted their usefulness in the 
collection of arms, the military authorities may issue an order to 
the effect that after a given date the military forces will be 
responsible for the collection of arms and the gathering of evidence 
for the conviction of persons involved. 

12 — 6. Custody of Arms. — a. Included in the plans for the 
disarming the population must be the designation of personnel 
necessary to receive and care for the material turned in. Buildings 
and storerooms suitable for the safekeeping of the weapons, 
munitions and explosives must be provided prior to the actual 
receipt of the material; the volume of this material may assume 
unwieldy proportions by the large increments arriving during the 
early days of the disarmament. An accurate system must be 
devised to keep a complete record of everything received, and the 
material tagged and stored in such manner as to identify it easily ; 
the place should be of such construction as to preserve the material 
and also to make it secure. When material is received in condition 
which makes its keeping dangerous, authority should be requested 
to destroy it or to dispose of it otherwise. A frequent inventory 
and inspection of all such material in custody should be made not 
only by the custodian official but by inspecting officers. 

b. Receipts should not be given for weapons delivered upon 
payment of money, nor for arms and material confiscated. There 
will be, however, a number of reputable citizens including merchants 
authorized previously to deal in these stocks, who wish to comply 
with the latest order and turn their stocks in to the custody of 
the military forces. The latter are obliged to accept this material 
and must be prepared to deliver it when a legimate demand is 
made for its return. 



c. Instructions should be issued designating and limiting the 
agencies who will accept the material and give receipts for same. 
There have been instances in the past, where sufficient time has 
not been allowed for proper organization and preparation for the 
methodical receipt of arms; in the avalanche of arms turned in 
simultaneously at many places, junior officers, in good faith, have 
accepted the material and have given personal receipts for it with- 
out having a proper place for its safe keeping. In the rush of 
official business, they did not demand a receipt from other officers 
to whom they delivered the material collected. No records were 
made of the ultimate disposition of the material. When proper 
authorities subsequently requested information concerning the 
final disposition of specific material, the information was furnished 
only after a most difficult search. In many cases, the material 
could not be located or its disposition determined due to the lack 
of records. 

d. If only certain officers are designated to issue receipts on 
the prescribed forms, and if the material is assembled by areas or 
districts, the confusion may be avoided which arises from junior 
officers giving personal receipts in several different districts in 
which they may serve during the disarming period with no record 
being made of receipts. The receipts should be in standard form, 
and should indicate the name and residence of the owner of the 
weapon, and the date and place of issue of the receipt. The 
material or weapon should be properly identified and other 
appropriate remarks should be added. This receipt should be 
signed by the officer authorized to receive the material. See 
Appendix No. 3. 

e. District Commanders should be required to submit monthly 
reports of all arms and ammunition collected within their respec- 
tive districts. The larger part of the weapons collected will be 
obsolete and in such poor condition as to render them of little or 
no practical value ; these may be destroyed by burning or dumping 
at sea. Those of better type and condition may be retained or 
issued to the native constabulary troops. The collection of arms 
cannot be said to be terminated at any given time; it is a process 
which continues throughout the occupation. 

12 — 7. Disposition. — a. When arms have been received from 
various sources, they are classified as follows : 

(1) Material for which a receipt has been issued. 

(2) Material confiscated, collected upon payment of money, 
or otherwise received by agreement. 

b. The custody of material under 'class one' implies respon- 
sibility to guard and preserve it for return to the rightful owner 
when law or decree permits. 

c. The material under 'class two' is further divided into 
serviceable and unserviceable or dangerous material. The service- 
able material may be of a type, caliber and condition suitable for 



reissue to native troops, local police, special agents or others whom 
it is desired to arm. The question of uniformity, adaptability and 
ammunition supply is involved. The unserviceable material, or 
that whose keeping is hazardous is disposed of as directed; fire- 
arms are burned, the metal parts being used in reinforcing concrete, 
or disposed of in other effective ways to insure any possible future 
use as a weapon. Sometimes material is dumped in deep water 
beyond recovery. Dangerous material, such as explosives, should 
be stored in special places apart from other material. 

d. Whenever any material is disposed of in any manner, per- 
manent record should be made of the transaction. Receipts should 
be demanded for that which is reissued or transferred no matter 
in what manner. When material is destroyed or otherwise dis- 
posed of, a certificate should be made, attested to by witnesses, 
which voucher should be set forth in sufficient detail by name, 
mark and quantity, the identity of the material disposed of. This 
will prove a valuable aid if and when information is ever demanded 
at a later date. 

e. In general, records are made and subscribed to by witnesses 
whenever material is destroyed or disposed of otherwise. Ap- 
propriate receipts should be demanded whenever material is issued 
in accordance with orders from higher authority. Care must be 
taken that no weapon or material is issued or otherwise disposed of 
except in an authorized manner. 

f. Great care should be exercised in keeping material which 
has been confiscated, or whose ownership is transferred to the 
government, segregated from that material which the government 
simply holds in custody. The latter is not subject to destruction 
nor available for issue. Beware of the ever present souvenir 
hunters of all ranks who wish to get possession of articles of unusual 
design, of historical interest or of special value. All such unusual 
weapons or articles create a peculiar interest whenever they come 
into our custody. They arouse the attention and interest of 
enlisted men or civilian workers who assist around the magazines 
or storerooms in the receipt or storage of such material. These 
unusual articles which are in greatest demand as souvenirs, and the 
disposition of which is most closely watched and remembered by 
subordinates, are the very articles that the original owners wish to 
have returned sooner or later. Minor indiscretions in the disposi- 
tion of material received assume serious proportions which are not 
at all in keeping with their importance. 

g. The military authorities determine who shall be empowered 
to issue arms permits, to whom they may issue them, and any 
other pertinent restrictions. Under existing circumstances District 
Commanders and District Provost Marshals may be the designated 
agencies. In any event the process must be coordinated to prevent 
conflict or overlapping authority. Certain civil officials, such as 
provincial governors, judges, and others exercising police functions, 



may be authorized to carry arms. Certain permits are issued which 
are honored throughout the country ; some are issued which are good 
for more than one district or jurisdiction but not for the whole 
country; in either case the higher authority approving same, 
notifies the responsible officers in the several subordinate juris- 
diction concerned. When permits are requested, information is 
furnished concerning the nationality, character, commercial and 
political affiliations, occupation, and address of the applicant and 
the necssity for the granting of the permit. Officers issuing per- 
mits must exercise great care to the end that permits be issued only 
where real necessity exists ; any application which has the appear- 
ance of being made simply to enhance the prestige of the individual 
making it, as often happens, should be promptly refused. 

h. Permits should be issued on a standard form with a des- 
cription of the person to whom issued, together with the character 
and serial number of the firearm, the purpose for which it is to be 
used, and the locality in which it is to be carried. These permits 
should be non-transferable and should be renewed each year or the 
firearms must be turned in to the authorized agency. Holders of 
permits should be warned that the unauthorized use of their fire- 
arms will result in certain disciplinary measures in keeping with 
the gravity of the offense and the punitive authority of the official; 
this may include revocation of the permit and confiscation of the 
firearm, and even fine or imprisonment, or both. 

i. Permits should be issued for the possession of pistols, 
revolvers, and shotguns only. The privilege of possessing rifles 
should be refused consistently, and it should be exceedingly difficult 
to secure any kind of permit. 

j. In order to maintain a strict account of all arms permits 
in effect, all issuing officers should be directed to keep a record of 
all permits issued by them, copies of which should be forwarded to 
the district commander. The district commanders in turn should 
submit to Force Headquarters annual or semi-annually, a list in 
duplicate of all permits issued within their respective districts. In 
addition to this annual or semi-annual report, they should also 
render a monthly change sheet in duplicate, containing a list of 
permits issued and cancelled during the month. 

12 — 8. Restriction and Control of Manufacture, Importation and 
Distribution or Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. — a. As the 

Military Force is charged with the preparation and execution of 
1 regulations concerning the possession and use of firearms, ammuni- 
tion and explosives, it is only proper that it should exercise similar 
supervision over the sources of supply. The official who has been 
granted authority over the arms should be given authority over the 
importation of firearms, ammunition and explosives. 

b. The military forces may control the entire legal supply 
of ammunition. This control may be exercised either (1) by 



requiring purchases to be made from official sources by the Provost 
Marshal General and turning this ammunition over upon requisi- 
tion to the District Commanders, who may distribute it : to their 
provost marshals for sale in limited and necessary quantities to 
persons having permits, or (2) certain merchants may be authorized 
to sell munitions. If there are munitions manufacturing plants 
in the country, they must be controlled ; in addition the introduction 
of munitions into the country must be restricted vigorously. 

c. Any person, or representative of a business or firm desiring 
to import these articles should make written application for permis- 
sion for each separate shipment of arms ammunition, or explosives, 
in which application should appear in detail, the quantity and 
character of the stores to be imported, the use to which supplies 
are contemplated, the name of the firm from which the stores 
are to be purchased, and the port from which they will be exported. 
All applications should be forwarded through local provost marshals 
or other designated authorities who should endorse the request with 
such information or recommendation as will establish the character 
and identity of the applicant. In case there is a legal restriction 
on the importation of arms, the approved application should be 
forwarded to the office of the Minister of Foreign relations for 
request on proper authorities through diplomatic channels. 

d. There have been two methods used in the past by Marine 
sale of munitions in the occupied territory. Either of these two 
methods shown below appear to be effective. 

(1) Immediately upon the arrival of the arms, ammunition,, 
or explosives at the port of entry, the customs officials should 
notify the local Provost Marshal who receives the shipment and 
deposits it in the provost store-room or other suitable place. The 
articles may then be drawn by the consignee in such quantities or 
under such conditions as the provost marshal may indicate. Except 
for an exceptional shipment of explosives for some engineering 
project, the shipments will ordinarily be small. 

(2) Immediately upon the arrival of the approved muni- 
tions shipment at the port of entry, the customs officials should 
notify the local Provost Marshal. This officer should notify the con- 
signee, and with him check the shipment for its contents and amount. 
An enumerated record of the contents and the amounts should be 
prepared by the Provost Marshal, one copy given to the consignee 
and the other retained by the Provost Marshal. The shipment is then 
turned over to the consignee, after payment of all duties and with 
the written approval of the Provost Marshall. A monthly check 
should then be made by the Provost Marshal of all munitions stores 
in the hands of the approved sales agency ; the sales agency making 
a monthly report of all sales (on individual approved permits) to 
the Provost Marshal. 



12 — 9. Measures Following Disarmament. — a. Even after the 
population has been effectually disarmed, energetic measures must 
be taken to discourage or prevent rearming. Some plan must be 
evolved without delay to make it impracticable or dangerous to 
procure firearms illegally, either from within or without the country. 
If the existing laws of the country prohibiting possession of arms 
are sufficient in themselves, measures should be taken to make 
them effective. To the extent that authority is delegated or 
assumed, additional or new laws should be put into effect restrict- 
ing the possession of firearms. This latter method can be applied 
only if military government is established. In issuing these laws 
one must bear in mind the responsibility assumed by the military 
forces in enforcing the laws and guaranteeing the security of life 
and property. If there be remote sections where law enforcement 
is difficult due to the limited number of the military forces, certain 
concessions may have to be made in order to permit the local 
inhabitants to protect themselves against the lawless element. On 
the other hand if the lawless elements remain in the field in numbers 
greatly in excess of the military forces, special considerations may 
make it advisable to provide means for arming a certain proportion 
of the reliable and responsible natives to compensate in a degree, 
for that inferiority in numbers; this should not be prejudicial to 
the other law abiding elements. Sometimes this action will greatly 
discourage the lawless factions. 

b. The military forces, or native constabulary, in conjunction 
with the customs officials, should be particuarly alert along the 
coast and frontiers of the occupied country to prevent illegal entry 
of munitions. Where a native constabulary exists or is later 
established, a portion of such organization may well be constituted 
a coast guard, equipped with fast boats, to prevent such arms 
smuggling along the coast and rivers. 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 



Arms Collected. 

Santo Domingo. — On the basis of a poulation of 800,000 in 
Santo Domingo the following statement indicates the extent to 
which they were armed and the effectiveness of the disarming order 
and its execution. A compilation of reports in Santo Domingo 
indicates that by July 1922 the Brigade had collected, in round 
numbers, about 53,000 firearms of all descriptions, approximated 
200,000 rounds of ammunition and some 14,000 cutting weapons. 
The greater portion of these articles were procured during the 
early years of the occupation. This represents one firearm to each 
fifteen inhabitants, counting men, women, and children. 


Historical Examples of Disarming Decrees and Orders. 

1. Vera Cruz, Mexican War. — At the time of entering upon his 
duties as military governor in our first intervention in Mexico at 
Vera Cruz, General Worth issued the following order to the alcalde 
or mayor of the city : 

"Arms in possession of citizens to be given into the alcalde's 
possession and to be reported to headquarters. Drinking saloons 
to be closed and not to be reopened hereafter except by special 
permission. Mexican laws as between Mexicans to be enforced and 
justice administered by regular Mexican tribunals. Cases arising 
between American citizens of the Army or authorized followers of 
the same, will be investigated by military commissions". 

2. Santo Domingo, 1916. — The first order issued after the Pro- 
clamation of Occupation and Military government in Santo Domingo 
on November 29, 1916 was directed to the Marine Brigade com- 
mander, and was designated to disarm the people. Under Dominican 
government, although contrary to the law, it had been the custom 
for every man and boy who could afford it to have and carry a 
firearm. As a consequence of the disarmament order, thousands 
of firearms and cutting weapons were turned in to the authorities 
or captured and confiscated. Probably other large numbers were 
hidden, but considering the ignorance of the Dominican in regard to 
the care of such things, the deterioration due to neglect effected 
the same result. 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 

Santo Domingo City, S. D., 29 November 1916. 

From: Commander, Cruiser Force. 

To: Brigade Commander, Second Provisional Brigade. 

Subject: Arms and Explosives. 

1. You will put into effect the following order: 

"It is forbidden to all individuals or organizations except the 
Military Forces in Occupation, to carry or have in possession fire- 
arms or ammunition therefor, or explosives. Owners of these 
prohibited articles are directed to turn them in to proper officers 
of the Forces in Occupation, who will receipt and care for such as 
are voluntarily surrendered. Any such articles not voluntarily 
surrendered will be confiscated. 

"The carriage of concealed weapons of any description is for- 

"After these regulations have been put into effect, explosives 
needed for peaceful public or civil purposes may be released by 
bompetent authority of the Military Government in the necessary 
quantities for immediate use, provided that the intending users 
are responsible persons and that they accept responsibility for the 
proper custody and use of the released explosives to insure that 
they will not be employed for any purpose inimical to public order. 

"Under exceptional circumstances, of whose existence and 
duration the Military Government will be the judge, responsible 
parties in exposed locations may be permitted to keep a limited 
supply of arms and ammunition by competent officers of the Mili- 
tary Government ; conditioned upon the acceptance of responsibility 
by the recipients that the arms and ammunition do not fall into 
improper hands, and that they will be used only for self -preser- 
vation-, and not for any purpose inimical to public order." 

_:'____________________ _ ... H.S. KNAPP 

3. Nicaragua, 1927.— "On April 22, 1927, Mr. Adolfo Diaz, the 
Conservative president of Nicaragua, proposed the following peace 
terms to the revolutionists who were disturbing the peace of his 
country : 

(1) Immediate general peace and delivery of arms simul- 
taneously by both parties into American custody; 

(2) General amnesty and return of exiles and return of 
confiscated property ; 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 

(3) Participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative 
Liberals ; 

(4) The organization of a Nicaraguan Constabulary on a 
non-partisan basis, to be commanded by American officers ; 

(5) Supervision of 1928 and subsequent elections by 
Americans who would have ample police power to make effective 
such supervision; 

(6) A temporary continuance of a sufficient force of 
American Marines to secure the enforcement of peace terms. 

In the Tipitapa conference between Stimson and Moncada a 
certain understanding was reached. For the proper conduct of a 
free and fair election, a general disarmament was considered nec- 
essary and American forces would be authorized to accept the 
custody of the arms of the government forces and of those others 
willing to lay them down, and to disarm the rest. In order to 
carry out the disarming of the Government and revolutionary 
forces in Nicaragua the following nonce was iss ed b Comsperon 
and given wide publicity throughout the Republic on May 11, 1927, 

"The Government of the United States, having accepted the 
request of the Government of Nicaragua to supervise the election 
in the latter country in 1928, believes a general disarmament of 
the country necessary for the proper and successful conduct of 
such election and has directed me to accept the custody of the arms 
and ammunition of those willing to place them in my custody, 
including the arms and ammunition of the forces of the Government, 
and to disarm forcibly those who do not peaceably deliver their 

"The Government of Nicaragua has expressed its willingness 
to deliver the arms under its control and I have directed that such 
arms of the Governmen be s i h same pro-: 

portion that arms are delivered by the forces opposing the Govern- 

"The Nicaraguan Government has granted general amnesty to 
all political and armed opponents. To facilitate the return to 
peaceful occupations of those who have heretofore opposed it, that 
Government will pay 10 cordobas to each and every individual 
delivering a serviceable rifle or machine gun to the custody of the 
United States forces. Amnesty and protection are assured to 
such individuals by the Nicaraguan Government and by the forces 
under my command. 

To avoid the regrettable and useless shedding of blood all 
individuals and leaders of groups now having in their possession 
or in hiding serviceable rifles, machine guns, or ammunition, or 
who know of the location of such munitions as may be hidden, 
should immediately deliver them to the custody of the nearest de- 
tachment of the American forces. Upon such delivery payment 
of 10 cordobas will be made, in the presence of a commission of the 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 

United States officers, for each serviceable rifle or machine gun 
so delivered." 

Signed: J.L. LATIMER, 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, 

Commander Special Service Squadron, 
Commanding United States Forces in Nicaragua. 

On 12 May, the following telegram signed by General Moncada, 
the revolutionary leader, and eleven of his generals, including all 
his prominent chiefs except Sandino, was received: 

"The military chiefs of the Constitutionalist army assembled 
in session today have agreed to accept the terms of the declaration 
made by General Henry L. Stimson, personal representative of 
President Coolidge of the United States, and consequently have 
resolved to lay down their arms. They hope that there will be 
immediately sent to receive these arms sufficient forces to guarantee 
order, liberty and property." 

General Moncada recommended to his troops that they yield 
and a general disarmament of both sides began. This resulted by 
26 May, in the delivery to the American forces of 11,600 rifles, 303 
machine guns, and 5,500,000 cartridges. 

Although the laying down of their arms by both the Govern- 
ment and revolutionary forces was carried out promptly as was 
expected, a few roving bands caused local disturbances in sections 
of the interior. 

4. Army of Occupation, Germany, 1918. — The preliminary in- 
structions issued by the Commanding General Third American 
Army on 28 November 1918 for troops entering Germany contained 
this provision to the commanding officers of units entering towns : 
"He will direct the Burgomaster to forbid the sale or carrying of 
arms or deadly weapons." 

On December 13, 1918, the following regulations as to fire- 
arms in occupied territory were issued as follows : 

American Expeditionary Forces 

13 December, 1918. 


No 8) 

* * ❖ ❖ 

II. Pending the receipt of instructions from the Commander- 
in-Chief regarding the restrictions governing the sale and carrying 
of firearms, the following will be observed : 

(a) Gendarmes will be permitted to carry a revolver, in 
addition to their swords. They will be required to turn in their 
carbines to the Burgomaster. 


Appendices, Chapter 12, 

(b) Regularly appointed Foresters will be permitted to 
retain light hunting rifles for the purpose of protecting the public 
from depredations. 

As soon as troops reach their permanent areas, the command- 
ing officers will require Burgomasters to submit the names of all 
gendarmes and foresters authorized to carry arms, as herein 
specified, and will issue passes to each individual for their purpose. 

No hunting permits of any kind will be issued to civilians. 



Malin Craig 
Chief of Staff 

On 5 January, 1919 the following instructions were issued: 

Headquarters Third Army 
American Expeditionary Forces 

5 January, 1919. 


SUBJECTS: (1) Arms and Ammunition in the hands of the 
German population in Occupied Territory. 

(2) — xxxxxxxx 

(3) — xxxxxxxx 

1. Arms and ammunition in the hands of German population 
in Occupied Territory. 

"Orders No. 5, Advance General Headquarters, American 
Expeditionary Forces, Dated 28th December, 1918, provide as fol- 
lows : 

1. Arms and ammunition turned in to American troops by the 
inhabitants will be inventoried and placed under guard in a suit- 
able place chosen by the station commander. When commanding 
officers change, receipts for arms under guard will be exchanged. 

2. Collections of arms in museums, etc., need not be interfered 
with, provided that the local commander is satisfied that the arms 
are not of modern date. 

a. In accordance with the foregoing orders, division com- 
manders and the Military Commander at Coblenz, will take the 
necessary steps to see that all arms and ammuntion will be turned 
in to the Burgomaster or the Landrat. A receipt will be issued 
by the Burgomaster or the Landrat for each arm or lot turned in. 
Each arm or lot will be plainly marked with the name of the ownei\ 
This material will then be stored and checked in a store room or 
suitable depot within an American Camp. This room or depot 
will be securely locked or sealed and the key retained by the 


Appendices. Chapter 12. 

Burgomaster or Landrat. An American guard will be placed 
over this room to prevent any of the arms collected therein from 
being removed by any one at any time, excepting by authority of 
these Headquarters. 

The purpose of the foregoing is that, while we have assured 
by these means that all arms and ammunition in the country are 
under proper guard, we have, nevertheless, not assumed respon- 
sibility to the individual owner for the return of his particular arm 
or lot of ammunition. 

. ' b. All arms and ammunition will be assembled in not to exceed 
two (2) points in each German Kreise. 

The location of each of these depots will be reported to these 
Headquarters on or before the 10th of January, 1919, together 
with a brief report as to the number of arms of different classes 
and amount of ammunition stored in each. These reports will be 
made direct to these Headquarters by the various Division Head- 
quarters concerned and by the Headquarters Military Commander 
of Coblenz. 

c. The most energetic measures must be instituted without 
delay by all area Commanders to the end that severe disciplinary 
action may be taken in the case of any of the civilian population 
who are found having arms and ammunition in their possession in 
contravention of the terms of the proclamation of the commander- 
in-chief, dated 28th December, 1918." 

On 13 January, 1919 the following order was published for the 
guidance of the civilian population of the districts occupied by the 
American forces : 

"a. Paragraph VI of the Armistice, signed upon the 11th day 
of November, 1918, is in part as follows: 

Military establishment of all kinds shall be delivered intact; 
so, also, military stores, food, munitions, and equipment not removed 
during the periods fixed for evacuation. 

b. Pursuant to the above provisions of the Armistice all 
military stores, food, munitions, and equipment which belonged to 
the German Army upon the 11th day of November, 1918, the day 
of the signing of the Armistice, and which had not been removed 
from the zone of the American Army of occupation during the 
period of time fixed by the Armistice for evacuation, are hereby 
declared forfeited under the terms of the Armistice, to the American 
Army of Occupation. 

c. Considerable quantities of material of the kind set forth in 
^Paragraph (a) and especially clothing, leather, iron, blankets, 
motor trucks, etc., were abandoned by the German Army prior to 
its evacuation or sold by it to individuals and cities after the 
armistice went into effect. 

All such sales are hereby declared null and void. The title to 
all such property so abandoned or sold vests in the United States. 

d. All individuals, corporations and municipalities having 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 

possession or custody of any property described in paragraphs 
a & b are hereby directed to turn over the same to the nearest .mili- 
tary commander or to the Burgomaster on or before noon of the 
20th day of January, 1919. 

e. Any property described in paragraph a and b of this order 
in the possession of any individual, corporation or municipality after 
noon on the 20th day of January, 1919 will be seized by the American 
Army and the owner and holder thereof brought to trial forthwith 
before a military court for violation of this order. 

Chief of Staff. 

5. Haiti, 1915. — After informing the foreign legations and a 
self-appointed "Haitian Committee of Safety" Admiral Caperton 
landed two companies of Marines and three companies of Blue- 
jackets at Port au Prince, Haiti at 5 :30 p.m. on 28 July, 1915 and as- 
sumed complete military control of the city and furnished guards 
to the various foreign legations. The following day he directed 
that all the soldiers in the city be disarmed by the "Committee of 
Safety" and placed a guard over the arms procured. 

The Gendarmerie or native constabulary was organized and 
its first recruits were armed with some old Graw rifles which had 
formerly been in the hands of the Haitian Army. 

On 18 August, 1915, at the suggestion of Admiral Caperton, 
the newly installed Haitian government declared full amnesty for 
all revolutionary troops. Each revolutionist turning in his arms 
and going to his home was to receive fifteen gourdes, while each 
chief of a band was to be paid one hundred gourdes. 

The following quotation appears in the History of the Garde 

"One of the outstanding tasks confronting the gendarmerie 
was the urgent need to disarm all those inhabitants who still 
possessed firearms, and to place on a legal footing the holding of 
arms by those who traveled throughout the country and needed 
them for their protection, whose occupation necessitated the carry- 
ing of large sums of money that might prove a temptation to 
bandits, or who wanted shotguns for hunting the winged game 
which abounds in Haiti. On the recommendation of the Chief of 
the Gendarmerie, the Legislature finally enacted a law on this 
subject, and the Gendarmerie was henceforth able to carry out 
the provisions of this law rather than enforce the previous ruling 
of the American Occupation against the possession of firearms. 
This law forbade any citizen of the Republic to have in his pos- 
session a firearm unless provided with a license therefor; decreed 
that the Chief of the Gendarmerie and his department and dis- 
trict commanders would issue arm licenses, which would be good 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 

for the duration of the fiscal year in which issued, that is, from 
October 1st to the following September 30th, at which time the 
person concerned must request a renewal of his license. An ap- 
plicant for an arms license was required to deposit $10.00 as 
security for the firearm ; sign an agreement that he would not use 
his arm except for self-defense against thieves, etc., and for hunt- 
ing ; and wag- directed to always carry his arms license card when 
in possession of the weapon. Cabinet ministers, judicial officials 
and mayors were authorized to carry arms by this law. The law 
placed the importation of firearms, as well as dynamite, blasting 
powder and all explosives, under the Gendarmerie. Reputable 
citizens, through loath to do so, complied with the law. The more 
ignorant, together with those who feared that an arms license 
would not be granted them, were extremely reluctant to turn in 
their arms. Firearms have always been precious objects in Haiti. 
It must be recalled that constant revolutions, a corrupt and in- 
efficient police force, a predatory army, had practically made of 
each man a law unto himself Who was obliged to either protect 
himself or remain defenseless. Hence, as opportunity offered, 
everyone sought and obtained a firearm of some description, the 
efficiency and condition of the weapon depending on the financial 
resources of the purchaser. As in many troubled countries, every- 
one felt he was obliged to have a firearm and each was unwilling to 
give up the protection the arm afforded even though its possession 
was prohibited by law. Haitians felt little respect for laws, for 
the country had a plethora of legislative restrictions which were 
seldom obeyed, especially by the upper class and the countrymen 
who lived in the isolated sections with whom the law enforcement 
agencies seldom troubled themselves." 


Appendices, Chapter 12 


Diarming Opposing Native Farces, Collection and Cnsto^ of 
Arms, Nicaragua, 1927. 

1. a. In Nicaragua in 1927 between 11 May and 6 June, the 
Disarming Commission, of which a Marine officer was ^nior mem- 
ber, collected from a total population of about 7&fi®0> 14,650 
rifles, 339 machine guns (modern) and 5,560,000 rounds of am- 
munition. No effort was made to collect machete* knives, daggers 
and similar weapons. This commission paid o& for these arms 
132,980 cordobas. / 

b. The first mention of an arms commission was made on 
the afternoon on which the Tipitapa Agreement was signed by 
Mr. Stimson and Mr. Moncada. There w^ no preparation nor were 
prior instructions issued. The princip^ duties of the Commission 
were outlined in a letter appointing ^he Arms Commission dated 
10 May and signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Naval 
Forces Ashore in Western Nicara^a. They were about as follows : 

(1) Arranging for the payment of troops and delivery of 


(2) Arranging for tne guarding of native paymasters and 
arms by the Marine Corps forces. 

(3) Arranging with the local commanding officers of Ma- 
rine Corps forces for the receipt and custody of arms and the wit- 
nessing of payment of 10 cordobas to each individual making the 
delivery of a serviceable rifle or machine gun; the disarmed in- 
dividuals to be given proper protection by the local commanding 
officers of Marines, and allowed to depart for their homes. 

(4) Arranging with the Nicaraguan government for the 
disarming of a proportionate number of government troops as 
Liberal troops disarmed. 

c. At first, the Commission was only interested in the disarm- 
ing of the actual soldiers in the two opposing native forces. Later 
it was extended to anyone who brought in a serviceable rifle or 
revolver. One of the main difficulties was in assuring Liberal 
soldiers protection to their homes after delivering their arms. As 
many of these soldiers came from the northern and eastern part 
of the country, there were few if any Marine Corps troops in those 
sections to afford them the necessary protection. 

d. The rifles, machine guns, etc., which were delivered to the 
Commission was later deposited in La Loma in the custody of 
the Marine Corps forces thereat. A member of the Commission 
reported that in his opinion there were very few rifles paid for 


Appendices, Chapter 12. 


. i rms Surrendered by Opposing Forces, Nicaragua, 1927. — As 

an incision of the importance of these measures one may cite the 
proportK ns assumed in disarming the conservative and revolution- 
ary Nicaragua in 1927 as follows: 
Turneain Dv the Conservative Army : 
ll,Ov) rifles 

231 machine guns 

5 Catling guns 
45 fidd artillery pieces 
4i/2 mihv> n rounds S.A. ammunition 
23 chests high explosive artillery ammunition 
9,600 bayonet^ 

Turned in by the revolutionary forces : 
4,000 rifles 

31 machine guns 
1 cannon 

li/ 2 million rounds S.A. ammunition. 

NOTE: — Grand total from September 1927 to February 1929 from all sources 

29,000 weapons of all kinds from pistol to cannon; 6,000,000 rounds of small 
arms ammunition; 3,000 rounds of high explosive artillery ammunition. 


8166 MCS QUANTICO, VA. 11-20-SS-400 


Quantico, Virginia 

1935 Revision 
Armed Native Organizations 

Paragraphs , 

Section I General 13-1 to 13-4 

II Preliminary Steps in Organizing a Constabulary 13-5 to 13-6 

III Essential Elements to be considered in Planning 

for the Creation of a Constabulary 13-7 to 13-18 

IV Training a Constabulary 13-19 to 13-20 

V Auxiliary Agents of the Constabulary 13-21 to 13-22 

VI Status of the Constabulary 13-23 to 13-24 

VII Withdrawal of the Intervening Forces 13-25 to 13-26 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1. Garde d'Haiti (Gendarmerie d'Haiti) 25 

No. 2. Policia Nacional Dominicana (Guardia N.D.) 41 

No. 3. Guardia Nacional de Nicargua 45 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 


4* 13—1—2 



Organic Armed Native Forces of the State 13-1 

Armed Forces of the State Superceded by the Armed Forces of the 

Intervening Power . . •. 13-2 

Obligation of Intervening Power to Re-create Local Armed Forces of 

the State 13-3 

Authority for Creation of Armed Native Forces 13-4 

13 — 1. Organic Armed Native Forces of the State. — In nearly 
all sovereign states, the executive authority is enforced by the 
following agencies: 

(1) The national military and naval forces under the con- 
trol of the State. 

(2) Organized reserves subject to call and under the con- 
trol of the State. 

(3) Organized militia under the control of the political sub- 
divisions of the State. 

(4) Purely police forces under the control of the State. 

(5) Purely police forces under the control of the political 
subdivisions of the State (provinces or states) . 

(6) Purely police forces under the control of municipalities 
(cities and towns) . 

These armed forces represent the National Defense Forces of the 
State or the armed forces employed to preserve peace and order 
within the State. 

13 — 2. Armed Forces of the State Superceded by the Armed 
Forces of the Intervening Power. — a. When the domestic situation 
within any State is such that it is necessary for another State to 
intervene therein, these national and local armed forces of the 
local State are usually in a more or less innocuous status and there- 
fore cannot effectively suppress the domestic disorder or enforce 
the laws. At the time of intervention, the armed forces of the 
State will, in all likelihood, have disintegrated through defeat or a 
wholesale desertion to an opposing or insurgent force. It is pos- 
sible that they may be still engaged with an insurgent force and 
at a period when the operations have created havoc and destruction 
throughout the land. The local police authorities are usually in- 
effective in suppressing lawlessness due to the magnitude of dom- 
estic disturbance, and may even have ceased to function. Some 
such condition usually exists when the armed forces of the inter- 
vening power enter a foreign state. From the time of their entry, 
the armed forces of the intervening power are responsible for the 
protection of life and property of all inhabitants of the state. The 
armed forces of the intervening power may therefore assume not 
only the functions of the national armed forces of the central 
government, but also the duties of the local or municipal police. 



b. In assisting any nation to restore peace and order, it is not 
the policy of the United States to accept permanent responsibility 
for the restoration and preservation of governmental stability or 
employing its armed forces indefinitely in a country for this pur- 
pose. It seeks as quickly as practicable to restore domestic tran- 
quillity and to restore national agencies to their normal status. It 
will insist on the establishment of an efficient and well trained armed 
force free from political influence and dictatorial control. To ac- 
complish this, the intervening power must ultimately provide the 
local government with a native armed force or forces having the 
mission of suppressing armed rebellion within the State, repelling 
aggression from outside the State, and of enforcing the laws of 
the State. 

13 — 3. Obligation of Intervening Power to Re-create Local 
Armed Forces of the State. — The responsibility of the intervening 
power for the restoration and preservation of the domestic tran- 
quillity of the local State is a definite obligation which it owes to 
the local State. Having assumed that obligation, and fulfilled it in 
its entirety by the use of armed forces, there still remains the 
problem of restoring to the State its organic national defensive and 
law enforcement powers. This is just as much an obligation as 
that of bringing domestic tranquillity to the State. The two ob- 
ligations therefore are so correlated as to make them almost a 
single duty to the local State. The restoration to the State of 
proper and adequate armed forces for national defense and for 
its law enforcement are the very means or agencies which will 
prevent the same domestic disturbance from again occurring in the 
State. In general it may be stated as a principle that having super- 
ceded or usurped the functions of the armed forces of the State, 
the intervening power must again restore certain armed forces to 
the State prior to withdrawal. 

13 — 4. Authority for Creation of Armed Native Forces. — a. 

When the decision is made to create a constabulary to replace the 
decadent armed forces of the State, the legal authority or approval 
of such an armed force for the State must emanate from some 
person or body empowered with such sovereign right. This ap- 
proval or authority may be obtained in the following ways : 

(1) By decree of the de jure or de facto executive of State 
(when the legislative agency does not exist) . 

(2) By legislation initiated by the legislative body, in 
which the old armed forces of the State are legally disbanded and 
the new armed force lawfully created. 

(3) By treaty between the local State and the intervening 

(4) By the arbitrary creation of a constabulary by the 
forces of the intervening power and maintained from the local 

b. In the first case, it is assumed that the only remaining 
agency of the local State is the executive thereof, who is either the 



original de jure official or is the de facto official head of the local 
government. The authority for any law enactment in such case 
rests with this official, who legally has the authority to issue a 
decree for the establishment of armed forces for his government. 
In the second case above, it is assumed that the civil administration 
of the local State still exists. In this case, it is necessary to either 
modify the organic law of the land to legislate the old armed forces 
out of existence and the new constabulary into existence, or to 
enact legislation to cover these points. In the 1st, 2d and 3d cases 
above, not only must the legal authority for the creation of a 
constabulary be granted but also provision must be made for the 
appropriation of the necessary funds from the national budget for 
its maintenace. In the 3d case above, it is assumed that an agree- 
ment or treaty is reached between the intervening power and the 
local government for the creation of the constabulary, definitely 
and legally enunciating its powers and limitations, its organization 
and funds for its maintenance. Often a treaty already exists 
between the two governments granting authority to the stronger 
sovereign power the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
the weaker when it is unable to control domestic disorder within 
its boundaries. This treaty will usually be the basis or the au- 
thority for the creation of new armed forces for the local State, 
either through the legislative or executive agency of the State or 
through the powers of a military government set up in that State 
by the forces of occupation. In the 4th case above, the legal 
creation of the constabulary rests upon the military power of the 
forces of occupation through its military government of the local 
State. In this case the decree or order of the military commander 
or military governor is the legal authority for the creation of the 
constabulary, since he represents the sovereignty of the local 




The Planning Agency 13-5 

Approval of Plans 13-6 

13 — 5. The Planning Agency. — a. In establishing a constab- 
ulary there appears to be certain steps that are necessary to be 
accomplished in succession. These are; first, the formation of a 
planning group (or it may be the appointment of an individual) 
to draft the necessary plans along the lines indicated in paragraph 
2 above; second, the approval of such plan by the local govern- 
ment and the government of the intervening forces ; and third, the 
necessary enactment of laws by both parties to legally create such 
a constabulary, including a treaty agreement for the use of members 
of the armed forces of the intervening power in the constabulary 
of the local government. Since the obligation to restore to the 



local State its law enforcement and defense forces rests upon the 
intervening power, the initiative in the creation of an armed force 
for the local State naturally devolves upon the intervening forces. 
Usually some individual member of the intervening forces or a 
group from these forces is ordered to prepare the necessary plans 
for the creation of this constabulary. This appointment or detail 
to such duty may be attained in various ways depending on the 
situation at the time. One method, suggested, in the case of the 
Marine Corps is: — the planning group with its chief are recom- 
mended to the Major General Commandant by the commanding 
general of the operating Force; such recommendation to have the 
prior approval of the local State Executive, the diplomatic rep- 
resentative of the United States, and the senior naval officer present 
in command of the forces ashore and afloat in the theater of opera- 
tions. (Sometimes the initiative in the selection of the planning 
chief and his staff originates with the Major General Commandant, 
such nomination being approved by the three officials previously 
mentioned). There is usually a very good reason for the concur- 
rence of all of these authorities in the selection of the planning 
chief and his staff, since it almost always follows that this selected 
planning chief and his staff are invariably selected as the com- 
manding officer and staff of the constabulary when legally created. 

b. When such a planning chief and his staff have been of- 
ficially named as such, they proceed to draft the necessary plans 
for the establishment of the constabulary, considering therein all 
the elements mentioned in Section III below. It is self evident that 
this planning chief and his staff, or the majority members of such 
group should be drawn from the operating forces of the intervening 
power then in the local State, for the reason that these officers will 
be more familiar with the psychological, political, and economic, as 
well as the geographic conditions, in the local State- 

13 — 6. Approval of Plans. — a. After the planning group men- 
tioned above have completed their plans for the organization of the 
constabulary, the plans must be approved by the proper officials. 
These officials are: the Chief Executive of the local State, the 
diplomatic representative of the United States accredited to the 
the local State, the senior naval officer in command of the U.S. 
Naval Forces in the theater of operations, the commanding general 
of the Marine Corps forces operating in the local State, the Major 
General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, the 
Secretary of the Navy of the United States (Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions) , the Secretary of State of the United States, the Congress of 
the United States, the legislature of the local State (when existing) , 
and the President of the United States. 

b. At a first glance of this imposing array of official ap- 
provals to the plans for a constabulary for the local State, one is 
rather bewildered by the amount of governmental machinery that 
must be utilized in order to give official sanction to these plans. The 
reasons for this are as follows : first, in the case of the Chief Execu- 
tive of the local State — this constabulary is being formed for his own 



country and will represent his office in the enforcement of the laws 
of the State as well as the provision for the defense of his State, and 
any plan involving the enactment of new laws will naturally require 
his approval; second, the diplomatic representative of the United 
States is concerned as these plans partake of the nature of the con- 
duct of foreign affairs between the United States and the local State, 
and must be concurrently agreed to by this representative; third, 
in the case of the senior naval officer in command of the U.S.Naval 
Forces ashore and afloat in the theater of operations — the Marine 
Corps forces ashore in the local State naturally are a part of his com- 
mand and he must approve all correspondence affecting the military 
and naval plans within the theater that affect these forces either 
directly or indirectly ; fourth, the commanding general of the Marine 
Corps in occupation is vitally concerned in the creation and employ- 
ment of a constabulary force as affecting the operations of his own 
forces and must therefore receive his approval ; fifth, in the case of 
the Secretary of the State, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Major 
General Commandant — these officials are the direct superiors of 
the respective officials mentioned above, and therefore must place 
their approval of the plans of their subordinates ; sixth, the Congress 
of the United States, the legislature of the local State, and the 
President of the United States are interested since the creation 
of the constabulary invariably contains provisions for the enactment 
of new laws, which must receive the approval of these authorities. 


13 — 7. Type of Native Armed Forces Necessary for the State. — 

In paragraph 13 — 1, it has been stated that the enforcement of 
law and order within the State and the security of the State 
from outside aggression are normally the functions of two classes 
of armed forces, namely the purely police forces of the State 
and its subdivisions, and the national defense forces ashore and 
afloat. In most large sovereign States, these functions or powers 



Type of Native Armed Forces Necessary for the State 

Required Strength 

Administrative Organization 

Equipment and Supply 

Records and Reports 


Recruitment of Constabulary 

Local Creative Laws Necessary 

Creative Laws Necessary by the United States 

Policy Relative to Duties and Powers 

Housing and Shelter 

Military Courts and Jurisdiction 















are assigned to separate and distinct armed forces, whose powers 
are expressely delegated by law. Past interventions have practi- 
cally demonstrated that in the case of small nations whose national 
and international affairs are not of a large magnitude, and supported 
by a small budget, that the defense functions and the police func- 
tions can be combined and assigned to one armed force within 
the State. Such a force, the United States has termed a "Consta- 
bulary." This term is synonymous with the title of such armed 
forces within the subdivisions of the United States, as the Pennsyl- 
vania State Constabulary, the New York State Constabulary, etc. 
One of the permanent forces so organized and termed by the United 
States is the constabulary of the Philippine Islands. Other examples 
of constabulary forces are the Garde d'Haiti, the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua, and the Policia Nacional Dominicana. See Appendices 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3. A constabulary so organized has the power of en- 
forcing the laws of the State as well as providing the national de- 
fense power of the State. It is a non-partisan, armed force generally 
patterned along the lines of the military forces of the intervening 
power ; in the case of the United States using the Marine Corps as 
its intervening forces, the constabulary would normally be modeled 
along the lines of the Marine Corps with modifications to suit local 
conditions. Initially the officers of such a constabulary should be 
selected officers and enlisted men (usually qualified non-comissioned 
officers) of the regular Marine Corps. The enlisted men of the con- 
stabulary should be composed entirely of the natives of the local 
State. In time, as the domestic situation becomes normal and the 
native members of the constabulary become efficiently trained, the 
Marine Corps officers of the constabulary will be relieved by the 
native personnel. In this manner the intervening power will have 
fulfilled its obligation in restoring to the control of the State, a loyal, 
well organized and trained constabulary. 

13 — 8. Required Strength. — a. In determining the strength of 
the constabulary force, it is necessary to consider carefully the 
domestic situation in each territorial division of the State, particu- 
larly in the principal cities and seaports. The strength of any con- 
stabulary detachment required for one locality may be entirely in- 
adequate or excessive in another. Many factors enter into the de- 
termination of the strength of a contemplated constabulary, among 
which are as follows : 

(1) Organic strength of the military forces effectually 
utilized by the State prior to the intervention. 

(2) Organic strength of the local police forces effectually 
utilized by the State, and in its territorial divisions and munici- 

(3) The political, economic, and geographic importance of 
the various territorial subdivisions of the State. 

(4) Normal domestic situation relative to law observance 
and law enforcement in the territorial divisions of the State. 

(5) Relative importance of the larger cities within the 



(6) Restrictions on the strength of the constabulary in 
keeping with the size of the national budget, and the needs of 
other governmental activities. 

(7) Necessity for armed state force to suppress active re- 

(8) Necessity for armed state force to repel outside ag- 

b. Although an original estimate of the strength required 
for the constabulary may take into consideration the normal 
domestic situation in each and every territorial division of the 
State, yet local conditions in any one section of the State may 
materially call for an increase in the original estimated strength 
of the national armed forces. The estimate, therefore, should be 
carefully made with this factor in mind in order that the initial 
strength of the constabulary be adequate to meet any and all 
situations which may arise requiring the use of the national armed 
forces of the State. See Appendices Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for estimated 
strengths of past constabularies. 

13 — 9. Administrative Organization. — a. The armed forces of 
any sovereign State are generally organized administratively in the 
following manner: 

(1) A headquarters, consisting of the commander and his 

(2) Administrative, technical and supply departments or 

(3) Operating forces, organized as administrative or tac- 
tical units and stationed in strategical or tactical localities within 
the State, or at posts and stations in conjunction with other gov- 
ernmental activities. See Chapter XV, Territorial Organization. 

b. From the foregoing it is plain that a constabulary will 
normally be organized into the following chain of command : 










(if necessary) 







Detachments as- 
signed to cities, 
or other small 

R.D 1290 

C. 0. TERR. 

C. 0. TERR. 






In organizing the "groupments" of territorial commands, the geo- 
graphical divisions of the state may largely influence the decision 
to form such commands. -Eor the principles governing the limits 
of territorial divisions and size of -military commands being re- 
sponsible therefor, see Chapter XV. ™ 

c. Among the other matters contained in this element of "or- 
ganization" are plans which should be "made for the operation of 
recruit depots (either under central or territorial control) and 
schools for candidates for commissioned and enlisted personnel in 
the constabulary. It.will be necessary to determine the ranks and 
percentage of officers and enlisted men in the constabulary, the 
titles of commanding officers of constabulary units of the operating 
forces, such as subdistrict commander, chief of the constabulary, 
etc. Consideration will have to be given to the formation of a 
medical department and in case of need, a coast guard, both to be 
included in the constabulary. 

13—10. Equipment and Supply. — a. Any estimate that is made 
to determine the strength in man-power of a constabulary must 
naturally include provisions for equipping and supplying the troops. 
Among the items of equipment are weapons, military uniforms or a 
distinctive dress for the troops, and in some cases the means for 
troop transportation. In many countries the distinctive dress or 
uniform of the native troops used prior to intervention has been 
of a type more adapted to purely peaceful military display or cere- 
monej^, than to combat. In other cases, the uniform for these 
troops has been of such a type that it could not be termed a "dis- 
tinctive dress" within the meaning of the Rules of Land Warfare. 
It has been a natural inclination on the part of the Marine Corps 
in organizing constabulary units to furnish a constabulary uniform 
similar to that of its own, with slight modifications in the distinc- 
tive ornaments, texture of clothing, etc. Any uniform adopted for 
constabulary troops must be suitable for combat and climatic con- 
ditions. In past small wars operations, native troops have been 
armed with inefficient weapons in comparison with those of the in- 
tervening forces. In the future this may not be the case since 
modern weapons and equipment are becoming more and more ac- 
cessible to all peoples through the activities of the arms producing 
States. Therefore, in the future, modern arms and equipment will 
frequently be found in the hands of the troops of small states. 
These weapons can be utilized to arm the newly created constab- 
ulary upon the disarming of the-. government or insurgent forces. 
While it is the desire of the intervening force to arm the constab- 
ulary force with weapons similar to its own, the availability of the 
source of supply and the purchasing agency !foye often influenced 
the decision as to the armament of the- coni&a.bular^.: 

b. A system of subsistence for the constabulary^mwt be de- 
cided upon. There are three methods of subsisting the troops : 1st, 
by organized general messes where sufficient troops are quartered 
together; 2d, by permitting the individual troops to mess them- 
selves upon the payment of an adequate subsistence allowance in 



cash, in addition to their normal pay ; and 3d, by contract messing. 
The ration allowance should be announced in orders ; the psychology 
of making the ration allowance the same for a general mess, con- 
tract mess or as a subsistence allowance is self-evident, since the 
native troops will feel that under each system they will be receiving 
the same treatment in regard to their food. The organized mess 
is only applicable to those posts and stations where it is practicable 
to mess the men in a general mess, both from a financial veiwpoint 
and the fact of having at any given time sufficient men at a central 
messing point. Recruit depots, officers' schools, and commands of 
over 20 men should all be messed in general messes. However, even 
in commands of over 20 men, the local conditions of their activities 
in the field may dictate that a subsistence allowance is more prac- 
tical. In small detached posts of only a few men, it is usually neces- 
sary to employ either the 2d or 3d system above. In isolated posts 
and stations the men will usually ration themselves on the cash 
allowance as when they were civilians, that is, by having their 
women folks prepare their meals. As a general rule, the cash 
allowance should not be granted since it has been found in the 
past that men usually squander the cash allowance and then are 
without funds to ration themselves, involving themselves finally in 
indebtedness to merchants in the locality for their food. Also the 
men will not subsist themselves on a well balanced ration. It is 
deemed better in such cases to award a contract to some local in- 
habitant to ration these men at the detached posts to insure that 
the men are regularly and adequately fed. Even this system has 
its disadvantage in that the contractor may endeavor to make such 
a profit from this system that the men will not receive the proper 
amount and quality of food. A constant check of the food so served 
the men should be made by the commanding officer of this detached 
post. In the conduct of general messes, the constabulary quarter- 
master's department should not purchase foreign food products. 
The ration components should be confined to local staples, and garden 
products, etc., so that the troops are fed the type of food to which: 
they are accustomed. 

c. In addition to the individual equipment and messing of the 
troops, there will be an enormous amount of other miscellaneous 
supplies to be estimated for and obtained. These supplies are those 
usually required by any military organization. Much of this ma- 
terial will be purchased in the country of the intervening power, 
or obtained locally. Where practicable, supplies should be of home 
manufacture or consumption since they have been prepared es- 
pecially for local use. 

13 — 11. Records and Reports. — Included under this heading are 
those normal military records utilized by all military forces. In 
addition, there are the usual office records and files, and the various 
reports submitted periodically to higher headquarters. These 
periodic reports may cover many subjects or projects supervised 
or controlled by the constabulary, such as report of local conditions, 



both economical and political, report of arrests and disposition of 
such cases, annual report of the activities of each command, and 
such special reports as may be required by constabulary head- 
quarters. Office stationery will also be an item in this estimate, 
in so far as the forms are considered as apart from the estimate of 
this material given in par. 13 — lO.c. One of the most important 
factors in the estimate under this heading is the system of ac- 
countability or records of accountability, both as to property 
and finances. All of these records and reports will undoubtedly 
parallel in form the normal records and reports employed by the 
military forces of the intervening power, modified when necessary 
to suit local conditions. It is highly important that these reports 
and records be rendered in the native language, for the constabu- 
lary will ultimately pass to the control of the local government and, 
moreover, it would be unreasonable to expect native troops to learn 
a new language for this purpose alone. This holds true particularly 
to text books prepared for the use of the troops, such as drill man- 
uals and legal books for the guidance of the constabulary when 
acting in their capacity as police. Likewise, it should be insisted 
from the beginning of the constabulary that all written or verbal 
orders and commands be given in the language of the country. 

13 — 12. Finances. — a. In planning for the creation of a constab- 
ulary, the element of finances is naturally a factor which influences 
the strength and supplies of such a force. Having estimated the 
necessary funds for the establishment of the constabulary, it be- 
comes imperative that the allotment of funds from the national 
treasury be made by presidential decree or by the legal sanction of 
the law making body. In case the constabulary is organized during 
the tenure of a military government, funds will have to be alloted 
from the revenues of the state by the military governor. Ap- 
propriations for the establishment and maintenance of the constab- 
ulary will often be difficult to obtain, not only due to the adminis- 
trative authority necessary for its allotment, but due chiefly to the 
fact that in most instances the State has little or no funds available 
for such purpose. This has been caused by the economic condition 
of the country as a whole, dispoilation of the state's treasury or 
through lack of an efficient system for the control and collection 
of taxes and custom duties. The funds necessary for the establish- 
ment of the constabulary should occupy a large part of this initial 
financing of the State and thereafter the allotment of the necessary 
funds for its maintenance obtained from the normal receipts of 
the customs and internal taxes. Once the initial allotment of funds 
has been authorized for the establishment of the constabulary, it 
will be necessary to insure that the annual or other periodic main- 
tenance allotment is continued and that the item for this purpose 
occupy a priority place on the national budget. This must be in- 
sisted upon at all times, and efforts to decrease or subordinate this 
allotment for the constabulary must be resisted energetically; for 
without the armed organization to enforce the laws and insure the 
collection of the normal revenues of the State, the finances of the 



State would be almost nil, and the domestic tranquillity of the State 
greatly disturbed. 

b. The matter of determining the rates of pay for the officers 
of the constabulary is very important. In the past, the following 
monthly rates of pay have been prescribed: 

Second Lieutenant $ 60.00 

First Lieutenant 100.00 

Captain and Major 150.00 

Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel 200.00 

Initially, members of the Marine Corps, appointed officers in 
the constabulary, received these rates of pay before the inclusion 
of native comissioned personnel. However the pay of $60.00 per 
month for a native officer commissioned as a second lieutenant 
did not attract the best type of native personnel. There may 
have been a hesitancy on the part of the planning agency for this 
constabulary to establish an adequate rate of pay for the different 
ranks in the officer personnel due to the fact that Marine Corps 
officers and men appointed to the constabulary would be in receipt of 
too large a combined salary. Also that it would create an im- 
pression on the local government that their local revenues were 
being exploited. Such, however, did not appear to be the case 
since the native population considered only the pay that the constab- 
ulary officer was receiving from the local government. Therefore, it 
is believed that in the future it would be wise to consider the matter 
of the pay of constabulary officers from the viewpoint of the native 
officers. A rate of pay should be established such as to insure that 
the best type and character of officer material will be attracted to 
the constabulary: the fact that Marine Corps officers receive the 
same pay will make the local government familiar with the pay re- 
quirements of its military personnel. 

13 — 13. — Recruitment of Constabulary. — a. The policy and 
methods of recruiting suitable personnel for the constabulary should 
include the following factors : 

(1) Age and height limits, and physical requirements. 

(2) Period of recruit training, if recruit depots are main- 

(3) Whether or not men from the disturbed areas or other 
pro-government and anti-government areas will be accepted. 

(4) Relative number of men to be accepted from the op- 
posing political parties. 

(5) Whether or not enlisted personnel will be employed in 
their own home areas. 

(6) Whether or not members of the former organic mili- 
tary forces of the state will be employed in the constabulary. 

(7) Any other restrictions which may be dictated by policy 
in the local state. 

The early establishment of officer candidate schools should receive 
much thought and consideration. The establishment of these 




schools will provide an early replacement of the personnel of the 
intervening force utilized initially to officer the constabulary, as well 
as indicating to the local State the altruistic motives of the interven- 
ing power. 

b. The first physical act is to obtain the officers for the con- 
stabulary. These are either drawn from the operating forces of the 
intervening power in the local State or are obtained from the home- 
land forces of the intervening power. It is desirable that each and 
every officer or enlisted man appointed from the intervening power's 
armed forces have the following characteristics : 

(1) Be acceptable to the local government. 

(2) Have the qualities considered essential for a similar 
position of importance in the forces of the intervening power. 

(3) Be physically fit to withstand continued duty in out- 
lying parts of the country, and to have the essential character- 
istic of TACT. 

(4) Have a general knowledge of the local conditions. 

(5) Be in sympathy with the inhabitants of the local State 
relative to their aspirations to become a stable sovereign people, 
irrespective of their class, creed, color or previous servitude. 

(6) Be educationally and professionally qualified for the 
position as an officer in the constabulary in order to execute the 
varied functions of that agency of the local government. 

(7) Be proficient in the language of the local state (in the 
case of certain officers of the constabulary, this requirement will 
not be essential). 

In accordance with the plan of organization of the constabulary into 
a chain of command through a territorial control, it will be advisable 
to distribute the officers of the constabulary to their respective posts 
and stations in order that the recruitment of the enlisted personnel 
may be accomplished under their direction and control. This dis- 
tribution of officers then becomes the recruiting machinery for the 
constabulary, as well as establishing these officers in their respec- 
tive command posts. 

c. Enlisted personnel for the constabulary may be obtained 
in the following manner : 

(1) Notice in the official gazette of the local government. 

(2) Local newspaper advertisements. 

(3) Notice to territorial local officials for publication to the 

(4) Itinerant recruiting parties. 

(5) Methods similar to those employed by the intervening 
forces in their own country. 

(6) Legalized methods employed by the local government 
in recruiting its military forces on prior occasions. 

Medical personnel should be stationed in certain places in each 
territorial subdivision in order that prompt medical inspection of 
the applicants may be made. In some cases it may be necessary 
at first to utilize the services of contract medical personnel from 
the civilian medical profession in the examination of these recruits, 



to be followed later by an examination by the constabulary medical 
personnel. In accepting applicants, the recruiting officer should be 
assured of the proper qualifications of each applicant by an oral 
examination of the applicant and in addition require him to submit 
a recommendation from some reputable citizen in the local com- 
munity. In many instances, the recommendations of the local civil 
officials will be invaluable in selecting applicants for duty in the con- 
stabulary. In accordance with the plans and policies promulgated 
by the constabulary headquarters, the disposition of the accepted 
applicants is accomplished. There are four methods of disposing 
of the recruits accepted by the local recruiting officer: 1st, their 
dispatch to a central recruit depot for their recruit training; 2d, 
their dispatch to territorial headquarters for their recruit train- 
ing; 3d, their retention at the local recruiting station or military 
post, to be trained thereat and assigned to duty in that locality and 
4th, their dispatch to another military post which may have been 
unsuccessful in obtaining recruits. The adoption of a single method 
of securing recruits might serve in one area, whereas a combination 
of the above methods might be necessary in order to meet local 
conditions existing in another area. Naturally the recruitment of 
personnel for the constabulary entails their equipping (clothing and 
arms) and their subsistence. Initially as the recruits are assembled 
in the localities, it is deemed best to permit them to subsist them- 
selves on the subsistence allowance determined for such ration pre- 
viously in the plans. As these assembled groups enlarge either at the 
local post or at the recruit depots, general or territorial, the general 
mess will be instituted. The recruiting officers should be supplied 
with sufficient uniforms for recruits ; uniforms may be of a tempor- 
ary nature utilizing the clothing available in the quartermaster de- 
pots of the intervening forces. A distinctive badge or insignia for 
the recruits should be issued as soon as practicable in order that they 
may be made to feel that they are a part of the government troops 
of their country. Initially at least, the arms, ammunition and 
other individual equipment received from the former armed forces 
of the local State should be utilized in equipping the recruits. These 
articles of equipment should later be superseded by a uniform type 
of armament, etc., which was planned for by the original planning 
group for the constabulary. 

13 — 14. Local Creative Laws Necessary. — a. In order that the 
constabulary be the constituted military instrument of the govern- 
ment its establishment should be legally accomplished. This is nec- 
essary so as to clothe it with the legal powers to execute its func- 
tions. This may be done in the following ways depending upon the 
local situation at the time of the creation of the constabulary : 

(1) By decree alone of the Executive of the local State, 
when the legislative body is non-existant or is unable to function 
properly as a legislative body for the enactment of laws. 

(2) By enactment of a law by the local legislature of the 



State creating such constabulary, and definitely abolishing the 
former organic military and naval forces of the State. 

(3) By decree of the military governor, in case a military 
government is established in the local State, to be later legally 
approved by the local government when the transition from the 
military government to the provisional government takes place. 

b. The law-making body or executive of the local State enacts 
a law legally creating the constabulary, defining its powers, its 
organization and other pertinent points, in accordance with the plans 
drawn up for such an armed force by the planning group; or the 
law-making body may ratify a treaty with the intervening power 
for the creation of this constabulary. Whichever method is em- 
ployed, such action by the law-making agency Of the local State 
results in establishing this action as a part of the laws of the local 
State. Naturally in the former case of enacting a law, this law can 
be repealed later by the local State when the intervening forces are 
withdrawn from the local State ; however in this case, the interven- 
ing power will have fulfilled its obligation to provide the local State 
with an effective armed force, and any later action tending to 
abolish this armed force is a natural sovereign right of the local 
State. Similarly in the case of a treaty which receives the ratifica- 
tion of the local legislature, and is later nullified by the local State, 
such action becomes a matter for diplomatic action, and maybe 
intervention again in the affairs of that local State. 

c. In a law enacted by the legislature for the establishment 
of the constabulary, there must be definite provision setting forth 
the authority and responsibility of the commander of the constab- 
ulary, to ensure freedom of the constabulary from autocratic or 
political control within the State. The law should definitely state 
the specific duties which the constabulary are legally empowered to 
perform. These duties may be many and diverse (see paragraph 

13 — 15. Creative Laws Necessary by the United States. — The 

plans for the constabulary invariably contain certain provisions 
relative to the employment of members of the armed forces of the 
intervening power as officers or directing heads of the proposed 
constabulary. The Constitution of the United States in Section 9 
(8) states: 

"No title of nobility shall be granted by the United State: and no per- 
son holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the con- 
sent of the Congress, accept of any present, EMOLUMENT, OFFICE, or 
Thus it is seen that in order for any member of the armed 
forces of the United States to accept any office (including emolu- 
ment for such office) from any foreign State, it is absolutely 
necessary that the Congress of the United States grant that 
specific authority by law. The necessary law for service with the 
constabulary is drawn up by the planning group, officially approved 
and presented to Congress for enactment and subsequently ap- 



proved by the President. Again the legality for such authority 
may be incorporated in a treaty between the United States and 
the local State. However, since all treaties of the United States are 
required to have the ratification of the U.S. Senate, it becomes 
necessary for a separate law to be enacted by the entire Congress 
to grant the specific authority for the use of members of the armed 
forces of the United States as officers in the constabulary (Unless 
such general law has been already enacted by the Congress of 
the United States). See Appendices Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 

13 — 16. Policy Relative to Duties and Powers. — The police duties 
formerly performed by the organic military and naval forces of 
previous governments must be assumed by the new constabulary 
force. It will also have the duty of representing the national defense 
forces of the State. All or any of the following duties may properly 
be assigned to the constabulary: 

a. Military Duties. 

(1) National defense force of the State against outside 

(2) Suppression of domestic disorders when local police in 
territorial subdivisions of the state are ineffective in subduing 

b. Police Duties. 

(1) Prevention of smuggling of goods and persons into or 
out of the state. 

(2) Arrest of offenders against infractions of the local 
laws, not only of the State but of the territorial subdivisions and 

(3) Guarding election returns and voting places. 

(4) Control of the importation, sale, and custody of arms, 
ammunition, and explosives. 

(5) Protection of persons and property. 

(6) Plenary control in time of disasters. 

(7) Control of prisons. 

(8) Issuance of travel permits. 

(9) Issuance of automobile licenses and permits. 

c. Civil Duties. 

(1) Distribution of funds for the payment of civil em- 
ployees in outlying areas under a proper system of accountability. 

(2) Operation of lighthouse and life-saving service by 
means of a coast guard. 

(3) Communal advisors to municipalities. 

(4) Census compilation. 

(5) Distribution of official notices, either executive, legis- 
lative or judicial. 

(6) Supervision of local sanitation. 

(7) Operation and control of telephone and telegraph sys- 
tem, including radio and air communication and transportation. 

(8) Construction and supervision of roads and bridges. 

(9) Report on and supervise the use of public lands. 
(10) Agricultural reports. 



(11) Supervision of weights and measures. 

(12) Enforcement of harbor and docking regulations. 

13 — 17. Housing and Shelter. — When the organic armed forces 
of the local State pass out of existence, it will be found that many 
public buildings are available to house the constabulary forces. 
These public buildings may consist of prior military headquarters 
offices, forts, prisons, camps, naval vessels and military barracks, 
and police stations of the municipal police. All of these buildings are 
within the eminent domain of the local government and as such can 
lawfully be employed by proper authority to house and shelter the 
troops of the constabulary. Where such housing does not exist, it 
may be necessary to rent suitable buildings or to erect permanent 
buildings utilizing in many cases prison labor and local materials, 
such as coral, lime, sand, etc. Warehouses may have to be leased 
for large stores of supplies where such space does not exist in old 
arsenals, forts or former military warehouses. 

13 — 18. Military Courts and Jurisdiction. — Any courts-martial 
system set up for the constabulary must have the legal approval 
of the law-making agency of the local government. Thus in the 
United States, the Articles of War pertaining to the U.S. Army 
and the Articles for the government of the Navy, have received 
the legal approval of the U.S. Congress. See Section 8 (14), U.S. 
Constitution. Usually the constitution or charter or bill of rights 
of any sovereign State will expressly provide for military tribunals. 
Therefore it is necessary for the agency which plans for the creation 
of a constabulary to obtain the necessary legislative approval for 
the system of courts-martial applicable to the constabulary. Na- 
turally the intervening military or naval forces will consider that 
their system of courts-martial is the most suitable for the constab- 
ulary; modification of its own system, adaptable to local conditions 
and the basic laws, may be acceptable for the government and reg- 
ulation of the constabulary. The constabulary is not to usurp the 
judicial functions of the State, but to act only in support of the ex- 
ecutive power in the enforcement of the law. Civil offenders should 
be brought before the civilian courts for trial and punishment rather 
than before exceptional military tribunals. 



Recruit Training 13-19 

Routine Training and Duties of All Commands 13-20 

13 — 19. Recruit Training. — The training of the recruit for the 
duties as a member of the constabulary are usually limited with 
two distinct objects in view namely, that of a military man and that 
of a police official. The military instruction of the recruit should cover 
only the subjects of basic individual training as a soldier, such as 



are given at the recruit depots of the Marine Corps. This normally 
includes target practice and drill. It is considered extremely useful 
in such training to utilize a recruit training text book prepared 
by the headquarters of the constabulary IN THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE LOCAL STATE. The instruction of the recruit in his police 
duties should be confined to instruction in the constitution of his 
country, the penal laws thereof and his powers and limitations in 
making investigations, arrests, assistance to local civil officials, etc. 
under these laws of the local State. The preparation of a hand- 
book covering these police duties, powers and limitations, in the 
language of the local State, will materially aid in presenting this in- 
struction as well as providing a useful guide to the members of the 
constabulary. Models of handbooks and regulations for constab- 
ularies heretofore created are on file at the Marine Corps Schools, 
M.B., Quantico, Va. 

13 — 20. Routine Training and Duties of All Commands. — This 
training is carried out by the individual commands of the constab- 
ulary as a part of their routine training to maintain their military 
and police efficiency. This training will embrace unit combat train- 
ing, target practice, field firing, specialist training, post schools for 
law enforcement instruction and in some cases elementary schol- 
astic training. Officer candidate schools should be operating during 
this period. In addition to the routine instruction carried out by 
each detachment or unit of the constabulary, their normal duties 
as military and police officials of the government must naturally be 




Urban and Rural Agents 13-21 

Special Agents 13-22 

13 — 21. Urban and Rural Agents. — The estimated strength of 
the constabulary is based usually, as one of the factors, on the post- 
ing of small detachments throughout the local State. However these 
posts will usually be located in the towns, cities and villages of 
varying importance. The area assigned to a local post or station 
detachment will usually be entirely out of proportion to the number 
of constabulary troops comprising that detachment. The outlying 
sections of communities in which these small detachments of the 
constabulary are posted must also be brought under the law-en- 
forcing agency. To accomplish this, it is necessary for the con- 
stabulary to be assisted by auxiliary police agents as a part of the 
constabulary; these individual agents being residents of the par- 
ticular outlying section and of some importance within the com- 
munity. These agents in reality are the rural police of the con- 
stabulary ; they are appointed or commissioned by the constabulary 



and are paid by that force as a separate budgetary unit. In the Re- 
public of Haiti, these auxiliary agents of the gendarmerie were 
termed "chiefs of sections". They may be assumed to have the 
same powers as the sheriff in the United States, except that they 
are members of the local State government rather than agents of 
the local territorial subdivisions of the country. They are not 
given any distinctive uniform, but are provided with a distinctive 
badge of office and are usually issued a special police permit to bear 
a small arm in the execution of their duties. They are directly 
under the command of the local constabulary commander of their 
area. These rural agents will prove invaluable to the constabulary 
since they are thoroughly familiar with their section or community 
and know each and every individual within that community, making 
the apprehension of any resident malfactor in that section a com- 
paratively easy task. They can keep the local constabulary com- 
mander informed of the domestic situation within his rural area, 
thus forestalling any organized attempt at insurrection or rebellion 
against the local government. When there occurs, within the local 
State, an organized rebellion, insurrection or banditry, and the local 
constabulary is not sufficiently strong to successfully combat such 
domestic disorder, volunteer units under the direction of the con- 
stabulary may be organized from the inhabitants of the country 
to assist in quelling such disorder. This is a temporary armed force 
and is in existence only during the duration of the emergency. 
This expedient is very similar to the creation of the "posse comi- 
tatus" in the United States. Such volunteer units have been used 
successfully in the past in the Republic of Nicaragua by the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua. During their period of service they are 
to all intents and purposes actual members of the armed forces of 
the State, that is, the constabulary. 

13 — 22. Special Agents. — In addition to these rural agents and 
temporarily armed civilians, there may be other authorized armed 
individuals endowed with police powers within the local State. 
These special armed guards are desired by owners of large estates, 
plantations, mines and ranches, banks and other large financial 
commercial houses established within the local State. They are 
in reality guards for the protection of life and property of an 
estate, firm or institution from marauders, bandits, robbers and 
such malf actors. They are paid by the estate or firm employing 
them, are often legally empowered to make arrests of trespassers 
as agents of the constabulary, given a distinctive badge of 
office as such and issued a special police permit to be armed. 
The selection of such armed guards should be carefully scrutinized 
by the local constabulary commander and under no considerations 
should this practice of permitting armed guards grow to such an 
extent that any one large land owner will have a considerable number 
of such armed men under his employ and control. Where suf- 
ficient constabulary troops insure the needed protection, the ex- 
istence of additional armed guards should be strenuously opposed. 




Relation to the Civil Power 

Relation to the Forces of the Occupation 


13 — 23. Relation to the Civil Power. — a. The constabulary, as 
organized in the preceding paragraphs, represents the power of the 
executive branch of the government, both for the central govern- 
ment and for the territorial government in the subdivisions of the 
State. Any unlawful acts committed by any member of the con- 
stabulary are usually found to be in contravention of either the regu- 
lations of the constabulary or the civil and criminal laws of the 
state. Under the former class are those military misdemeanors and 
crimes which are purely under the jurisdiction of the military 
power, that is, the constabulary courts-martial system. Under the 
latter class are those crimes and felonies which are set forth in 
the penal code of the local state. Generally, any infraction of the 
constabulary regulations by any member of the constabulary should 
be tried by the constabulary itself, either by the member's im- 
mediate commanding officer or by a court-martial. Likewise any 
member of the constabulary charged with conspiracy against the 
local government should be tried by a court-martial and punishment 
executed by the constabulary, after confirmation of the sentence 
by the chief executive of the state. With regard to other offenses 
committed by a member of the constabulary which are in contra- 
vention to the penal code of the local state, the following procedure 
is recommended : 

(1) The offense is investigated by the constabulary; if 
found to be sufficiently proved by evidence as to its commission, 
the member should be discharged from the constabulary and de- 
livered into the custody of the civil authorities for trial and pun- 
ishment as a civilian. 

(2) If after investigation of the offense by the constab- 
ulary the evidence indicates that the member is guiltless, the 
member should under no circumstances be delivered to the civil 
authorities for trial and punishment. In such cases, it is deemed 
wise to transfer the member to some other section of the country 
for duty. 

It is to be expected that a certain amount of animosity and jealousy 
will be prevalent during the establishment of the constabulary 
under the direction of the officers of the intervening power, and 
many attempts may be made to interfere or embarrass its operation 
indirectly in this manner by civil courts and officials. Complaints 
against members of the constabulary should be thoroughly investi- 
gated and just trial and punishment effected if necessary to indicate 
to the populace at large, that the constabulary enforces the law 
against its own members as it does against others. The chief of 
the constabulary should be responsible only to the Chief Executive 




of the local government, who normally is the Commander in Chief 
of the armed forces of the State. 

b. In their contact with the civil officials of the local State, 
the constabulary must be courteous, firm in the execution of their 
duties and fair in dealing with any and all classes, no matter what 
their rank, title, creed or social position. TACT is one of the 
principal characteristics which the members of the constabulary 
should have; fair and just operation of the constabulary must 
always be tempered with TACT. Brutality on the part of any 
member of the constabulary in making investigations and arrests 
should be firmly and swiftly suppressed. The people should be en- 
couraged to look upon the constabulary as an honest, impartial 
and just law enforcement agency and a friend of the law abiding 
population. In times of emergency such as fires, floods and other 
like catastrophies, the constabulary should be quick to render aid 
to the distressed. 

13 — 24. Relation to the Forces of the Occupation. — a. Often the 
line of demarcation between the execution of the military power 
of the intervening forces and that of the constabulary of the local 
state may appear to be indefinite, that is, where the power of one 
leaves off and the other begins. Briefly this line of demarcation 
should be embodied in the basic principle that the armed force of 
the local state should be permitted to have sole control over the 
conditions in any section of the local state. The basic truth of 
the whole matter is that since the intervening forces have set up 
this military instrumentality for the local state and endowed it 
with a certain strength, this agency should be given a free hand to 
operate as such in its own country. The constant interference by 
the military forces of the intervening power not only seriously 
decreases the prestige of the constabulary but also does not permit 
the local state to freely utilize the instrumentality which has been 
provided for this purpose. There should be no intention on the 
part of the intervening forces to interfere in duties of the constab- 
ulary. The whole matter hinges on the question of the preparedness 
of the constabulary, once organized, to take over its duties. The 
assumption of its function is a gradual process extending to the 
outer provinces, and under the guidance and observation of the 
occupying forces. When it has demonstrated its competence to 
take over its duties, the occupying forces relinquish control and 
command and are withdrawn and concentrated at central points 
where they act as a moral force, and if necessary, as reinforcements 
to the constabulary in case of unexpected emergencies. At any 
time after the organization of the constabulary, the assignment of 
detachments of the constabulary to operating forces of the inter- 
vening power in joint action against the hostile elements may be 
advisable. Thus the constabulary, as well as the native population 
will feel that the local situation is being handled by their own 
governmental agency, and not by a foreign power. Naturally any 
act against the armed forces of the intervening power comes legally 



under the control of that military force, and may be punishable by 
an exceptional military court-martial of that power ; however where 
possible even such acts may well be punished by the military agency 
of the local State (the constabulary) or even the local civil judicial 
agency, since in this manner the population of the local State will 
realize that all unlawful acts are being punished by their own 
agencies and not by an alien power. 

b. The intervening forces should endeavor by all means to 
strengthen the potential power of the agency which it created to 
replace the military power of the intervening forces; therefore, 
except in grave cases, the constabulary should be given a complete 
and free hand in representing the armed power of the local State. 
This policy is not necessarily one of negative action, as it is one 
of cooperation and support, when and where needed. Relative to the 
command of joint operations where part of the operating force is 
made up of members of the constabulary and part U.S. Marines, it 
has been found in the past, that the principle of seniority according 
to Marine Corps rank should prevail ; thus, if the constabulary of- 
ficer (who is also an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps) is senior to 
the Marine Corps officer with the Marines, the constabulary officer 
will assume command of the combined forces, and vice versa. 



Policy of Withdrawal 13-25 

Date of Withdrawal 13-26 

13 — 25. Policy of Withdrawal. — Since it has never been the 
policy of the United States to retain its military or naval forces 
permanently in a local State where such forces have been employed 
in an intervention, the thought of eventual withdrawal from the 
local State is always a consideration. This thought is also upper- 
most in the minds of the members of the Marine Corps who are 
serving as officers in the local constabulary and their replacement 
by native officers is progressively carried out in order to conform to 
the policy. 

13 — 26. Date of Withdrawal. — Sometimes either upon the estab- 
lishment of the constabulary or at a later date, diplomatic inter- 
course between the local State and the intervening power will pro- 
vide that on a fixed date, the entire control of the constabulary will 
pass into the hands of the local State. This naturally means that 
by a certain date, all the Marine Corps personnel of the constab- 
ulary will have been replaced by native officers. This date may 
also indicate the time of the withdrawal of the military and naval 
forces of the intervening power from the local State ; so that after 
this date of withdrawal, no member of the armed forces of the 
intervening power will remain in the local State. In connection with 



this complete delivery of the constabulary into the hands of the 
local government, there are a multitude of matters to be taken 
care of, such as property, finances, records, reports, etc. All these 
matters must be carefully conveyed to the native constabulary with- 
out prejudice to the intervening power. When the date of with- 
drawal arrives, the intervening power should be able to look back 
upon its work within the local State and feel that the sovereignty 
of that local State has been restored and that it is again a member 
of the family of nations in good standing, fully capable of controlling 
its international and internal affairs indefinitely. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

(Gendarmerie d'Haiti) 

Extracts from "Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti 
and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, 67th Congress, 1st and 
2d Sessions, pursuant to S. Res. 112, authorizing a special committee 
to inquire into the occupation and administration of the territories 
of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Vols. 1 and 
2, Government Printing Office." 


1. "As a result of the negotiations which had been carried on over a 
considerable period of time between the American charge d'affaires and 
representatives of the Republic of Haiti, a treaty of mutual amity for the 
purpose of remedying the financial conditions and assisting the economic 
development and tranquillity of Haiti was signed at Port au Prince, Sep- 
tember 16, 1915, subsequently ratified by both the contracting parties, and 
proclaimed in the United States, May 3, 1916. The United States Govern- 
ment recognized the government of Dartiguenave of Haiti on September 17, 
fired the necessary salute and Rear Admiral Caperton, accompanied by his 
staff, called on the President of the Republic of Haiti, his call being returned 
by the President of Haiti and his cabinet on September 18. 

2. "On November 11, 1915, the treaty was ratified by the Haitien 
Senate after much delay, and on November 29 a modus vivendi embodying 
the exact terms of the treaty was signed by plenipotentiaries of the United 
States and Haiti to establish some method of procedure while awaiting 
exchange of ratifications. The modus vivendi, however, was not carried out 
by the United States at this time owing to constitutional restrictions in the 
matter of appointing officers as officials without congressional action. 

3. "On October 15, 1915, the Secretary of the Navy decided as follows: 
'Article I, section 9, clause 8, of the Constitution of the United 

States prohibits any person holding any office of profit or trust under the 
United States from holding or accepting any office, present, or emolument, 
or title from any foreign State, unless Congress shall consent thereto. While 
officers of the United States on duty in Haiti could not without the consent 
of Congress hold office, receive emolument, etc., under the Haitien Govern- 
ment, they are not prohibited by the Constitution or any law of the United 
States 'from rendering a friendly service' to that State such as assisting to 
organize a gendarmerie. (See Op. 13, Atty. Gen., 537, 538.) However, at 
the present date there is no authority whereby such officers could become 
officers in such a force by appointment from the Government of Haiti.' 

4. "In the following proclamation the President of the United States 
proclaimed this treaty on May 3, 1916: 

'Whereas a treaty between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Haiti having for its objects the strengthening of the amity 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

existing between the two countries, the remedying of the present conditions 
of the revenues and finances of Haiti, the maintenance of the tranquillity of 
that Republic, and the carrying out of plans for its economic development 
and prosperity was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries 
at Port au Prince on the 16th day of September, 1915, the original of which 
treaty, being in the English and French languages, is word for word as fol- 

'The preamble reads in part as follows: 

'The United States and the Republic of Haiti desiring to confirm and 
strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial cooperation 
in measures for their common advantage; 

'And the Republic of Haiti desiring to remedy the present condition 
of its revenues and finances, to maintain the tranquillity of the Republic, 
to carry out plans for the economic development and prosperity of the Re- 
public and its people; 

'And the United States being in full sympathy with all of these aims 
and objects and desiring to contribute in all proper ways to their accom- 
plishment'; etc. 

5. "Article II of this treaty provides for the nomination by the Presi- 
dent of the United States and appointment by the President of the Republic 
of Haiti of a general receiver to supervise customs, and of a financial 
adviser. Article X (see below) provides for the establishment of the Gen- 
darmerie d'Haiti, to be organized and officered by Americans, nominated by 
the President of the United States and appointed by the President of Haiti. 
Article XIV provides that should the necessity occur the United States 'will 
lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitien independence and the 
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, 
and individual liberty,' and furthermore that the United States and the 
Republic of Haiti 'shall have authority to take such steps as may be neces- 
sary to insure the complete attainment of any of the objects comprehended' 
in the treaty. This treaty shall remain in 'full force and virtue for the term 
of 10 years,' and 'further for another term of 10 years if, for specific reasons 
represented by either of the high contracting parties, the purposes' of the 
treaty has not been fully accomplished. Over five years of this period has 


The Haitien Government obligates itself, for the preservation of 
domestic peace, the security of individual rights, and the full observance 
of the provisions of this treaty, to create without delay an efficient con- 
stabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians. This constabulary 
shall be organized and officered by Americans appointed by the President 
of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States. The 
Haitien Government shall clothe these officers with the proper and necessary 
authority and uphold them in the performance of their functions. These 
officers will be replaced by Haitians as they, by examination conducted under 
direction of a board to be selected by the senior American officer of this 
constabulary, in the presence of a representative of the Haitian Government, 
are found to be qualified to assume such duties. The constabulary herein 
provided for, shall, under the direction of the Haitian Government, have 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies and 
traffic therein, throughout the country. The high contracting parties agree 
that the stipulations in this article are necessary to prevent factional strife 
and disturbances. 

6. Pursuant to the above treaty and upon recommendation of the 
State Department expressly reciting the desirability 'that every effort 
should be made to put the provisions thereof in operation with the least 
delay', Congress enacted a law which was approved by the President of the 
United States on June 12, 1916 (39 Stat., 223), and which provided as 
follows : 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of 
the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized in his discretion, to detail to 
assist the Republic of Haiti such officers and enlisted men of the United 
States Navy and the United States Marine Corps as may be mutually agreed 
upon by him and the President of the Republic of Haiti: Provided, that the 
officers and enlisted men so detailed be, and they are hereby, authorized to 
accept from the Government of Haiti the said employment with compensa- 
tion and emoluments from the said Government of Haiti, subject to the 
approval of the President of the United States. 

Sec. 2. That to insure the continuance of this work during such time 
as may be desirable, the President may have the power of substitution in 
the case of the termination of the detail of any officer or enlisted man, for 
any cause: Provided: That during the continuance of such details the of- 
ficers and enlisted men shall continue to receive the pay and allowances of 
their ranks or ratings in the Navy or Marine Corps. 

Sec. 3. That the following increase in the United States Marine Corps 
be, and the same is hereby, authorized: Two majors, 12 captains, 18 first 
lieutenants, 2 assistant quartermasters with the rank of captain, 1 assistant 
paymaster with the rank of captain, 5 quartermaster sergeants, 5 first ser- 
geants, 5 gunnery sergeants, and 11 sergeants. 

Sec. 4. That the following increase in the United States Navy be, and 
the same is hereby authorized: One surgeon, 2 passed assistant surgeons, 
5 hospital stewards, and 10 hospital apprentices, first class. 

Sec.5. That officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps 
detailed for duty to assist the Republic of Haiti shall be entitled to the same 
credit for such service, for longevity, retirement, foreign service, pay and 
for all other purposes, that they would receive if they were serving with the 
Navy or with the Marine Corps. 

7. "Marine and naval officers were immediately appointed by the Presi- 
dent of the Republic of Haiti after nomination by the President of the United 
States to officer and administer the Gendarmerie d'Haiti. 

8. "The American minister in Haiti on January 10, 1916 informed Rear 
Admiral Caperton that the State Department on January 8, 1916 had ad- 
vised him concerning the organization of the gendarmerie; that it had been 
agreed between the State Department and the Haitian commission that 
"members of the gendarmerie shall be the sole police and military force 
of the country", thereby abolishing the palace guard as unnecessary. 

9„ "From October 13, 1915, to February 1, 1916, the gendarmerie acted 
in accordance with instructions issued by the expeditionary commander. On 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

February 1, 1916, the following proclamation was issued changing those 
duties from purely police to include both military and police and absolutely 
supplanted the old regime: 


"Where as the President of Haiti and his cabinet have decreed that 
on this date the commandants of communes and the chiefs of sections are 
abolished, and also that all military and police duties of the commandants 
of arrondisements are taken away, it is hereby ordered that, from this 
date, all the military and police duties heretofore performed by those 
officers be performed by the Gendarmerie d'Haiti supported by the expedi- 
tionary forces under my command." 

Pursuant to this order, the gendarmes then in service were trans- 
ferred to all parts of Haiti, both in the large and small towns, appropriate 
increase made in strength, and the gendarmerie took up its duties under 
the following instructions issued by the expeditionary commander regarding 
its functions: 

1. Preservation of order. 

2. Protection of individual rights. 

3. Protection of property. 

4. Supervision of arms. 

5. Prevention of smuggling. 

6. Protect and report on conditions of highways and bridges. 
When so ordered by the commandant of the gendarmerie, the gendarmes 
will require, according to law, the proper inhabitants to alter or repair 
public highways and bridges, and will supervise this work. At the request 
of the mayor of the commune they may, when ordered by the proper officer 
of the gendarmerie, undertake this work. 

7. Protect and report on conditions of the telegraph and tele- 
phone service. When ordered by a commissioned officer of the gendarmerie, 
will have the authority to censor all messages and to take charge of any 
station or office when necessary for the good of the public. 

8. Report on and supervise the use of the public lands according 

to law. 


9. Protect and report on conditions of public buildings. 
10. Collection of vital statistics, including the census, when or- 

11. Report on and protect public irrigation works. 

12. Enforce sanitary orders and regulations. 

13. Report on and enforce regulations preventing spread of animal 

14. Report on and enforce regulations preventing spread of epi- 

15. Plenary control in time of great disorder following war, rebel- 
lion, earthquakes, typhoons, etc. 

16. Control of Prisons. 

17. Issuance of permits for travel within the Republic. 

18. Agricultural reports. 

19. Require all weights and measures to conform to legal standards. 

20. Enforce harbor and docking regulations. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

10. "These duties have since been modified as follows: 

a. "On August 24, 1916, in an agreement between the United States and 
Haiti the maintenance and operation of the telegraph and telephone lines 
were put under the engineer of Haiti. (See below.) 

b. "On January 4, 1917, the Secretary of the Interior issued an order 
that permits for travel within the Republic were no longer necessary. 

c. "On May 31, 1919, the building, upkeep, and repair of roads were 
turned over to the direct supervision of the engineer of Haiti. 

d. "With these exceptions the duties and functions of the gendarmerie 
are at present as outlines above. 

11. a. "On August 24, 1916, the gendarmerie agreement (protocol to 
treaty) was ratified by the United States, and on the same date the com- 
mandant of the Marine Corps directed that the officers and enlisted men 
then serving be transferred out of the marine brigade and into the gen- 

b. "The difficulties with which the gendarmerie had to cope in the early 
days were almost multitudinous. The conditions, both urban and rural, the 
results of over a hundred years' custom, were suddenly changed, and these 
changes were manifestly not agreeable to the old officials replaced by this 
new organization. 

c. "On July 5, 1916, the municipal and rural police were abolished and 
the entire policing of Haiti placed in the hands of the gendarmerie. This 
had to be done, as each commune had its own 'private' police which extended 
into the sections of the commune and through custom and law degenerated to 
such an extent that the chief of section had the authority to require any 
citizen to arrest any other and countenanced arrests of which he had no 
previous knowledge. 

d. "The gendarme as a soldier has done excellent work not only under 
their white officers but under their native noncommissioned officers as well. 
On many occasions they have met and defeated greatly superior forces. 
From the date of their organization the native gendarme has on no occasion 
deserted his white officer. 

e. "The gendarmerie has direct charge of all the prisons and prisoners, 
of Haiti. During the past year the number of prisoners had increased, due 
to captures made in the field. At each district headquarters there is a main 
prison. Each district and post have a "lockup." 

12. "Agreement Regarding Telegraphs and Telephones. 

The undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Gov- 
ernments, have this day agreed: 

I. That the operation, management, and maintenance of the tele 7 
graphs and telephones in the Republic of Haiti shall be under the control 
and direction of the engineer or engineers to be appointed by the President 
of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States and authorized 
for that purpose by the Government of Haiti in accordance with Article 
XIII of the treaty of September 16, 1915. 

liC That in order that officers of the gendarmerie shall be better 
able to fulfill their duties under the treaty, the unrestricted service of the 
telegraphs and telephones is hereby assured to them and in order to pro- 
vide for the prompt transmission of messages of the gendarmerie the of- 
ficers thereof will afford all necessary protection to the lines. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

In witness whereof the undersigned have hereunto signed their 
names and affixed their seals in duplicate. 

Done at Washington, D.C., this twenty-fourth day of August, nine- 
teen hundred and sixteen. 

Robert Lansing. 
Solon Menos. 

13. Agreement Regarding the Gendarmerie. 

The undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Gov- 
ernments, have this day agreed: 

1. That the constabulary contemplated by Article X of the treaty 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at 
Port au Prince on September 16, 1915, shall be known as the Haitien Gen- 
darmerie; that its strength and amounts to be expended for pay, rations, and 
expenses of operation, etc., shall be as set forth in the following table: 

Per annum. 

1 commandant, 250 per month $ 3,000 

1 assistant commandant, $200 per month 2,400 

4 directors, $200 per month 9,600 

9 inspectors, $150 per month 16,200 

1 quartermaster, paymaster, director, $200 per mo. . . 2,400 

2 assistant quartermaster paymasters, inspectors, $150 

per month 3,600 

1 surgeon director, $200 per month 2,400 

2 surgeons, inspectors, $150 per month 3,600 

18 captains, $150 per month 32,400 

21 first lieutenants, $100 per month . 25,200 

3 first lieutenants, (hospital corps) $100 per month . . 3,600 

39 second lieutenants, $60 per month 28,080 

8 second lieutenants, (machine gun), $50 per month . . 4,800 

6 second lieutenants, (hospital corps), $60 per month . . 4,320 

19 first sergeants, $25 per month 5,700 

112 sergeants, $20 per month 26,880 

262 corporals, $15 per month 47,160 

40 field musicians, $10 per month 4,800 

2,100 privates, $10 per month 252,000 

Pay, personal $ 478,140 

Rations, 2,533 enlisted men, at 10 cents per diem 92,455 

Clerical force: 

1 secretary, $100 per month 1,200 

1 clerk to commandant, $45 per month 540 

1 clerk to assistant commandant, $45 per month 540 

2 clerks, $50 per month 1,200 

11 clerks, $45 per month 5,940 



Appendices, Chapter 13 

Forage and remounts 40,000 

Uniforms 66,000 

Ammunition and target practice 15,000 

Hospital, medicine, etc., per month 10,000 

Transportation, maps, office supplies, intelligence ser- 
vice,, etc., per month 35,000 

Miscellaneous rent and repair of barracks, tools, 

kitchen utensils, lights, etc., per month 20,000 


Total land forces 766,015 

Coast Guard, annual cost of maintenance: 

2 inspectors, $1,800 3,600 

4 first lieutenants, $1,200 4,800 

4 engineers, $276 1,104 

4 quartermasters, $216 864 

30 seamen, $156 4,680 


Fuel 20,000 

Total 35,048 

II. A coast guard service shall be established, operated, and maintained 
as a constituent part of the gendarmerie, under the direction and control of 
the commandant of the gendarmerie, and in addition to the annual ex- 
penses heretofore set forth, the sum of $75,000 shall be allotted for the 
purchase of the necessary coast guard vessels for this service. These vessels 
may be used for the transportation of troops, Government employees, and 
the supplies of all departments at the discretion of the commandant of the 
gendarmerie, subject to the direction of the President of Haiti. 

III. All American officers of the gendarmerie shall be appointed by 
the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United 
States, and will be replaced by Haitians when they have shown by examina- 
tion, as provided in Article X of the treaty, that they are fit for command. 

IV. The genderamerie shall be considered the sole military and police 
force of the Republic of Haiti, clothed with full power to preserve domestic 
peace, the security of individual rights, and the full observance of the pro- 
visions of the treaty. It shall have supervision and control of arms and 
ammunitions, military supplies, and traffic therein throughout the Republic. 
It shall be subject only to the direction of the President of Haiti; all other 
officials desiring the services of the gendarmerie, shall be required to submit 
request through the nearest official of that organization. 

The private guard referred to in article 175 of the constitution of Haiti 
shall be composed of 100 men of the gendarmerie, chosen by the President 
of Haiti, which men shall wear distinctive insignia while employed on that 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

V. All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction or training, pro- 
motion, examination, discipline, operation, movement of troops, clothing, 
rations, arms and equipment quarters and administration, shall be under the 
jurisdiction of the commandant of the gendarmerie. 

VI. The gendarmerie shall be organized and officered as provided for 
in Article X of the treaty. The clerical force of the gendarmerie shall be 
Haitian citizens. 

VII. Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of 
the gendarmerie shall be issued by the commandant, after being approved 
by the President of Haiti. Infraction of these rules and regulations by 
members of the gendarmerie may be punished by arrest, imprisonment, 

, suspension from duty without pay, forfeiture of pay, or dismissal under 
regulations promulgated by the commandant of the gendarmerie and ap- 
proved by the President of Haiti. 

VIII. Other offenses committed by gendarmes will be investigated by 
f the gendarmerie officers as directed by the commandant of the gendarmerie, 
i If the behavior of a gendarme is unjustified, he may, at the discretion of the 

commandant of the gendarmerie, be discharged from the gendarmerie, and, 
after his guilt is established, be punished in the same manner as other 
, Haitian citizens; or, if not discharged, he will be punished as provided for 
< „in Articles VII and IX of this agreement. Officers and enlisted men of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps serving with the gendarmerie will 
continue to be subject to the laws of United States for the government of 
. the Navy. 

IX. A tribunal, consisting of five officers of the gendarmerie, is au- 
thorized for the trial of gendarmes charged with conspiracy against the 
Government of Haiti. This tribunal will be ordered by the commandant of 
the gendarmerie, and in case of conviction is authorized to inflict the pun- 
ishment of death or such other punishment as the tribunal may adjudge and 
deem proper, in accordance with the laws of Haiti. All sentences of this 
tribunal, after being reviewed and approved by the commandant of the 
gendarmerie, must be confirmed by the President of Haiti before being 
carried into execution. 

X. Persons violating the laws governing traffic in arms, ammunition, 
and military stores shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 United 
States currency, or imprisonment not exceeding five year, or both. 

XI. The Haitian gendarmerie shall be under the control of the Presi- 
dent of Haiti, and all orders from him pertaining to the gendarmerie shall 
be delivered to the commandant through the minister of the interior. All 
other civil officials desiring protection or the services of the gendarmerie 
will make application to the senior officer of the gendarmerie in the locality. 

XII. The sum of $801,063, United States currency, shall be appro- 
priated annually for pay and allowances, equipment, uniforms, transporta- 
tion, administration, and other current expenses of the Haitian gendarmerie. 
Allotments for the various needs of the gendarmerie shall be made from 
this sum by the commandant, but the total of such allotments in any month 
shall not exceed one-twelfth of the total annual appropriation: Provided, 
however, that the surplus from one month may be allotted in subsequent 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

XIII. Reports of expenditures shall be made by the commandant as 
directed by the President of Haiti. 

XIV. The laws necessary to make effective the above provisions shall 
be submitted to the legislative body of Haiti. In witness whereof the under- 
signed have hereunto signed their names and affixed their seals in duplicate. 

Done at Washington, D.C., this 24th day of August, 1916. 

Solon Menos. 
Robert Lansing. 




14. a. Admiral Caperton. — "In compliance with the department's radio- 
gram No. 10001, regarding the organization of the gendarmerie, on October 
12, 1915 I submitted the following recommendations in a message to the 
Secretary of the Navy: 

"10001. Submit following recommendations regarding constabulary, 
gendarmerie, for Haiti: 

"1. (a) Gendarmerie to consist of 1,530 men, officered by 55 marine of- 
ficers, including sergeants. The gendarmerie will perform the duty of both 
urban and rural constabulary, (b) There are no arms in Haiti suitable 
for this purpose, (c) Annual cost estimated, as follows: Pay including 
marine officers and sergeants as officers, $351,200; clerical force, $9,780; 
uniforms, $40,000; forage and remounts, $22,769; ammunition and target 
practice, $12,000; administration expenses, $43,099; total, $478,848. 

"2. The saving during the first year on pay rations, and other estimated 
expenses of personnel will cover the necessary appropriations of barracks, 
and also for the first equipment, as the recruiting up to the full strength, 
will take several months. 

"3. This organization provides for two marine officers for each company 
and Haitian officers to be assigned when they are properly instructed in 
their duties, the number of marine officers to be gradually reduced as the 
Haitian officers are substituted. 

"4. The cost of the gendarmerie, as proposed, will be about $40,000 
less than Haitian budget for 1914-15 for army and police. 

"5. The pay recommended for the American officers and gendarmerie 
is as follows: American officers to receive following additional monthly pay: 
Commandant, $250; assistant commandant, $200; quartermaster and paymas- 
ter, $200; assistant quartermaster and paymaster, $150; directors, $200; in- 
spectors, $150; medical officers, $150; captain of company, $150; lieutenant of 
company, $100. Haitian officers and men, monthly pay as follows: Captains, 
$90; lieutenants, $60; first sergeants, $25, sergeants, $20; corporals, $15; 
privates, $10. Enlisted men to receive ration of 10 cents per day. In ad- 
dition to pay and rations, each enlisted man will have certain clothing 
allowances. 14412. 



Appendices, Chapter 13 

b. "Legation of the United States of America 

January 10, 1916 

Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, United States Navy. 

Commanding United States forces in Haiti and Haitian waters, 

U.S.S. 'Washington.' 

SIR: Referring to your note of January 10, 1916 No. 434 — 16, I have 
the honor to inform you that the following message sent by the Department 
of State at 6 p.m., January 8, 1916, referring to the legation's telegram 
of 5 p.m., January 5, 1916, which I communicated to you and which stated 
that reforms desired were agreed to by the Government and that you were 
carrying out the provisions as instructed, has been received and a para- 
phrase thereof is herewith forwarded for your information: 

It is understood in Washington that it has been accepted that the so- 
called palace guard be abolished. 

The Department of State proposed to the Haitian Commission, in ar- 
ranging with them for the organization of the gendarmerie, that the follow- 
ing provision be included: 'The gendarmerie shall be the sole police and 
military force of Haiti.' The Haitian minister maintained this would be 
contrary to the Haitian constitution, which provides for a president's per- 
sonal guard. He objected to the words "the sole military" and now says 
that he has telegraphic instructions under dated of January 6 which permit 
him to accept the department's proposed wording if the words 'excepting 
a palace guard not to exceed 250 men' be added, claiming this would allow 
conformance with the Haitian constitution, article 175. The palace guard 
is an unnecessary extravagance, and its continuance may in the future well 
develop into a source of danger to the Government. With it in existence 
it would be impossible for the gendarmerie properly to guard the palace. 
And if the palace guard remains in existence it would be impossible for any 
members of this gendarmerie to be detached on special duty in personal 
attendance on the President. I am instructed to bring these facts orally and 
discreetly to the attention of the President and to show him that his per- 
sonal safety may be at stake. The department therefore believed it de- 
sirable that the commission accept the following phraseology: 'Members of 
the gendarmerie shall form the personal guard of the President of Haiti, and 
the gendarmerie shall be the sole police and military force of the country.' 
This meets objection raised by the Haitian minister. 

I am instructed to furnish the department with a copy of the telegram 
accepting the above, which I am also instructed to suggest to the President 
to send to the commission, and to hasten my reply in order that on Monday 
next the department can conclude this matter with the commission. I have 
the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Bailly-Blanchard, 
American Minister. 



15. "Mr. Angell. As to the gendarmerie, General, you have testified 
that the officers of the gendarmerie were of the Marine Corps, and so pro- 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

vided for under the treaty. Do you know who chose, or rather, who was 
responsible for the choice and organization of the personnel of the gen- 
darmerie ? I do not mean of the specific officers of the Marine Corps. 

Gen. Barnett. I was responsible for it, I think. I signed the orders, 
but I naturally got the suggestions from different officers and different 
members of the profession. From time to time the officers were sent to Haiti 
and from time to time the officer in command of the Gendarmerie in Haiti 
would state to the commanding marine officer in Haiti that there were cer- 
tain vacancies in the Gendarmerie, and the senior marine officer in Haiti 
would make a report to me recommending certain people. These people 
had to be mentioned by name to get authority from the President of the 
United States to be detailed to the gendarmerie before they could draw the 
extra pay as gendarmerie officers. In every case when an officer was detailed 
to the gendarmerie the final order had to be approved by the President of the 
United. States. 

Mr. Angell. When you used the expression "these people", you meant 
the members of the Marine Corps who were detailed to duty as officers in 
the gendarmerie? 

Gen. Barnett. Certainly. 

Mr. Angell. I referred more to the whole plan of organization and train- 
ing and choice of the general personnel of the gendarmerie. 

Gen. Barnett. That was sent by the senior officer of the gendarmerie 
to the senior marine officer and approved by him and sent to me and ap- 

Mr. Angell. In other words, it was done by the Marine Corps, not by 
the Haitian Government at all? 

Gen. Barnett. Not at all ; it was done by the Marine Corps, of course. 

Mr. Angell. Did the officers of the gendarmerie choose the enlisted 
personnel of the gendarmerie? 

Gen. Barnett. Undoubtedly; they were all Haitians. 

Mr. Angell. Did they take and train men from among the Haitian 
population ? 

Gen. Barnett. I do not know what their scheme of enlistment was, but 
they had that in charge the same as officers here who were in charge of 
enlistments for the Marine Corps. 

Mr. Angell. Do you know what attempts, if any, was made, General, 
to make native Haitian officers in the gendarmerie, as provided or suggested 
by article 10 of the orginial treaty? 

Gen. Barnett. Our intention was originally as fast as possible to make 
the Haitians junior officers and see if they could not soon be in a position 
to become captains of companies. That was thought of at that time. 

Mr. Angell. Do you know how far that original plan was pursued ? 

Gen. Barnett. I do not know. That was left entirely to the gendarmerie ; 
it was under Haitian control entirely. 

Mr. Angell. When you say under Haitian control .... 

Gen. Barnett. I mean under Haitian control according to the treaty. 
They were essentially Haitian troops and they were paid by the Haitian 

Mr. Angell. And the choice? 

Gen. Barnett. Entirely with the marines. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 



THE G.d'H. 

16. "Mr. Howe. During the time you were organizing the gendarmerie 
— that is to say, from December, 1915, to September, 1916 — will you please 
give us a little more definite idea as to the extent to which you consulted 
the President of Haiti and took his directions? 

Gen. Butler. During the period from the 3d of December, 1915, to the 
29th of January, 1916, the gendarmerie performed no functions whatsoever 
except those necessary to its own organization. It was assembled in a 
number of towns for drill and organization and equipment purposes only. It 
performed no police functions; it was nothing but a school. 

Mr. Howe: And consequently you, as its organizer, were in charge of no 
police functions? 

Gen. Butler. No police; and had no connection whatsoever with the 
Haitian President except as to its future development and status. During 
this period, with the assistance of the President of Haiti, we wrote and 
prepared for promulgation, upon the confirmation of the service by our 
own Congress, a set of rules and regulations for the government of the gen- 
darmerie, in accordance with the treaty, which rules and regulations were 
promulgated and enforced in the name of the President of Haiti, and the 
whole conduct of the force of the gendarmerie during the whjole time I was 
in it was directly in accordance with the directions and orders given by the 
President of Haiti himself. 

Mr. Howe. And in the preparation of those orders he was consulted? 

Gen. Butler. Every day 

Mr. Howe. Did those early orders and regulations meet with his ap- 
proval ? 

Gen. Butler. Absolutely, or they could not have been published, because 
the treaty stated that they had to be promulgated by the President of 

Mr. Howe. You are referring to Article X, no doubt, of the treaty? 

Gen. Butler. I am referring to the gendarmerie agreement here, which 
has the same effect with us as the treaty. 

Mr. How. Will you give a reference to that gendarmerie agreement? 

Gen. Butler. It is an agreement dated the 24th of August 1916, in 
which appears this provision: 

'Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of the 
gendarmerie shall be issued by the commandant after being approved by 
the President of Haiti/ 

That was strictly carried out. That is article 7 of the protocol of the 
24th of August, 1916. 

Mr. Howe. While you were organizing the gendarmerie did you per- 
form any other duites? 

Gen. Butler. I did not. 

Mr. Howe. After you were duly appointed commandant — is that the 
correct term, or commander? 

Gen Butler. I would like to bring this in. On the 1st day of February, 
1916, the following proclamation was issued by Admiral Caperton: 


Appendices, Chapter 13 


Whereas the President of Haiti and his cabinet have decreed that on 
this date the commandants of communes and the chiefs of sections are 
abolished, and also that all military and police duties of the commandants 
of arrondissements are taken away, it is hereby ordered that from this 
date all the military and pol,ice duties heretofore performed by those of- 
ficers be performed by the gendarmerie of Haiti, supported by the ex- 
peditionary forces under my command. 

By order of Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, United States Navy, com- 
manding United States forces in Haiti and Haitian waters. 

Littleton W. T. Waller, 
Colonel, United States Marine Corps 

Commanding United States Expeditionary Forces Ashore in Haiti. 
Port au Prince, Haiti, February 1, 1916. 

Gen. Butler. We took over the police duties and performed them until 
the formation of the gendarmerie made it possible for them to take it over. 

Mr. Howe. General, I want to get back later on in the examination to 
a few of the facts about the selection of your forces — enlisted men and 

Gen. Butler. That is, the organization of the gendarmerie and how it 
was done ? 

Mr. Howe. Yes. 

Gen. Butler. In each town where a considerable force of marines was 
stationed — that is, a company or more — one commissioned officer of marines 
and certain noncommissioned officers and privates were detailed by the com- 
mander of the marines in Haiti to enlist and organize and train Haitians 
for this gendarmerie, so that each body of marines resolved itself into a 
little training camp? 

Mr. Howe. And recruiting station? 

Gen. Butler. And recruiting station, the Haitians voluntarily enlisting 
on enlistment papers similar to those used in our corps. They were dressed, 
in our clothes. The Haitian Government bought the excess marine clothing,, 
in order that we might have some distinguishing mark for them, and dressed 
them just as marines were dressed, with the exception that we did not 
give them the Marine Corps device. They had no Marine Corps devices, 
and they had plain Haitian buttons. 

That system continued until the 1st of February, 1916, when it was neces- 
sary for the gendarmerie to stand on its own feet. On the 29th day of 
January Gen. Waller, commanding the marines in Haiti, notified me that 
the Haitian Government had decided to give up trying to maintain law and 
order and had said, 'Now, you Americans do it with your gendarmerie'; and 
Gen Waller gave me two days to garrison Haiti. 

Mr. Howe. With the gendarmerie? 

Gen. Butler. With the gendarmerie. 

Mr. Howe. What did the Haitians mean, then, by saying to the Ameri- 
cans to preserve law and order with their gendarmerie, when the gendarmerie 
was the Haitian gendarmerie? 

Gen. Butler. It was the Haitian gendarmerie. We understood it to be 
an effort on their part to embarrass us, because they well knew that our 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

gendarmerie, or their gendarmerie that we were organizing for them under 
the provisions of a treaty already confirmed, was not complete; but in two 
days we established 117 posts around Haiti, and on the night of the 1st of 
February I reported to the commander, to Col. Waller, that the police force 
of Haiti was complete, but in reduced numbers. We did not have a suf- 
ficient force. 

Mr. Howe. Did you have any difficulty in getting recruits? 
Gen. Butler. Absolutely none. We took the best men in the country. 
Mr. Howe. Was there competition among them for recognition? 
Gen. Butler. Very great competition. 




17. . . "Thereafter, on June 12, 1918, the Republic of Haiti adopted a new 
constitution, article 127 of which provided that — 

" 'The present constitution and all the treaties actually in force or to be 
concluded hereafter and all the laws decreed in accordance with this consti- 
tution or with these treaties shall constitute the law of the country, and 
their relative superiority shall be determined by the order in which they 
are here mentioned.' 


Art. 118. An armed force, to be known as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, 
shall be established to preserve order, guarantee the rights of the people, 
and police the cities and the country. 

It shall be the only armed force of the Republic. 

Art. 119. The regulations for the maintenance of discipline in the 
gendarmerie and the repression of the offenses committed by those who 
compose it shall be established by the executive power. These regulations 
shall have the force of law. 

These regulations shall establish the organization of the courts-martial 
of the gendarmerie, shall prescribe their powers and shall determine the 
obligations of their members and the rights of the individuals who are to 
be judged by them. 

The sentences pronounced by courts-martial of the gendarmerie shall 
be subject only to revision by the Court of Cessation, and this revision shall 
be confined to questions of jurisdiction and of excess of powers. 




. 18. Intelligence Agents. — Haitian gendarmes in civilian clothing 
and civilians, selected for their loyalty and intelligence, were 
sent throughout the affected area for the purpose of gaining 
knowledge of the identity of the various chiefs of bands; it being 
realized that if the leaders were eliminated banditry would soon 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

come to an end. All officers were furnished lists of these leaders 
and lent special efforts to their capture. Much important informa- 
tion was likewise obtained from cacos (bandits) captured by the 
various patrols. 

19. Vigilantes (Guides) — In 1919, it became apparent that 
patrols could obtain better results if friendly inhabitants who 
knew the country thoroughly could be persuaded to accompany 
them. These inhabitants would know persons of honest reputa- 
tion in the country thru which the patrols travelled and be able 
to identify bandits and bandit sympathizers- Accordingly, meas- 
ures were taken to secure the services of one or more such civilians 
to accompany each patrol. Money was appropriated to suitably 
recompense them for their time, risk and trouble, and there was 
inaugurated a system which was to be of great value. These 
civilians, known as vigilantes, served the Gendarmerie, the Marine 
Corps, and their Government well and risked their lives doing so. 
Many were killed by the bandits, some in action, some murdered; 
but the records do not contain a single instance where they were 
guilty of traitorous actions or dealings- 

20. Police Rurale (Chiefs of Section) (County Sheriffs). — a. 
Until 1923, order was maintained in the rural districts and the law 
enforced by regular and frequent patrols of gendarmes sent out 
from the nearest Garde station. While it was realized that this 
system diverted many men from other duties at which they were 
badly needed, lack of funds made it impracticable to make other 
provisions for the enforcement of the law in rural districts. With 
increased prosperity in Haiti, funds became available to make 
lasting and effective provision for the policing of rural districts. 
Prior to 1915 this had been accomplished by the appointment of an 
official known as a chief of section and numerous assistants. This 
chief of section and his staff were supposed to enforce the law, 
but corruption and lack of supervision had soon reduced the posi- 
tion to an excuse for extortion, with consequent mistreatment and 
pillage of honest and law-abiding inhabitants. The Gendarmerie^ 
after careful study, organized a rural police that was as effective 
and as honestly administered as possible. The 551 sections of 
Haiti, corresponding to county divisions in the United States, were 
canvassed and a prominent citizen in each section selected to serve 
as the chief of that section. These men were enlisted as members 
of the Rural Police, Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and were required to 
provide themselves with neat blue denim uniforms. Each was 
issued a Krag rifle, ammunition, and a star denoting his office. 
The fullest instruction possible was given them, and their duties 
were set forth in detail. They enforced the Rural Code, encouraged 
the inhabitants in their work, and observed that law and order 
was maintained in the section. As strict discipline as possible was 
maintained among these chiefs of sections from the very first. 

b. Gendarmerie officers maintain close supervision over them, 
requiring them to report to the subdistrict headquarters weekly, 
and themselves making an inspection of each section frequently. 



Appendices, Chapter 13 

During these inspections, complaints against the chiefs of section 
were heard and, where the complaints were found to be justified, 
appropriate action was taken. For some offenses police rurales 
were reprimanded, or discharged. For the more serious mis- 
demeanors they were court-martialed, the same court-martial 
being prescribed for them as for the Gendarmes. Regulations 
were eventually promulgated concerning rural police and these 
were rigidly enforced. This arm of the Gendarmerie, even as early 
as 1925, proved that it could accomplish law enforcement through- 
out the rural sections, and this released a large number of regularly 
enlisted gendarmes for other military and police duties. The police 
rurals, because they possessed the advantage of most intimate 
contact with the inhabitants, were used more and more for dis- 
seminating and securing information. For example: each coffee 
season they rendered valuable service by explaining the coffee 
law, and proper methods of gathering and drying coffee. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

(Guardia Nacional Dominicana) 

1. General. — a. The Policia Nacional Dominicana was organized 
on April 7, 1917 and from that date until July 12, 1924, officers 
and men of the U.S. Marine Corps, and Medical Corps, U.S. Navy 
were charged with directing the training and organizing of this 
military and police force. 

b. In a general way, many of the methods employed in train- 
ing and organizing the Guardia in Nicaragua were similar to the 
methods employed in training and organizing the Policia in the 
Dominican Republic. However, the employment of "civil patrols" 
by the U.S. Forces of Occupation is of particular interest and is 
described below. 

2. Civil Patrols. (Patrols composed of civilians). — a. The 
training and employment of civil patrols or guards was not an 
established practice. As a matter of fact, their use was seldom 
resorted to, and then only in cases of emergency. However, their 
organization was frequently advocated by the civil authorities 
(Dominicans) and not infrequently recommended by officers of 
the Occupation (Americans) . 

b. As far as can be determined, there was no policy pertain- 
ing to the employment of the civil population for purely military 
reasons. However, some intimation of a radical change in the 
political situation in Santo Domingo, led the Navy Department in 
May, 1923, to announce a policy which had for its main object 
the divorcing of all civil and police functions from the Marine 
Brigade, and the assumption of these functions by the Policia. 
This covered the problem as far as the Brigade was concerned. 
The terms, "civil guards" and "civil patrols" are used synonymously, 
although the former was intended to apply to civilian organizations 
employed defensively in communities where the absence of the 
military forces or the numerical weakness of the municipal police 
did not afford adequate police protection against the descent of 
the bandit groups. While never specifically organized for this 
purpose, they were, however, employed offensively against the 
bandit groups. Therefore, the term civil patrols would appear to 
be more appropriate. 

c. The employment of the native population by a force in 
occupation, as an improvisation, for police or military purposes 
should ordinarily be condemned and viewed as an undesirable re- 
course to means that properly belong to other agencies. Numer- 
ous disadvantages inseparable to the formation of civil patrols 
can only be neutralized by the most inflexible supervision. Where 
such forces were authorized to operate either independently or 
in concert with the forces of the Occupation, the Military Govern- 
ment (American) was accountable for their acts, and thereby be- 
came likely recipient of severe censure. Furthermore, with patrols 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

of this sort, there was the grave possibility of encountering the 
forces of the Occupation or the Policia, who might mistake their 
identity with disastrous results. Such unfortunate incidents hap- 
pened during the bandit operations, after every reasonable pre- 
caution had apparently been taken. Again, any carelessness in 
the selection of the members composing these patrols and the plac- 
ing of firearms in the hands of irresponsible, inefficient, and un- 
disciplined persons contained an element of danger. 

d. Like so many problems affecting the population, the Oc- 
cupation could not ignore giving some attention to the political 
side of the military induction of the civil population. Especially 
did reflection seem imperative in such cases, where the civil au- 
thorities or politicans sponsored movements associated with the 
military affairs of the Republic. If the Military Government desired 
to adhere to a policy which had for its purpose the divorcement 
of the civil authorities and politicans from all military connec- 
tions, then the sanctioning of civil patrols was in direct discord 
with such a policy. Based on this idea, the leadership of a civil 
organization, possessing military characteristics, might be expected 
to develop certain political aspects. The command of a large patrol 
would naturally enhance the prestige of the leader, and in a 
country where politics play a predominant part in the lives of the 
people, the supposition was that the leader would be disposed to 
use his influence for political aggrandizement. 

e. One example will serve to illustrate some of the disad- 
vantages outlined above. A Dominican of considerable prominence 
was authorized to collect about fifty native followers to operate 
against the bandits. This band was armed, and directed to destroy 
a certain notorious bandit leader and his followers. Outside of 
securing information, the band rendered no service whatsoever to 
the Occupation. On the contrary these irregulars did irreparable 
damage, and were an actual embarrassment to the Military Gov- 
ernment by making hosts of enemies among all classes of Domini- 
cans. Evidently the leader interpreted the authority conferred 
upon him as carrying with it an unbridled license to commit 
depredations against- the peaceful inhabitants, whose cause he 
had agreed to support by force of arms. According to reports, 
the history of the band was one of pillage and lawlessness, which 
necessitated the immediate disarming and disbandment of the 
group, and the placing of the leader under surveillance. 

f. Another example where civil guards were utilized would 
tend to discredit many of the above objectionable features, and, 
moreover, offered, in lieu of, certain redeeming virtures. But in 
this instance, the most rigid control was exercised. The system 
used was similar in many respects to the method followed in the 
western part of the United States where outlaws were numerous ; 
namely, the employment of posses of civilians, inhabitants of the 
country in which the outlaws were operating, and who in a great 
many cases were impelled to action by some personal grievance 
against the outlaws. . In Santo Domingo these groups -consisted of 

Appendices, Chapter 13 

the better known, more courageous and trustworthy citizens, prac- 
tically all of whom were actuated by a grudge against the bandits. 
They were organized into small bands of not more than sixteen 
men. These small groups had the advantage of being highly 
mobile, easily concealed, and readily controlled. Each member of 
a group was thoroughly instructed by the armed forces of the 
Occupation in the use of the rifle and automatic pistol, especially, 
in firing rapidly and accurately at short ranges. The groups were 
not permitted to operate until they were competent to handle their 
firearms with some degree of skill, and with some knowledge of 
their powers and limitations. To obviate any promiscuous use of 
these weapons, they were kept locked in gun racks when not ab- 
solutely required. Four groups were originally established at posts 
where the military forces were stationed. With some assurance of 
their success, three more groups were organized later. Each group 
was controlled by a Marine officer, who supervised the training and 
accompanied the group when on patrol. In order not to restrict 
the initiative of the groups, or to interfere with their freedom 
of maneuver, this officer allowed the native leader to employ his 
own methods in the conduct of the patrol, but was, nevertheless, 
in a position to observe and correct the behavior of the group 
should the necessity arise. 

g. The character or composition of the groups facilitated the 
gathering of information concerning the bandits, their movement, 
location of camps, and rendezvous. An inhabitant would have 
little or no hesitancy in giving pertinent information to the native 
leader of a group, that he would under no circumstances divulge to 
a member of the Occupation. As already cited, the collection of 
bandit information was a most essential item looking towards the 
destruction of banditry. 

h. Each patrol's operations were confined to a well defined 
section of the country with which all the members were thoroughly 
familiar. Upon the receipt of information of any bandit movement 
within the area, the proper group was ordered out, while all the 
armed forces of the Occupation were simultaneously directed to 
remain in their garrisons until the group was recalled. This pre- 
caution eliminated any possibility of mistaking the armed natives 
for bandit groups. This system possessed the marked advantage 
of keeping the bandits continually on the move. 

i. A variation of this method, frequently consisted in sending 
out all the native groups, each group assiduously patrolling within 
its designated area for three consecutive days of a week. Upon 
their return, they were promptly relieved by the military patrols, 
which scoured the country for the remainder of the week. 

j. The operation of these groups gave evidence of the con- 
fidence reposed in them for their behavior was irreproachable. 
They were able to secure a number of contacts with the bandit 
groups, and in each encounter conducted themselves in a most 
creditable manner, inflicting severe punishment on the bandits. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

The effect of witnessing their own countrymen assist the Military 
Government in the repression of lawlessness and disorder must 
have been demoralizing to the bandits. These patrols, combined 
with the activities of the military forces, were primarily conducive 
to the final suppression of banditry. 

k. Shortly before the installation of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment (Dominican), the Military Government directed the sev- 
erance of all relations with the civil guards, although several of 
the sugar estates were authorized to retain their services. In- 
dications are that the rest were disbanded as there is no record 
of the Policia employing them. It was felt that with the installa- 
tion of the Provisional Government any semblance of control over 
these civil guards by the forces of Occupation would create an un- 
favorable impression in the minds of Dominicans. 

1. It is doubtful if this same system could have been success- 
fully employed in the early days of the Occupation, in face of the 
general opposition to the Military Government and the mistrust of 
its purposes. In other words, a change in conditions demanded 
or permitted the application of remedies to old ailments, that 
formerly would neither have been suitable nor advisable. 
3. Act of Congress. 

1918, Feb. 11. Dominican Republic; detail of naval personnel 
to assist. 

That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, au- 
thorized, in his discretion, to detail to assist the Dominican Re- 
public, officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy and 
the United States Marine Corps: Provided, That officers and en- 
listed men so detailed be, and they are hereby, authorized to ac- 
cept from the Government of the Dominican Republic offices under 
said Government with compensation and emoluments from the 
said Dominican Republic, subject to the approval of the President 
of the United States: Provided further, That while so detailed 
such officers and enlisted men shall receive, in addition to the com- 
pensation and emoluments allowed them by the Dominican Republic, 
the pay and allowances of their rank or rating in the United States 
Navy or United States Marine Corps, as the case may be, and they 
shall be entitled to the same credit, while so serving, for longevity, 
retirement, foreign-service pay, and for all other purposes that 
they would receive if they were serving with the United States 
Navy or Marine Corps in said Dominican Republic. (40 Stat., 437, 
chap. 15.) 

(See act of June 12, 1916 (39 Stat., 223), as to Haiti; joint resolu- 
tion of October 13, 1914 (38 Stat., 780), as to Brazil; and act of 
June 5, 1920 (41 Stat., 1056), as to all South Amercian Re- 
publics ; see also note to Constitution, Article I, section 9, clause 


Appendices, Chapter 13 


L General Data on Nicaragua. — a. Miscellaneous- 

(1) Area. — 49,200 square miles (larger than N. Y. State). 

(2) Population (1920).— 638,119 

White; 17% 

Indian (full-blooded) ; 3% 
Negro; 9% 

Spanish-Indian (mixed) ; 71% 

(3) Language. — Spanish. 

b. First Nicaraguan Campaign. — (1) August 15, 1912, Ma- 
rines, landed, crushed a revolution, and withdrew; leaving a 
Legation Guard at the United States Legation. 

(2) August 4, 1925, the Legation Guard was withdrawn. 

(3) August 25, 1925, the disorders and violence commenced 
that led to warfare between the Conservatives and Liberals ; and 
the Second Nicaraguan Campaign. 

c. Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1926 to 1932; Landing of 
the Marines. — Because of the nature of the fighting between the 
Conservatives (the "Ins") and Liberals (the "Outs"), the United 
States was compelled to land Marines in Nicaragua. A Legation 
Guard was established in Managua, railroad and seaport towns were 
garrisoned, and neutral zones were designated in which there should 
be no fighting, and where foreign lives and property might be 
safe. (This protection was extended to the Nicaraguans within 
the Neutral Zone) . 

d. Tipitapa Agreement. — In May, 1927, Colonel Stimpson, 
President Coolidge's representative, completed a peace between the 
contending Conservative and Liberal military forces and political 

While the Tipitapa agreement was never reduced to one single 
document and signed by both Nicaraguan parties and the United 
States, it was the fundamental agreement on which the Guardia 
Nacional was organized, and provided in general for: 

(1) Immediate general peace and delivery of arms simul- 
taneously by both parties into American custody; and the im- 
mediate disbandment of the Federal and Revolutionary military 

(2) General amnesty and return of exiles, and return of 
confiscated property. 

(3) Participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative 

(4) The organization of a Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional 
on a non-partisan basis; training and organization to be under 
the direction of American officers. 

(5) Supervision of 1928 and subsequent elections by Ameri- 
cans who should have police power to make effective such super- 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

(6) A temporary continuance of a sufficient force of Ameri- 
can Marines to secure the enforcement of the peace terms be- 
tween the two Nicaraguan parties. 

e. The Bandit Insurrection. — In accordance with the Tipitapa 
Agreement, the forces under the control of the leaders on both 
sides laid down their arms. Sandino, a liberal general, and 400 of 
his followers, refused to lay down their arms. They retired to the 
mountains and jungles of Northern Nicaragua and defied the con- 
stituted authorities of the Nicaraguan government. This outlaw 
force became the nucleus around which formed many criminals, 
Latin-American adventurers, ignorant Indians, and misguided pa- 
troits. These bandit forces, sometimes a thousand strong, re- 
mained in existence during the entire period of the Second Nicara- 
guan Campaign (1927 to 1932) and waged savage warfare against 
the constitutional government, Guardia Nacional, peaceful but non- 
sympathic individuals and communities, and such U.S. Marines as 
were employed to assist the aforementioned. The fighting between 
the Marine-Guardia forces and the bandits was of a guerrilla nature. 
The bandit methods of waging war against peaceful communities 
included murder, robbery, pillage, intimidation, enforced contri- 
butions, rape, and burning of property. 

2. Initial Steps in Reorganizing the Guardia. — a. The "Old" 
Guardia. — Since 1925 there had been a Nicaraguan military force 
named the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. It consisted of several 
hundred officers and men and constituted the "Presidential Guard". 
It occupied part of the Campo de Marte, a military compound in 
Managua. The Tipitapa Peace found it in a rather demoralized 
state, and, as described below, it was disbanded, and replaced by 
the "New" Guardia. 

b. Appointment of a Chief Director ( Jefe Director) : — Presi- 
dent Diaz, on May 8, 1927, requested the appointment of an Ameri- 
can Officer to instruct and command the Guardia Nacional, and on 
May 12, 1927, the reorganization of the Guardia was started under 
the direction of Lieutenant Colonel R.Y. Rhea, U.S. Marine Corps. 
Lt. Col. Rhea had served in the First Nicaraguan Campaign, and 
was personally acquainted with President Diaz and other govern- 
ment officials. 

c. Appointment of Additional Officers and Men. — The ap- 
pointment of additional officers and men from the Marine Corps, 
and Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, was made as their services were 
authorized and required. The officers and men were transferred 
to the "Nicaraguan Nacional Guard Detachment", a Marine Corps 
unit attached to the Marine Brigade in Nicaragua. Upon reporting, 
they were assigned duty in the Guardia Nacional, and commissioned 
as officers in the Nicaraguan service. Thereafter they served in 
a dual capacity and were carried on the rolls of the Nicaraguan 
National Guard Detachment, and the rolls of the Guardia Nacional 
unit to which attached. 

d. Conferences. — Initial plans involved conferences which in- 
cluded the President of Nicaragua, American Minister, Admiral 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

Special Service Squadron, General Moncada (Liberal leader), Colonel 
Stimpson, Brigade Commander, and the Jefe Director. 

e. Disbanding "Old" Guardia. — It was considered desirable 
to disband the "old" Guardia and start out with a "new" Guardia. 
The old Guardia still maintained several sentry posts, chiefly at 
gates to the camp, and guards for the President. For this reason, 
its disbandment was gradual and extended over several weeks. 
After recruits in the "new" Guardia were ready to be put on post 
the "old" Guardia was completely disbanded. 

f . The Model. — In general, the Guardia was modeled after the 
Marine Corps. All Guardia officers, in their many daily problems, 
fell back on Marine Corps organization and methods for a guide. 
The recruiting, clothing, rationing, quartering, arming, equipping, 
training, administration, organization, medical service, discipline, 
recreation, civil relations, paymaster's department, quartermaster's 
department, supply, transportation, and so on, were based on a 
similar feature of the Marine Corps. To supplement Marine Corps 
experience there was the experience of those officers and men who 
had on previous occasions served with the Policia in the Dominican 
Republic, and the Garde in the Republic of Haiti. 

g. Preliminary Steps.— Within several days after the Jefe, 
(Lt. Col. Rhea), had been appointed he had the Guardia "under 
way". Some incidents were: 

(a) Marines and U.S. Navy medical personnel were 
transferred to the N.N.G.D. and assigned duties within the 
Guardia as follows : 

1 Captain, USMC.— Personnel, Adjutant, Chief of Staff, 
Recruiting, etc. 

1 Captain, USMC. — Quartermaster, Paymaster, Ord- 
nance, Mess Officer, etc. 

1 Lieut., USMC. — Company Commander, Recruit Sta- 
tion, etc. 

1 Surgeon, USN. — Medical Director. 

6 Noncommissioned officers. — Chiefly veterans of the 
Policia and Garde and well acquainted with organ- 
izing a native army. 

2 Enlisted U.S. Navy. — Medical personnel. 

(b) Recruiting commenced. Some members of the "old" 
Guardia enlisted. Publicity was started, including recruit ser- 
geants and sign boards. Prominent Nicaraguans were prevailed 
upon to urge their followers to apply for enlistment. 

(c) A Headquarters was organized. 

(d) The barracks of the "old" Guardia was taken over. 

h. Arms and Equipment. — From the stores turned in by the 
Conservative and Liberal Forces. 

i. Rationing. — A mess was started. 

j. Quarters. — The recruits were quartered in the barracks in 
the Campo de Marte. (The Marines occupying about one-half of 
the Campo). 

k. Rifle Range. — A simple rifle range of 200 yards distance 
was constructed. The targets (borrowed from the Marines) were 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

set up on the ground and marked by a marking detail that took 
cover behind a convenient bank during firing. Ranges were 200, 
100, and 50 yards. Positions were prone, kneeling and standing; 
with and without sling. Standing, without sling, was emphasized. 

1. Recruits were drilled by the Marine N.C.O.'s, now lieuten- 
ants in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

m. The First Companies. — The first man was enlisted in the 
reorganized Guardia on 24 May, 1927, and between the dates of 18 
to 25 June, 1927, the First Company, Recruit Company, and Head- 
quarters Company were organized at Campo de Marte, Managua. 

The First Company, consisting of three officers and fifty en- 
listed, cleared Managua on July 1, 1927 for Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, 
and on 16 July, 1927, in conjunction with Marine forces, participated 
in the defense of Ocotal against a bandit attack directed by Sandino. 

3. Organizing the Guardia, Year 1927. — Some of the important 
incidents of 1927 associated with organizing the G.N. de Nic. are: 

a. President Diaz, on 13 July, 1927, authorized the strength 
of the Guardia to be increased to six hundred enlisted and the ap- 
pointment of Marine Corps and Navy personnel as officers of the 
Guardia up to six and one-half per cent of the authorized enlisted 
strength. On 8 September, 1927, the complement for officers was 
raised by President Diaz to ten per cent of the authorized enlisted 

b. On 29 July, 1927, President Diaz directed the Jefe Director 
to take over the police service of the Republic as soon as the enlisted 
strength of the Guardia would permit, and that this service be 
started in the Department of Chinandega, then one of the most 
disturbed and lawless departments of the Republic. 

c. Enlistments in the Guardia Nacional during the first few 
months of reorganization were necessarily slow due to the fact 
that few Nicaraguans believed the Government would actually pay 
good wages to soldiers; the coffee picking season intervened and 
good wages in the coffee areas made men reluctant to enlist; and 
the approaching elections caused political leaders to discourage 
volunteers, who on enlistment were sworn not to engage in political 

d. The early organization of the Guardia was divided into a 
General Headquarters, Areas, Divisions and Subdivisions. The 
Division ordinarily included one political department, garrisoned by 
one company under the Division Commander usually of the rank 
of Captain. The Division was divided into Sub-Divisions which in- 
cluded one or more towns of importance, commanded by the Sub- 
Division Commander, usually of the rank of Lieutentant. The Sub- 
Divisions were further divided into Sub-Stations known as Posts 
and usually commanded by a noncommissioned officer. An Area 
included two or more Divisions commanded by a Colonel known as 
the Area Commander. This organization continued in effect until 
1 May, 1929, when the designations Division and Sub-Division were 
changed to Department and District. 

e. The terms of an agreement for the establishment and 
maintenance of the Guardia Nacional were drawn up and the 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

agreement was signed in Managua on 22 December, 1927, by the 
American Charge d' Affaires at Managua and the Nicaraguan Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs. This agreement provided for: 

(1) The creation of a Guardian Nacional of 93 officers and 
1136 enlisted men, or a total of 1229 officers and men, at a cost 
of $689,132 per annum, with provisions that both personnel and 
expenses could be increased as finances permitted, upon recom- 
mendation of the Jefe Director and approval by the President of 

(2) The Guardia to be considered the sole military and 
police force of the Republic, and to have control of all arms, 
ammunition, and military supplies, forts, prisons, etc., through- 
out the Republic subject only to the direction of the President. 

The Guardia agreement was approved by the Nicaraguan 
Senate on 10 January, 1928, but the Chamber of Deputies delayed 
approval of the bill for more than a year. The agreement was 
amended and finally passed by both houses of the Nicaraguan Con- 
gress on 19 February, 1929, and was signed by President Moncada. 
The original agreement, however, was changed by the Nicaraguan 
Congress to such an extent as to render it unacceptable to the 
United States, and the Guardia continued to function and expand 
under Presidential Decrees. 

f. The Guardia Nacional on 31 December, 1927, or approxi- 
mately six and one-half months after reorganization was started, 
consisted of eighty-two officers and five hundred and seventy-four 
enlisted assigned to the following organizations : 

General Headquarters (Managua) . 

Division of General Headquarters (Managua). 

Division of National Penitentiary (Managua) . 

Division of Chinandega, 

Division of Leon, 

Division of Neuva Segovia (including Third Company in 
Department of Esteli) 
and distributed in five political departments as shown below: 

4. Organizing the Guardia, Years 1928 to 1932. — Some of the 
important incidents of the years 1928 to 1932 associated with or- 
ganizing the G.N. de Nic. are : 

a. The strength of the Guardia Nacional, as determined upon 
in the Guardia agreement of 22 December, 1927, was based upon 
the belief that after the termination of the civil war, peace would 
follow in Nicaragua. However, with the continued activity of 

Department of Nueva Segovia 

Department of Esteli (Pueblo Nuevo) 

Department of Chinandega 

Department of Leon 

Department of Managua 

Officers Enlisted Total 
12 124 136 

3 20 23 
10 114 124 

6 82 88 
51 234 285 





Appendices, Chapter 13 

Sandino and other armed bandit groups in the remote sections of 
the country it soon became apparent that an increased strength 
over the original number of 1229 officers and enlisted men was 
necessary to cope with the situation, and on 10 June, 1928, Presi- 
dent Diaz authorized the strength of the Guardia to be increased to 
246 officers and 2000 enlisted men. 

b. During the latter part of May, 1929, a complete reorganiza- 
tion of the Guardia was decided upon to better permit the conduct- 
ing of operations in the field and to decentralize the organization 
in Managua. Five Areas, the Northern with headquarters in 
Ocotal, the Southern with headquarters at Granada, the Eastern 
with headquarters at Bluefields, the Western with headquarters 
at Leon and the Central with headquarters at Jinotega, were pro- 
vided for in the plan of reorganization. Following this plan of re- 
organization, the Central Area was organized on 1 June, 1929, the 
Northern Area on 11 June, 1929, and the Western Area on 1 
August, 1929, in accordance with the general plan of organization 
as set forth in the following extracts from Guardia General Order 
Number 150—1929: 

" The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is commanded by the 

Chief of the Guardia who has general control and supervision of the or- 
ganization. He is charged with its instruction, discipline, interior economy 
and administration. 

The following are members of the Staff of the Chief of the Guardia 
Nacional: Chief of Staff; GN-1; GN2; GN8; and GN4 (Quartermaster); 
Medical Director; Paymaster, and Law Officer. 

For purposes of administration, discipline, training, supply and dis- 
bursement of funds, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is divided into a 
General Headquarters, which is located in the city of Managua; Areas, 
Departments, Districts, and Posts. 

The Areas, and Departments embraced in each Area, are as follows: 

a. NORTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Nueva Segovia 
and Esteli, with headquarters in the town of Ocotal. 

b. SOUTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Carazo, 
Chontales, Granada, Masaya, and Rivas and the Comarco of San Juan del 
Norte, with headquarters in the city of Granada. 

c. EASTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Bluefields and 
the Comarcas of Cabo Gracias a Dios, Princapolca, Rio Grande and Siquia, 
with headquarters in the city of Bluefields. 

d. WESTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Chinandega and 
Leon, with headquarters in the city of Leon. 

e. CENTRAL AREA: Comprises the Departments of Matagalpa and 
Jinotega, with headquarters of the area located in the city of Jinotega. 

A Department corresponds with the geographical departments of the 
Republic of Nicaragua. 

a. For purposes of administration, the Department of Bluefields is 
divided into two sections known as follows: 

Department of Southern Bluefields with headquarters in the city of 

The Department of Northern Bluefields with headquarters in the town 
of Puerto Cabezas. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

b. The Department of Managua is not included in an Area, but is 
under the jurisdiction of General Headquarters. 

The following separate companies serving in the city of Managua are 
not included in any Area or Department, but are directly under the juris- 
diction of General Headquarters: 

1st Company (Police Company in the city of Managua). 
4th Company (National Penitentiary Guard). 
16th Company (Presidential Guard)." 
Guardia Headquarters was finally established with a modified 
General Staff organization. Due to the ever existing shortage of 
experienced officer personnel, the majority of the officers of the 
staff of the Jef e Director were required to act in a dual capacity and 
the resulting organization consisted of : 

JEFE DIRECTOR with rank of Maj Gen 

CHIEF OF STAFF " " " Brig Gen 

GN-1 and ADJUTANT " " "Captain 

GN-2 and GN-3 " " " Colonel 

GN-4 and QUARTERMASTER " " " Major 


The organization of the Central and Northern Areas materially- 
reduced the Guardia strength in the Southern Departments, as over 
four hundred officers and enlisted men were placed in the Depart- 
ments of Jinotega and Matagalpa and over five hundred officers and 
enlisted men in the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli. This 
organization, with minor changes, continued in effect during the 
remainder of the time the American officers controlled the Guardia ; 
with the exception that the Southern Area was never organized 
due to lack of personnel, and on May 3, 1930, the Western Area 
ceased to function as an Area, the Departments included in the 
Southern and Western Areas operating as separate commands. 

c. During the years 1931 and 1932, the officer and enlisted 
strength of the Guardia varied considerably due to the financial 
difficulties of the country, and the number of towns garrisoned and 
troops assigned to the different areas and departments, likewise 
varied with the changing bandits situations. 

The authorized distribution of the Guardia on 1 July, 1932, was 
as indicated below, which general distribution continued in effect 
until 31 December, 1932: 


Appendices, Chapter 13 





ili ill. 


Hi ni. 









Dlhr X. 1V1 A±N JWx U A: O AxviiLZj W . . . 














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1 f\ 

tittpt rnnMT a t.fq 


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d. As previously stated, the continued activity of Sandino 
and other bandit leaders necessitated an increase in the Guardia 
over the original strength specified in the agreement, which same 
conditions later led to the creation of the Guardia Municipal, in 
order to relieve the regular Guardia from purely local police duties in 
the larger cities, and the enrollment of civicos and auxiliares from 
time to time to reef orce the regular Guardia in the field and in hold- 
ing defensive positions in the bandit areas. 

5. Guardia Municipal (Municipal Police). — The enlistment of 
Guardia Municipal or municipal policemen, under control of the 
Guardia, and supported by their respective municipalities, was 
authorized for the purpose of releasing regular enlisted Guardia 
from purely municipal police duties within towns and thereby mak- 
ing additional men available for patrol duty and the garrisoning of 
outlying posts. This arrangement, while making the support of the 
municipal police dependent upon the municipalities, incorporated 
them as an integral part of the Guardia Nacional, and subject to the 
control of that organization. The members of the municipal police, 
or Guardia Municipal were recruited, trained and controlled 
by the Guardia. They were enlisted for a period of one year for 
duty in the town in which they were enlisted, and were subject to 
punishment under the Articles for the Government of the Guardia 
Nacional. They wore the Guardia uniform which was purchased 
for them by the respective municipalities from the Guardia Nacional. 
Although the municipalities met the expenses of the Guardia Muni- 
cipal, they paid the necessary funds directly to a designated officer 
of the Guardia, who in turn made the required payments to the 
police. A Presidential Decree authorized a tax of ten percent per 
liter on all aguardiente sold within the municipalities supporting 
municipal police, the proceeds from which were used to defray the 
expense of the police. This arrangement for the enlistment and 
maintenance of the municipal police had the dual advantage of mak- 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

ing the municipalities financially responsible for their own police 
protection and at the same time making the Guardia Municipal an 
integral part of the Guardia Nacional, thereby keeping it removed 
from partisan control. 

6. Civicos (Armed Civilians).— a. Two classes of armed civi- 
lians or civicos, enlisted as such and under the control of the Guardia, 
developed through force of circumstances and as the result of ex- 

b. The first class consisted of volunteer groups of citizens who 
became civicos for the purpose of forming local defense units to be 
called to defend their respective localities or stand guard duty there- 
in in case of emergency when the Guardia took the field or remained 
in insufficient numbers to guarantee the safety of the respective lo- 
calities. Arms for this class of civics were kept in the Guardia store- 
rooms and issued only when the civicos were actually called into 
service. The services of this class of civico were utilized to ad- 
vantage at numerous stations in the bandit areas to reenforce the 
regular Guardia garrisons during emergencies, and on many occa- 
sions they accompanied Guardia combat patrols in the field. 

c. The second class of civicos, called civicos en fincas, consisted 
of individuals employed by private parties such as hacienda owners, 
mining companies, etc., as guards for their property. This class 
of civicos amounted to private watchmen, but were enlisted as civi- 
cos to bring them under the control of the Guardia, and in case of 
emergency they were subject to call for duty with the Guardia in the 
same manner as the first class of civico. Civicos en fincas were 
issued rifles which they were allowed to keep in their possession 
during the existence of their contracts of enlistments, for the pur- 
pose of guarding the particular property concerned. This class of civ- 
ico, or watchman, was not, however, employed by many large proper- 
ty owners due to the agreement made by certain Government officials 
that on withdrawal of Marines stationed on private haciendas they 
would be replaced by an equal number of Guardia Nacional. This 
agreement necessitated, at a time when the Guardia was handicap- 
ped by lack of sufficient personnel, the establishment and continu- 
ance of Guardia stations at points where the. services of the person- 
nel involved were of little value other than the safeguarding of the 
private property where they were stationed. 

d. All civicos served without pay, except those employed as 
civicos en finas, which expense was borne by the owners of the prop- 
erty concerned. All personnel enrolled as civicos were regularly 
enlisted as such and required to sign a contract form. This contract 
placed the first class of civicos under the jurisdiction of the Guardia 
rules and regulations when actually called into service in conjunc- 
tion with and serving under the immediate control of the Guardia, 
while the civicos en fincas were likewise placed under the Guardia 
rules and regulations when actually serving with the Guardia, but a 
special provision placed them under the jurisdiction of civil tribunals 
in cases of legal proceedings resulting from their official acts when 
performed solely in their capacity as private guards. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

7. Auxiliaries (Guardias Enlisted for Emergencies). — a. A 

force of auxiliaries was created late in November, 1931, when a 
strong bandit movement towards the railroad in the Departments of 
Chinandega and Leon was in progress, and additional fighting men 
were required to reinforce the Guardia troops in that section. 

b. The President of the Republic authorized the enlistment of 
three hundred auxiliaries on a basis of three months service, sub- 
ject to discharge at any time during that period at the convenience 
of the Government. The assistance of the Jefe Politicos, and other 
civil government officials was obtained in securing auxiliaries and 
character recommendations of one government official or two re- 
putable citizens were required. After enlistment they were wholly 
under the control of the Guardia and in the same status as regular 
Guardia in regard to freedom from interference by the civil au- 
thorities. The men were recruited mostly from the rural districts 
and contracts were effected, without formal medical examination, 
with about one hundred fifty men of the following authorized com- 
plement : 

From the Department of Leon 100 men 

" Chinandega 100 " 

" Masaya 50 " 

" Carazo 50 " 

Total complement 300 

c. These auxiliaries were paid twelve dollars monthly, had a 
ration allowance of $0.20 daily and a clothing allowance of $0.20 a 
day during the first month and $0.07 daily thereafter. Each man 
was issued one regulation Guardia shirt, trousers, and a pair of 
shoes; hats were not provided, and the men usually wore straw 
hats of the native high-crown, broad brimmed type. They were 
entitled to medical treatment while in active service only. 

d. They were subject to the Articles for the Government of 
the Guardia Nacional, and to all orders and regulations of the 
Guardia, and were available for such patrol duty, including combat 
patrols, as they might be assigned by the Guardia Commanding 

e. Much hard and arduous service was experienced by the aux- 
iliaries during December, 1931, and the greater part of the year 
1932, during which some two hundred fifty additional auxiliaries 
were enlisted, and their services were of considerable value in the 
combat operations conducted by the Guardia, not only early in 
1932 when the second bandit threat against the railroad depart- 
ments was in progress, but later during the registration and elec- 
tion period. They usually operated as part of a Guardia patrol, 
or in close conjunction with such patrol, but at times operated in- 
dependently with success. They were officered by regular Guardia 
officers and were furnished arms, ammunition and equipment by 
the Guardia. To all intents and purposes they were considered 
and employed as a part of the Guardia complement of the section 
of the country in which they served. 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

8. Privately Maintained Guardias. — A number of American com- 
panies doing business in Nicaragua, and the Pacific Railroad Com- 
pany of Nicaragua, desired the establishment of Guardia posts on 
certain of their properties, and as there were no regular Guardia 
available for the purpose they met the situation by furnishing 
the money necessary to support the number of Guardia required. 
Each company concerned was required to make a written contract 
covering the following points: 

"1. The detachments of Guardia will be composed of men regularly 
enlisted in the Guardia Nacional under the terms of the contract of the 
Guardia Nacional, and thereby come under complete control of the Guardia 
and subject to all the rules and regulations for the government and dis- 
cipline of the Guardia. 

"2. The money for the maintenance of the detachments must be de- 
posited with or to the order of the Guardia by the 25th of each and every 
month preceding the month for which its use is designated. 

"3. The Company will be required to give one month's ad- 

vance notice in case it is desired to discontinue the Guardia on any prop- 
erty in order that the Guardia Nacional may have time to make the neces- 
sary adjustments in its enlisted strength. 

"4. The Guardia on its part will agree to maintain the detachments 
and furnish them with arms and ammunition, and to utilize their services 

for the sole protection of the properties of the Company and to 

employ them only on such limited offensive operations as may be required 

for the protection of the properties. 

"5 In addition, the company will be expected to furnish 

satisfactory quarters for any officer who may be assigned to command the 
detachments, and suitable barracks for the enlisted personnel." 
The Standard Fruit Company, on the East Coast, furnished 50 
Guardia under such a contract, and the San Antonio Sugar Estates 
and the Pacific Railroad Company of Nicaragua, 20 men each in the 
Departments of Leon and Chinandega. 

9. Jueces de la Mesta, and Jefes de Canton (Justices of Peace). — 
a. During September, 1930, all Jueces de la Mesta and Jefes de 
Canton were placed jointly under the control of the Guardia and 
Jefes Politicos in accordance with a Presidential Decree. These 
men served without pay, except for a percentage of certain fines 
which they were authorized to impose by Nicaraguan law, and their 
services were utilized by the Guardia for minor police functions in 
the districts they represented. A canton is similar to a township 
in the U.S. 

b. Jueces de la Mesta. — The Jueces de la Mesta are appointed 
by the President, one for each canton in Nicaragua. They cor- 
respond very closely to our justices of the peace. The court of 
a Juez de la Mesta is not a court of record. They are authorized to 
award fines of not to exceed two dollars ($2.00) or confinement of 
not to exceed five days. They are required to submit a monthly 
report of the amount of fines imposed. They receive one-half of 
the value of the fines imposed by them. They receive no other 


Appendices, Chapter 13 

c. The Jef es de Canton. — The Jef es de Canton are appointed by 
the President, two for each canton in Nicaragua. They are assistants 
to the Jueces de la Mesta. They are authorized to impose fines of 
not to exceed two dollars. They submit a report to the Jueces de la 
Mesta of the amount of fines imposed and are entitled to one-half 
of the amount of the fines imposed. They receive no other re- 

10. Act of Congress. 

1920, June 5. Naval officers authorized to accept offices in 
South America. 

"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, 
upon application from the foreign Governments concerned, and whenever in 
his discretion the public interests require, to detail officers of the United 
States naval service to assist the Governments of the Republics of South 
America in naval matters: Provided, That the officers so detailed be, and 
they are hereby, authorized to accept offices from the Government to which 
detailed with such compensation and emoluments therefor as may be first 
approved by the Secretary of the Navy: Provided further, That while so 
detailed such officers shall receive, in addition to the compensation and 
emoluments allowed them by such Governments, the pay and allowances of 
their rank in the United States naval service, and they shall be entitled to 
the same credit while so detailed for longevity, retirement, and for all other 
purposs that they would receive if they were serving with the United States 
naval service. (41 Stat., 1056, chap. 261)." 

"See joint resolution of October 13, 1914 (38 Stat., 780), and references 

8308 MCS QUANTICO, VA. 3-9-36— 400 




1935 Revision 


Relationship — Military, Naval and Civil Authorities 


Section I General 14-1 

II The State Department's Influence on Relationship 

in Small Wars 14-2 to 14-4 

III The Chain of Command in Small Wars — The Navy 

and the Marine Corps 14-5 to 14-11 

IV Military— Civil Relationship 14-12 to 14-15 

Appendix: Page 
Relationship Directive 14-15 



14 — 1. Scope of Chapter. — a. The relationships herein dis- 
cussed embrace, in general, those situations which arise incident 
to the participation of our naval forces in operations within the 
boundaries of other countries under conditions not involving a 
state of war either in its legal sense or in its material sense, 
and consequently not involving the establishment of a military 
government. The relationships existing between naval, military 
and civil population in military government situations are treated 
in Chapter XXXI of this manual. 

b. As the status and relationship of the parties involved or 
affected as a result of the establishment of complete military con- 
trol incident to actual warfare or a clear-cut intervention on a 
war basis, vary greatly from those that obtain in cases where 
there is no civil or international war involved, a thorough under- 
standing is necessary of the situation that underlies the operation 
and of the task to be accomplished. 

c. As previously stated in paragraph 1 — 1 (b) , Chapter I, "the 
assistance rendered in the affairs of another State may vary from 

a peaceful act such as the assignment of a financial advisor 

to the establishment of a complete military government supported 
by an active combat force". The present discussion concerns itself 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 


14—1—2—3 - 

only with those relationships that obtain in situations not involv- 
ing the latter extreme. 

d. The relationship between the United States Naval Service 
and foreign governments in many cases develops from the detail 
of officers and men to assist those governments to solve their dif- 
ficulties rather than from campaigns involving hostile interference 
with their affairs or actual war upon them by the United States. 




Importance Of Cooperation 14-2 

Principles Prescribed by Navy Regulations . . 14-3 

Importance of Contacting State Department Representative .... 14-4 

14 — 2. Importance of Cooperation. — a. One of the principal 
obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war 
situations is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean-cut 
line of demarcation between State Department authority and mili- 
tary authority. It is difficult to visualize a clean-cut separation 
between diplomatic and military authority. Diplomacy must go 
on while wars, large or small are being waged. 

b. In a major war, "diplomatic relations" are summarily sev- 
ered at the beginning of the struggle. During its continuance, 
diplomatic intercourse proceeds through neutral channels in a 
manner usually not directly detrimental to the belligerents. There 
are numerous precedents in small wars which indicate that di- 
plomacy does not relax its grip on the situation, except perhaps 
in certain of its more formal manifestations. The underlying reason 
for this condition is the desire to keep the war "small", to confine 
it within a strictly limited scope, to deprive it, in so far as may be 
possible, of the more outstanding aspects of "war". The existence 
of this condition calls for the earnest cooperation between the State 
Department representatives and naval authorities. 

c. There are no defined principles of "Joint Action" between 
the State Department and the Navy Department by which the 
latter is to be restricted or guided when its representatives become 
involved in situations calling for such cooperation. In the absence 
of a clearly defined directive, the Naval Service has for guidance 
only certain general principles that have been promulgated through 
Navy Regulations. 

14 — 3. Principles Prescribed by Navy Regulations. — a. The 

principles referred to as set forth in Navy Regulations, 1920, are 
for ready reference, herein quoted: 



"718 (1) The Commander in Chief shall preserve, so far as possible, 
the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives 
of the United States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, 
salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these 

"(2) He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or 
other communication from any such representative. 

"(3) Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice 
of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely responsi- 
ble to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration 
of his command." 

"719. The commander in chief shall, as a general rule, when in foreign 
ports, communicate with local civil officials and foreign diplomatic and con- 
sular authorities through the diplomatic or consular representative of the 
United States on the spot." 

"722. On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens 
thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of inter- 
national law or treaty rights, the commander in chief shall consult with 
the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take 
such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the 
Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken 
by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer 

"723. The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against 
anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. 

"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to 
States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the 
protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and 
property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, 
whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The con- 
ditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation can not 
be denned beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsi- 
ble officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible 
care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace 
otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above 
denned. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent 
which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never 
be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already com- 

"724. (1) Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned prin- 
ciples, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in foreign territory 
on occasions of political disturbance where the local authorities are unable 
to give adequate protection to life and property, the assent of such authori- 
ties, or of some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without 
prejudice to the interests involved. 

"(2) Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can be com- 
municated with from all parts of the world, no commander in chief, flag 
officer, or commanding officer shall issue an ultimatum to the representative 



of any foreign Government, or demand the performance of any service from 
any such representative that must be executed within a limited time, with- 
out first communicating with the Navy Department, except in extreme cases 
where such action is necessary to save life." 

b. The attitude of the Navy Department towards the relation- 
ship that should exist between the naval forces and the diplomatic 
branch of the government is clearly indicated by the foregoing 
quotations. Experience has shown that where naval and military 
authorities have followed the "spirit" of these articles in their 
intercourse with foreign countries, whether such intercourse is 
incident to extended non-hostile interposition by our forces or to 
minor controversies, the results attained have met with the ap- 
proval of our government and have tended towards closer coopera- 
tion with the naval and military forces on the part of our diplomats. 

c. It should be borne in mind that the matter of working in 
cooperation with the State Department officials is not restricted 
entirely to higher officials. In many cases a very junior subordinate 
of the State Department and Marine Corps will have to solve 
problems that might involve the United States in serious dif- 

14 — 4. Importance of Contacting State Department Representa- 
tive. — The State Department representative may be of great help 
to the military commander whose knowledge of the political ma- 
chinery of the country may be of a general nature. It is therefore 
most desirable that he avail himself of the opportunity to confer 
immediately with the nearest State Department representative. 
Through the latter, the commander may become acquainted with 
the details of the political situation, the economic conditions, means 
of communication and the strength and organization of the native 
military forces. He will be able to learn the names of the gov- 
ernmental functionaries and familiarize himself with the names 
of the leading officials and citizens in the area in which he is to 
operate. Through the diplomatic representative the military com- 
mander may readily contact the Chief Executive, become acquainted 
with the government's leading officials and expeditiously accomplish 
many details incident to the occupation of the country. 




U. S. Navy Regulations 

Control of Joint Operations 

The Directive 

Naval Officer Commanding Ashore . 
Marine Officer Commanding Ashore 

Marine — Constabulary 

Direct Control by Navy Department 







14 — 5. IL S. Navy Regulations. — a. Article 575, Navy Regula- 
tions, 1920, states: "When serving on shore in cooperation with 
vessels of the Navy, brigade commanders or the officer commanding 
the detachment of marines shall be subject to the orders of the 
commander in chief, or, in his absence, to the orders of the senior 
officer in command of vessels specially detailed by the commander 
in chief on such combined operations so long as such senior officer 
is senior in rank to the officer commanding the brigade or the de- 
tachment of marines. When the brigade commander or the of- 
ficer commanding the detachment is senior to the senior officer 
in command of the vessels specially detailed by the commander 
in chief on such combined operations, or when, in the opinion of 
the commander in chief, it is for any reason deemed inadvisable 
to intrust such combined command to the senior officer afloat, the 
commander in chief will constitute independent commands of the 
forces ashore and afloat, which forces will cooperate under the 
general orders of the commander in chief." 

b. In Article 576, it is provided that: "The brigade com- 
mander or other senior line officer of the Marine Corps present shall 
command the whole force of marines in general analogy to the 
duties prescribed in the Navy Regulations for the senior naval 
officer present when two or more naval vessels are serving in com- 
pany, but the commander of each regiment, separate battalion, or 
detachment shall exercise the functions of command over his regi- 
ment, battalion, or detachment in like general analogy to the duties 
of the commander of each naval vessel." 

14 — 6. Control of Joint Operations. — In a situation involving the 
utilization of a marine force in a small war campaign, the directive 
for the marine force commander usually requires him to report 
to the senior officer present in the area of anticipated operations. 
The Major General Commandant exercises only administrative con- 
trol over the marine force; its operations are controlled by the 
Chief of Naval Operations directly, or through the senior naval 
officer present, if he be senior to the marine force commander. 
Consequently, no operation plans or instructions with regard to 


the tactical employment of the marine force originate in the office 
of the Major General Commandant. 

14 — 7. The Directive. — a. In situations calling for the use of 
naval and marine forces in operations involving protection of life 
and property and the preservation of law and order in unstable 
countries, the burden of enforcing the policies of the State De- 
partment rests with the Navy. The decisions with regard to the 
forces to be used in any situation are made by the Secretary of 
the Navy as the direct representative of the President. Through 
The Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy exercises 
control of these forces. The directive issued to the naval com- 
mander who is to represent the Navy Department in the theater 
of operations is usually very brief, but at the same time, clearly 
indicative of the general policies to be followed. The responsibility 
for errors committed by the naval commander in interpreting these 
policies and in carrying out the general orders of the Navy De- 
partment rests with such naval commander. 

b. If, as is the usual situation, the naval commander is the 
senior officer present in the theater of operations, his sole directive 
may be in the form of a despatch. A typical directive of this type 
is set forth as follows: 



c. Under the provisions of the foregoing directive, a naval 
commander concerned would be placed in a position of great re- 
sponsibility and in accomplishing his task, he would necessarily 
demand the highest degree of loyalty and cooperation of all those 
under his command. The usual procedure adopted by the naval 
commander would be first to make a careful estimate of the 
situation, then arrive at a decision, draw up his plan based on this 
decision, and issue the necessary operation orders. 

14 — 8. Naval Officer Commanding Ashore. — If the force to be 
landed consists of naval and marine units and is placed under the 
direct command of a naval officer, matters with regard to the re- 
lationship between the forces ashore and the naval commander 
afloat will give rise to little or no concern. The naval officer afloat 
will, under such conditions, usually remain in the immediate vicinity 
of the land operations, maintain constant contact with all phases 
of the situation as it developes, and exercise such functions of 
command over both the forces ashore and those afloat as he con- 
siders conducive to the most efficient accomplishment of his task. 



Commanders of marine units of the landing force will bear the 
same relationship towards the naval officer in command of the 
troops ashore as is set down for subordinate units of a battalion, 
regiment, or brigade, as the case may be. 

14 — 9. Marine Officer Commanding Ashore. — a. When the 
force landed comprises a marine brigade or smaller organization 
under the command of a marine officer, and such forces become 
engaged in a type of operation that does not lend itself to the 
direct control by the naval commander afloat, many questions with 
regard to the relationship between the marine forces ashore and 
the naval forces afloat will present themselves. The marine force 
commander, in this situation, should not lose sight of, and should 
make every effort to indoctrinate those under his command with, 
the idea that the task to be accomplished is a "Navy task"; that 
the responsibility for its accomplishment rests primarily with the 
immediate superior afloat; and that regardless of any apparent 
absence of direct supervision and control by such superior, the 
plans and policies of the naval commander afloat must be adhered 

b. The vessels of the naval force may be withdrawn from 
the immediate theater of operations; the naval commander may 
assign certain vessels to routine patrol missions along the coast; 
while he, himself, may return to his normal station and maintain 
contact with the marine force and the vessels under his command 
by radio or other means of communication. 

c. The directive issued to the marine force commander will 
usually provide that he keep in constant communication with the 
naval commander afloat in order that the latter may at all times 
be fully informed of the situation ashore. The extent to which 
the marine force commander will be required to go, in furnishing 
detailed information to the naval commander, will depend on the 
policy established by the latter. As a general rule, the naval com- 
mander will allow a great deal of latitude in the strictly internal 
administration of the marine force and the details of the tactical 
employment of the various units of that force. He should, how- 
ever, be informed of all matters relative to the policy governing 
such operation. In case the naval commander does not, through 
medium of routine visits, keep himself informed of the tactical 
disposition of the various units of the marine force, he should be 
furnished with sufficient information with regard thereto as to 
enable him to maintain a clear picture of the general situation. 

d. Usually the naval commander will be required to submit 
to the Navy Department, periodically, a report embracing all the 
existing economic, political and tactical phases of the situation. 
The naval commander will, in turn, call upon the marine force com- 
mander for any report of those matters as are within the scope 
of the theater in which the force is operating. 

e. Estimates of this sort carefully prepared will often pre- 
clude the necessity of submitting detailed and separate reports on 
the matters involved and will greatly assist the naval commander 
in his endeavor, through the coordination of the other informa- 



tion at his disposal, to render to the Navy Department a more 
comprehensive analysis of the situation confronting him. 

f. When questions of major importance arise, either involv- 
ing a considerable change in the tactical disposition and employ- 
ment of the marine force, or the policies outlined by the naval 
commander, the latter should be informed thereof in sufficient 
time to allow him to participate in any discussion that might be 
had between the political, diplomatic and military authorities with 
regard thereto. It should be remembered that in making decisions 
in matters of importance, whether or not these decisions are made 
upon the advice of our diplomatic representatives, the marine force 
commander is responsible to his immediate superior afloat. 

g. In addition to the principles that are necessarily adhered 
to incident to the "chain of command", a marine force commander 
on foreign shore habitually turns to the Navy for assistance in 
accomplishing the innumerable administrative tasks involved in 
the small war situations. Matters with regard to water transporta- 
tion for evacuation of personnel, matters concerning supply, mat- 
ters involving intercourse with our diplomatic representatives in 
countries in the vicinity of the theater of operations, matters re- 
lating to assistance from the Army in supply and transportation, 
and any number of other phases of an administrative nature can 
be more expeditiously and conveniently handled through the medium 
of the naval commander whose prerogative and facilities are less 
restricted than those of the commander in the field. 

14 — 10. Marine — Constabulary. — When there is a separate ma- 
rine detachment engaged in the organization and training of an 
armed native organization, the commanding officer of this detach- 
ment occupies a dual position. Although he is under the super- 
vision of the President of the country in which he is operating, 
he is still a member of the Naval Service. In order that there 
may be some guide for the conduct of the relationship that is to 
exist between the marine force commander and the marine officer 
in charge of the native organization, fundamental principles should 
be promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy. See Appendix No. 1. 

14 — 11. Direct Control by Navy Department. — If the naval ves- 
sels that participate in the initial phases of the operation withdraw 
entirely from the theater of operations, the command may be 
vested in the marine force commander or in the senior naval 
officer ashore within the theater. In such case, the officer in com- 
mand on shore would be responsible directly to the Chief of Naval 
Operations. His relationship with the Chief of Naval Operations 
would then involve a combination of those principles laid down for 
the relationship that exists between the forces on shore and the 
naval commander afloat, and the relationship that the latter bears 
to the Navy Department as its representative. 







Contact with National Governmental Officials 
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies 
Contact with Inhabitants 


14 — 12. Importance. — a. All officers of the naval establishment, 
whether serving with the forces afloat, the forces ashore, or tem- 
porarily attached to the national forces of another country, are 
required by the Constitution and by Navy Regulations to observe 
and obey the laws of nations in their relations with foreign states 
and with the governments or agents thereof. 

b. One of the dominating factors in the accomplishment of 
the mission in small war situations has been in the past, and will 
continue to be in the future, the civil contacts of the entire com- 
mand. The satisfactory solution of problems involving civil author- 
ities and civil population requires that all ranks be familiar with 
the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic 
factors involved in the country in which they are operating. Poor 
judgment on the part of subordinates in the handling of situations 
involving the local civil authorities and the local inhabitants is 
certain to involve the commander of the force in unnecessary mili- 
tary difficulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests 
of the United States. 

14 — 13. Contact with National Government Officials. — a. 

Upon the arrival of United States forces at the main point of entry 
the commander thereof should endeavor, through the medium of 
the United States diplomatic representative to confer with the 
Chief Executive of the government, or his authorized representative 
and impart such information as may be required by the directive 
he has received. Such conference will invariably lead to acquaint- 
ance with the government's leading officials with whom the military 
commander may be required to deal throughout the subsequent 

b. Meetings with these officials frequently require consider- 
able tact. These officials are the duly elected or appointed officials 
of the government, and the military commander in his association 
with them, represents the President of the United States. These 
meetings or conferences usually result in minimizing the number 
of officials to be dealt with, and the way is thereby speeded to the 
early formulation of plans of action by the military commander. 
When the mission is one of rendering assistance to the recognized 
government, the relationship between its officials and the military 
commander should be amicable. However, if animosity should be 
shown or cooperation be denied or withdrawn, the military com- 
mander cannot compel the foreign governmental officials to act 
according to his wishes. Ordinarily an appeal to the Chief Execu- 



tive of the country concerned will effect the desired cooperation 
by subordinate officials. Should the military commander's appeal 
be unproductive, the matter should be promptly referred to the 
naval superior afloat or other designated superior, who will in turn 
transmit the information to the Navy Department and/or the 
State Department as the case may be. 

c. In most of the theaters of operations, it will be found that 
the Chief Executive maintains a close grip on all phases of the 
national government. The executive power is vested in this official 
and is administered through his cabinet and various other presi- 
dential appointees. Some of these appointed officials exercise con- 
siderable power within their respective jurisdictions, both over the 
people and the minor local officials. Some of them exercise judicial 
as well as executive functions, and are directly responsible to the 
President as head of the national government. 

d. It follows, therefore, that in the type of situation which 
involves the mission of assisting a foreign government, the military 
commander and his subordinates, in their associations with national 
governmental officials, will, as a rule, be dealing with individuals who 
are adherents to the political party in power. This situation has 
its advantages in that it tends to generate cooperation by govern- 
ment officials, provided of course, the President, himself, reflects 
the spirit of cooperation. At the same time, it may have the dis- 
advantage of creating a feeling of antagonism towards our forces 
by the opposite political party, unless the military commander 
instils in all members of his command the necessity for maintain- 
ing an absolute non-partisan attitude in all their activities. 

e. Political affiliation in most countries is a paramount ele- 
ment in the lives of all the citizens of the country. Political ties 
are taken very seriously and serve to influence the attitude and 
action of the individual in all his dealings. 

f. When subordinate military commanders are assigned in- 
dependent missions which bring them into contact with local and 
national governmental officials, they should make every effort to 
acquaint themselves with the political structure of the locality in 
which they are to be stationed. The principle guide for the con- 
duct of their associations with the civil officials will be, of course, 
the regulation previously referred to which governs the relations 
between members of the naval service and the agents of foreign 
governments. The amenities of official intercourse should be ob- 
served and the conventions of society, when and where applicable, 
should be respected. When assuming command within a district 
or department, an officer should promptly pay his respects to the 
supreme political authority in the area, endeavor to obtain from 
him the desired information with regard to the economic situation 
in that locality and indicate by his conduct and attitude that he is 
desirous of cooperating to the extent of his authority with those 
responsible for the administration of the foreign government's af- 

g. In giving the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities, 
the military commander should insist on reciprocal action on their 



part towards the military forces. Interference with the perform- 
ance of the functions of civil officials should be avoided, while non- 
interference on the part of those authorities with the administra- 
tion of the military forces should be demanded. In brief, a feeling 
of mutual respect and cooperation between members of the military 
forces and civil officials on a basis of mutual independence of each 
other should be cultivated. 

h. The actual cooperation with the civil officials of the na- 
tional government constitutes a problem requiring firmness, poise, 
tact, an understanding of the psychology of these officials, and a 
consistent adherence to an adopted policy. 

14 — 14. Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies. — -a. 
United States forces, other than those attached to the military 
establishment of the foreign country in which they are operating, 
will not, as a rule, participate in matters concerning police and 
other civil functions. The military forces usually constitute a 
reserve which is to be made available to assist the native con- 
stabulary in the performance of its purely police mission, only in 
extreme emergency. 

b. The mission of our forces usually involves the training of 
native officers and men in the art of war, assisting in offensive 
operations against organized banditry and in such defensive meas- 
ures against threatened raids of large organized bandit groups 
as are essential to the protection of lives and property. When the 
civil police functions are vested in the native military forces of 
the country, these forces are charged with the performance of two 
definite tasks — a military task involving the matters outlined in 
the preceding paragraph and a police task involving in general 
the enforcement of the civil and criminal laws. The native military 
forces control the traffic of arms and ammunition; they see that 
the police, traffic, and sanitary regulations are observed; they 
assume the control and administration of government prisons, and 
they perform numerous other duties that, by their nature, may 
obviously, directly or indirectly, play an important part in the 
accomplishment of the military mission. 

c. It follows, therefore, that by cooperating to the fullest 
extent of his authority, with the native forces in the performance 
of civil police functions, the military commander will, without ac- 
tually participating in this phase of the picture, be rendering valu- 
able assistance towards the accomplishment of the ultimate mission 
assigned to the combined military forces. Due to the fact that in 
most cases the individuals occupying the important positions in 
those native organizations performing police duties, are United 
States officers and enlisted men, questions arising with regard to 
cooperation and assistance are easy of solution. Adherence, on the 
part of our personnel, to the dictates of the local laws and regula- 
tions, and a thorough knowledge of the scope of authority vested 
in the native police force is essential to the end that we do not 
hamper this force in the performance of its duty, and to the end 
that we may maintain the respect and confidence of the community 
as a whole. 



d. With regard to the contact that is had with those con- 
nected with the judicial branch of the government, very little need 
be said. The magistrates and judges of the various courts are 
usually political appointees, or are elected to the office by the na- 
tional congress. Consequently, they are affiliated politically with 
the party in power — national and/or local. In most situations, the 
civil courts will continue to function. Although this procedure 
is not always conducive to the best interests of the military forces, 
it is a situation that normally exists and must be accepted. The 
manner in which the judiciary performs its functions may have a 
profound effect on the conduct of a small war campaign. In the 
first place, the apprehension and delivery of criminals, including 
guerrillas by the armed forces to the courts will serve no useful 
purpose if these courts are not in sympathy with the military 
authorities; and in the second place, a lack of cooperation on the 
part of the courts, in so far as the punishment of outlaws is con- 
cerned, may have a tendency to place the local inhabitants in fear 
of assisting the military forces. In view of this situation, every 
endeavor should be made to generate a friendly attitude on the 
part of these law enforcement officials in order that their coopera- 
tion may be had. 

14 — 15. Contact with Inhabitants.— a. Whether a military 
commander be stationed at a headquarters in the republic's metrop- 
olis or assigned to the smallest outpost, he must necessarily come 
into contact with the civilian population. By "contact" in this case is 
implied intercourse in daily life. The transaction of daily routine 
involves the association with the civilian element, even in the most 
tranquil territory. The purchase of fresh provisions, wood, and 
other necessities of camp life involve relationships with mer- 
chants, bankers, those in charge of public utilities, and many others. 
In relations with these persons, whether they be business or social, 
a superiority complex on the part of the military commander is 
unproductive of cooperation. The inhabitants are usually mindful 
of the fact that we are there to assist them, to cooperate with them 
in so doing, and while dignity in such relationship should always 
obtain, the conduct of the military authority should not be such 
as to indicate an attitude of superiority. 

b. Association with civilians may be other than business or 
social. The same daily occurrences that take place in the United 
States between members of the naval forces and our own police 
and civilian population frequently take place on foreign soil. Dam- 
age to private property by automobiles operated by the military 
forces are frequently the cause of complaints by members of the 
civilian population. Dealings with civilians making claims for 
damages incurred through the conduct of our personnel should be 
as equitable as the facts warrant. Even where the responsibility 
rests with the United States, the settlement of such claims is nec- 
essarily protracted by the required reference to the Navy Depart- 
ment, and the lack of facilities through which to afford prompt 
redress is often times the cause of bad feelings. If the military 



commander was supplied with a fund to be used for the prompt 
adjustment of limited claims, the foregoing condition might be 
materially improved. However, under existing laws and regula- 
tions the amicable adjustment of matters involving injury and dam- 
age to the civilian population and their property calls for the high- 
est degree of tact and sound judgment. 

c. Cordial relationship between our own forces and the civilian 
population is best maintained by engendering the spirit of good 
will. As previously stated, a mutual feeling of dislike and an aver- 
sion to association may exist between members of rival political 
parties. Conservatives and liberals, or by whatever label they may 
be known, are frequently prone to remain "die hards" when their 
political candidate is unsuccessful at the polls. It is, therefore, 
highly important for a military commander to ascertain the party 
affiliation of the persons with whom he comes into contact. The 
homely advice: "Don't dabble in politics" is wise, and military 
authorities should scrupulously avoid discussing the subject. 

d. Akin to politics is the subject of religion. The people of 
many countries take their religion as seriously as their politics. 
Consequently members of United States forces should avoid any 
attitude that tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the 
religious beliefs and practices observed by the native inhabitants. 

e. Relations between our military forces and the civilians 
might easily be disturbed if the former were to get into altercations 
with the public press. Freedom of speech is another liberty of 
which the inhabitants of many republics are not only proud, but 
jealous. Editors of the local newspapers are not always adverse 
to criticizing the actions of troops other than their own. Nothing 
can be gained by the marine commander in jumping into print 
and replying to such newspaper articles, other than possibly start- 
ing a controversy which may make his further retention in that 
locality undesirable. 

f. When a matter is so published and it is consdered detri- 
mental, the subordinate marine commander should bring it to the 
attention of his immediate superior for necessary action by higher 

g. Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian 
population of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be 
spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure 
their friendly cooperation. All ranks should be kept mindful of 
the mission to be accomplished, the necessity for adhering to the 
policy of the United States and of observing the law of nations. 


Appendix, Chapter 14. 



The following extracts from a letter addressed to the Com- 
mander Special Service Squadron by the Secretary of the Navy 
during the operations in Nicaragua show the relationship which 
existed between the Brigade Commander and the Commanding Of- 
ficer of the Nicaraguan National Guard: 

"(a) Basic Principles. The Second Brigade constitutes the force of 
the United States, responsible to the President of the United States. The 
National Guard constitutes the force of Nicaragua, responsible to the Presi- 
dent of Nicaragua. These two forces should operate independently of each 
other, except in an emergency requiring joint action. 

"(b) Command. The command of the Second Brigade will rest in the 
Brigade Commander, responsible to the Commander, Special Service Squad- 
ron, to the Navy Department and to the Major General Commandant. The 
command of the National Guard will rest with the commanding officer 
thereof, responsible to the President of Nicaragua. In the absence of the 
brigade commander, the senior officer of the brigade will succeed him, and 
a similar succession will apply to the National Guard. 

"(c) Discipline. The discipline of the Second Brigade will be ad- 
ministered by the Brigade Commander, in accordance with the law and 
regulations. The discipline of the National Guard will be administered by 
the Commanding Officer thereof, solely in so far as the native personnel is 
concerned. In the case of members of the naval service attached to the 
Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, discipline will be administered 
by the Commanding Officer thereof within the limits of his legal powers; 
i.e., in ordering summary courts-martial, deck courts, and awarding of pun- 
ishments. In cases where such naval service personnel require trial by 
general courts-martial, the individual will be transferred to the Second 
Brigade with appropriate report and recommendation in each case. The 
senior officer present will act as the immediate superior in command in 
summary courts-martial ordered either by the Brigade Commander or the 
Commanding Officer of the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment. The 
record of all courts will be forwarded direct as prescribed by regulations. 

"(d) Organization, Supply, Administration and Training. These ac- 
tivities will be conducted independently by the commanders of the Second 
Brigade and the National Guard. There should be the fullest cooperation 
and assistance between the two organizations. 

"(e) Correspondence. Correspondence will be conducted direct by each 
commander through the proper channels without reference to each other. 
Matters pertaining to combined operations, however, will be conducted 
through the senior officer present. Each commander will keep the other 
informed of the matters which have a bearing on combined operations. 

"(f) Police and Other Civil Functions. The Second Brigade should 
refrain from all police and other civil duties except where necessary to 
preserve peace and public order. As rapidly as conditions permit, the 
brigade should be withdrawn from these duties being relieved by the Na- 
tional Guard. When so relieved, units of the brigade should constitute a 


Appendix, Chapter 14. 

reserve force only, available in cases of emergency to which the National 
Guard is not equal. 

"(g) Senior Officer Present. The senior officer present will be the 
officer of the naval service present in the line of command, according to 
United States commission. His functions as such, in coordination of the 
Second Brigade and of the National Guard will be restricted to combined 
operations, the necessity for which he will be the judge. 

"(h) Combined Operations. In the case of disorder to which the Na- 
tional Guard is unequal, the senior officer present is responsible for the 
measures taken for the reestablishment of tranquillity, and will direct 
action to be taken by the Second Brigade and by the National Guard for 
combined operations for that purpose. Such combined operations should 
continue only so long as the military necessity exists. 

"(i) Military Operations. Combined operations will be under the direc- 
tion of the commanding officer of the brigade subject to the command of the 
senior officer present. When forces of the Second Brigade and the National 
Guard are acting together, the senior officer in line of command, according 
to United States commission, whether of the brigade or of the guard, will 
command the combined forces." 

Although the above principles were formulated as a directive 
for a given situation, they indicate the general attitude towards 
the relationship that should normally prevail between the com- 
mands that enter into the picture of practically all small war 

8235 MCS QUANTICO, VA. 1-21-36- 400 





1935 Revision 


Military Territorial Organization and Methods of Pacification 


Section I Military Territorial Organization 15-1 to 15-5 

II Methods of Pacification 15-6 to 15-15 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1 Establishment of Areas 9-12 

No. 2 Assignment of Troops and Division of Territory 13-14 

No. 3 Methods of Operation 15-18 

No. 4 A Combination of Methods of Operation 19 

No. 5 Zones of Protection 20-26 



General 15-1 

Purpose of Subdivisions of a Country 15-2 

Influence of the Mission on Military Territorial Organization .... 15-3 

Assignment of Troops to Areas 15-4 

Size and Limits of Areas 15-5 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 



15 — 1. General. — a. In all warfare, territorial organization is 
for the purpose of decentralization of command, that is, to facilitate 
the performance of strategical, tactical, and administrative func- 
tions by allocating appropriate tasks to various units. 

b. In operations against guerrillas as well as in organized 
warfare, the theater of operations is divided into areas suitable 
to the size of the tactical unit responsible therefor. 

15 — 2. Purpose of Subdivisions of a Country. — Nearly all inde- 
pendent states include internal territorial subdivisions that are 
utilized to facilitate the execution of numerous governmental f unc- 
tions : In many cases the limits of these subdivisions were prede- 
termined by the necessities of government. Usually one or more 
of the following factors have fixed the geographical limits of the 
internal territorial subdivisions of a country : 

Density of population. 

Routes of communication. 

Economic conditions. 

Geographic features. 

Racial extraction. 

Military requirements. 
The larger subdivisions of a country, regardless of name (De- 
partment, Province, State, etc.) are usually the political, electoral, 
administrative, judicial, and military districts of the country. 

15 — 3. Influence of the Mission on Military Territorial Organiza- 
tion.— a. The mission of the intervening force will usually come 
under one of the following headings : 

(1) Pacification. 

(2) Restoration of law and order; either by furnishing aid 
to the recognized government or by establishing military gov- 
ernment until a new government is organized and functioning. 

(3) Supervision of elections. 

(4) Establishment of neutral zones. 

b. If the mission is one of pacification or if armed force must 
be extensively resorted to, the location and strength of the opposing 
force (s) and other considerations included in the estimate of the 
situation will dictate the limits of military areas and districts. 
When the military situation requires that an arbitrary divison of 
the country into areas be made, easily recognized topographical 
features should be used as boundary lines. In areas of military 
activity, boundaries should not split a locality that favors hostile 
operations, such as dense forests and rugged terrain, but should in- 
clude such features in a single command area when practicable. 

c. If the mission is to aid the local government in restoring 
law and order or to establish military government until a new gov- 
ernment is organized and functioning, it is advisable to recognize 
the political subdivisions of the country subject to the remarks in 
the preceding sub-paragraph. 



d. In supervising elections political subdivisions should be 
recognized and followed in the assignment of personnel. 

e. Neutral zones are generally as limited as the accomplish- 
ment of the mission will permit. Thus the boundaries of such 
zones will often be arbitrary and will follow some distinctive terrain 

15 — 4. Assignments of Troops to Areas.— a. Major territorial 
divisions, such as areas, should have complete tactical and adminis- 
trative control within their limits subject to such coordinating 
instructions as are issued by higher authority. This necessitates 
the assignment of sufficient executive and special staff personnel 
to enable the unit to perform all of its functions efficiently. Thus 
the assignment of a regiment, independent battalion or other 
tactical and administrative unit to an appropriate area , is advan- 
tageous in that these organizations are organized for such duties. 
Small tactical units must have the necessary administrative staff 
assigned to them. 

b. Large areas are usually sub-divided for the reasons stated 
in paragraph 15-1. Such minor divisions are usually called depart- 
ments, districts or sub-districts, depending on the size and import- 
ance of the area. Command and staff appropriate to the task are 
allocated to these subdivisions. 

15 — 5- Size and Limits of Areas — -a. It is not necessary that 
areas be equal in military strength, population, or extent, but for 
reasons of organization and command previously discussed, more 
or less similarity in these features is desirable. Some of the con- 
siderations that should be borne in mind when defining the size 
and limits of specific areas are: 


Available troops in the theater. 


Location and strength of hostile force (s). 


Present boundaries of subdivisions of the country. 


Political affiliations of the inhabitants. 


Geographic-topographic features. 








Distribution of population. 


Economic conditions. 

The more important of these are discussed in order in the 

paragraphs below. 

b. In considering the troops available it will usually be found 
that a considerable number are required for garrisoning areas 
where unrest exists and for the protection of bases, lines of com- 
munication and the like. Often this duty can be utilized as rest 
periods for troops that have been engaged in active operations. A 
decision as to the strength of forces required in various localities 
will determine the location of the administrative and tactical units 
of the Force. This in turn should be considered in determining 



the size of military areas. 

c. If active opposition is localized, it may be desirable to form 
an area of the turbulent zone in order to centralize the command 
so far as combat activities are concerned. The nature of the op- 
position has considerable influence on the composition of the force 
assigned to an area. A large area with varied terrain and consid- 
erable resistance to overcome might have a force of all arms for 
the task, and it, in turn, may have a section particularly adapted to 
the operation of a particular arm (mounted units, mechanized unit 
or special river patrol) , in which case the particular arm if available, 
might well compose a district garrison. 

d. Other considerations being equal, retention of existing 
boundaries when defining the limits of command areas is desirable 
for several reasons, among which are: 

(1) Political, judicial, and administrative functions (in so 
far as the civil population is concerned) are better coordinated. 

(2) The routine of the people is less disturbed ; thus better 
information and less antagonism may result. 

(3) Often such boundaries coincide with those dictated by 
strategy and tactics. 

e. When political or other antagonisms among the inhabit- 
ants contribute materially to the difficulties of the situation, former- 
ly established subdivisions may be divided or combined in a manner 
best calculated to accomplish the desired end. 

f. In cases where a step by step occupation of the country 
is necessary, territorial organization may conform to the geographic- 
al features which control the successive objectives. Navigable 
streams or well defined routes of travel should not be used as 
boundaries. Boundaries so located create division of responsibility 
in important localities. 

g. Each area should have its own base(s) of supply. A 
landing field should be in each area. If the supply channels of 
one area pass through another area, positive steps must be taken 
by the supreme commander to insure that the flow of supplies to 
the far area is uninterrupted. It is highly desirable that areas 
have transversal as well as longitudinal lines of communication. 
Ordinarily an undeveloped section with poor roads or trails that 
might serve as a hideout or stronghold for irregulars should be 
incorporated in a command area in such a way that the commander 
controls the routes thereto. 

h. Consideration of the existing wire communication installa- 
tions is of importance when defining the limits of an area. Area 
commanders should not be forced to rely on radio and airplane com- 
munications alone if there is any other alternative. 

i. In countries which are not well developed, maps are not 
usually up to the normal standard as to variety or accuracy. Under 
the circumstances the use of a particular map designated as "official" 
by all larger unit headquarters facilitates coordination and partly 
eliminates the confusion as to names of localities, distances, 
boundaries, and other matters that result from the use of erroneous 
maps of different origin. 






The Nature of the Problem 

Methods of Operation 

Occupation of an Area .... 


Roving Patrols 

Zones of Protection 

The Cordon System 

The Blockhouse System . . 
Special Methods 







15 — 6. General — a. The pacification of any portion of the 
theater of operations where armed resistance exists is usually 
the prime consideration in campaigns of the nature dealt with in 
this text. In the presence of armed resistance of a guerilla nature, 
the supreme commander must adopt a method or combination of 
methods to accomplish this purpose. This method is in reality the 
military strategy that will best accomplish the mission. . 

b. Subordinate commanders faced with armed resistance, 
and within the limitations enforced by the orders of higher com- 
manders, must adopt a method well calculated to assure the paci- 
fication of the districts for which they are responsible. 

c. The methods discussed in the succeeding paragraphs have 
been used in specific situations with varying success. No one of 
these methods is accepted as having general advantages over 
other methods. It will usually be found, that in a given situation 
there will be one system or combination of systems that will give 
the greatest promise of success. 

15 — 7. The Nature of the Problem. — The considerations discuss- 
ed in the estimate of the situation will influence the commander in 
his decision as to the method of operation to be pursued. The 
regular forces in this type of warfare usually are of inadequate 
numerical strength from the viewpoint of extent of terrain to be 
controlled. Thus the decision as to the amount of dispersion of 
regular forces that may be resorted to is an important problem. 
Detachments with offensive missions should be maintained at 
sufficient strength to insure their ability to overcome the largest 
armed bands likely to be encountered. Detachments with security 
missions, such as the garrison of a town or the escort of a convoy. 



should be of the minimum strength essential to the accomplishment 
of the task. 

15—8. Methods of Operation. — Among the various methods 
that have been used for the pacification of an area infested with 
irregulars are: 

(1) Occupation of an area. 

(2) Mobile Columns. 

(3) Roving patrols. 

(4) Zones of Refuge. 

(5) Cordon system. 

(6) Blockhouse system. 

(7) Special methods. 

Each of these will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 

15 — 9. Occupation of an Area. — a. This consists of dispersing 
the force in as many small towns and important localities as the 
security and patrolling required of each garrison will permit. It 
partakes of the nature of an active defense. When communications 
are good, a coordinated counter offensive may be taken up rapidly, 
because patrols from various garrisons will receive prompt opera- 
tion orders. 

b. Modification of this scheme wherein many detachments of 
regulars are encamped in infested localities and on or near hostile 
routes of movement, has been used successfully in combination 
with other courses of action. See Appendices Nos. 3 and 4. 

c. Sometimes the requirements that certain localities be de- 
fended necessitates the application of this method; at other times 
pressure from outside sources to secure protection for communities 
and individuals makes this method mandatory. In establishing 
numerous fixed posts consideration should be given to the fact that 
withdrawal therefrom during active operations involves protests 
from those protected directly or indirectly, loss of prestige, and 
increased danger to the installations or individuals that were 
protected. The greater the number of localities that are garrison- 
ed permanently, the less is the mobility of the command; conse- 
quently, care should be taken to retain sufficient reserves properly 
located to take up the counter offensive at every opportunity. See 
Appendix No. 3 and Appendix No. 1, Chapter II. 

d. The necessity for bases of operation indicates that this 
method will be used to a greater or less extent in every operation, 
that is, irrespective of the plan adopted, this method will be used 
at least in part. The discussion in this paragraph is particularly 
applicable to those situations where this plan is the fundamental 
one for accomplishing the pacification. 

15 — 10 Patrols. — a. These are detachments capable of oper- 
ating for only a comparatively limited time without returning to 
a base. They vary anywhere from powerful combat patrols to 
small detachments performing police functions according to the 
situation and mission. They are usually controlled by the com- 
mander responsible for the area in which they operate, but in 


15—10— 11— 12— 13 

operations against well defined objectives they are often coordinated 
by higher commanders. 

b. Patrolling is essentially offensive action. Accordingly its 
use in small wars operations is universal even under conditions 
that require the strategical defensive. 

c. When information of hostile forces is lacking or meager 
recourse to patrolling for the purpose of denying the opposing forces 
terrain and freedom of movement is the only effective form of 
offensive action open to the commander. In this case patrols 
in effect become moving garrisons and deny the opposing forces 
such terrain as they can cover by observation, movement, and fire. 
Extensive operations of this nature exhaust the command, but on 
the other hand are often more effective in the restoration of order 
than first appearances indicate. What may appear to be aimless 
patrolling to the combat elements of the command may in fact be 
making the haunts of the insurgents so untenable as to force them 
to desire peace. See Appendix No. 3. 

15 — 11. Roving Patrols.— a. A roving patrol is a self sustaining 
detachment of a more or less independent nature. It usually operates 
within an assigned zone and as a rule has much freedom of action. 
As distinguished from other patrols it is capable of operating away 
from its base for an indefinite period of time. Missions generally 
assigned include a relentless pursuit of guerilla groups continuing 
until their disorganization is practically complete. w 
; b. This method, ds particularly applicable when large bands 
are [known! to exist and the locality of their depredations is approxi- 
mately known. Such patrols are often employed in conjunction 
with other methods of operation. See Appendices Nos. 3 and 4. 

15 — 12. Zones of Protection. — a. This system consists of 
establishing protected zones in the vicinity of garrisons. Their 
areas are so limited as to be susceptible of protection by the 
garrisons concerned. Peaceful inhabitants are drawn into this 
protected area together with their effects, livestock and movable 
belongings. Unauthorized persons found outside of these areas 
are liable to arrest and property that could be used by insurgent 
forces is liable to confiscation. 

b. This procedure is applicable at times when through sympa- 
thy with or intimidation by insurgents the rural population is 
furnishing such extensive support to the resistance as to seriously 
hamper attempts at pacification. This is a rather drastic procedure 
warranted only by military necessity. See Appendices Nos. 3 and 5. 

15 — 13. The Cordon System. — a. This system involves placing 
a cordon of troops around an infested area and closing in while 
restoring order in the area. 

b. The cordon may remain stationary while patrols operate 
within the line. 

c. This system may be used when the trouble is localized or 
the regular force is of considerable size. Due to the limited forces 
usually available the application of this system by a Marine Force 



will usually be confined to situations where the trouble is rather 
localized or to the variation of the method where only a general or 
partially effective cordon is established. See Appendix No. 3. 

15 — 14. The Blockhouse System. — a. The Blockhouse System 
involves the establishment of a line of defended localities. In one 
way it is similar to the Cordon System as both methods deny the 
opposing forces terrain beyond an established line. In principle 
it is defensive while the latter is offensive. See Appendicies Nos. 
2 and 3, Chapter II. 

15 — 15. Special Methods. — a. The peculiar nature of any 
situation may require the application of some special method in 
conjunction with and in accord with the general principles discussed 
in the preceding paragraphs. Two important phases of operation 
that may be used in any campaign of this nature are: 

(1) River Operations. 

(2) Flying Columns. 

b. The strategical considerations involved in River Operations 
are similar to those discussed in paragraphs 15-10 and 15-11. The 
tactics and technique are discussed in Chapter XXVI. 

c. Flying Columns are self sustaining detachments with 
specific objectives. Their most common use is in the early phases 
of campaign such as the movement inland where large columns 
with important strategic objectives in view may temporarily sever 
their connections with the base, seize the objective and thereafter 
establish lines of communication. See Chapter XI, and Appendix 
No. 8, Chapter II. 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Appendix 1. 


1. Nicaragua, Initial Order.— In May, 1927, when the mission of 
the Marine forces in Nicaragua changed from maintaining neutral 
zones to occupying and maintaining order throughout Western 
Nicaragua, the following order was promulgated: 



1. The late government and revolutionists armies are being 
disarmed and disbanded throughout NICARAGUA. 

2. Our forces will occupy and maintain order throughout West- 

3. (a) Western NICARAGUA for purposes of our occupation 
will be divided into Districts as follows : 


District No. 1. 

Province of MANAGUA. 

Province of MASAYA. 

Province of CARAZO. 
District No. 2. 

Province of GRANADA. 

Province of RIVAS. 

Province of CHONTALES. 
District No. 3. 

Province of MATAGALPA. 

Province of JINOTEGA. 


District No. 4. 

Province of CHINANDEGA. 
Province of LEON. 
Province of ESTELI. 
Province of NEUVA SEGOVIA. 

(b) Districts are assigned Organizations as follows: 

District Headquarters will be established at points shown. 
District No. 1.— 1st Bn 5th Regiment. Hq.— MANAGUA 
District No. 2.— 2nd Bn 5th Regiment. Hq— GRANADA 
District No. 3.— 3rd Bn 5th Regiment. Hq— MATAGALPA 
District No. 4.— 1st Bn 11th Regiment. Hq— LEON. 

17 May, 1927. 

Number 29 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

(c) District Commanders will be responsible for the 
maintenance of order within their respective districts. 

4. Administrative details will be announced in Administrative 

5. (a) The mission of the Marine Corps in NICARAGUA is 
to maintain order and to guarantee the rights of life and property 
to all. 

(b) The civil government will be maintained and exis- 
ting means provided by the civil government for preserving public 
safety, so directed as to cooperate in the accomplishment of our 
mission, will continue in effect. Commanding Officers are, 
when they deem necessary, authorized to give such directions as 
to insure that the means provided by the civil government are so 
employed as to cooperate in the accomplishment of our mission. 

6. (a) Commanding Officers will at all times within their 
areas maintain all detachments at sufficient strength as to insure 
their ability to cope with the largest bands likely to be encountered 
in the locality concerned. 

(b) Public safety within Districts will be secured by 
radiating influence from our posts. 

(c) Marauding bands establishing themselves after re- 
fusing disarmament will be broken up. Every effort will be made to 
avoid the necessity of constant patrolling and chasing elusive and 
perhaps imaginary bands. 

7. District Commanders will when satisfied that security of 
our own forces will permit, make such recommendations as to 
division of the forces within their districts as they consider will 
provide greater public security for the district. 


Acting Chief of Staff. 

A.C. of S., F-3." 

2. Readjustment of Areas.— In 1928 an increase in guerrilla 
activities necessitated an increase in the Marine forces and an ex- 
tension of the field of operations as indicated in the orders quoted 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 


BO No. 10. 

26 January, 1928. 

Number 10 j 

Subject: Territorial Reorganization of Western Nicaragua. 

Reference: (a) Brigade Order No. 9, January 24, 1928. 

1. Western Nicaragua is divided into two (2) Areas, viz: The 
Northern Area and the Southern Area. 

Boundary between Areas: — The General line: SOMOTILLO (to 
the Southern Area)— ACHUAPA— ESTELI— (both to the 
Northern Area)— JINOTEGA (to the Southern Area). 

2. The mission of the Southern Area is to maintain existing law 
and order therein and give strong impulse to supplies destined to the 
Northern Area. The command of the Southern Area is assigned to 
the Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment, with headquarters at 

3. The mission of the Northern Area is to suppress outlawery 
and establish law and order within its area. The command of the 
Northern Area is assigned to the Commanding Officer, 11th Regi- 
ment, with Headquarters at OCOTAL for the present. 

4. Troops (except aviation units) stationed, or operating, within 
an Area are hereby placed under the command of the Area Com- 
mander concerned. 

5. Aviation units will remain under Brigade control except when 
specifically attached to Areas. 


/s/ 0. Floyd, 

0. FLOYD, 

Major, USMC, 

Acting Brigade Executive. 


/s/ 0. Floyd, 
0. FLOYD, 
Major, USMC, 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 


BO No. 24. 

18 February, 1928. 

Number 24 J 

Subject: Creation of EASTERN AREA. 

1. A Territorial Subdivision known as "THE EASTERN AREA" 
is hereby created. The Eastern Area comprises the East Coast of 
NICARAGUA and such Nicaraguan Territory inland which can be 
controlled by troops supplied from the East Coast of NICARAGUA. 

2. The Senior Line Officer on duty with troops in the Eastern 
Area (at present, Major Harold H. Utley, USMC) will be known 
as "Commander, Eastern Area, NICARAGUA"; that officer will 
command all troops of this Brigade stationed or operating within 
said Area. 

3. The Eastern Area as herein defined will be immediately sub- 
ordinate to these headquarters. 


Major, U.S.M.C." 


/s/ 0. Floyd, 
0. FLOYD, 
Major, U.S.M.C., 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Appendix 2 


The following is an extract from an article entitled "Diplomatic 
Spurs" portions of which have appeared serially in the Marine Corps 
Gazette commencing with the issue of February, 1935 : 


"As far as can be ascertained no restriction was ever imposed upon the 
Brigade as to the manner, or method to be pursued in establishing and main- 
taining its garrisons in Santo Domingo. The general rule, however, was to 
place troops in civic and economic centers, and sections known as hot beds 
of political unrest, or within areas notorious for banditry and revolutions. 
The matter of supply, transportation, and communication was also a de- 
termining factor in troop disposition. The Brigade always had to depend 
upon the home base for military supplies of all classes, and it was necessary 
to establish subsidiary bases in Santo Domingo where these supplies could 
be received, stored and issued. While this alone required the stationing of 
troops in the more important sea port towns for the security of bases of 
supplies, this was not, however, the only controlling feature in troop dis- 
position in regard to sea port towns. These towns were points of strategical 
importance, commanding as they did the routes of trade and communication, 
and were the main entrances and exits from Santo Domingo, through which 
the Republic must pass her marketable products, and in return receive those 
articles essential to her existence. Again with the Dominican customs under 
American supervision, it was paramount to guarantee the collection of the 
duties at the several custom houses in the sea port towns against interrup- 
tion or interference, if the provisions of the Convention of 1907 were to be 
complied with. The safety of the custom houses was best assured by the 
presence of troops in the sea port towns. As it was, the sea port towns 
held the greatest part of the urban population of the Republic with the 
corresponding political and military significance. Thus it was, that the 
Brigade maintained during the active functioning of the Military Govern- 
ment strong garrisons in each of the eight important sea ports of Monte 
Cristi, Puerto Plata, Sanchez, La Romana, San Pedro de Macoris, Santo 
Domingo City, Azua, and Barahona. 

"The Republic was originally divided into two military districts for the 
purpose of regulating and supervising the military and administrative af- 
fairs of the Military Government. Natural and geographical features, dis- 
tribution of population, political conditions, communication, and banditry 
were the main contributory factors in denning the limits of these military 
divisions. For instance, the Central Cordillera, a precipitious mountain 
range, with its base line running east and west throws up a natural and 
almost impassable barrier across the Island, effecting a cleavage of the 
Dominican Republic into two geographical divisions, almost equal in extent 
of territory. Concurrent with the landing of troops on the north and south 
sides of the Island in 1916, inter-communication was found to be extremely 
problematical, while troop movement over this rugged mountain range was 
exceedingly slow and precarious due to the inaccessibility of the terrain. 
In order to obviate these difficulties, troops were permanently garrisoned 
north and south of Central Cordillera. 


Appendices, Chapter 15. \ 

"Banditry played a prominent role in the garrisoning of certain sections 
of the Republic, especially in the eastern part, where bandit activities were 
virtually confined during the major part of the Occupation. Here banditry 
flourished, assuming such alarming proportions, that the adoption of meas- 
ures incident to its suppression involved the gathering of a considerable 
number of troops wtihin the affected area. As a consequence of this situation, 
augmented by some political disturbances, in the Province of Seibo and the 
District of Macoris, the military authorities were evidently influenced into 
recommending a further division of the Republic. In July 1919, such a 
partition was consummated, and the Republic was divided into three dis- 
tricts with a regiment assigned to each district. 

"Correlated with the problem of the military division of Santo Domingo, 
there was the other problem of troop dispersion and troop concentration 
within each district. The vast extent of Dominican territory, the uncertain 
political .conditions, and the general- prevalence of banditry, all contributed 
to troop dispersion, a condition irrespective of the mission which always 
appears to be a violation of sound military principles. Some will contend 
that the expression 'troop dispersion' is a relative one, and must be considered 
in connection with the mission of the troops, and the mobility and character 
of the arm involved. Yet, if the stationing of many small outposts in Santo 
Domingo constituted a violation of any tactical, or strategical principle, it 
was inevitable in many instances. -However, every effort was taken to offset 
this weakness by improving the methods of communication and transporta- 
tion. Unquestionably, in the early days of the Occupation, the lack of 
facilities for communication, and the inadequate means for the rapid transit 
of troops, must have been a constant scource of annoyance to the military 

"It is the opinion of the writer that the stationing of small detachments 
at great distances from a higher headquarters particularly under conditions 
as obtained in Santo Domingo, is to be carefully considered, and avoided 
whenever practicable. Keeping innumerable, outposts supplied is not only 
a difficult and most expensive task, but frequently means the placing of in- 
experienced subalterns in command. Bearing in mind the unpopularity of 
any military government, the severe criticism of its motives regardless of 
the justification, will invariably demand the constant and personal observa- 
tion of the superior over the conduct of the armed forces. For example, 
during a short period of time one regiment maintained as high as twenty- 
four^ posts, and aside from the necessity of this apparent and unusual dis- 
tribution, must have exacted the most rigid supervision and control on the 
part of the regimental headquarters. 

"The varied character of the duty performed by the regimental com- 
mander, accompanied by a wide scope of jurisdiction and influence, clothed 
him with more than ordinary authority. In time he came to occupy a dual 
position. He was the direct representative of the Brigade Commander in 
all things military and was also the deputy of the Military Governor in mat- 
ters that pertained to the administration of civil relations within his dis- 
trict. In this latter - capacity he was known as the District Commander." 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Appendix 3 

1. The following extract from the same article quoted in Ap- 
pendix No. 2 gives a clear picture of the methods used in the 
Dominican Republic : 


"As far as can be ascertained no definite plan of operation, denning the 
methods of warfare to be adopted in the suppression of banditry, was ever 
issued by Brigade Headquarters. Apparently it was realized that explicit 
instructions would curtail the initiative and liberty of action of those officers 
commanding the field forces. Furthermore, recognizing the fallacy of fixed 
rules to the application of irregular warfare, the various commanders of these 
operations were encouraged to exercise their own ingenuity and best judg- 
ment in fighting the bandit groups. Various methods were employed by the 
different commanders all of which had as their basis some system of patroll- 
ing. No effort will be made to draw conclusions from these methods, but 
the following are a majority of the methods most frequently used: 

(a) Small independent patrols under experienced leaders, highly mo- 
bile, and constantly patrolling the affected areas. 

(b) Small mixed patrols composed of Marines and Policia sometimes 
operating under the disguise of civilians. 

(c) Large patrols operating on special missions with definite in- 

(d) Concentrated operations within an area, utilizing large patrols 
acting in conjunction with each other. 

(e) Withdrawal of the peaceful and law abiding inhabitants from 
the rural sections of an infested area to the towns followed by a vigorous 
search for bandits within the vacated area. 

(f) Placing a cordon of troops around suspected areas and the 
closing-in of the cordon, or cordon remaining in position while strong 
patrols combed the area inside of the cordon. All suspicious characters 
were collected and held for identification. 

(g) The use of civil patrols or posses within well defined areas, acting 
under the supervision of military control, the patrols being kept in the 
field for three or four days when they were relieved by the military patrols. 

"These methods frequently involved night operations in order that 
patrols or other forces could, under the cover of darkness, secretly move 
to positions from which they would be able to advantageously gain contact 
or launch an attack against a bandit group." 

2. Occupation of an Area. — One application of this method to 
restore order and repopulate a district is described in the following 
extract from an article by an authoritative executant of the Marine 
forces in the Eastern District (area) of the Dominican Republic: 

"Regimental Headquarters was a negligible affair and functioned only 
for administrative routine. The tactical office was that of the district and 
it consisted of one colonel, commanding; one major, assistant; one captain, 
Provost Marshall and general utility man; one mail orderly and two clerks. 
This personnel handled everything for Regiment and District, except the 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Quartermaster's Department which was really the only thing that belonged 
to the 15th Regiment. 

"Our own troops were elastically organized; the company was the tac- 
tical and administrative unit. Every company was given charge of the 
general area in which it was located. Company Headquarters remained 
in one place, but as many small camps were established in the company 
areas as seemed to be necessary. These camps consisted of from ten to 
twenty men, under a lieutenant or a responsible noncommissioned officer. 
At rare intervals some camp was reduced below ten men, when conditions 
made it necessary, or the locality demanded no more than the presence of 
marines to give the people confidence. Camps so reduced were always pro- 
vided with machine guns. The two mounted companies not only had super- 
vision of the territory surrounding them but sent roving patrols throughout 
the Eastern District, taking in the more distant and isolated points that 
could not be readily reached by the infantry of the small camps ; this terri- 
tory included the wide savanas east of Los Llanos and Dos Rios. The 
Squadron of Aeroplanes conducted air patrols, and often conducted the of- 
ficers over the territory they were in charge of; it also located bandit 
camps, took photographs of trails, and at times attacked bandits from the 

air. >f . bt*g. jfltft v iiwri .> ^hs-iimm ml* *o *$&ild'M x:t s m» %nfcMlt&*108$ 

"The decision was to establish as many small camps as the strength 
of the command allowed; to place these camps in the abandoned territories, 
and in the middle of the favorite bandit assembly places. Those in the aban- 
doned territories were for the purpose of insuring safety to all who would re- 
turn and go to work. Those in the bandit assembly places would prevent bands 
from forming in any large numbers. All camps were to make friends with 
the natives and inspire them with, confidence, and their immediate tasks 
were to repopulate the farms and get the. people to resume work. It was 
assumed (and correctly) that the majority of the marauding bands were 
composed of men who would work if they could; with these men safely an- 
chored on the land again there would remain no so-called "bandits" except 
the real criminals who could be dealt with later on, and when the confidence 
of the people was established. 

"The action taken pursuant to this consisted first of organizing talking 
(or propaganda) parties. Officers accompanied by influential natives rode 
all, oyer the country. Speeches were delivered, and people were told what 
, $0 expect. They were advised to return home and cultivate their land; never 
to run from a man in uniform but to look upon him as a friend; to inform 
the nearest camp at once when any bandits were in the neighborhood; and 
then guide the Marines to where they were; to give information of criminals 
so they could be tried before the civil courts; to organize themselves into 
communities for mutual protection; to travel the roads in groups until they 
considered it safe to go singly; to resume their regular lives and to go about 
making their living. : f 

All these things were to begin whenever men learned that a camp had 
been placed in the neighborhood of their homes. The Marines on the other 
hand, were instructed to conduct themselves so as to inspire the trust of the 
natives; to encourage the natives to resettle the -abandoned farms; to patrol 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

the roads and trails and keep them open to trade. The officers were told 
that their work would be judged by the inhabited state of their respective 
areas ; that they should search for abandoned land and locate the owners of it 
and tell them to come back and go to work; that they should repair their 
houses and fences, and begin to raise crops; and that they should travel 
freely, and appeal to the nearest camp if they feared danger. Following this 
about thirty small camps were established throughout the District, and we 
waited to see what would happen. 

"The Military Orders that were issued were about as follows: only 
the sense is given as there are no records available; and it is not necessary 
to go into details of what companies were involved, and the names of the 
locations of their camps. 

"There are four general lines followed by our camps. The first is San 
Pedro de Macoris — La Romana — Gato — Yuma. The second is Los Llanos — 
Chicharones — San Fransisco — Chavon Abaja-Higuey. The third is 1-2-3-4 
Higuey. The fourth is Bayaguana-Dos Rios-Hato Mayor-Seibo-Higuey. In 
general terms every camp will be responsible for the country on each side, 
and to its immediate front (north) as far as the next line. The northermost 
line (Bayaguana-Higuey) is responsible for the country north of itself, 
but we have little interest in the mountain ranges that are not inhabited. 
Every camp will do its utmost to induce the people to return to the land 
and resume their work. Drive criminals gangs to the north, and communicate 
their movements by means of the field radio sets; when they are once in 
the mountain ranges they are out of our way and can be hunted down at 
more leisure, unless they leave the territory of the Eastern District. The 
two mounted companies are responsible for the open country lying west of 
Las Pajas, and for the Las Pajas Area itself. 

"The result of the foregoing were about as expected, and hoped for. 
It took time for plans and confidence to become operative, but when once 
started the people flocked back to their abandoned homes, and their work. 
When interested again in these they ceased marauding, and the "bandit 
situation" began to disappear. Some people actually did lead Marine patrols 
to bandit nests, and these were destroyed whenever found. As people 
gained confidence they depended on themselves more and more, and several 
times they banded together and killed a well known outlaw. In the course 
of a few months the country showed unmistakable signs of improvement. 
People were at work in the fields and around the houses, and there was life 
on roads and trails. Schools were reopened and well attended. The 
military government started building roads and bridges; Haitian labor 
was excluded as far as possible, and such Haitians as were employed were 
kept at work south of the line Los Llanos-San Fransisco. In other words 
the Haitians remained inside the area of the sugar fields and did not enter 
into contact or competetion with the Dominicans. This placed most of 
the work of road building in the hands of the men of the country, who 
needed it and whose properties were benefitted by it. Being supplied 
with work, and living in their own communities, the natives rapidly 
stabilized and the District became more orderly. Although the "bandit 
situation" was never solved during this period, and there continued to be 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

outrages throughout the writer's whole tour of duty, it nevertheless improved 
enough to allow the reduction of the military forces in the District from 
over two thousand to about five hundred. Among the first to be trans- 
ferred were the two mounted companies and the squadron of aeroplanes. 

"The principle of the scheme here outlined can be stated in a few 
words: — Settle the country from the rear outward, or forward; and as 
you progress stabilize from the rear. 

"Decentralize control of all military operations by dividing the territory 
into areas, all of which are under their separate commanders. 

"Area commanders at their discretion decentralize their own territories 
by dividing them into smaller areas, each under its own commander who is 
responsible for everything in his own territory." 

3. Consolidation of Areas. — a. To bring the Boer War to a 
conclusion the British were finally forced to adopt a step-by-step 
advance, consolidating the country as they progressed, and collecting 
and interning the inhabitants. 

b. Lyautey successfully pacified and colonized Morocco by 
the union of civil and military administration under one command, 
concentration of military forces into strong columns based on 
strategic points, and progressive consolidation of areas. 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Appendix No. 4. 


1. The following extract from "The Guardia Nacional de Nicara- 
gua, 1927-1932" (not yet published) draws some conclusions of 
interest relative to operating with a limited force under the con- 
ditions prevailing there at the time: 

"The success of company "M" in its footloose operations in many parts 
of Western Nicaragua led to the conclusion that with limited resources 
the best method of combating banditry and revolt under the conditions 
encountered by the Guardia Nacional, would have been to carry on the 
combined scheme of locally controlled defensive and offensive operations, 
but in addition to have a number of roving patrols with no defensive 
missions, each capable of waging constant aggressive warfare against the 
organized groups. A total of eight such patrols would have required an 
additional 14 officers and 210 men actually in ranks, with possibly 3 officers 
and 30 men to allow for casualties and replacements**** 
This would have been the system most economical of men and money that 
could have been devised. However, the funds, $8,900 a month, (and hence 
the men), were not available and it was never practicable to put this plan 
into execution." 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

Appendix 5 


1. Operations in First District, Department of Southern Luzon, 
P.I. from December 1, 1901 to June 30, 1902.— When Brig. Gen. 
V. Franklin Bell assumed command of this district on 1 December, 
1901 the insurrectionists had established an extensive system of 
intimidation by assassination. Treachery by municipal officials 
was almost universal. Extracts from his annual report are quoted 
herewith to indicate the method of pacification used: 

"*****Insecurity of Americans and their supplies. — Though for a time 
in 1900 and a part of 1901 all outward manifestation of armed insurrection 
had practically ceased, and though our troops had been in these provinces 
about two years, no American nor any native who was identified with 
Americans was safe outside the immediate confines of garrisoned towns. 
With the exception of a few occasions no American thought of traveling 
without a guard. All trains of supplies were escorted, and even from 
Batangas to Bauan, a distance of only four miles, the brigade commander 
had considered it necessary to direct that officers should not ride alone. 
In certain localities an American military or civil official would occasionally 
make a ride between towns alone, but always with risk, against his better 
judgment, and in disregard of the advice of others. 

"*****Policy. — After careful consideration of the situation, terrain 
and attitude of the people for about a week after my arrival (during which 
time I interviewed every prominent intelligent Filipino in reach who had 
the reputation of really desiring peace) it became apparent that the only 
way I could possibly succeed in putting an end to insurrection in this brigade 
was by cutting off the income and supplies of insurgents and by pursuing them 
at the same time with sufficient persistance and vigor to wear them out. 

"Attitude of the people — Contributions. — I had become aware of 'all the 
impositions set forth in the preceding pages, but, notwithstanding my 
belief that there were people who contributed to the insurrection solely 
through fear, it was impossible for me to judge who wanted peace and 
who not. No native's word alone could be relied upon. Many persons 
unquestionably had sympathy with the insurrection and were perfectly 
willing to assist it in ways that did not cost them anything, who, on account 
of scant resources, could not be induced to make contributions except through 
fear. The rich, all of whom lived in towns under our protection, could 
regulate their own contributions and had no especial objection to contributing 
amounts which were small in proportion to their means. These felt no 
sympathy whatever for the poor who, living in localities outside of limits 
within which Americans were able to protect them, were compelled at the 
risk of their lives to pay whatever was demanded of them. These compli- 
cations increased the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and foe. 

"Food Supplies. — I also learned that insurgents had accumulated large 
quantities of food supplies in mountains and other hiding places. They 
claimed to have enough hidden food to last Malvar's army for two years. It 
was necessary to confiscate and bring this food into towns for use of the 
people (from whom it had been taken) or destroy it. But a large number 
of poor natives, either under compulsion or from choice, were living with 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

insurgents, aiding and assisting them. They, too, had food hidden away, 
which I did not wish to confiscate or destroy. 

"Under conditions then prevailing it was impossible to identify or 
discriminate between the food supply of those who might be desirous of 
peace and those who were opposed thereto. To prevent, as far as possible, 
the falling of hardship and damage (during active operations) upon those 
who desired peace, it was plainly necessary to afford them opportunity to 
securely separate themselves and their supplies from hostile natives. I 
was as anxious as anyone could be to avoid making war against those who 
really wanted peace, and it was my duty to protect them against the 
vengeance of others. 

"Warning to noncombatants. — It is customary and the laws of war 
enjoin the giving of warning to noncombatants, whenever practicable, 
before beginning operations liable to result in their injury. I could do 
nothing more than offer such protection as I was able to give, and warn them 
that unless they accepted that protection their property (which consisted 
almost solely of food supply) would become 'liable' to confiscation or 
destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged 
to hostile or peaceable people. 

"(At that time insurgents and people of the mountains were in the 
habit of leaving their houses and food and sneaking away to hide in the 
brush whenever they saw Americans approaching. As a matter of fact, 
no food belonging to people who were with it when it was found was ever 
confiscated or destroyed, but was brought with them into zones of protection. 
No other kind of movable property was ever destroyed, except insurgent 

"Zones of Protection. — Over and above all these considerations in 
importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible 
for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions upon others. 

"Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an 
opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food 
supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish 
zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the 
small garrisons thereof to give to the people living within these zones 
efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. 
The following telegraphic order was consequently issued by me: 
'To all station commanders: 

'In order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents 
upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, 
by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all towns 
now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including those 
at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify and 
establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone 
within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to 
exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants 
(who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. 
These limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town 
to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include 
some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be 
patrolled and watched. All ungarriscn^d towns will be garrisoned as soon 
as troops become available. 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and 
distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which 
they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining out- 
side of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying 
barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, 
palay, chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established 
at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone 
at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people 
will be permitted to move houses from oulying districts should they desire 
to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant 
land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to 
deprive them of the privilege of doing so. 

'In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of 
existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking 

'As soon as peaceful conditions have been reestablished in the brigade 
these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assist- 
ance be rendered them as may be found practicable.' 

"It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones, but 
merely to offer them the opportunity and permit them to decide for them- 
selves whether they would cast their lot with us or with the enemy. The 
latter, however, drove many of them off to the mountains by means of 
threats and by frightening the ignorant with shameless lies concerning 
what the Americans intended to do with them after they entered the zones. 

"The fact had developed during a former experience with protected 
zones, that the efficiency or inefficiency of the protection afforded therein 
was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many 

"Retaliation. — To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was 
reluctantly determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred 
by President Lincoln's Order 100, of 1863. A circular telegram was published 
announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in 
case any more persons were assassinated by insurgents for political 
reasons. It was a source of profound satisfaction to me that I was never 
called upon to enforce this order. Its mere publication stopped the crime 
of assassination at once, and not a single instance occurred after the announce- 
ment of the order. 

"Neutrality. — Strong in the conviction that the people of these provinces, 
notwithstanding they are Tagalos, could be turned against the insurgents, 
as the Ilocanos were turned in northern Luzon, it was determined to operate 
with this purpose in view. A policy of permitting no neutrality was, in 
consequence, adopted and enforced. 

"Contributions from Fear. — As the campaign progressed, it became 
more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed 
through fear, for the power of insurgents to collect soon came to an end 
after they had lost opportunity to intimidate and impose upon them. 

"Growth of Peace, Sentiment and Volunteers. — From time to time 
many additional families voluntarily entered zones of protection. The 
sentiment for peace waxed stronger every day, and natives volunteered 
assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

volunteers could be trusted they were armed and sent to the mountains, 
and always succeeded in performing service of some value. They some- 
times brought back guns and insurgents (who were detained as prisoners 
of war), but more frequently still they returned with hundreds of half- 
famished men, women, and children, who, released from the intimidating 
influence of insurgents entered the zones under protection the volunteers 
afforded them. They were permitted to join their friends in the zones, if 
they had any, but in case they had none, food and shelter were provided for 

"Treatment of Sick. — Those who were sick were furnished food, medicine, 
and medical attention free of charge. It is always unhealthy to live in 
the mountains of these islands at certain seasons of the year, and to live 
there at any time, unprovided with proper food and shelter, conduces to 
malaria and other ills. Those people who remained in the mountains as 
long as they could were generally found sick with fever or other ailments 
when they finally entered protected zones. In the native hospital we 
established at Batangas we probably treated, from time to time, not less 
than 1,500 such persons. 

"Vaccination. — Nearly 300,000 of those who entered zones of protection 
were vaccinated. As a consequence we have completely escaped the epidemic 
of smallpox which generally comes each year during the dry season, in the 
months of January, February, March, or April. 

"Closure of ports and importation of food. — On December 10 the ports 
of Batangas and Laguna were closed, it being essential to prevent insur- 
gents from importing food from Manila. But as these provinces never raise 
enough rice to provide for the local demand, when the supply began to run low 
it became necessary for the government to bring from Manila and China 
millions of pounds every month for the people living in protected zones. To 
those entirely without means and unable to work it has been distributed free 
of cost. To those who had money with which to buy it has been sold at a 
reasonable profit, the cost being much less than that which usually prevails 
during this season of the year. The profit derived from such sales con- 
stitutes the poor fund with which we shall be able to prevent any want or 
suffering until the people have somewhat recovered from the effects of the 
war and from their loss of work cattle by rinderpest. 

"When it became necessary merchants were permitted to bring from 
Manila, on Government boats, supplies of such staple articles as petroleum, 
cocoanut oil, sugar, salt, dry goods, tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, matches, and 
medicines for sale to people living under our protection. 

"No one had died of starvation in zones of protection, nor, so far as I have 
been able to learn, has anyone experienced serious hunger. 

"Roadwork. — In order that able-bodied men might earn money with 
which to buy food for their families, extensive road work was carried on 
during the campaign, the money to pay therefor being derived from a road 
tax imposed on those who preferred to pay rather than work, and also from 
special appropriations by the Philippine Commission. Marked improvement 
in roads has resulted in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna. 

"Cultivation and gathering of crops. — During the season for working 
land, laborers, under the protection of patrols, were permitted to prepare the 
soil for cultivation, except where the land was situated so far away as to 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

render it impracticable to do this. We fortunately succeeded, however, in put- 
ting an end to the insurrection so promptly that any land could be prepared 
before the planting season arrived. During the campaign some irrigated land 
was planted under the protection of patrols, and standing crops were likewise 

"Palay, corn, and camotes for planting, and several thousand hoes, were 
also procured and distributed gratis to the poor of many towns. 

"Breaking up insurgent organization. — We soon realized what had been 
learned by experience elsewhere, that it would be difficult to accomplish any- 
thing until the insurgent organization of the towns was completely broken 
up. The method of doing this is well set forth in the report submitted by 
Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Calvary. Insurgent collectors and those 
municipal officials who had violated their oaths in order to serve insurgents 
were generally tried and punished, thus breaking up Malvar's organziation, 
which enabled insurgents to procure income and supplies and insure security 
and information. 

"Insurgent alarm and resentment. — People no sooner entered zones of 
protection than the insurgents became greatly alarmed and aroused, and the 
result was felt by increased activity and resentment on their part. As a 
consequence, during the latter part of the month of December we had some 
sharp engagements and a number of unimportant skirmishes, but this ac- 
tivity resulted in such vigorous and relentless pursuit from our troops that 
the enemy became thoroughly demoralized, and after the 10th of January 
there was no armed encounter worthy of record here. 

"Pursuit of insurgents. — We continued to pursue them with relentless 
persistence. Not waiting for them to come out of hiding, we penetrated into 
the heart of every mountain range, searching every ravine and mountain top. 
We continually found their barracks and hidden foods in the most unexpected 
and remote hiding places. We burned hundreds of small barracks and shelters 
as fast as they could construct them. We destroyed their clothing and 
supplies, and pursued them so persistently that they finally ceased to stay 
more than twenty-four hours in any one place. 

"We maintained as many as 4,000 troops in the field at once, keeping them 
supplied in mountains where no roads existed. They camped by companies 
at strategic points on trails, each sending three or four detachments, with 
five or six days' rations, to bivouac at points radiating several miles from 
its base. Leaving their rations in charge of a man or two, these detach- 
ments moved out from their bivouacs and searched the mountains by day 
and night. In this way it was rendered unsafe for insurgents to travel at 
any time, and having no longer any safe retreat in which to hide themselves, 
they became so scattered and demoralized that they continued to surrender 
and be captured by wholesale. 

"Insurgent food secured or destroyed. — By this method of campaign we 
finally succeeded in securing and sending into towns, or destroying, almost 
every pound of food which the insurgents possessed or could obtain, and 
about the 1st of April it became exceedingly difficult for them to maintain 
themselves. Their appearance indicated great want and suffering, and a 
number were so sick when captured as to need medical attention. 

"Effect of campaign on command. — It need not be supposed, however, 
that we were able to continue such operations so persistently without cost 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

to our own officers and men, many of whom came down with fever, dysentery, 
and other complaints. 

"At the time of Malvar's surrender we had every mountain range in this 
province full of troops, some of whom had not entered a post for more than 
a month. Though we managed to keep them supplied with food, it was im- 
possible to get sufficient clothing to them. Because of the destructive eifect 
of mountain brush and rocks nearly all became ragged and many almost 
barefooted, but I take pleasure in here recording a fact which I hope will 
be as gratifying to my superiors as to myself, namely, that I never heard 
one complaint from any officer or man of this command on account of hard 
work. On the contrary, as the contest waxed warm and we all realized that 
Malvar and his few remaining followers were hard pressed and waning in 
strength, the determination of the command seemed to increase in proportion 
as the interest and excitement grew intense. 

"Malvar's surrender. — The day Malvar surrendered (April 16) satis- 
faction consequent upon success achieved by earnest work took possession 
of many very tired officers and men. We one and all had the satisfaction 
of realizing that for the first time in the history of Philippine insurrection 
the most determined and persistent enemy of Spanish or American sover- 
eignty had been unequivocally forced to submit to legally constituted au- 
thority after he had ignored many invitations to surrender on liberal terms, 
without humiliation and without inflicting hardship upon his people. 

"Results — Conversion of natives. — We succeeded in turning most of the 
people against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end of our 
struggle several thousand Batangas natives joined us in our determined hunt 
for their fugitive leader, who can never again inspire in them the confidence 
and esteem he once possessed. Realization of the fact that the people had 
finally abandoned his standard materially aided in bringing Malvar to his 

"Contact with Americans — Respect for Government. — Hundreds of 
people have been brought into intimate contact with Americans, whom 
they had never seen or known before, and as a consequence no one will again 
be able to mislead them as to our real character. Notwithstanding the vigor 
of the campaign, I conscientiously believe we have gained friends. I know 
that the authority of the United States Government has gained respect. Some 
of the poor, who came from the mountains into Batangas and who are still 
remaining, when asked why they do not return to their homes, reply that 
they would rather remain and work for the Government. (We employ a 
great deal of labor here). 

"Arms and insurgents captured. — We have secured 3,581 guns and 625 
revolvers, with many thousand bolos, rounds of ammunition, etc. 

"We have detected, captured, or forced to surrender some eight or 
ten thousand persons actively engaged in one capacity or another in the 

"Release of prisoners. — Those surrendering voluntarily with guns were 
generally released on taking the oath of allegiance. The remainder, number- 
ing several thousand were held as prisoners of war, but with the surrender 
of Malvar their release was immediately begun and continued as fast as we 
could separate those who were held as prisoners of war, on political charges 
only, from those arrested and held for civil crimes. It did not take long to 


Appendices, Chapter 15. 

release all political prisoners, and when the President's proclamation of 
amnesty arrived it found not a single political prisoner in this brigade. 

"People return to homes — Ladrones. — The people have returned to homes 
where they can live free from molestation or apprehension, and with a feel- 
ing of security for life and property, which they have been unable to enjoy 
for years. They appear to be relieved of a heavy burden and glad that the 
delusion has run its course. 

"I have thus far not heard of a single ladrone in either Batangas or 
Laguna since the campaign closed, It is not probable that this state of 
affairs ever existed before in the history of these two provinces. 

"Present conditions — Effect of war, plagues, and epidemics. — In addition 
to the curse of war, the people of the Philippine Islands have unfortunately, 
been visited during the past six years by about every plague and epidemic to 
which man and beast are subject. The bubonic plague, typhoid and dengue 
fevers, beri-beri, smallpox, cholera, dysentery, and malaria have all con- 
tributed their share to the misfortunes of the poor, whilst rinderpest, surra, 
and glanders have destroyed large numbers of cattle, carabao, and horses. 

"* * * * Conclusion — 'Concentration.' — So much misapprehension has 
arisen in the United States regarding the details of the miscalled 'concen- 
tration' policy, as practiced in this brigade, that I had intended to set forth 
as comprehensively as possible all the facts bearing upon that subject. But 
this report has already become very extensive and the rough draft prepared 
with a view to giving a full exposition of the circumstances leading to and 
attending 'concentration' is even more extensive still. I have therefore con- 
cluded it best to make a supplementary and special report on that subject 
alone, which will be forwarded as soon as completed." 

8261 MCS QUANTICO, VA. 1-24-36—400 



Quantico, Virginia 


1935 Revision 
Principles and Functions of the Marine Staff 


Section I. The Staff in Small Wars 16-1 to 16-3 

II. The Chief of Staff 16-4 

III. The First Section 16-5 to 16-9 

IV. The Second Section 16-10 to 16-18 

V. The Third Section 16-19 to 16-23 

VI. The Fourth Section 16-24 to 16-27 

VII. The Special Staff 16-28 to 16-47 

Appendices : Page 

No. 1. The Staff 54-55 

No. 2. Staff Section Journal 56 

No. 3. Intelligence Annex 57-58 

No. 4. Intelligence Estimate 59-60 

No. 5. Estimate of the Political, Economic, and Civil Situation .... 61 

No. 6. Intelligence Report ! 62-63 

No. 7. Daily Intelligence Memorandum 64 

No. 8. Periodic Report of Intelligence 65 

No. 9. A Form for the Study of a Theater of Operations 66-68 

No. 10. Form for Planning the Intelligence Annex 69 

No. 11. Form for an Intelligence Estimate of the Situation 70 

No. 12. Report of One Method Followed in Use of Secret Agent 71-72 

No. 13. Historical Examples of Distribution of Personnel in the 

Second Section of Brigades, Regiments, and Battalions . 73-77 

No. 14. Postal System Used in Nicaragua 78-79 

Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military 







Command and Staff Responsibility in Small Wars 
Staff Procedure 



16 — 1. General. — a. Staff principles and functions remain fun- 
damentally the same irrespective of the type of operation. Command, 
combat, and service elements form the basic structure of the or- 
ganization. The Commander of a Marine Force has such staff as- 
sistants as necessary to relieve him of details and enable him to 
exercise proper control over the entire command. This staff or- 
ganization is part of the command element and is divided into the 
executive staff and the special staff. 

b. For a general description of the functions of the executive 
staff and the special staff see Appendix No. 1. 

16 — 2. Command and Staff Responsibility in Small Wars. — A 

Marine Force engaged in small wars operations, irrespective of its 
size, is usually independent or semi-independent. Thus a small 
force in such a campaign assumes strategical, tactical, and ter- 
ritorial functions. Strategical decisions and territorial control are 
largely matters for the attention of the high command in major 
warfare. In small wars the Marine Force Commander must be 
prepared to make or recommend decisions as to the strategy of the 
operation, and his staff must be able to function as a GHQ staff. 
In short the force must be prepared to exercise those same func- 
tions of command, supply, and territorial control required of the 
supreme command or its major subdivisions in regular warfare. 
The inference is that more extensive planning is required than 
would ordinarily be expected of the same size unit that is part of 
a higher command. For the reasons stated above it is obvious that 
a force undertaking a small war campaign must be adequately 
staffed for independent operations even if the tables of organiza- 
tion do not specify a full staff complement. 

16 — 3. Staff Procedure. — a. Staff conferences, staff visits, 
staff inspections, measures to insure adequate liaison, and provision 
for administrative details are the usual methods employed by all 
staff organizations to facilitate the proper performance of all of those 
duties specified in the detailed discussion of the staff sections and 
special staff officers. This procedure unifies the efforts of the staff 
in furthering the accomplishment of the will of the commander. 
This procedure is common to all of the staff and is discussed here 
in order to avoid repetition in subsequent portions of the text that 
describe the duties and functions peculiar to each staff section and 
special staff officer. 

b. Staff conferences are informal meetings of members of 
the staff for the purpose of disseminating information to the staff, 
and receiving recommendations, plans or suggestions from in- 


dividual members of the staff. They are usually held at the call 
of the chief of staff or the chief of an executive staff section de- 
pending on the purpose and scope of the meeting. Executive staff 
officers and special staff officers (or their respective representatives) 
who are concerned with the subject matter of the conference should 
be present. When decisions or plans are made that affect staff 
sections or staff officers who are not present or represented the 
officer conducting the conference is responsible that the necessary 
information is furnished those absent. 

c. Staff visits are visits made by members of the commander's 
staff to units of the command- They are of an informal nature and 
serve as a medium of exchange of information between the subordi- 
nate unit and the staff of the commander. Through these visits the 
staff becomes intimately acquainted with the problems, capabilities, 
and needs of subordinate units, while the subordinate commanders 
gain a thorough comprehension of the decisions, policies, and plans of 
the supreme commander. Frequent visits of this nature are es- 
sential for the efficiency of the command as a whole because they 
promote a common understanding between the commander and his 
principal subordinates which is necessary to unity of action. They 
assume an added importance in small wars operations where the 
dispersion of the command usually prevents the supreme commander 
from conferring frequently with his unit commanders. 

d. Staff inspections are usually more formal than staff visits. 
They are made in the name of and by authority, actual or implied, 
of the superior commander. They ordinarily have a specific pur- 
pose such as determining the condition of the unit inspected as to 
some particular phase of its training, supply, morale, or other item. 
Often these inspections are for the purpose of checking the manner 
in which orders are being executed. In addition to the specific 
purpose for which intended, staff inspections serve the purposes of 
staff visits. They are for the purpose of gaining information for 
the superior staff and the commander and should be conducted in 
such a manner as to assist subordinate commanders in the per- 
formance of their tasks and promote cordial relations which en- 
gender cooperation. 

e. All of the procedure described above promotes liaison or 
intimacy between elements of the command. In addition to these 
measures to assure proper liaison, it is sometimes advisable to 
detail officers for special liaison missions. This is particularly 
desirable when units are furnishing each other mutual tactical 
support in a specific tactical operation. In small wars it finds its 
most frequent application where the operation of one unit is to be 
coordinated with that of another and the dispersion of the com- 
mand prevents centralized control. Liaison officers should have 
orders specifically setting forth their duties. These orders serve as 
credentials and are presented to the commander of the unit to 
which the officer is accredited. These officers should be tactful, 
but at the same time they must convey all essential information to 
the commander whom they represent. 



f . Administrative procedure and the details of the organiza- 
tion and routine of various staff offices are largely dependent on the 
requirements of the particular situation. It is important that es- 
sential information be immediately available and that every item 
coming under the cognizance of the staff section or special staff 
officer concerned receive proper attention and be disseminated to 
individuals concerned. This entails the formulation of a systematic 
office routine and proper allocation of duties to individuals. A 
discussion of some important administrative details applicable to 
various offices is included under the appropriate heading in sub- 
sequent sections. Executive staff sections are not offices of per- 
manent record. Each of these sections (or in smaller units com- 
binations of these sections) keeps a journal which is the day book of 
the section. It contains briefs of important written and verbal 
messages, both received and sent, and notations of periodic reports, 
orders, and similar matters that pertain to the section. If an item 
is received or issued orally it is entered in detail; if written, the 
entry may be either a reference to the file number of the document 
or a brief of its contents. A brief notation is also made of instruc- 
tions and directions pertaining to the section which have been given 
by the commander or a member of the section to someone outside 
of the section. The journal is closed when directed by the com- 
mander, at the end of the day, a phase, or other period. These 
journals are the permanent records of the activities of the sections. 
Combined they form the record of events of the organization. See 
Article 10 — 21, Marine Corps Manual and appendix No. 2. 



16 — 4. The Chief of Staff. — a. In a Marine Force no greater 
than a regiment or a reinforced regiment the executive officer may 
perform all of the duties of chief of staff. As executive officer he 
will be second-in-command. In larger forces the chief of staff will 
usually be an officer specially detailed for the purpose and will not 
necessarily be the officer of the force next junior to the commander. 

b. The chief of staff (or executive) is the principal assistant 
and advisor of the commander. He informs the staff and unit 
commanders of the policies, decisions and plans of the commander 
and coordinates the actions of the staff and subordinate units of 
the command so as to insure the efficient functioning of all elements. 
In addition to such special duties as he may be assigned, the chief 
of staff (or executive) is normally responsible for the perform- 
ance of the following duties : 

(1) Formulates and announces policies for the general 
operation of the staff in accordance with the directive of the 

(2) Directs and coordinates the work of the four staff sec- 
tions of the executive staff group in all their relations with the 
special staff, with the troops, and with each other. 



(3) Keeps the commander informed of the enemy situation 
and of the situation of his own forces- as to location, strength, 
morale, training, equipment, supply, and general effectiveness. 

(4) Prepares an estimate of the situation when called for. 

(5) Represents the commander during his temporary ab- 
sence and at other times when authorized to do so. 

(6) Obtains basic decisions from the commander and takes 
the following action : 

(a) Makes necessary supplementary decisions and gives 
necessary instructions to the staff in furtherance of the basic 
decisions of the commander. 

(b) Allots the detailed work of preparing plans and 
orders, obtains drafts of plans and orders from the staff, and 
submits to the commander a completed plan developed from 
these plans. 

(7) Reviews and coordinates all instructions that are to 
be published to the command to insure that they are strictly in 
accord with policies and plans of the commander. 

(8) By personal inspection and through the staff, insures 
that the orders and instructions of the commander are executed. 

(9) Keeps himself informed of the situation constantly 
with a view to being prepared for future contingencies. 

(10) Assembles the routine staff section reports and, after 
their approval by the commander, forwards copies to next higher 


Duties in Smaller Units 

Administrative Details 



Relationship with Other Sections and with the Special Staff 

16 — 5. Duties. — a. The general duites of the chief of the first 
(personnel) section of the executive staff group and his relations 
with the commander, chief -of-staff , other chiefs of section, and the 
special staff group in so far as they pertain to the period of con- 
centration of forces are covered in Chapter IV, Section 5. 

b. The first section (personnel) is charged specifically with 
the supervision and coordination of activities concerning: 

(1) Assignment, promotion, transfer, retirement, and dis- 
charge of all personnel. 

(2) Replacement of personnel, in accordance with priorities 
formulated by the third (operations and training) section of the 
executive staff- 

(3) Decorations, honors, and awards- 

(4) Leaves of absence and furloughs- 



(5) Sanitation and sanitary inspections. 

(6) Headquarters arrangements. 

(7) Plans for military government. 

(8) Postal service. 

(9) Military police relations with military personnel and 

(10) Designation of restricted places and areas. 

(11) Furnishing information to the supply section as to the 
amount and location of shelter necessary for the command and 
for activities under its supervision. Administration of quarter- 
ing areas. 

(12) Morale and welfare, including religious, recreational, 
and welfare work, coordinated with the training programs and 
operation plans prepared by the third section of the staff. 

(13) Reports concerning the capture, care and disposition 
of prisoners and material. 

(14) Strength reports and graphs, casualty reports, station 
lists, and other personnel reports as required. 

(15) General regulations and routine administration which 
especially concerns individuals, or routine not specifically assigned 
to another staff section. 

(16) Preparation of such parts of administrative orders or 
instructions as relate to the first section of the executive staff. 

c. (1) The foregoing list of activities supervised by the first 
section is largely self-explanatory, but a few remarks thereon may 
help to clarify some of them. 

(2) Promotion. The equitable distribution of promotion 
is of great value in stimulating ambition and maintaining morale. 
The chief of the first section should carefully examine all recom- 
mendations for promotion and insure that all organizations re- 
ceive their proportionate share of the total promotions allotted 
or available to the whole command. Care should be exercised that 
technical and clerical activities do not receive an undue share 
of promotion at the expense of line units. The chief of the first 
section of the Force staff should have just as much interest in 
the efficient functioning of a battalion adjutant's office in the 
field as he has in the Force adjutant's office. He must know the 
force as a whole intimately and not merely that part of it which 
rotates about force headquarters. 

(3) Transfers. The chief of the first section should super- 
vise transfers of personnel within the force to insure that those 
made are in the interests of the force as a whole. He should 
be especially alert to reduce the mixing of commands in the 
field to a minimum, this he can avert by cooperation with the 
third section, especially when operating plans are being prepared. 
When operating in the field, authority to effect interior trans- 
fers should be decentralized down to and including battalions, or 
corresponding territorial commands. 

(4) Retirements and Discharges. This matter is a routine 
function of the 1st Section. 



(5) Replacements. The prompt arrival of replacements for 
casualties and transfers to the United, States is essential. The 
chief of the first section should insure by timely planning that 
complete information as to the needs of the Force reaches Head- 
quarters Marine Corps in sufficient time for the replacements to 
arrive on time when needed. He should cooperate closely with 
the third section in estimating, well in advance of actual needs, 
changes in conditions that will require replacements, augmenta- 
tion or reduction of the Force. When replacements or reinforce- 
ments are received, they are distributed in accordance with prior- 
ities formulated by the third section. 

(6) Decorations, leaves of absence and furloughs. These 
require no coment further than that the announcement of the 
policy regarding them is a function of the first section. 

(7) Rewards, discipline, and punishment. All of these 
matters have great value in stimulating and maintaining morale. 
The chief of the first section acts as assistant to his commanding 
officer in obtaining uniformity in punishments and the just and 
prompt distribution of rewards. Insofar as matters of discipline 
are concerned, he will deal largely with the force adjutant, in- 
spector and the force law officer, but the broader aspect of his 
duties bring him into contact with all subordinate commanders 
in the brigade. He should make frequent visits to the head- 
quarters of subordinate units, regardless of where they may be 
located, and be personally acquainted with all officers acting as 
adjutants thereof. 

(8) Headquarters arrangements. The first section is 
charged with responsibility for the allocation of space to the 
various headquarters' offices; the execution of this duty is a 
function of the headquarters commandant. The proper perform- 
ance of this duty can lend much to the orderly transaction of 
business, particularly under conditions where force headquarters 
is subject to frequent moves. Whatever the contemplated dura- 
tion of the occupation, force headquarters should be so located 
and space so allocated thereat, as to facilitate either the ex- 
pansion or the reduction of its activities. In selecting space for 
headquarters activities and alloting it to the various headquarters 
activities, the first section confers with all members of the staff 
relative to their needs, and particularly with the fourth section 
which supervises rentals and purchases. 

(9) Plans for Military Government. Until personnel is 
designated to take active charge of military government, the 
1st section will prepare plans as necessary for the establishment 
of military government. Usually it will be advisable to organize 
a special staff section for this purpose. Where the military gov- 
ernment is an independent organization apart from the force, the 
1st section acts as the liaison agent between the force Commander 
and the staff of the military governor. For details see Chapter 



(10) Postal service. The value of an efficient postal service 
as a stimulant to morale is obvious. The first section should 
make plans and formulate orders as may be necessary to avoid 
delay and interruption in handling the mail. See The Adjutant, 
Section VII, this chapter. 

(11) Military Police. Where military police are used, the 
first section supervises their relations with both naval and civilian 
personnel. The irritation which may be produced by the use of 
improper methods on the part of military police can have a far- 
reaching evil effect. The chief of the first section can contribute 
greatly to the morale of the command and promotes the good-will 
of the civilian population by his close supervision over this 

(12) The designation of restricted places and areas, is a 
function of the first section. 

(13) Amount and location of shelter. The first section is 
charged with responsibility for furnishing the fourth section 
with accurate information as to the amount and general location 
of the shelter required by the command. The reason for charg- 
ing him with this responsibility is that he is familiar at all times 
with the strength and distribution of all units of the force. 

(14) Morale and welfare. The first section has supervision 
over the agencies and activities which operate to promote the 
morale and welfare of the force. In arranging recreational pro- 
grams the chiefs of the first and third sections confer in order 
that the time for recreation be properly coordinated with train- 
ing periods. Since post exchanges are established for the wel- 
fare and convenience of the enlisted men, supervision of this 
activity comes under the first section. See Chapter IV, Section 

(15) Civilian prisoners. The first section is charged with 
the rendition of reports concerning, and the handling of, civilian 
prisoners or prisoners taken from hostile forces. Where a local 
constabulary is operating in cooperation with the intervening 
force, such prisoners usually are turned over to the former, for 
trial by the constabulary courts-martial, or by the civil courts, 
or are held at the disposal of the force commander. Where such 
an arrangement cannot be made they must be held within the 
force. The force brig being a place of confinement for its own 
personnel, should never be used to confine native prisoners. A 
separate prison should be utilized. The first section must make 
the necessary arrangements with the second section to permit 
the latter to have free access to all prisoners for interrogation in 
order to obtain information concerning hostile forces or other 
hostile activities. He is likewise charged with responsibility for 
any action that it may be necessary to take concerning his own 
troops in the hands of hostile forces, arrested by the local auth- 
orities, or who become otherwise embroiled with the civil popu- 

(16) Strength reports and other personal statistics. This 
requires little comment. The chief of the first section should in- 
sure that the necessary routine reports are made on time and 



that the paper work of all offices is kept at a minimum by the 
elimination of or reduction of all reports not vital to the success 
of the force. 

(17) Regulations. The first section is the clearing house 
for all force regulations issued. These regulations are prepared 
in the appropriate offices of force headquarters. The chief of 
the first section is charged with their final approval for publica- 
tion as they emanate from these sources but he does not dictate 
their subject matter. He should exercise great care to coordinate 
all orders issued and to avoid the issuance of unnecessary orders 
and regulations. 

(18) Administrative orders. The first section prepares and 
transmits to the fourth section such parts of the force adminis- 
trative order as affect the activities of the first section. These 
are principally : 

Military Police. 
Postal Service. 

Care and disposition of civilian prisoners and prisoners 

taken from the hostile forces. 
Payment of the command. 
Post Exchange supplies. 

16 — 6. Duties in Smaller Units. — Within their respective or- 
ganizations the personnel officers of regiments and battalions per- 
form the duties prescribed for, and function in the same manner 
as the chief of the first section of a force. In addition thereto the 
regimental personnel officer (R-l) is regimental adjutant and head- 
quarters company commander ; the battalion personnel officer (Bn-1) 
is intelligence officer, adjutant, and headquarters company com- 

16—17. Relationship with Other Sections and with the Special 
Staff. — a. All executive staff sections are closely related and have 
many overlapping functions. The first section has more activities to 
coordinate with the fourth section than it normally has with the 
second and third sections, thus conferences between these two 
sections are frequent. As these conferences the administrative 
functions wherein personnel and supply questions may conflict, 
are compromised and coordinated. 

b. The first section is charged with executive staff functions 
which relate to the personnel of the command as individuals. It 
is therefore brought closely into contact with the adjutant, the 
inspector, the chaplain, the law officer, the surgeon, the provost 
marshal, the paymaster, the communication officer, the exchange 
officer, and the commanding officer special troops. 

16 — 8. Organization. — Peace strength tables of organization 
(1935) do not specify the exact strength of the First Section. 
Clerical assistance is supplied as required from the Force Head- 
quarters Section of the Headquarters Company. 



16 — 9. Administrative Details. — The records kept in the office 
of the first section should be reduced to the minimum. It should 
not be used as an office of permanent record, which is a function 
of the adjutant's office. The following documents are needed in 
order to function efficiently: 

a. Section Journal. See paragraph 16 — 3 f . 

b. A suspense file of orders, memoranda, and letters of in- 
structions, which later are turned over to the adjutant. 

c. Copies of important communications which affect the force 
continuously. (The originals are kept in the possession of the 
adjutant) . 

d. A situation map should be kept posted, to show the status 
of matters pertaining to the 1st section in the force, at all times. 



Basic Intelligence Directives 16-10 

Definition and Classification of Naval Intelligence 16-11 

Civil Intelligence, Importance of 16-12 

Duties of the Intelligence Officer 16-13 

Organization of the Force Intelligence Section 16-14 

Regimental (area) Intelligence Section 16-15 

The Battalion Intelligence Section 16-16 

Intelligence Agencies 16-17 

Intelligence Records 16-18 

16 — 10. Basic Intelligence Directives. — The intelligence activi- 
ties of naval forces operating on shore in small war situations is in- 
cluded in the general category of naval intelligence. The policy and 
methods pursued by the intelligence agencies of such forces are 
guided by general directives covering intelligence activities issued 
by the Department or under its authority. 

16 — 11. Definition and Classification of Naval Intelligence. — a. 

Naval intelligence in its broadest aspect is knowledge of nations, 
primarily their war-making capacity. It is the most complete and 
most authentic information of a probable or actual enemy, or theater 
of operations, which has been critically analyzed, and the strate- 
gical or tactical conclusions drawn therefrom. In small war situa- 
tions it consists particularly of a knowledge of the capacity of the 
hostile forces to prevent the accomplishment of the mission assigned 
to or deduced by the landing force. 

b. As to time, naval intelligence is classified as peace-time in- 
telligence and war-time intelligence. These terms are self-explana- 
tory. As to type, intelligence is classified, customarily, as Navy De- 
partment intelligence and combat intelligence. 

c. Navy Department intelligence — This is intelligence secured 
by the Navy Department both in peace and in war. The agency of 
the Department charged with the collection, collation, analysis, and 
evaluation of information and with the dissemination of the result- 



ing intelligence, is the Intelligence Division of the Office of Naval 
Operations. The intelligence division of the operations and training 
section, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, functions similarly for 
those phases of naval intelligence of peculiar interest to naval forces 
operating on shore in small war situations. 

d. Combat intelligence. — The distinguishing mark of combat 
intelligence is that it is gathered by the intelligence agencies of the 
public armed forces in contact with or seeking contact with the 
enemy. In small war situations it includes the location, strength, 
composition, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, training, dis- 
cipline, morale, movements, intentions, condition, and situation of 
forces opposing a combat unit, and the terrain over which a combat 
unit is to operate or is operating. To this may usually be added 
economic, political, geographic and social intelligence of the area 
in which the combat forces are operating, which is collected in the 

e. Between Navy Department intelligence and combat intel- 
ligence lies a hitherto unclassified type of intelligence which, prop- 
erly speaking, cannot be placed in either category. It includes hos- 
tile information collected and forwarded directly to forces in contact, 
by intelligence agencies, other than the Department, outside the 
theater of operations or combat zone; and economic, political, geo- 
graphic and social intelligence such as hostile propaganda, sabotage 
activities, political machinations, etc., collected by agencies of the 
general headquarters of a force operating outside the continental 
limits of the United States, where, because of the distance involved, 
the headquarters intelligence section must operate as a miniature 
ONI. This, for want of a better term, may be designated "G.H.Q. 
intelligence-" It is similar to Navy Department war-time intel- 
ligence. In small wars it is usually of more importance to the com- 
mander in formulating his policies and guiding his activities than 
is combat intelligence since his political and civil relations, if in- 
telligently conducted, will frequently reduce, if not altogether avoid, 
the need for military operations against hostile armed forces. 

16 — 12. Civil Intelligence, Importance of. — a. National major 
effort. — In a war involving a national major effort, a thorough 
knowledge of the political, social, economic, and geographic factors 
of a theater of operations is required only of the higher command- 
ers. So far as the balance of the Force is concerned, the problem is 
confined to the rigorous application of military power against the 
public armed forces of the enemy. 

b. Small Wars. — (1) A dominating factor in the successful 
accomplishment of the mission of the intervening or occupying 
forces in small war situations in which the United States has been 
involved to date has been the civil contacts of the entire command. 

(2) Because of the dispersion of troops over a wide area and 
the consequent placing of junior officers in a position of practically 
independent command, all ranks of officers in small wars must 
make themselves thoroughly familiar with the language, the geo- 
graphy, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in 
the country in which they are operating. This is necessary for 



the satisfactory solution of civil problems frequently presented to 
local commanders, and to gain the respect, friendship, and con- 
fidence of the peaceful and industrious element of the local in- 
habitants upon whom the military commander is largely depend- 
ent for gaining information essential to the accomplishment of 
his military mission. The alienation of this element is certain to 
involve any commander in unnecessary military difficulties and 
will result likewise in publicity adverse to the public interests of 
the United States. 

16 — 13. Duties of the Intelligence Officer. — In a Force or other 
independent unit operating in a small wars situation, the duties of 
the intelligence officer are as follows : 

a. To keep the commander and all others concerned constantly 
informed of all aspects of the situation confronting the Force. 
This includes not only the hostile military situation, but the political, 
economic, and social status of the occupied area, together with the 
attitude and activities of the civil population and political leaders 
in so far as those may effect the accomplishment of the mission of 
the brigade. Information of the hostile military situation will in- 
clude : 

(1) Organization and strength of forces. 

(2) Location of hostile forces and customary routes fol- 

(3) Condition of troops or combat value. 

(4) Morale of troops. 

(5) Armament and equipment. 

(6) Name and description of leaders, area in which they 
operate, and their methods and means used for giving combat. 

(7) Supply; methods, routes, and agencies. 

(8) Terrain, as it effects hostile forces. 

(9) Hostile knowledge of our situation. 

(10) Hostile casualties, including prisoners. Care should be 
taken to base these on fact. 

(11) Hostile propaganda in the occupied territory, adjacent 
territory or countries, and our own country ; methods, means, and 
agents used for propagating same. 

b. To evaluate the information obtained by critical and sys- 
tematic analysis for the purpose of determining its probable accur- 
acy, significance, and importance. 

c. To disseminate the intelligence obtained to all concerned. 

d. To maintain liaison with government officials and depart- 
ments of the occupied country or area and with the civil representa- 
tives of our own and foreign governments therein. 

e. To maintain close liaison with the commander of aviation 
in arranging for aerial reconnaissance. 

f . To act as press relations officer with representatives of the 
local press, American press, and foreign press, issuing all news 
releases and maintaining cordial relations with the press. 

g. To receive and conduct visitors. 

h. To prepare rules for the regulation of the activities of ob- 
servers, press correspondents, and civilians who may be attached 



to the unit. As a matter of policy, in small war situations the 
less their activities are hampered and the more assistance is ren- 
dered, the better impression the public will receive of our activities. 

i. To prepare rules for and control the operation of such degree 
of censorship as the situation warrants. 

j. To supervise the preparation and use of codes and ciphers 
and the solution of hostile secret correspondence. 

k. To make translations. 

L To determine the need for military maps and surveys for 
general naval and military purposes and the character of such maps 
as are to be produced; to prepare schedules of distribution and to 
supervise map reproduction and distribution. When an adequate 
engineer unit is not included in the organization, the intelligence 
officer is likewise charged with the actual conduct of surveys, and 
the reproduction and distribution of maps. A fully equipped and 
staffed topographical survey and map reproduction division must 
then be included in the brigade intelligence section. 

m. To conduct counter propaganda insofar as it lies within the 
province of the naval forces to do so. Care should be taken not to 
appear to assume responsibility for international policy by defend- 
ing acts of government properly lying outside the field of internal 
naval administration. Correction of hostile propaganda should be 
confined to presenting in a true light the conduct and aim of the 
naval forces. The defense of international policy, if necessary to 
be made, is properly left to other branches of the government. 
Whenever such matters are brought up, officially or privately, dis- 
cussion should be avoided and the person or persons concerned 
directed to the proper civil officials of our government for enlighten- 

n. To supervise and coordinate measures necessary to prevent 
hostile agents from gaining information. 

16 — 14. Organization of the Force Intelligence Section: — a. 
The authorized strength of the intelligence section of the Force 
Staff is given in the Marine Corps Tables of Organization, (Peace 
Strength, 1935). It appears that the authorized strength of the 
present Force intelligence section is adequate in small war situations 
except where it is necessary to compile data for ONI monographs 
and to establish a mapping section. A distribution other than that 
indicated in table "lip" will, however, usually be required. For 
instance, as there is no need for a Force observation post, the 
observer personnel can be assigned to other tasks. 

b. The Force intelligence officer. — He supervises and coordi- 
nates the intelligence activities of the next subordinate units and 
makes recommendations for the amount and kind of training in 
securing intelligence, including scouting and patrolling, to be 
contained in training programs. He should be a frequent visitor 
at the headquarters of lower units where he will bring to the atten- 
tion of the intelligence officer concerned, informally, faulty practice 
observed or suggestions that he may have to make. When this 
method does not succeed in correcting matters, the points involved 



should be taken up unofficially with the unit commander. The 
case should never be even mentioned to the Force Commander 
unless official action is necessary to secure the application of cor- 
rective measures. B-2 should study the personalities of the com- 
manders and intelligence officers of subordinate units and be guided 
thereby in the conduct of his relations with each, noting those who 
will respond to informal suggestions and those who resent such 
methods. The contents of this paragraph apply likewise to super- 
vision over intelligence activities of lower units by regimental and 
battalion intelligence officers. 

c. When more than one headquarters is located in the same 
town. — When Force battalion and regimental headquarters are 
located in the same town, higher staff sections should be careful 
not to infringe on the functions of the staff section of lower units 
or impose on them tasks that properly should be performed by the 
staff of the higher unit. The battalion intelligence section is the 
primary unit for gathering intelligence in the field. It may, how- 
ever, in special circumstances be advisable for the senior intelli- 
gence section present to specifically reserve to itself responsibility 
for gathering all intelligence in the headquarters' town. Where 
this is not desirable or practicable, a reasonable division of tasks 
should be made. Force, for instance, in the capital, should handle 
relations with the officials of the national government. Regiment 
should handle departmental officials and either reserve municipal 
officials to regiment or allot this task to battalion. Battalion might 
handle outside intelligence in the capital, but where this would 
unduly burden the battalion staff in addition to the conduct of field 
intelligence in the battalion area outside the town, it should be all 
divided between the two higher headquarters. The natural tenden- 
cy of individuals to take their affairs to the highest official who will 
listen to them, disregarding the subordinate supposed to handle 
such matters, will cause any such division of tasks to break down 
immediately unless it is thoroughly understood by the senior staff 
sections that no organization will function efficiently unless the 
responsibility of subordinate echelons in the chain of command is 
scrupulously respected within their assigned spheres of activity. 

d. Primary task of Force intelligence section. — The Force 
intelligence section is primarily an office for the consolidation of 
information supplied by lower units, special agents, and outside 
sources ; and for the prompt distribution of the resulting intelligence 
to the people who need it. Where circumstances require the 
functions of the section to be extended beyond this, additional 
divisions must be organized under the charge of a competent as- 
sistant to the Force intelligence officer, or the efficiency with which 
the section performs its basic task will be impaired. 

16 — 15. Regimental (Area) Intelligence Section.— a. The duties 
of the regimental intelligence officer, or of the territorial area cor- 
responding thereto, are the same as those of the Force intelligence 
officer within the scope of the regimental activities. 



b. Organization of the regimental intelligence section.— The 
authorized strength of the intelligence section of the regimental 
staff is given in Marine Corps Table of Organization, (Peace 
Strength) . 

16 — 16. The Battalion Intelligence Section. — a. The authorized 
strength of the intelligence section of the battalion staff is given in 
Marine Corps Tables of Organization, (Peace Strength, 1935). 

b. A properly conducted battalion intelligence section in 
small war situations where the battalion is functioning independent- 
ly will be of the greatest value to the commander in accomplishing 
his mission. Bn-2 is essentially an outside man; Bn-1, a combina- 
tion of executive staff officer and adjutant, essentially an inside man. 
It is believed that in practice a more satisfactory combination will 
be Bn-1 and communications, or perhaps even Bn-2 and communica- 
tions. The battalion commander should, however, have full authori- 
ty to distribute the staff functions among his authorized personnel 
as he sees fit according to the situation and the personalities 

16 — 17. Intelligence Agencies. — (a) The Force. (1) There 
are available to F (B)-2 for securing information: secret agents, 
voluntary informers, aviation, intelligence agencies of lower units 
(regiments or areas) , other governmental departments. 

(2) Secret agents hired from among the inhabitants in the 
theater of operations have in the past proved valuable collectors 
of information. Great care, however, must be exercised in 
employing them and a close watch kept on their activities there- 
after. Usually the only persons willing to act as agents are 
persons politically opposed to the recalcitrant forces, the activities 
of which have brought about our presence. The tendency of 
such agents is to use their position for their own aggrandizement 
and to embarrass personal enemies. Such agents not only are 
useless for gaining information but are a distinct handicap to 
the naval forces in gaining the confidence of the population. 
Every effort should be made by intelligence officers to detect and 
get rid of them. However, reliable agents when obtained have 
provided extremely valuable information in past operations. 
Rewarding them with a bonus for timely, accurate information 
that proved to be of value has given good results. If this is 
made a policy, the agents' regular wages should be low. 

(3) One of the most reliable, and at the same time trouble- 
some, agencies for obtaining information is the voluntary inform- 
er. Whatever the reason may be, the major portion by far of the 
information so obtained is either false, or grossly distorted. 
However, when the informer has personal reasons for making the 
report, late, accurate information is usually obtained. Excellent 
results have been obtained by paying liberally in cash for informa- 
tion that proved both correct and timely enough to be of value. 
In lower units the test of the v?lue of the information is whether 
or not it results in a contact with the hostile forces. Hired agents 



working in the field have been of great value in uncovering the 
hostile sources of supply. Both to protect the informers and 
to insure an uninterrupted flow of information, the source of 
the information must be kept inviolable. 

(4) However reliable hired agents and voluntary informers 
may be, their universal tendency is to protect anyone with whom 
they are in any way connected by politics, business, or blood. It 
has often been suspected that insurrectionary activities have been 
supported secretly from the capital by high officials of both the 
party in power and the opposition in order to insure themselves 
an armed following in the field in case the intervention should 
be suddenly ended; thus assuming simultaneously both a long 
and a short position on the occupation in an effort to guarantee 
themselves a normal political profit for their efforts whichever 
way the intervention market might go. Such a condition would 
increase the always difficult task of securing agents who will 
report impartially on all disturbing elements. 

(5) Excellent results have been obtained through the 
cooperation of business establishments with branches or other 
contacts throughout the occupied area and which, for business 
reasons, find it necessary for the central office to keep posted on 
local conditions in all parts of the country. The advantage of 
information so secured is that it comes from a source which for 
reasons of financial profit must have timely impartial knowledge 
of conditions as they actually exist and of influences that may 
bring about disturbing conditions in the near future regardless 
of politics or other motives which influence the ordinary sources 
of information available to intelligence officers. In seeking to 
establish such a contact, the intelligence officer should look for 
a business establishment with which the force normally does 
business. No one in the firm or in the office force should have any 
knowledge of the arrangement except the head of the firm, or 
other official with whom the contact is made, and the intelligence 
officer. Information should be supplied in a sealed envelop by 
messenger using members of the command who visit the business 
house in the routine course of duty and are publicly known to 
do so. It is unfair as well as poor intelligence technique to risk 
the business career of a man in his community, and even his life, 
through carelessness or any possibility of loose talk. 

(6) Aerial reconnaissance is invaluable in locating large 
movements, encampments, and affected areas. When the opposi- 
tion has been broken into small raiding bands, the lapse of time 
between gaining information and the arrival of a ground patrol is 
usually too great to give effective results. The value of aviation 
cooperation with ground patrols working an area is doubtful, 
so far as securing information is concerned. The aeroplane 
discloses the presence and location of the patrols and enables the 
hostile groups either to avoid it or choose their own time for 
making contact. Any ambush that can be located from the air 
should be uncovered in ample time by the exercise of a little 
care on the part of the patrol leader. 



(7) Subordinate units provide the Force Commander with 
detailed information on hostile activities, the terrain and 
geography, and the political and economic situation in the areas 
in which operating or to which assigned. As combat intelligence 
for the purpose of gaining contact with and destroying hostile 
armed opposition, such information usually will be of value only 
to the unit first gaining it. But such information when trans- 
formed by study and analysis into intelligence on the entire 
occupied state or area, provides the commander with the informa- 
tion he must have in order to keep the disposition of his forces 
in accord with conditions as well as to prepare for eventualities. 
F-2 should coordinate the activities of the intelligence sections 
of subordinate units through indoctrination and frequent confer- 
ences. Using the intelligence section of a subordinate unit, 
quartered in the same town as Force Headquarters, as an appen- 
dage to the Force Intelligence Section is poor practice. The 
intelligence section of such a subordinate unit should be permitted 
and required to function in the same maner as if it were located 
beyond the ready hand of Force to interfere or to unload. How- 
ever, every advantage should be taken of the opportunity to 
develop a close understanding and personal relationship between 
F-2 and the subordinate intelligence officer. 

(8) Close contact should be maintained by F-2 with other 
agencies of our government established in the occupied state 
of area. Information from such agencies as to facts connected 
with the higher officials of the government of the occupied state 
or area and of the opposition party, as well as of the economic 
condition of the state, may be accepted as sound. But because 
of the limited circle within which they move, as well as for other 
reasons, their opinion on the effect of the national economy on 
the peace of the state, and of political and social trends to which 
the higher classes are unsympathetic, must be accepted with care. 
The same applies to American business men domiciled in the 
occupied state. An officer possessing a working knowledge of 
the language, a knowledge of the psychology of the people, powers 
of observation, and who has ridden the trails and slept in ham- 
mocks and shacks among the hills for a month, is in a position to 
possess a sounder knowledge of the fundamental disturbing fac- 
tors at work in the country than an official or business man who 
may have spent years at the capital. 

(9) Close contact likewise should be maintained with rep- 
resentatives of our government in bordering states, especially 
naval and military attaches. This is particularly applicable 
when the affected area borders the frontier. 

b. The Regiment or Area. — The same agencies for securing 
information are available to R-2 as to F-2, except that it will be 
unusual for him to contact representatives of our government di- 
rectly. Reconnaissance aviation is usually available to him on 
request. When the regiment is operating independently in a small 
wars situation, all comments made on the brigade are equally ap- 



plicable, but the regimental intelligence section is totally inadequate 
in strength to meet the situation. Where the regimental headquar- 
ters company likewise is the garrison of the town in which the com- 
mand post is located, R-2 has an additional agency in patrols sent 
out by the garrison. The use of patrols in securing information is 
discussed below in the paragraph on the battalion intelligence 
section. R-2 should be primarily an outside man, thoroughly ac- 
quainted with the regimental area, with the battalion intelligence 
officers and their activities, with the more prominent native resi- 
dents of the area, and with all the foreign residents. 

c. The Battalion or District. — (1) Even the battalion in 
small wars rarely operates as a unit. Its companies often occupy 
the more important villages of the district, and in turn, send out 
subdivisions to occupy strategically located settlements and 
farms. All garrisons actively patrol the territory dependent 
upon the locality where they are quartered. It is upon these 
garrisons and patrols that Bn-2 is largely dependent for informa- 

(2) Every garrison, immediately upon establishing itself, 
should initiate active routine patrolling for the purpose of be- 
coming thoroughly acquainted with the topography and geogra- 
phy of the locality, the trails, inhabitants, and the economic, 
psychologic, and political forces at work in the community. 
Acquaintance should not be confined to the leading citizens of 
the community. 

(3) Local garrisons should be so thoroughly acquainted 
with their sub-districts as to note any changes or unusual con- 
ditions when passing through on patrol. Local commanders and 
their noncommissioned officers should, after a short time, be able 
to proceed immediately, and without any loss of time due to ignor- 
ance of the trail, to any point in their sub-district without a guide 
or interpreter. 

(4) A record should be kept of all prominent citizens and 
all bad-men of the sub-district, including those absent therefrom 
with roving bands. This is best kept by card-file system. Each 
card should show the full name of the person, taken from the 
baptismal record or birth certificate (both were these records 
differ) , and the name by which the person concerned is customari- 
ly known, together with all known aliases. Such cards should be 
made in triplicate, one kept at the garrison, and two forwarded 
to Bn-2 who in turn forwards the third copy to R-2. These cards 
should contain a complete record of the reputation, character, 
and activities of the persons whose names appear thereon. 
Additional information as received should be forwarded in dupli- 
cate to Bn-2. Where lack of clerical assistance necessitates the 
cardfile being kept in long hand, Bn-2 will secure the necessary 
data for completing his records during periodical visits. Although 
this method involves considerable time, care, and thought on the 
part of the officers concerned in keeping and preparing the cards, 
it is only by this means that accurate and continuous information 



can be maintained on the inhabitants of the occupied areas, 
districts, and subdistricts which will prove invaluable in question- 
ing detained suspects, for orienting newly arriving officers, and 
for preparing charges where it is desired to bring suspects to 
trial for their activities. 

(5) The garrison of the village at which Battalion Head- 
quarters is located usually will consist of the Battalion Head- 
quarters and Headquarters Company, with such additional rein- 
forcements as the situation may require. The battalion com- 
mander must assiduously avoid falling into error of considering 
himself primarily the commanding officer of the village garrison, 
and his staff as his assistants in that limited activity. Particular- 
ly does this apply to Bn-2. 

(6) Bn-2 should organize his office force so as to permit 
him to spend the maximum time in the field. He should become 
thoroughly familiar with the topography, geography, trails 
weather conditions, climate, and more prominent inhabitants 
(both good and bad) of his district, not only to gain information, 
but better to prepare himself for evaluating information received. 
He should plot on his map localities where hostile groups are re- 
ported to have been and by this means, together with information 
received from inhabitants on their activities, deduce the signifi- 
cance of recurring hostile movements and deduce the probable 
route and course of action for the immediate future of any hostile 
band known to have been at a given time at a given locality 
within the district. He should establish personal contacts with 
the intelligence officers of adjacent battalions or areas. 

(7) Trail maps should be made of their sub-districts by 
all garrison commanders, under the supervision of Bn-2 who will 
provide assistance from the mapping division of the Bn-2 section 
wherever practicable and necessary. This work should be under- 
taken immediately upon arrival, beginning with the most 
important unmapped trails, and continuing throughout the occu- 
pation, until accurate detailed large scale maps are available of 
all sub-districts. This work should be supplemented by the 
preparation of a trail chart showing the distance between all 
points of military importance on the trails and the time necessary 
to cover them by foot patrols and by mounted patrols when the 
trail is dry and when the trail is muddy. A master trail chart 
should be kept posted by B-2 at battalion headquarters, and a 
corrected copy furnished at irregular intervals to R-2. At the 
termination of the occupation, or at such time previous thereto 
as the state of the Brigade master trail chart may warrant, a 
copy should be filed with the intelligence section at Headquarters 
Marine Corps and with the Marine Corps Schools. 

(8) Intelligence activities, particularly of battalion and 
smaller units in the field, are greatly handicapped by officers 
not knowing the language. This is particularly true of Bn-2. 
Every effort should be made to dispense with interpreters as 
soon as possible and to reach a state of fluency in handling the 



language that will permit social contacts to be developed. A 
conversation over a friendly glass in the backroom of the village 
store, or over a cup of coffee brewed in a shack on a mountain 
side, frequently will prove more productive of intelligence than 
a multitude of formal interrogatories through the medium of an 

(9) Means for extracting information not countenanced by 
the laws of war and the customs of humanity cannot be tolerated. 
Such actions not only are degrading to the person inflicting them 
but tend to produce false information in order to free the victim 
from pain. 

16 — 18. Intelligence Records. — a. The following studies, plans, 
reports, and records are made, kept, or disseminated by the intelli- 
gence officer, as occasion demands: 

(1) Study of the theater of operations. 

(2) Special studies. 

(3) Intelligence annex. 

(4) Intelligence estimate of the situation, both of the gen- 
eral situation facing the command at the opening of the campaign 
and of special situations as the need therefor arises. 

(5) Journal of the intelligence section. 

(6) Work sheet. 

(7) Periodic report. 

(8) Special reports as required by the situation or as 
called for by the commander. 

(9) Hostile situation map. 

b. Study of the theater of operations. — (1) This study 
should include the organization and condition, both political and 
economic of the area, state, or states included in the theater, the 
psychological factors involved, the military geography, and the 
hostile military forces. For the reasons stated in paragraph 3, 
the study of the theater of operations becomes highly important 
to all officers, as well as to the commander and his staff, in small 
war situations. Studies made prior to the arrival in the theater 
must be supplemented by reconnaissance and research on the 
ground in order that complete details may be correctly known and 
understood by the military commander concerned. 

(2) The political study. — This covers the political status; 
the political history; the form of government and its historical 
development; organization of the government, subdivided into 
the central government, the political subdivisions, and the local 
government; the internal affairs; and the foreign affairs. An 
exhaustive treatise on these subjects is neither expected nor 
advisable. They should be covered only with that degree of 
thoroughness necessary to meet the needs of the commander 
according to the circumstances of each particular situation. It 
is important in small wars that the information contained in the 
political study be disseminated to all officers of the brigade in 
order that their relations with the representatives of the govern- 
ment and with the people with whom they come in daily contact 



may be conducted intelligently and expeditiously. Should it 
become necessary to establish a military government, then a more 
detailed study must be made ; it may be advisable for such a study 
to be performed by the military government division of the first 
section of the staff. 

(3) The economic study. — (a) By means of the economic 
study the commander is able to determine what economic factors 
may be involved in creating and maintaining the situation which 
he is called upon to correct by military force, and consequently to 
facilitate the accomplishment of his mission by initiating through 
the proper governmental channels the necessary corrective 
economic measures. It likewise provides him with a knowledge 
of the economic capacity of the hostile forces to impede the ac- 
complishment of his mission and what measures he can take to 
bring economic pressure to bear against them. It will also enable 
him to determine to what degree his own forces may be self- 
sustaining in the theater of operations or what aid, for humani- 
tarian reasons, should be afforded the civil population. The 
economic study may cover any or all of the subjects as enumerated 
in Appendix No. 9. 

(b) Following the economic and population analysis, 
there may next be considered the conversion of these factors 
into military resources ; that is, the men, animals, and materials 
available for war purposes, the production of materials of war, 
and the arsenals and factories available for converting raw 
materials into war equipment and supplies. Any lack of such 
equipment is important to note. In small wars, outside sources 
by which war materials are made available to the hostile forces 
will usually be of greater importance than the interior facilities 
for producing them. 

(c) The economic and population study should not be 
made any more comprehensive than is necessary to accomplish 
its purpose. This purpose will usually be to determine ac- 
curately first : the hostile capacity for opposition in the theater 
of operations involved ; second : those vital economic areas the 
loss or destruction of the resources of which will seriously 
hamper or destroy the capacity of the hostile forces to continue 
their opposition ; and, third : those sensitive points which must 
be seized because they control access to communication between 
the hostile forces and their vital economic area or other source 
of supplies. 

(4) The psychologic study.— (a) This is concerned with 
the population as a whole, and not with the military or battle 
psychology of the armed forces which should be dealt with 
in the military study. Topics which may be considered are 
enumerated in Appendix No. 9. 

(b) In small war situations, the study of the psychology 
of the population of the theater of operations is of outstanding 
importance. Determining correctly the pschyological factor 
and requiring his command to act accordingly will greatly facili- 
tate the accomplishment of the commander's mission. 



(5) Military geography. — (a) The study of the military 
geography of the theater is nothing more nor less than the 
study on a large scale of such matters as concern the captain 
of a rifle company making a reconnaissance to determine by 
what route he may best employ fire and movement in advanc- 
ing the attack against the enemy ; in other words, by what lines 
of operation the principles of war may best be applied. It 
includes form, size, and relief of the theater of operation, 
hydrography and coast line in a case a landing operation is 
involved, meteorology, the terrain, and in some cases logistics. 

(b) Form, size, and relief of an area are the essentials 
of military geography. The form and size of the theater in 
which operations are to be undertaken should first be studied 
as to their influence upon the operations. The relief of an 
area is even more important. The length, breadth, and dif- 
ficulty of mountain ranges and the nature of passes must be 
considered; likewise the width, length, and depth of valleys, 
and the extent of plateaus. Rivers and smaller streams, and 
sometimes lakes, have an influence on military operations which 
needs no emphasis. Closely connected with all these features 
are considerations of soil and vegetation as they affect the 
movement and maneuver of troops, and, in inhabitated areas, 
the cultivation of the soil- 

(6) Military situation. — In this is covered the strength, 
organization, training, dispositions, morale, supply, equipment, 
armament, and psychology of the hostile forces. The effect of the 
Force's civil relations policy and of the civilian contacts and at- 
titude of the personnel of the command upon the hostile strength, 
should also be considered. The naval commander does not rep- 
resent the branch of our government primarily concerned with the 
attitude of our own civilian population toward the campaign or 
of the local element claiming to represent it ; but in so far as de- 
termining hostile effectiveness in opposing the accomplishment 
of the commander's mission may be affected by the attitude of 
the American public, this attitude must be considered. For in- 
stance, the hostile resistance may be prolonged by a favorable 
attitude on the part of American civilians which will permit 
funds to be collected ostensibly for medical supplies for the in- 
surgent forces, which in turn, are used for the purchase of mili- 
tary supplies or even to augment the personal financial capital 
of hostile leaders. Again, it. may cause them to hang on in the 
hope that American opinion will cause the withdrawal of the 
naval forces before their mission is accomplished, leaving the 
hostile leaders in an advantageous position to pursue their political 
and personal ambitions after the withdrawal with the added 
prestige of appearing to have coped successfully and alone with 
the armed forces of the United States. 

(7) Any or all of the foregoing may be included in the 
estimate of the situation, particularly the military study which 
can be readily covered under the heading of opposing forces. If 
including the study of the theater of operations in the estimate 



of the situation will unduly lengthen it (as will usually be the 
case) , or detract from its clarity, then the theater of operations 
should be made the subject of a separate study to which reference 
may be made as necessary in the estimate or pertinent extracts 
therefrom included. 

(8) Form. — There is no prescribed form for a study of the 
theater of operations. A sample form which may be used for 
such a study is shown in Appendix 9 of this Chapter. 

c. Special studies. — From time to time the intelligence officer 
may be called upon to make special studies of particular localities, 
situations, or other factors arising during the course of the cam- 

d. The Intelligence Annex. — (1) When intelligence recon- 
naissance missions and other instructions are so voluminous as 
to lengthen unduly the operations plan or order, an intelligence 
annex thereto is issued. At the beginning of an expedition a 
complete annex should be issued to accompany the campaign plan. 
This will provide the general directive for the conduct of intelli- 
gence agencies in gathering information throughout the cam- 
paign. Annexes to plans and order for subsequent operations 
will omit paragraphs in which there is no change. There are no 
available records from our small wars operations on which to base 
a concrete discussion of the contents and form of the^ intelligence 
annex to either the campaign plan or to operation plans and orders. 

(2) It will usually be found unnecessary to issue an intel- 
ligence annex to operation orders except where a formal opera- 
tion against organized resistance is required initially to destroy 
or disperse hostile opposition. When there is no intelligence 
plan issued, tasks will be embodied in the appropriate subpara- 
graph of paragraph 3 of the operation order, or of the equivalent 
in oral, dictated, or fragmentary order. It will frequently be 
necessary and advisable to assign intelligence tasks to informa- 
tion collecting agencies independently of an operation plan 
or order. Such instructions may be considered as a modification 
of or supplementary to the intelligence annex to the latest cam- 
paign plan, or operation plan or order, issued. 

(3) Form of intelligence annex. — A form for the intelli- 
gence annex is given in Appendix 3 to this chapter. It is furnished 
only as a guide. Considerable deviation therefrom may be neces- 
sary in many small war situations. 

(4) The Essential Elements of Information Required. — 
These elements comprise those factors which are important in 
the highest degree for the commander to know as soon as pos- 
sible in order to accomplish his mission. They may be political, 
economic, social, geographic, or military, or a combination of any 
two or more of these factors. In military and political situations 
they consist of inquires to the intelligence officer as to which of 
the courses of action open to them the opposition will adopt. The 
essential elements are designated by the commander, but he may 
be assisted by his staff in determining them. Whatever means 
are used to arrive at the essential elements of a given situation 



confronting the command, the final decision and sole responsibility 
therefor rests with the commander. 

(5) Purpose of Essential Elements. — The attention of all 
intelligence agencies is focused by the essential elements on 
those items which at the time are most important to the com- 
mander. But this does not limit the activities of such agencies to 
those items, for they must continue to collect and report all 
classes of information bearing on the situation confronting the 
command which they may encounter. The essential elements 
are announced by the commander as soon as he has made his 
decision for a military operation or other course of action requir- 
ing information. 

(6) Preparation of the Intelligence Annex. — (a) As soon 
as the essential elements of the confronting situation are desig- 
nated, the intelligence officer proceeds to prepare the intelli- 
gence plan by : 

1. Analyzing the essential elements in order to de- 
termine the contributary information required for obtaining 
the answer to them. 

2. Determining the tasks assignments for gaining the 
required information. 

3. Assigning the tasks to the available intelligence 
agencies of the command, and requests to senior and col- 
lateral sources. 

(b) Some essential elements may be answered by direct 
action. Such would be, "Is (BLANK) occupied by insurgents ?" 
Others require considerable analysis in order to determine 
what indications must be sought to supply the required answers. 
For example, "When, where, and in what strength will the 
next outbreak occur ?" It will probably be beyond the capabili- 
ties of any one intelligence agency to supply the answer. So 
the intelligence officer must make a careful analysis to deter- 
mine what indications might be of assistance to him in pro- 
viding the commander with the answer and then assign the 
tasks of collecting the required information to the most suit- 
able agencies available. Appendix No. 10 illustrates a con- 
venient form for making this analysis and determining task 
assignments. If an intelligence annex is to be issued, the tasks 
are grouped by organizations and placed in the appropriate sub- 
paragraphs of paragraph 3. If no intelligence annex is issued, 
the tasks will be taken directly from the chart and assigned 
orally, by dispatch, by memorandum or otherwise, as the 
situation indicates, to the agency concerned, 
d. The Intelligence Estimate. — (1) The intelligence estimate 
of the situation provides the answers to the questions asked by the 
commander in the essential elements of information required 
concerning the situation confronting the command. It may be 
written or oral, depending upon the circumstances, but, for the 
purposes of record, when given orally should be reduced to 



writing as soon as practicable. During the progress of such 
organized military operations as may be necessary in the opening 
phases of the campaign, estimates probably will be either oral 
or in memorandum form. 

(2) An example of a form for an intelligence estimate in 
a small war situation appear as Appendix 4 to this chapter. 

f . The Journal. — See paragraph 16 — 3 f . and Appendix No. 2. 

g. The Intelligence Report. — (1) This is the periodic report 
of the intelligence section. It is issued by all combat units down 
to and including the battalion or corresponding command. It is 
a summary of the intelligence which has been collected and 
evaluated during a given period. The period of time to be 
covered by the report is prescribed by higher headquarters, or 
by the unit commander. It is a convenient form for keeping 
adjacent and subordinate units informed of the situation con- 
fronting the unit preparing the report. It may be supplemented 
by a situation map or overlay. In small wars situations it may 
be advisable to prepare separate reports on the military situation 
and on the development of non-military phases of the situation 
originally covered in the study of the theater operations. For 
a form for an intelligence report on the military situation pre- 
pared in a small war situation, see Appendix 6, to this chapter. 
Appendix 7 gives a form for a daily intelligence memorandum, 
where required or advisable, and Appendix 8, a form for a com- 
bined periodic report. Where the volume of intelligence, clarity 
of the report, or other reason, warrants, separate reports may 
be made on the military economic, and political situation. Where 
they interlock, it will probably be advisable to submit a com- 
bined report. It should be clearly understood that both forms 
are merely for the guidance of intelligence officers in the field, 
who should submit their reports in the form most suitable to 
the situation. 

(2) Intelligence Summaries. — Jnformataion is transmitted 
to higher echelons in the form of brief summaries of the situation. 
It is obvious that the Naval Commander afloat, for instance, is 
not interested in the mass of detail that will usually appear in the 
intelligence reports of the naval forecs ashore. Where the imme- 
diate transmission of items of information is necessary, the most 
rapid means of communication available is employed. 

(3) In view of the peculiar status of naval forces operating 
ashore in small wars situations, which frequently consist in 
fact of providing military aid to the civil power of a foreign 
nation involved in domestic difficulties, the use of the term 
"enemy" should be avoided in all records, reports, and other 

h. The intelligence work sheet. — As information is received 
by the intelligence officer, it must be recorded in an orderly fashion 
preliminary to the preparation of the intelligence report. The best 
results are obtained by segregating the information by subject 



matter as it arrives. This is done by means of the intelligence 
work sheet. No form for this is prescribed, but a convenient 
method is to classify the information under the same headings used 
in the intelligence report, starting each heading with a new sheet. 
When an estimate is called for, or a report is submitted, conclusions 
drawn from an analysis of the data recorded are entered under the 
last entry of each heading and the work sheet closed out for that 
period by drawing a line under the conclusions. Keeping the work 
sheet under the same headings as the intelligence report, not only 
provides a satisfactory means for segregating the information 
received, but also greatly facilitates the preparation of the intelli- 
gence report. 

i. The Intelligence Situation Map. — A situation map is kept 
by the intelligence officer showing the disposition of the hostile 
forces according to the latest information received, and such other 
intelligence data an understanding of which is facilitated thereby. 
Where the information is voluminous, separate maps may be kept 
for the military and such other phases of the sitaution as conditions 



Duties 16-19 

Relationship with Other Staff Sections and with the Special Staff . 16-20 

Staff Qualities 16-21 

Organization 16-22 

Administrative Details 16-23 

16 — 19. Duties. — a. The third section is charged with the 
preparation of plans for, and supervising: 

(1) The organization and equipment of combat units. 

(2) Training to include: 

(a) Selection of training sites. 

(b) Preparation of training programs. 

(c) Organization and conduct of schools. 

(d) Rendition of training reports and maintenance of 
records of training. 

(3) Attachment or detachment of units for tactical opera- 

(4) Movement of combat troops. 

(5) Tactical disposition of combat troops- 

(6) Security measures, reconnaissance and maintenance 
of communications between combat elements- 

(7) The maintenance of liaison with adjacent units- 
b. The third section keeps informed of: 

(1) Location, effective strength, and morale of combat 



(2) Needs for replacements and reinforcements. 

(3) State of equipment and supplies. 

(4) Enemy situation. 

(5) Terrain as it affects combat operations. 

(6) Instructions, tactical plans, and operation orders 
received from higher or adjacent units. 

c. The third section is charged with having prepared : 

(1) Estimate of the situation and plans for combat when 

(2) Operation orders, and when approved is responsible 
for their timely delivery. 

(3) Recommendations as to priorities in the assignment 
of replacements and equipment. 

(4) A map or daily overlay showing the tactical situation 
of the force. 

(5) A signal communication map. 

(6) Timely plans for possible changes in the situation 
such as movement by land, water, rail, motor, air, or marching, 
in shifting theaters of active operations or withdrawal from the 

(7) The Section Unit Journal. 

(8) Assignment of missions and their priorities to the air 

(9) Data for periodic confidential or special reports of 
the commander to higher authority. 

d. An analysis of the duties enumerated above indicates that 
many of them may be delegated to a capable office force while the 
chief of the section devotes the major portion of his time to the 
discharge of those responsibilities the proper execution of which 
will be most helpful to the commander. Among the many duties 
that usually require much study and thought on the part of the 
operations officer are: 

(1) Preparation of an estimate of the situation when 
required. He is assisted in assembling the necessary information 
by the other staff sections, and may also use estimates of sub- 
ordinate commanders. This estimate may take the form of a 
periodic report to higher authority and the operations officer 
should be prepared to submit such a report or estimate on short 
notice. For the sake of uniformity, to insure a comprehensive 
study by subordinates of all the phases of the situation, especially 
non-military, and to facilitate the digest, compilation and trans- 
mission of that data, all estimates should follow the prescribed 
outline. See Chapter I for a detailed discussion of the estimate 
of the situation. See Appendix No. 1. 

(2) Letters of Instruction. — One of the first duties of the 
operations officer may be to prepare a letter of instruction as 
outlined by the Commanding General to the next subordinate 
unit or area commanders. These instructions are secret and 
contain the innermost thoughts of the commander. They indicate 
the future course of action, or the action which it is proposed to 



pursue in case the operations do not unfold as anticipated or as 
proposed by the orders as issued. They contain operations 
contemplated in case of reverse, or of future or simultaneous op- 
erations which it is not desired to indicate in regular operations 
orders (at least for the time being). Depending upon the size 
of the command and the will of the commander, such instructions 
may be either written or oral. They need not necessarily be 
issued to subordinate leaders for their immediate guidance only, 
but also as a guide for proposed or likely future contengency. 
There is no fixed form for such secret instructions ; they simply 
state how the commander expects the operation to unfold itself 
and the successive steps proposed in such event; then they 
describe how the operation might develop and what measures 
are contemplated in each of the possible eventualities. In major 
warfare such intruments are not common in units smaller than 
a corps but in small wars situations of the Marines Corps, which 
are generally extremely vague and present so many possibilities, 
it appears that some instructions of this nature delivered either 
orally or in writing would materially assist the commander's 
immediate subordinate leaders in understanding the execution of 
the commander's scheme of maneuver and campaign plan. 

(3) Orders.— After the orders have been prepared, 
approved and signed, the operations officer is responsible for their 
timely delivery to the troops concerned. He assures himself of 
their delivery by the signatures of recipients of orders in the 
usual manner and by the air patrol reports containing records 
of drops and panel code acknowledgment of their receipt by 
ground troops. Orders are designed to indicate the situation 
to subordinates, the commander's general conception of the 
operation, the mission of subordinate elements, and such technical 
and administrative details as are necessary. The means or 
methods of attaining these ends are defined only to the extent 
that the commander deems it necessary, owing to the lack of 
experience in the subordinate, to his own lack of confidence in 
hirn, or as it may be necessary to coordinate the efforts of adjacent 
or cooperating units. In principle, and in so far as it is practic- 
able, the subordinate is charged with attaining given results or 
objectives and the procedure is left to the devices of the recipient 
of the order. In small wars where there is often a necessarily 
long lapse of time between the issuance of the order and its 
receipt by the executant, the situation may change to such a 
degree that methods of procedure cannot be predetermined and 
detailed orders therefore would often be dangerous. The units 
of the Force are generally so scattered the commander cannot 
be constantly informed of the detailed situations existing in the 
various elements. Thus the tendency in small wars is to leave 
the details of execution to subordinate commanders upon their 
own responsibility. This necessary decentralization of authority 
is simplified by partition of the theater of operations and the 
organization of the command into areas, districts and subdistricts. 



(4) Training". — One of the principal duties of the opera- 
tions officer of a force destined for, or engaged in a small war is 
that of supervising the training of the officers and men of that 
organization. The training must be adapted to the requirements, 
and should be continuous and progressive. By training direc- 
tives he prescribes the general nature of the instruction, the 
standards of efficiency to be attained and the dates when these 
standards must be attained. By his supervision of the periodic 
schedules prepared by the subordinate commanders and the 
actual training (without relieving the subordinate unit com- 
manders of any of their responsibilities) he may give such aid 
and advice as is appropriate to facilitate the task of the unit 
commander. The operations officer studies the intelligence data 
and the detailed reports of combat with a view to determining the 
development or appearance of new weapons, formations or 
tactics on the part of the enemy; among his own organizations 
he searches for any advantage or disadvantage disclosed in 
certain tendencies of means or methods in armament or procedure. 
These studies, augmented by his tactical inspections of troops, 
will enable him to make or recommend desirable modifications 
in equipment or tactis. The corresponding instructions to the 
troops are issued in the training directives or information bulle- 
tins issued periodically. For details as to the particular type of 
training applicable to this kind of operation and information as to 
programs and schedules see Chapter VII. 

(5) Field Duty and Inspections. — It is believed that the 
operations officer of an expeditionary force should be, and readily 
can be, in the field and with the next subordinate leaders a fair 
proportion of his time. During comparatively quiet periods in 
the operations, this officer may be gathering information and by 
first hand knowledge, preparing himself to advise the commanding 
officer relative to the ensuing action. He may do this by flying 
over the active theater of operations, and landing wherever 
practicable and conferring with subordinate commanders. In 
this way he not only informs himself of the nature of the terrain, 
but the needs, powers and limitations of the troops. Sometimes 
a preliminary conference with an executant prior to a contemplat- 
ed operation may bring forth certain ideas which may modify to a 
degree, the conception of the operation. Similarly, after the 
plans and orders have been prepared and issued, or after the 
maneuver has been undertaken, the operations officer may take 
the field by air or other available transportation and observe the 
progress of the action. Being thoroughly familiar with the 
commander's conception of the operation, he more than any one 
else on the staff is prepared to discuss the details of the tactical 
operation, to correct interpretations of the orders and instruc- 
tions, and if necessary in an emergency, to render a decision 
in the name of and in the absence of the Commanding General. 
A staff officer will hesitate to render a decision in the name of the 
commanding officer even in an emergency ; that practice is accept- 
ed in executive staffs only upon the express authority of a com- 



manding officer who has complete confidence in the judgment 
and ability of those officers, in their detailed knowledge of the 
situation, and their conception of the operation. In visiting or 
inspecting subordinate units the operations officer should guard 
against criticism and unnecessary or unauthorized interference 
with the conduct of operations which come entirely within the 
responsibilities of the subordinate commander. The operations 
officer keeps informed of the location of all posts and their effec- 
tive strength. In considering the patrolling and other combat 
contemplated, or to be demanded of the various areas or districts 
he makes timely recommendations for appropriate redistribution 
of personnel or for replacements when necessary. Owing to the 
natural delay required to make any change in the distribution 
of men or to get more replacements from the United States, 
studies must be made constantly with greater foresight than is 
required in regular warfare and under conditions of uncertainty 
which also make it more difficult. 

(6) Coordination. — One of his greatest responsibilities is 
to maintain the coordination of effort of the various arms, 
aviation in particular, and the various area organizations; by 
intimate contact with corresponding staff officers of these and 
other units such as native military organizations, the greatest 
combined effectiveness is possible or assured. 

16 — 20. Relationship with Other Staff Sections and with the 
Special Staff. — a. By intimate contact with other sections the third 
section keeps informed of all pertinent matter affecting the combat 
capacity of the troops. A thorough knowledge of hostile informa- 
tion is secured through and studied in conjunction with the second 
section. In collaboration with the fourth section supply as it af- 
fects operations is exhaustively studied. Since successful opera- 
tions are often dependent upon the supply facilities the liaison 
between these sections is highly important. If arms, equipment, 
or transportation are unsuited or inadequate, these sections must 
reach a compromise on what it is advisable or practicable to furnish 
the troops, and make timely requisitions accordingly. 

b. The third section is in close liaison with special staff of- 
ficers concerning all matters wherein their duties, knowledge, or 
functions embrace in whole or in part the matter outlined in this 
text. Special staff officers whose functions directly affect opera- 
tions receive many coordinating directions from the third section 
and are often required to render technical advice and reports and 
to submit plans to that section. After consultation with the tech- 
nical adviser concerning the powers and limitations of that service, 
he indicates the tactical requirements of the situation to the signal 
officer; the latter in turn submits a communication plan based 
thereon and has the responsibility for its execution when approved. 
Similarly other special staff officers, especially those with the dual 
function of